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**RESPONSE TO THE EARTHQUAKE IN PAKISTAN
OCTOBER 8, 2005**

*Country Initiative for Case Study No. 4: What methods have proved most effective for establishing
country leadership of relief and reconstruction following natural disasters?*

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The opinions expressed in this case study are the author's alone,
and do not represent the official views of the organisers of
the Asian Regional Forum on Aid Effectiveness

Executive Summary

1. This country assessment is one of twelve based on initiatives within Asia that demonstrate good practice and lesson learning with respect to the Paris Declaration. Together these country assessments inform the five thematic case studies which will be used as the basis for discussion at the Regional Forum.
2. This particular assessment reviews the response to the Pakistan earthquake of 8th October 2005. The Government of Pakistan (GoP) took a strong lead from the outset supported during the relief phase by the United Nations and in preparation for long term reconstruction and development by a core group of donors convened by ADB and the World Bank. This leadership, and the harmonisation and alignment of donor support followed Paris Principles and the assessment focuses on the lessons learnt as a result.
3. The assessment describes the scale and impact of the earthquake and sets the context of the response in terms of the background of aid and development assistance, the situation in the affected areas, the institutional capacity, and the prevailing development partnerships and relationships especially related to aid effectiveness.
4. The response to the earthquake during the immediate relief, early recovery and preparation for reconstruction phases is reviewed with a particular focus on the emerging roles, relationships, processes and structures. The strength of Government leadership, the role of the UN during the relief phase, and the role of the Core Donor Group (seven major donors coordinated by the Asian Development Bank and World Bank) are discussed. Harmonisation of donor support and of the wider UN/NGO/donor effort in support of Government is explored.
5. Some of the specific aspects of the Pakistan earthquake response are reviewed including the role played by the Pakistan military and the adoption of the 'cluster approach'. The unintended consequence of strong national leadership further weakening an already disseminated local civil administration is one of the particular lessons from this response that has wider application.
6. The impact assessment focuses on four institutional elements – the Government of Pakistan, the UN system, the cluster approach and the core group of donors. Each was critical to the overall success of the response. Each element also depended on the role of key individuals whose relationships and trust were significant to building the institutional coherence that developed.
7. The assessment concludes by identifying the lessons learnt with respect to the Paris Declaration objectives, the design and implementation of this response to a major disaster, the replication of the experience, and the development of an evaluation framework for the Paris Declaration.
8. Overall the assessment concludes that Government of Pakistan led a successful response which worked to incorporate Paris Declaration principles into the relief effort from an early stage. Donors and the UN responded well to this leadership and harmonisation and alignment of the relief effort and the preparations for reconstruction were strong. The main weaknesses were around the management of the transition between the too and the planning of the early recovery process where role confusion and institutional rivalry undermined the process. In terms of aid effectiveness the success achieved in the first six months is considerable. The focus of future monitoring needs to be on the transfer of responsibilities to the Provincial and local authorities and the rebuilding of communities that are more resilient and sustainable.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AOC	Air Operations Cell
DFID	Department for International Development
DNA	Damage Needs Assessment
EAD	Economic Affairs Department
ERRA	Earthquake Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
DFID	Department For International Development
D-PRWG	Informal Donor Poverty Reduction Working Group
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FRC	Federal Relief Commission
GoP	Government of Pakistan
HRR	Humanitarian Response Review
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Agencies
IOM	International Office for Migration
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
MDB	Multi-lateral Development Bank
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OSOCC	On Site Coordination Centre
PEF	Pakistan Earthquake Fund
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SOG	Strategic Oversight Group
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Assistance
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

1. Introduction

1. The response to the Pakistan earthquake incorporated and built on many of the approaches developed following the Tsunami nine months earlier. The earthquake killed or seriously injured over 140,000 people and left 3.3 million homeless. The mountainous topography and climate posed enormous logistical problems for the relief and reconstruction operation. Some 85 bilateral and multilateral donors and over 100 NGOs have contributed to the operation to date, under strong leadership from the Pakistan Government through the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) and subsequently the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA).

Box 1: Military/Civilian Cooperation in the 2005 Pakistan Earthquake

Pakistan October 8th 2005, early morning - school bells ring, children crowd into rural classrooms in mountain top hamlets. They hope the school day will be fun and the homework short. Impoverished towns and villages kick into daily life. They anticipate business in the bazaar, or bargains in the shops. Indian and Pakistani soldiers stare down their barrels to eye each other across the Line of Control. They hope the peace process will continue. 'Situation normal' was the right phrase to describe that day.

