

REPORT TEMPLATE

1. This is a template for the structure and contents of a country assistance program evaluation (CAPE). It is consistent with the guidance on chapter contents and headings provided in the guidelines. Page lengths are provided for guidance only. While the main chapter headings are prescribed in the guidelines, the contents of each chapter should be structured to convey the evidence and findings in a logical, concise and coherent manner.

ABBREVIATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (5 pages)

CONTENTS

- I. INTRODUCTION (3 pages)
 - A. Goals and Objectives of the CAPE
 - B. Assessing Development Effectiveness: Applying the CAPE Methodology

- II. THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT AND GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES (4 pages)
 - A. The Evolving Political, Economic and Social Setting for Development
 - B. Government's Development Priorities and Strategies

- III. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK'S COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAM (5 pages)
 - A. The Evolution of ADB's Country Strategies and Assistance Program
 - B. Expected Results of Key Program Thrusts
 - C. Positioning of ADB Assistance vis-à-vis Other Development Partners

- IV. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION (5 pages)
 - A. Trends in Lending and Nonlending Program Performance
 - B. Consistency Between the Planned and Realized Program
 - C. Factors Affecting Implementation

- V. RESULTS ACHIEVED AND FACTORS INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE (20 pages)
 - A. The Program's Contribution to Outcomes and Impacts, by Key Sectors
 - B. The Program's Contribution to Outcomes and Impacts, by ADB Pillars
 - C. The Program's Contribution to Outcomes and Impacts, by Thematic Areas
 - D. Factors Affecting the Delivery of Results
 - E. Attribution of Results

- VI. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT AND RATING (3 pages)
 - A. Sector Performance
 - B. Countrywide Performance
 - C. Overall Assessment

VII. KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS (5 pages)

- A. Key Findings
- B. Future Challenges and Opportunities
- C. Conclusions and Recommendations

APPENDIXES¹

- 1. List of Projects and Technical Assistance
- 2. Country Political, Economic and Social Development
- 3. Summary of the Government's National Development Plans and Poverty Strategies
- 4. Summary of ADB's Evolving Country Strategies and Programs
- 5. Trends in Portfolio Performance During the Assessment Period
- 6. Summary of the Main Findings of Project, Program and TA Evaluations
- 7. Sector Assessments²
- 8. Thematic Assessments
- 9. Special Country-Specific Study Results³

¹ All appendices are optional, and those listed below are representative of the type that have been included in previous CAPEs. CAPE appendices serve to provide more detailed evidence and background information than can be accommodated in the main report. The findings of CAPE research into special, country-specific topics can also be included in the appendices.

² Detailed sector assessments generally cover the sector context; the Government's sector strategy; ADB's sector assistance program; the implementation of ADB's assistance program to the sector; and the results of that assistance, in terms of the delivery of agreed outputs, outcomes, and impacts. The contribution of the sector assistance program to ADB's pillars and to selected thematic objectives is also reviewed. A rating and performance assessment of ADB's contribution within a sector is also included.

³ An example of this would be the appendix on ADB-NGO partnership in the Bangladesh CAPE.

PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT AND RATING

A. Introduction

1. The country assistance program evaluation (CAPE) performance assessment mirrors the methodology used in the CAPE itself. It makes an assessment and rating of the performance of Asian Development Bank's (ADB) operations in key sectors (i.e., a bottom-up approach) and it makes an assessment and rating of ADB's overall positioning and contribution to development results at a national level (i.e., a top-down approach). A combination of the bottom-up and top-down ratings approaches is then used to derive an overall performance assessment.

2. The bottom-up approach to determining an overall assessment rating is to separately evaluate and to rank for each sector five core criteria (the building blocks of evaluation): relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. The top-down approach is to assess country positioning and contribution to development results for the country program as a whole. Each criterion within each sector is assigned a whole-number rating. These ratings are then aggregated by sector, across sectors, and by the two country-level criteria. The assigned weights vary between criteria, reflecting the contribution that each makes to overall development performance. Finally, fixed cutoff points are used to assign appropriate descriptors (highly successful, successful, partly successful, unsuccessful) to the aggregate numeric ratings. Evaluators may also include country-specific subcriteria and vary the weights used to aggregate across criteria, provided that the variation is justified and reported in the CAPE position paper¹ or as subsequently agreed modifications to the position paper.