Just after school started that Saturday morning, a massive earthquake struck. Seven-point-six on the Richter Scale it shook the earth for approximately a minute, destroying 400,000 homes and damaging 200,000 others. Five hundred medical facilities, most government buildings, many roads, bridges, electricity supplies, water services, sanitation facilities, all things wiped out in that minute. Three and a half million people became homeless; 30,000 square kilometres were affected. Thirty-five thousand school children were killed. An equal number of adults in towns also died. Seventy-three thousand gone, as many again severely injured.

In terms of scale, a greater territory was affected than that affected by the Asian tsunami. There were more injuries, although less deaths. The terrain, rather than flat and coastal, was mountainous and rugged. The weather, rather than temperate and tropical, was Himalayan, threatening and lethal. The freezing temperature of the mountainous winter was less than two months away. Predictions of massive second waves of death caused by infection, starvation and cold were realistic and frightening. Disease could be expected, calamity was thought certain.

The problems faced were large, and huge constraints challenged the planners. Whilst billions of dollars were donated to support the tsunami victims, funds given for Pakistan earthquake relief were slow and scarce, hence so was the international response.

Faced with a massive catastrophe without precedent in modern times, many times larger in impact than Hurricane Katrina, the Pakistan government, nonetheless, had to react. Expectations were bleak and the task was huge, yet less than six months later the Government of Pakistan, with the support of the Pakistani people, international agencies and organizations, and foreign volunteers, was able to declare relief operations successful and over. The second wave of deaths had been avoided; deaths from the cold were less than those recorded for the previous year. No one starved to death, no diseases breakout occurred. Just under a million tents were distributed, nearly 400,000 emergency shelters were built, water supplies were rebuilt, and the closed areas of Kashmir were opened to foreign assistance. In less than six months the Pakistan Government, with the help of the international community, was able to say 'job well done, now let's look to rebuild'.

Unpublished draft account of Lieutenant General Nadeem Ahmed and Andrew MacLeod

2. The Government of Pakistan (GoP) requested the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) to coordinate the humanitarian effort. UNOCHA worked closely with the FRC, the military, other UN agencies and the international and national NGO community. Despite the logistic problems and contrary to some criticisms the immediate relief activity was rapidly mobilised and operated well.

3. GoP, through the Ministry of Finance, also asked the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank to coordinate a Preliminary Damage Needs Assessment (DNA). This was undertaken between 24th October and 5th November and published on 12th November. The DNA drew on input from a wide range of donors and technical agencies and also benefited from the guidance and support of a Core Group of Donors¹ that formed in mid October and has continued as the key link to the donor community. The United Nations (UN) has conducted a parallel assessment with a particular focus on immediate relief and early recovery.

4. The joint assessment estimated the overall cost with the earthquake at \$5.2billion. Of this \$3.5billion was the estimate for reconstruction and \$300million for early recovery.

Box 2: Overall Costs of the Earthquake	
Category	US\$ Million
Relief	1,092
Death and Injury Compensation	205
Early Recovery	301
Restoration of Livihoods	97
Reconstruction	3,503
<i>Of which Short term Reconstruction</i>	450
<i>Of which Medium/Long term Reconstruction</i>	3053
Total	5,198
<i>Note: Excludes indirect losses (income) of \$576 million</i>	
<i>Sources: Relief, Death and Injury Compensation and Early Recovery - UN Agencies</i>	
<i>Reconstruction and Restoration of Livihoods - ADB/World Bank Assessment Team</i>	
<i>Table 1 Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment, ADB/World Bank 12 Nov 2005</i>	

5. The context of the emergency in Pakistan was unique in that it involved national authorities that were highly competent and overwhelmingly cooperative, it was a rapid onset natural disaster, and it was an event of exceptional scale. The joint collaboration between FRC, the military and UNOCHA led to effective coordination of the relief process. The planning for rehabilitation and longer term development has been led by ERRA and the Core Group of Donors. The challenge was in managing the transition (from military back to civilian administration; from UN coordinated support for relief to donor mobilisation of long term resources; and from a humanitarian response to a development process). The difficulty was in managing the 'bridge' of early recovery where the harmonisation and alignment behind GoP's leadership became strained.

6. This assessment explores the clear benefits of Government leadership and the harmonised response from UN agencies, multilateral and bilateral donors. The need for clear and continued communication to support such commitments and the different roles during relief, early recovery and reconstruction are discussed. Changes in leadership responsibility and reduction in participation can undermine agreements to work together. Pressures can also occur when divergent agency roles and expectations are not dealt with in a transparent way. Jealousy and tensions within the donor community can cause discontinuities in otherwise good practice.

¹ Core Group of 7 Donors comprising the ADB, DFID, the European Union, Japan, UN, USAID, and the World Bank formed to lead coordination of the earthquake response.