B. Bottom-up Sector Performance Rating

3. Since ADB assistance programs are customarily organized along sector lines, program performance will, in the first instance, be assessed for each of the key sectors for which ADB has provided support. The evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impacts are rated on a 4-point scale. Twice as much weight is allotted to criteria relating to the delivery of development results (i.e., effectiveness, sustainability, and impacts) in order to emphasize the importance that ADB accords to making a durable contribution to poverty reduction outcomes. The sector rating criteria and scoring system are discussed below.

4. **Relevance.** This refers to (i) whether or not the focus of ADB's sector strategy and sector program was consonant with the mission of ADB, on the one hand, and with the key, evolving economic circumstances, priorities, and absorptive capacity of the developing member country (DMC), on the other; (ii) the extent to which ADB sector support was aligned with sector policies and strategies; (iii) the degree to which ADB sector support was in line with ADB's evolved comparative assistance advantage; (iv) the extent to which ADB's sector interventions achieved a level of critical mass, were balanced across objectives, selective and focused; and (v) the degree to which ADB sector assistance was harmonized with that of other development partners. The above subcriteria are intended to encompass dimensions of coherence, cohesion, comprehensiveness, responsiveness, positioning, and harmonization in ADB's sector assistance program. Ratings will be assigned to the relevance of ADB's country strategies and programs for each sector as follows:

¹ A brief concept paper highlighting the approach and major issues to be addressed in the evaluation was prepared by the mission leader for approval by the director general of OED.

- (i) **Highly relevant** (3 points). ADB's strategies and programs are deemed to be completely relevant to the key sector development challenges and opportunities, country-driven, aligned with sector strategies and priorities, focused, balanced, sufficient to achieve results, and harmonized with assistance provided by other development partners (DPs).
- (ii) **Relevant** (2 points). ADB's country strategies and programs are deemed relevant, with minor reservations, to the key sector development challenges and opportunities, country-driven, aligned with sector strategies and priorities, somewhat focused, generally balanced, sufficient to achieve results and harmonized with assistance provided by other DPs.
- (iii) **Partly relevant** (1 point). ADB's country strategies and programs are deemed partly relevant when they address a minority of the key development challenges and opportunities faced by the DMC, are partly country-driven, partly aligned with sector strategies and priorities, inadequately balanced, insufficiently resourced in certain areas, and only modestly harmonized with assistance provided by other DPs.
- (iv) **Irrelevant** (0 point). Strategies and programs are deemed irrelevant if they do not address the major sector challenges and opportunities, are not country-driven, not well-aligned with sector strategies and priorities, are poorly focused, insufficiently resourced compared with sector objectives, and not harmonized with assistance provided by other DPs.
- (v) The evaluator will provide a rationale for the score selected for sector relevance. This rationale may also include other country-specific factors impinging on the relevance scoring.²

5. **Effectiveness.** The effectiveness of lending and nonlending assistance refers to how successful the sector strategy and assistance program has been in contributing to the achievement of outputs and outcomes in support of the DMC's sector development goals and objectives. It also refers to the extent to which the results defined under the country assistance program (CAP) were actually achieved. Effectiveness refers, as well, to achievement of outcome, which is the extent to which the outputs defined for the various types of lending and nonlending interventions supported under the CAP for the sector were actually achieved.

- (i) **Highly effective** (6 points). Effectiveness is judged highly effective if a sector assistance program completely achieves its main objectives, contributes to the delivery of key outputs and outcomes, and can demonstrate good practice in several areas.
- (ii) **Effective** (4 points). Effectiveness is judged effective if a sector assistance program achieves about three-quarters of its main objectives in the sector, partially contributes to the delivery of key outputs and outcomes, can demonstrate good practice in 1–2 areas, and possibly has some minor shortcomings.
- (iii) **Less effective** (2 points). Effectiveness is judged less effective if a sector assistance program achieves between half and three-quarters of its objectives, outputs and outcomes.

² For example, it may be that fostering regional integration (or other country-specific criteria) is of paramount importance in a particular sector of a DMC. In this instance, both the relevance criteria and scoring could be adjusted to take this country-specific priority into consideration.

- (iv) **Ineffective** (0 point). Effectiveness is judged ineffective if a sector assistance program achieves less than half of its objectives, outputs and outcomes and with major shortcomings.
- (v) The evaluator will provide a rationale for the score selected for sector effectiveness. This rationale may also include other country-specific factors impinging on the assessment of effectiveness.

6. **Efficiency.** Efficiency compares the achievement of the sector assistance program goals and objectives with the use of ADB assistance resources. It is measured by the extent to which ADB's resources provided for each sector have been optimally utilized, in terms of (i) the net contribution of ADB assistance to broad-based socioeconomic progress through support for essential sector policy and institutional reforms; (ii) the direct, net economic benefits of ADB's sector assistance; (iii) the degree to which the benefits of ADB's sector assistance have reached the poor; and (iv) the degree of cost assistance in delivering the sector assistance program and coordinating sector operations with other DPs, compared with the costs of providing such assistance to other, similar DMCs.

- (i) **Highly efficient** (3 points). A program of assistance in a sector is deemed highly efficient when ADB assistance has contributed to major improvements in the sector policy and institutional enabling environment, the returns to major projects are high, a large portion of the program is deemed to have been successful, a large portion of technical assistance (TA) activities is rated a success, and the cost of delivering assistance is substantially lower than for comparator countries.
- (ii) **Efficient** (2 points). A program of assistance is deemed efficient when ADB assistance has contributed to modest improvements in the sector policy and institutional enabling environment, the economic returns to major projects are above 12%, the majority of the programs are deemed to have been successful, the majority of TA activities have been rated a success, and the cost of delivering the assistance is just about equal to the cost of delivering assistance to comparator countries.
- (iii) **Less efficient** (1 point). A program of assistance is deemed less efficient when ADB assistance has made a negligible contribution to improvement in the sector policy and institutional enabling environment, the economic returns to major projects are modestly below 12%, and the costs to deliver the assistance is about 20–30% higher than the cost of delivering assistance to comparator countries.
- (iv) **Inefficient** (0 point). A program of assistance is deemed to be inefficient if ADB assistance has made no contribution to improvement in the sector policy and institutional enabling environment, the economic returns to major investments are well below 12%, a minority of the sector programs are deemed successes, a minority of the TA projects have been assessed as successful, and the cost of delivering assistance is more than 30% higher than the cost of delivering assistance to comparator countries.
- (v) The evaluator will provide a rationale for the score selected for sector efficiency. This rationale may also include other country-specific factors impinging on the efficiency scoring.

7. **Sustainability.** This criterion focuses on the likelihood that the achievement of sector results and benefits will be sustained into the future. It is assessed as the extent to which sector interventions review have contributed to durable development gains that are likely to prove resilient to identified risks. Sustainability has important fiscal, social, political-economy and

environmental dimensions. Ratings will be assigned to the sustainability of ADB's programs for each sector as follows:

- (i) **Most likely** (6 points). Sustainability is judged most likely if it is established that the benefits of an assistance program are fully resilient to risks that might derail them.³
- (ii) **Likely** (4 points). Sustainability is assessed to be likely if the benefits of an assistance program are moderately susceptible to likely risks.
- (iii) **Less likely** (2 points): Sustainability is assessed to be less likely if the assistance program benefits are moderately vulnerable to some risks.
- (iv) **Unlikely** (0 point). Sustainability is judged unlikely if there are major risks that threaten the resilience of CAP benefits.
- (v) The evaluator will provide a rationale for the score selected for sector sustainability. This rationale may also include other country-specific factors impinging on the assessment of sustainability.

8. **Impact.** This refers to ADB's plausible contribution to long-term changes in development conditions through its program in a particular sector. This includes how successful the sector program has been in contributing to the attainment of specified development goals (i.e., socioeconomic conditions, income poverty, non-income Millennium Development Goals [MDGs], and other specified national poverty reduction goals and objectives). It is also evaluated with respect to the extent to which the sector program has contributed to building the sector's institutional capacity to manage for poverty reduction. The latter refers to improvement in the sector's ability to make effective and efficient use of its human, financial and natural resources to pursue poverty reduction. Ratings will be assigned to the actual and expected impact of ADB's programs for each sector as follows:

- (i) **High** (6 points). Actual and expected impacts are rated high if a clear contribution has been made to attaining sector development goals, institutional capacity in the sector, national poverty reduction goals and objectives or MDGs.
- (ii) **Substantial** (4 points). Actual and expected impacts are rated substantial if a clear contribution has been made to attaining sector development goals, institutional capacity in the sector, national poverty reduction goals and objectives or MDGs, but there are still major areas of weakness in the areas that have been assisted.
- (iii) **Modest** (2 points). Actual and expected impacts are rated modest if limited progress was made in strengthening the institutional capacity of the sector, and if there was very little evidence of any contribution from the assistance program in the sector toward attaining sector development goals, national poverty reduction goals and objectives or MDGs.
- (iv) **Negligible** (0 point). Actual and expected impacts are rated negligible if no progress was observed toward strengthening institutional capacity, major institutional weaknesses remain, and there is no evidence of any contribution from the sector assistance program toward attaining sector development goals, national poverty reduction goals and objectives or MDGs.