2. Context

2.1 *Pattern of aid and extent of aid dependence*

7. During the four decades following independence Pakistan enjoyed steady economic growth starting from a low base, yet outpacing its neighbours. Efforts were made to address the structural and deep seated poverty complemented by external donor support. During the 1990's progress slowed as did external support culminating in the suspension of much assistance to GoP at the time of the military coup. Pakistan entered the new millennium as a low income country (LIC) having a gross national income (GNI) per capita of \$520 (2003) with relatively low dependence on aid but large performance and financial gaps in relation to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

8. Today aid constitutes approximately 2% of Pakistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and about 6% of government expenditures. However 80-90% of aid received is provided by the five largest donors² operating under different mandates and pursuing different national and institutional interests. The ADB and the World Bank by themselves provide 60-70% of the aid.

9. Between 1968 and 2005 ADB provided \$15billion of support, \$1.5 billion accounted for in 2005 itself; and the 2006 to 2008 programme plans to provide \$4.4 billion. The World Bank has seen a similar growth in lending most recently rising from \$300million in 2003 to \$1.5billion in the current year. In terms of earthquake specific support the World Bank has provided \$470 million and the ADB \$412million. ADB established the Pakistan Earthquake Fund (PEF) with an initial grant of \$80 million (of the \$412million). Overall both ADB and World Bank pledged \$1billion each. Amongst others Finland, Norway, Australia and the EU channelled their official support for earthquake reconstruction through PEF and co-financing arrangements managed by ADB.

10. Bilateral support has also grown. After a seven-year pause due to US-imposed nuclear non-proliferation sanctions, USAID reopened its Mission in Pakistan in July 2002. In all, the United States, through USAID, is providing more than \$1.5 billion in development assistance to Pakistan over the next five years to improve education, health, governance and economic growth. In addition, the United States has pledged a total of \$510 million in earthquake relief and reconstruction efforts to assist the people of Pakistan and to support GoP relief and reconstruction efforts. Other bilateral support has grown less dramatically though significantly again with substantial earthquake related additions. Japan has provided approximately \$200million in earthquake related assistance, DFID approximately \$230million. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have also made significant contributions.

2.2 *Socio-economic profile of affected areas*

11. The earthquake affected both India controlled and Pakistan controlled Kashmir. Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the eastern part of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) were dealt the most serious blow with the focus on eight Districts five in NWFP and three in AJK the Federally administered part of disputed Kashmir. This region is home to a scattered population of some 5.7 million people nearly 90% of whom live in hilly, mountainous rural settlements in close knit family groups. 42% are below 15 years, whilst only 6.7% are above 60. Most people lack access to basic services, clean drinking water and safe disposal of waste. The environment is extremely vulnerable with frequent landslides, extreme weather conditions, and unchecked urban development.

² Asian Development Bank, France, Japan, United States, and World Bank

12. The economy in these mountainous areas is based on subsistence agriculture which accounts for 60-70% of household income and 37% of rural employment. Public administration accounts for a significant proportion of employment in urban areas; followed by small trading and businesses, construction and transport, mostly in the informal sector. Employment in public administration is especially prominent in AJK, and agriculture conversely employs a higher fraction of the rural population in NWFP. In both areas remittances from migrant male family members are a vital source of income. Options for women to become employed outside of the household are very limited, even though the proportion of women-headed households is high (20% in AJK).

2.3 Impact of the disaster

13. 73,000 people were killed and as many injured and 3.3 million were left homeless to face the winter exposed, hungry and isolated. Aside from the loss of life and injury there was major damage to houses, roads and public infrastructure, crops and livestock. 84% of all houses in the affected Districts of AJK, and 36% in the affected Districts of NWFP was destroyed. 45% of the mountainous roads were damaged and 72% of the three national highways that provide main access to the northern areas of NWFP. 7,669 schools and colleges (75% primary and middle schools) were affected with about half collapsed or were beyond repair. 574 health facilities were damaged or destroyed. Major damage was reported at the intake of gravity schemes, and to a lesser extent to supply mains due to landslides and to distribution systems due to house/building collapse. 55 provincial office buildings and 9 District and 249 provincial officers' residences were destroyed. 25% of the revenue records and 85% of municipal records were lost.

2.4 Institutional capacity

14. The institutional capacity to respond to the earthquake was already limited due to the terrain and weak governance in both NWFP and AJK. The situation was aggravated by the disruption to civil administration with 30% of the employed population lost including many public servants (e.g. 853 teachers). Both the NWFP and AJK administrations handed over responsibility to the military and national authorities and are only just resuming full control. Prior to the earthquake access for foreigners to Pakistan controlled Kashmir (AJK) and the remote conservative affected areas of NWFP was restricted. The result was that international humanitarian assistance was working in unknown areas and was dependent on the military for much information and physical access.