³ Among key resilience factors are: technical resilience (including adequate recurrent finance to operate and maintain project assets), financial resilience (including policies on cost recovery), economic resilience, social support, environmental resilience, ownership by government and other stakeholders, institutional support (including a supportive legal and regulatory framework), and resilience to such exogenous shocks as fluctuations in terms of trade.

- (v) The evaluator will provide a rationale for the score selected for sector impacts. This rationale may also include other country-specific factors impinging on the assessment of impacts.

9. **Sector Performance Rating.** A sector performance score is derived for performance in each sector by adding up the scores accorded to each criterion. Program performance in the sector is assessed as highly successful if the sector performance score is equal to or greater than 20, successful if the sector performance score is greater than 15 and less than 20, partly successful if the sector performance score is greater than 10 and equal or less than 15, and unsuccessful if the sector performance score is 10 or less.

10. **Aggregating Across Sectors.** A total-sector performance score is to be reported as a measure of the bottom-up performance of ADB's assistance program. Sector performance scores are to be weighted by an index of 2 for major sectors, and 1 for minor sectors. Major sectors are those in which ADB was either the lead development partner, had an extensive portfolio of lending and nonlending services, or provided assistance that has generated major development results. Conversely, minor sectors are those in which ADB was not the lead development partner, provided a modest amount of lending and nonlending support, and in which the contribution of ADB's assistance to development results was more limited. The aggregate bottom-up rating (i.e., sector performance score) is computed as:

$$\text{Total-sector performance score} = \frac{\sum (W_i * \text{Sector performance score})}{\sum W_i},$$

where W_i is equivalent to 1 for minor sectors and 2 for major sectors.

Aggregate sector performance is assessed as highly successful if the total-sector performance score is equal to or greater than 20, successful if the total-sector performance score is greater than 15 and less than 20, partly successful if the total-sector performance score is greater than 10 and equal or less than 15; and unsuccessful if the total-sector performance score is 10 or less.

D. Country Positioning, Contribution to Development Results and Asian Development Bank Performance

11. ADB's development effectiveness depends on its performance in key sectors. But it depends also on the positioning of its assistance, the contribution of that assistance to overall development results, and the quality and responsiveness of ADB's services. A top-down perspective is used to assess and rate ADB's country positioning, the overall contribution of the assistance effort to national development results, and the quality and responsiveness of ADB's services. It assesses whether or not ADB's choices of sectors, thematic initiatives and partnership arrangements were appropriate, given evolving country requirements and priorities. In light of that positioning, it assesses the extent to which the program's overall contribution to development results was as great as could have been reasonably expected. It then assesses the quality of the services ADB provided to influence the delivery of development results.

12. **Country positioning.** This is a measure of how well ADB responded to (or even anticipated) the evolving development challenges and priorities of the Government, built on the organization's comparative advantage, and designed the country strategies and programs in a manner that took into consideration the support available from other development partners. Country positioning involves an overall assessment of (i) relevance, to gauge whether the most strategic opportunities for assistance were exploited effectively; (ii) responsiveness, which is the timing and scope of ADB engagement in what turned out to be major development priorities in

the country; (iii) operational flexibility, which considers how the mix of lending and nonlending services, as well as operational approaches were tailored to the particular conditions of the country; (iv) portfolio management, which is the progress made in implementing the agreed program of assistance; and (v) partnerships, to determine the extent to which ADB was able to forge productive relationships with other development partners within the wider framework of development cooperation in the country. Ratings will be assigned to the strategic positioning of ADB's country assistance strategies and programs as follows:

- (i) **High** (8 points). ADB's CSPs were fully aligned with the government's national development priorities and programs, were country-focused and fully supported by the government, were designed to effectively address binding constraints to poverty reduction, built on ADB's comparative advantages, were well-harmonized with assistance of other development partners, were translated into a suitable mix of lending and nonlending operations, and were implemented in a timely and effective manner.
- (ii) **Substantial** (6 points). ADB's CSPs were generally aligned with the government's national development priorities and programs, were supported by the government, addressed key constraints to socioeconomic development, built on ADB's comparative advantages, were generally harmonized with assistance of other development partners, and were reflected in a suitable lending and nonlending program that was generally implemented effectively.
- (iii) **Modest** (4 points). ADB's CSPs were not fully aligned with the government's national development priorities and programs and were only partially supported by the government. While addressing key issues, they did not address the binding constraints to poverty reduction. The assistance provided was not fully harmonized with that of other development partners, and there were flaws and imbalances in the lending and nonlending program that affected implementation.
- (iv) **Negligible** (0 point). ADB's CSPs were donor-driven and only partly owned by the government. There is little evidence that they were addressing binding constraints to poverty reduction or that assistance was effectively harmonized with the nation's development partners. Implementation was poor due to flaws in the design of the lending and nonlending program.
- (v) The evaluator will provide a rationale for the score selected for country positioning. This rationale may also include other country-specific factors impinging on the assessment of country positioning.