2.5 Development policy, harmonisation, alignment, and aid effectiveness

15. The Pakistan Government has signed up to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However with little progress achieved during the 1990's Pakistan has some of the worst poverty indicators in Asia and on present progress will not achieve many of the MDG targets by 2015. More broadly Pakistan's progress in reform and reframing its policy orientation is beginning to see results. Its strategy for economic growth and poverty reduction is articulated in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP 2003). The PRSP is based on four pillars: accelerated economic growth, improved governance and devolution, investing in human capital, and targeting the poor and vulnerable.

16. There is broad donor support for the PRSP and already evidence of investments aligning with its key themes notably economic growth, governance and devolution. This is setting a context for alignment but harmonisation is less evident with the larger investors tending to operate independently and synergies often being confined to complementary technical assistance (TA) provided as grant support alongside large loans. Paradoxically some smaller donors are also disinclined to collaborate fearing that as small partners they will lose identity and presence.

17. The political turbulence has disrupted partnership development with a lack of continuity of alliances and joint working from the 1990s and contemporary international agendas tending to dominate donors national interests. Overall the scale of investment and the attention required has reinforced individual approaches by the larger donors.

18. Nevertheless there is a growing interest in aid effectiveness amongst donors and the Informal Donor Poverty Reduction Working Group (D-PRWG) has established a sub group on aid effectiveness which was instrumental in commissioning an issues paper *“Improving Aid Effectiveness in Pakistan”* prior to this year’s Pakistan Development Forum (PDF). The sub group is working closely with the Donor Coordination Cell established by GoP within the EAD which is taking a lead on the government side.

19. Since 1998 when the PDF replaced the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium which had focused on the annual pledges of commitment from donors it has developed as the key occasion when GoP shares its development strategy with donors, civil society and other stakeholders. The Government used the 2001 PDF to explain its plans for the country to donors, and to ally their concerns about the transition of 1999. Subsequent PDFs have focused on the reform programme, as well as on key national planning documents like the 2003 PRSP and the 2005 Medium-Term Development Framework (MTDF).

20. The success of the PDF has led some Provincial Governments to hold their own provincial development forums. The Government of Punjab (GoPb) has held three Punjab Development Forums (PbDF) since 2003 and in 2006 there was the first NWFP Development Forum. The PDFs, Provincial and Federal, enable a sharing of information but they are not designed for decision making. The next step will be for GoP to put in place mechanisms for regular dialogue and decision making with donors to progress the Paris principles.

3. The initiative

21. The Government of Pakistan responded quickly to the earthquake emergency. Although communications with the affected areas were severed, the President and Prime Minister visited affected sites the first day after the disaster and by the afternoon the President officially requested the United Nations to mobilise support including the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) who arrived the following morning and took lead responsibility jointly with the Pakistan Military.

22. One missing link in the GoP response was a functioning National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). The existing Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) within the Cabinet office had a coordination function and was not equipped for crisis management. The President and Prime Minister recognised this and established the Federal Relief Commission within days of the earthquake. With senior military leadership the FRC and the UNOCHA provided joint leadership during the relief phase.

23. Two features were key to success at this stage. Firstly the decision to implement the cluster model recommendations of the Humanitarian Response Review (See box 3). This provided an institutional framework that was applied to the relief phase and to the preparation for rehabilitation beginning with the DNA with a similar model of lead development partners for specific sectors. Whilst this was a new approach, and roles remained confused throughout, the cluster model and the institutional framework based on it provided a structure for coordination and decision making on the international side. The second key feature was the establishment of the Strategic Oversight Group (SOG) within the FRC which provided management and coordination. The core of this group was The Federal Relief Commissioner, the Chief Military Coordinator, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (the UN Resident Coordinator), and the Head of UNOCH.

Box 3: Humanitarian Response Review

Following the tsunami, and what was seen as a poorly coordinated relief effort by all international actors, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) asked UN OCHA to establish a review of humanitarian response.

Through the northern summer of 2005 a wide ranging consultation process involving all key actors formulated a series of recommendations. In essence it was recommended that humanitarian response be divided into nine sectors or 'clusters' and for a global 'cluster lead' to be made responsible and accountable for coordinating the subject matter of each cluster. The nine clusters were:

1. Health
2. Food and nutrition
3. Water and Sanitation
4. Logistics
5. Camp Management
6. Emergency Shelter
7. Emergency Telecommunications
8. Protection of vulnerable groups
9. Early Recovery

A cluster for 'education' was considered but rejected.

The HRR recommendations were finalized in September and due to be put to the IASC at the December 12 meeting. In between the September recommendation and the December meeting was the October earthquake in Pakistan.

24. The net result was a close working relationship during the relief phase between the UN and the Pakistan leadership in which the UN acted as the interface with the international community using the cluster system as the channel for communication. In terms of planning for reconstruction the GoP also established an appropriate structure this time with a regular (initially weekly) development partner meeting coordinated by the ADB and World Bank. These structures allowed space for participation by all key stakeholders with the exception of the heads of the numerous NGOs.

25. The cluster system and the leadership of the SOG ensured coherence in terms of the relief effort in which a unique relationship developed between the Pakistan military and the UN humanitarian system. Similarly following the joint DNA the ADB and World Bank continued to coordinate the Core Group of Donors with weekly meetings oscillating between their respective offices and the chair alternating between the two country directors. The ADB took the lead in health, power, transport and education; JICA on urban settlements; the World Bank on livelihoods and housing and DFID the development of a monitoring and evaluation framework. There was no duplication and the approach was one of consensus building. The linkages with the wider development partner community were made at monthly development partner meetings convened by ERRA. The result was a coordinated approach to the relief phase and joint policy dialogue and objective setting for rehabilitation amongst the main donors.

26. Operationally the cluster system led to agency leadership for particular themes with a coordinated approach on the ground with a strong presence from the Pakistan military. The relief process was thus developed as a joint operation. The preparations for reconstruction followed a different pattern. The allocation of leadership for specific sectors to individual funding agencies resulted in complementary programming and subsequently separate approaches to financing. The World Bank is providing support through five instruments including budget support, support through the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund and a \$400million Emergency Recovery Project focusing on

livelihoods and housing. Whereas the ADB established a trust fund and are the largest funder channelling support directly through ERRA. Whilst the process was ‘90% harmonised’ this has declined as implementation has begun. Donors have gone their own way. The frequency of meetings has declined and the emphases have become more diverse with some focusing on funding through Government systems others off-budget approaches; some emphasising the empowerment of the affected communities and others centrally managed projects. As a generalisation donor funding agencies have reverted to their traditionally preferred model or one informed by their particular perspective.

27. Whilst the leadership of GoP has ensured alignment with country systems at the national level, this leadership itself and the disruption caused to the administration in AJK and to a lesser extent NWFP has diverted attention away from the Provincial and AJK Government systems. Usually disasters are dealt with Provincially this was not possible on this occasion. The scale of the earthquake and the subsequent creation of a national response agency have made it difficult to return to ‘normal administrative processes’ and sub-national country systems.

28. The final aspect of the GoP/donor response to the earthquake was the Earthquake Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (EMEF). In January the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and the Core Group of Donors agreed to jointly support this umbrella monitoring and evaluation framework for the response to the earthquake. The objectives of the framework are:

- timely information to all stakeholders on financial inputs, progress of programmes, and current situation in the earthquake affected areas;
- GoP and partners to plan and implement successful earthquake programmes;
- a coordinating framework for all M&E activities, with the aim to improve the overall quality of M&E and reduce the cost
- transparency and public and international confidence

29. DFID has taken the lead role working with ERRA to develop the EMEF. The focus is on the relatively high level M&E required by GoP and donors to monitor and plan programmes centrally and demonstrate accountability. The M&E Wing of ERRA will coordinate and manage the process developing an agreed set of core project performance and impact indicators in the key sectors (construction, private housing, livelihoods, social protection, health, education etc). Ideally the EMEF should have been in place as soon as possible after the earthquake. Progress has been steady but slow. However the commitment remains high amongst the Core Group of Donors and ERRA. A common monitoring system may restore a more coordinated approach to the reconstruction and subsequent development process.

4. The process

30. The GoP took the initiative in requesting the UN to mobilise support as is usual in disasters at this scale. The GoP also took a strong lead in establishing the FRC and subsequently the ERRA as empowered agencies. This Government lead combined with the active engagement of the Pakistan military made possible in part because of their close relationship with the regime was key to the process. The proactive response of UNDAC, the Un Resident Coordinator, and the Core Group of Donors, led by the ADB and World Bank complemented and confirmed the leadership of Government.

31. The relief phase has been led and managed by a unique coalition of the UN and the FRC/military with the SOG embodying the strategic focus. The adoption of the cluster approach was endorsed by this leadership and one of its strengths was that it enabled

relationships to be made between each cluster and the respective operational unit within the military structure. The planning for reconstruction and development was also led by GoP and informed by the joint DNA coordinated by ADB and the World Bank.

32. The main interlocutors from GoP have continued to be the military. The leadership of the FRC was from the army and the Chief Military Coordinator for the military wing of the FRC is now Deputy Chair of ERRA. At a political level it is the Prime Minister and the President who have continued to reinforce the authority of these structures. This weakened the linkages with civil administration both nationally and in NWFP/AJK but meant that GoP played a strong and consistent role throughout the process.

33. During the initial relief phase the strength and capacity of the military was a critical factor. They needed assistance to appreciate the nature of the humanitarian response and adjusting their planning processes accordingly. When ERRA was established there was a clear need for capacity building for this new agency to take on its role. Donors provided this support and continue to do so (e.g. EMEF). Capacity building is a feature of the programme support of all the major donors.

34. The main difficulty has been the management of the transition from relief to reconstruction. This is the point at which a lull often occurs and this was no exception. GoP, through ERRA, made a firm decision that relief would end on 31st March. This was a strategic decision focused on changing expectations at all levels and avoiding an extended period of dependency. Whilst the decision was clear the process was not. There was no strategic framework for the early recovery phase and no continuity of the cluster system. Whilst efforts were made to hand over coordination functions in the field to local authorities in Islamabad there was a discontinuity on the UN side as responsibility moved from UNOCHA to the Pakistan based UN system.

35. The UN-ERRA early recovery plan was based on the initial UN assessment made in November 2005 and was drafted during March 2006. The plan was finally approved in mid April and published in May 2006. The plan espoused Paris Declaration principles but the harmonisation with donor agencies does not appear to have been strong enough. Subsequent reflections from GoP expressed concerns that NGOs were perpetuating their role, that early recovery funds were being used to address the long term development agenda, and that overall there was 'donor fatigue' in relation to the early recovery phase. Certainly there seems to have been a failure to adequately harmonise between the UN system and the ADB/World Bank coordinated Core Donor Group

“In an environment so heavily dominated by International Financial Institutions it will be difficult to define and promote the UN's competencies and competitive edge in early recovery and transition efforts. There was appreciation for the UN efforts to develop guiding principles as well as to negotiate with IFIs on a broad division of roles in developing the funding appeal documents. It was felt however that the UN's efforts were seen overshadowed by the IFIs. Clarifying respective roles in recovery and transition between the UN and IFIs was cited as a top priority.” *Real Time Evaluation of Cluster Approach, LASC 2006, p16*

5. Costs and benefits

36. The joint planning and joint working arrangements were characterised by speed and efficiency on all sides. Other than the discontinuities in the transition period there were no major delays. Money has never been a problem as donors have mobilised resources for reconstruction and some of these were available from as early as December 2005. However the cost of mobilising and maintaining the large international presence is considerable and fund flow issues around the time of the initial Flash Appeal and again during early recovery were an issue and this is recurring under reconstruction.

37. Similarly there do not seem to have been delays in establishing the planning and coordination mechanisms. Though the cluster model was new and the evaluation identifies clear lessons to be learnt it was applied in an efficient manner. There was role confusion due to its novelty there were no concerns raised about delay. ERRA has been slow to get established but this is no more than is usual for a new agency with such a large task. As capacity has developed and the structure has settled down improvements have taken place. Most comments stressed the flexibility and the leadership roles within the UN, FRC, and ERRA and from the country directors of ADB and the World Bank.

38. The question of permanence and exit for ‘temporary’ structures and processes is a critical one in post disaster situations. ERRA should have a time limited life and the transition to the NWFP and AJK Governments and local authorities for coordination should have already begun. More community based responses and citizen choice from the outset could have enhanced the approach and reduced the risk of dependence. Some argued against the establishment of an ad hoc agency for this very reason. From that perspective some of the structures may already have become too permanent. Paradoxically some of the systems may have been curtailed prematurely. Meetings between ERRA and the wider development partner community have ceased, the Core Donor Group is meeting less frequently and the consequent gaps in communications are causing concern. The lesson appears to be that permanent structures that detract from normal government and governance systems should be avoided but that the experience of working together and improving communication should be sustained.

6. Impact assessment

39. There are four institutional arrangements that emerged in response to the earthquake that are worth reviewing in terms of impact – the GoP leadership arrangements through FRC, ERRA and the military; the UN system in country supported by UNOCHA; the specific use of the cluster approach; and the GoP/donor arrangements for reconstruction and development.

40. Overall the leadership of GoP and the arrangements put in place have been widely appreciated. Some have questioned the appropriateness of establishing ERRA as a national agency and suggested that a greater role at an earlier stage for the Governments of NWFP and AJK would have had a stronger impact. Nevertheless the leadership and direction that was provided during the relief phase is acknowledged by all as the single most important factor in the success of the response, and continues to play a key role. The delegated authority from the highest level and the military efficiency, coupled with an openness to appreciate the humanitarian processes combined to excellent effect. The questions now are how to manage the transition and exit strategies whilst ensuring that Pakistan does in fact ‘build back better’.

41. The responsiveness of the UN system was also identified by all informants. Mistakes are inevitable when speed and complexity are to the fore but from the arrival of the UNDAC Team within 24 hours of the earthquake the in-country leadership and coordinated role of the UN complemented the role of the GoP. Where the impact of the UN has been less strong is in addressing the institutional relationships amongst with the wider donor community to ensure an integrated approach to early recovery and reconstruction. Greater clarity on roles and a more coordinated approach between UN agencies was identified as a lesson that may inform the ongoing UN reform process.

42. What was critical to the impact during the relief phase was the close working relationship between the UN system and the GoP. In particular the roles played by the members of the SOG and the key liaison role of the UN Resident Coordinator were not seen by many but the impact was widely commented on as being of major significance.

43. The use of the cluster approach has been the subject of a separate ‘real time’ evaluation the conclusions of which are summarised in box 4. A tool for disaster responses the cluster model was successful in organisation and harmonising the on the ground activity. From an aid effectiveness perspective there are also wider lessons. The way in which the clusters related to GoP systems could be a model for donor/GoP sector based dialogue. The focus on technical delivery did detract from head of agency coordination especially for the NGOs. Achieving a balance between strategic and technical coordination and ensuring that the right people and the right agendas and addressed in the right groups is a lesson for all aid effectiveness systems.

Box 4: Evaluation of the Cluster Approach in the Pakistan Earthquake

- Overall, the Cluster Approach (CA) was generally successful in Pakistan.
- It provided a ‘single and recognizable framework for coordination, collaboration, decision making and practical solutions in a chaotic operational environment.’
- There were some challenges arising from a lack of clarity surrounding CA.
- Participation by organisations in the CA was ad hoc and inconsistent - increased effort to include NGOs, IFIs, other Government Offices and donors to ‘broaden the CA beyond merely a UN exercise.’
- Pakistan Government. played a vital role in the implementation of the CA and adapted its relief structure to the framework. Pakistan’s Military commended for adopting successfully the CA.
- Clusters with technical framework worked well compared to past emergency responses. Clusters covering cross-cutting themes need to be developed further.
- Recommendation to implement a results-based planning and monitoring system to help identify and fill the gaps.
- Many respondents supported the expansion of the UN County Team to an IASC County Team as a mechanism to improve stakeholder participation and operational coherence and humanitarian response.
- Donor engagement and participation was not consistent in Cluster meetings.
- The interface between the clusters and Pakistan Government structures functioned well despite some criticisms.
- CA offers the ‘possibility of greater coherence in planning and cost estimation leading to reliable funding appeals.’
- Some respondents thought that Clusters would continue in some form in the post-emergency phase; this initiative was just beginning to develop led the Government.
- In order for CA to develop and succeed, the County Team would have to develop an “enabling environment” with greater guidance and support by the IASC and HQ of its member agencies.’

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44. The fourth group is the Core Donor Group and wider development partner arrangements. The role of the seven leading donors and the coordination provided by the ADB and World Bank also made a significant impact and ensured that the groundwork was in place for sustained reconstruction and development. Again flexibility and the role of the coordinating figures in this case the country directors of ADB and the World Bank was commented on by those concerned. A traditional rivalry or at least cautious distance between the two Multi-lateral Development Banks (MDBs) was set aside and genuine joint collaboration became a model for their staff and other donors. The area of difficulty has been in linking the work of this core group to the wide development partner community. More attention to communication and role sharing may have enhanced the impact even more.

45. The success of the response and the role played by these institutional arrangements has certainly strengthened the development partnerships in Pakistan. At a macro level the Pakistan Development Forum was already playing a strong role at the policy level. What this earthquake response has done is build understanding at the operational level. The role of the military in Pakistan's political life is contested and for donors and the military to work together as they have done has increased mutual understanding and respect. The role of the UN has been reinforced and whilst some difficulties and tensions have emerged during the relief stage and especially during the early recovery period they can now be addressed and this could contribute to the strengthening of relationships.

46. The response has been less beneficial in building coherence in the approach to capacity building. Relief is about getting on with the job and has less time for capacity building. Indeed it is those with capacity who are turned to for support. At later stages capacity becomes important and particularly during reconstruction capacity building at all levels within the affected communities will be critical. Similarly at this stage the response has not directly impacted on relationships between Federal and Provincial Government and between both and the District administration. The loss and damage to public administration at District level will take time to rebuild. As noted the leadership from Islamabad though key to the success did have the unintended consequence of detracting from the role of the NWFP and AJK Governments. Again attention must be paid to these issues during reconstruction.

47. The ERRA-UN Early Recovery Plan specifically refers to the Paris Declaration in setting its own principles. Paris was not explicitly referenced in the same way during the relief phase but the objectives were clearly evident in the role of GoP, the harmonisation and alignment of the donors and the systems that were put in place including the cluster approach itself. The leadership and ownership of GoP has been affirmed by the response and its capacity endorsed. This has built confidence and will have wide implications. The alignment of the external support based on the DNA and the role of the ASDB and World Bank in facilitating that process has the potential to be more generally applied. This is part of a closer working relationship between the two MDBs and the other leading donors. Most stakeholders saw these as the major areas of impact in achieving Paris Declaration objectives and expressed the view that they would be built on.

48. It is too early to make an assessment of the impact of the response on monitoring and mutual accountability. The EMEF is an ambitious attempt to take a common approach to monitoring of the reconstruction effort. It is linked to the wider interest that some other donors share with DFID in managing for development results. If EMEF is successful in establishing a collaborative approach to M&E then the impact on the Paris objectives would be considerable. Mutual accountability depends to an extent on reliable and accepted monitoring data. Working together with mutual confidence is the first step to mutual accountability. The earthquake response has begun to build the relationships and there was mutual accountability at activity level within the response but this is seen by most stakeholders as only an initial step in that process.

49. The response to the earthquake demonstrated the value of the Paris Declaration objectives in enabling effective impact. Their successful application in the post earthquake scenario was not related directly to the MDGs by any of the stakeholders. In the short term the MDGs were not seen as relevant to the disaster. In the medium term the impact and the disruption to the development process will undermine progress. Hopefully if Pakistan is able to 'build back better' including better governance within the affected areas then progress towards the MDG will be enhanced. However there is little linkage between the disaster, the Paris Declaration and the MDGs at this stage.

7. Lessons learned

7.1 *The Paris Declaration objectives*

50. There are some clear lessons in relation to the Paris Declaration objectives from the response to the Pakistan earthquake:

- Strong Government leadership and ownership in a post disaster situation can provide the basis for a coordinated and effective response involving national and international effort.
- The role played by the UN system in a relief situation can complement national leadership if there is mutual understanding and respect; in particular the (national) military and (international) humanitarian approaches can work together.
- The harmonisation and alignment of external support depends on clear direction and leadership from Government.
- Monitoring of a disaster response and management by results are more difficult than in 'normal' development contexts. Developing agreed frameworks takes time and would benefit from a prior agreement between stakeholders.
- Mutual accountability is difficult to develop in the emergency context. Where there are already working arrangements and mutual understanding these can inform and be reinforced by the post disaster experience.
- The Paris Declaration was developed in the context of the wider international development context. Its application to a disaster context is appropriate but the roles of other actors (civil society, international NGOs) needs to be incorporated.

7.2 *The earthquake response in Pakistan*

51. Key Lessons from the design and implementation of the earthquake response are:

- Leadership and Coordination was quickly developed during the relief phase and gained the confidence of all stakeholders.
- The 'cluster approach' was a success despite the problems arising from trailing a new model in a live situation.
- An empowered leadership group is a valuable asset to the relief process, the coordination of external support and through 'lead development partners' to the implementation of reconstruction and development programmes.
- The role of civil defence and local government structures that have the mandate but limited capacity could play a stronger role.

52. Challenges to the design and implementation of disaster responses arising from this assessment are:

- Continuity and transition need careful management. Attention to process and especially the maintenance of effective communication systems is essential.
- Moving from Relief through Early Recovery to Rehabilitation requires changes of style, changes in leadership, and changes in the roles of key actors with roles moving between existing and even new organisations. The process needs to be initiated as early as possible and managed in a transparent way.

- Changing leadership and effective participation (by local government, affected communities, and civil society) need to be encouraged and facilitated.
- Institutional experience and knowledge can play a critical role – including policies, structures, processes, systems, procedures and people.

7.3 Aid effectiveness in Pakistan and Beyond

53. Lessons for replication of the experience from the Pakistan response and for developing an evaluation framework for implementation of the Paris Declaration:

- Trust and personal relationships are critical to ensuring effective institutional leadership and direction.
- A strong single lead agency working with the authority of Government can be valuable during the relief and early recovery phase but the involvement of local government, the affected communities and citizen choice must be given priority.
- This agency can play the role of a National Disaster Management Authority establishing protocols, links with the international UN systems (UNOCHA), and operational policies in advance of potential disasters.
- Plan early for early recovery and give careful attention to the transition from relief to reconstruction.
- Share Paris Declaration objectives with the international NGO community so they appreciate the value of national leadership and harmonisation.
- The experience of and preparations for disaster responses should be seen as a ‘special case’ for application of the Paris Declaration.
- The evaluation framework for the Paris Declaration should include both process and outcome evaluation and make clear distinctions between the two

Paris objectives need to be reflected in the process – i.e. ownership, harmonisation, alignment and mutual accountability within the development of the aid effectiveness discourse in each country.

However aid effectiveness is about outcomes. Monitoring and management by results are the more difficult but the more important means of verifying aid effectiveness.

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