13. **Contribution to Development Results.** This is an assessment of the extent to which ADB's overall country program contributed to the achievement of development results at a national level. This assessment should also reflect any positive or negative synergies arising from ADB support to different sectors (which have already been assessed in a bottom-up manner). This assessment is primarily focused on ADB's contribution to national development outcomes. It assesses ADB's contribution to results at the level of a poverty reduction pillar (i.e., pro-poor growth, inclusive social development, and good governance) and a thematic level of intervention. Ratings will be assigned to ADB's contribution to development results as follows:

- (i) **High** (8 points). ADB made a major contribution to the achievement of outcomes that enabled pro-poor growth, social development and good governance. ADB assistance contributed to positive outcomes in several thematic areas.
- (ii) **Substantial** (6 points). On balance, ADB assistance made a positive contribution to the achievement of outcomes that enabled pro-poor growth, social

- development and good governance. ADB assistance contributed to positive outcomes in a few thematic areas.
- (iii) **Modest** (4 points). On balance, ADB assistance contributed to the achievement of outcomes that enabled pro-poor growth, social development and good governance, but performance in all of these areas lagged the government's and ADB's expectations. Some progress was registered thanks to ADB's contribution to the overall assistance effort in improving outcomes in key thematic areas.
 - (iv) **Negligible** (0 point). There is no evidence that ADB's program of assistance made a meaningful, positive contribution to poverty reduction or to the achievement of priority thematic outcomes. Without ADB assistance, development outcomes would have been much the same.
 - (v) The evaluator will provide a rationale for the score selected for the overall contribution of the program to development results. This rationale may also include other country-specific factors impinging on the assessment of the overall contribution of the program to development results.

14. **ADB Performance.** This criterion focuses on the processes that underlie ADB's effectiveness in discharging its responsibilities as a development partner. This includes, importantly, ADB's efforts and success in providing quality support for lending and nonlending services, demonstrating and adhering to good corporate governance practice, being sensitive and responsive to client needs, fostering client ownership, and the extent to which performance was harmonized with that of other development partners. It also considers compliance with basic operating principles; meeting client capacity building objectives; consistency in furthering ADB's corporate, country and sector strategies; and its client service satisfaction. This rating should reflect the views, as relevant, of the borrower, EAs, and other development partners in addition to feedback from operational staff. Ratings will be assigned to ADB's performance as follows:

- (i) **High** (8 points). ADB provided high quality strategy and program formulation, project and program design and supervision services, was responsive to the needs of the government, and undertook its role in a fashion consistent with fostering client ownership, improved client capacity, client satisfaction, and good corporate governance. ADB forged excellent partnerships with other development partners, government and civil society groups, and it operated in a manner that was fully consistent with ADB's mandate, policies and strategies.
- (ii) **Substantial** (6 points). On balance, ADB provided good quality strategy and program formulation, project and program design and supervision services, was generally responsive to the needs of the government, and undertook its mission in a fashion broadly consistent with fostering client ownership, improved client capacity, client satisfaction, and good corporate governance. ADB forged a number of good partnerships with other development partners, government and civil society groups, and it operated in a manner that was generally consistent with ADB's mandate, policies and strategies.
- (iii) **Modest** (4 points). On balance, the quality of ADB's strategy and program formulation, project and program design and supervision services was mixed. ADB was partly responsive to the needs of the government, and undertook its mission in a way that was partly consistent with fostering client ownership, improved client capacity, client satisfaction, and good corporate governance. ADB forged a small number of partnerships with other development partners, government and civil society groups, and it operated in a manner that was partly consistent with ADB's mandate, policies and strategies.

- (iv) **Negligible** (0 point). On balance, the quality of ADB's strategy and program formulation, project and program design and supervision services was poor. ADB was inadequately responsive to the needs of the government, and it did not sufficiently promote client ownership, improved client capacity, client satisfaction, and good corporate governance. ADB forged very few partnerships with other development partners, government and civil society groups, and it operated in a manner that was, in many areas, inconsistent with ADB's mandate, policies and strategies.
- (v) The evaluator will provide a rationale for the score selected for ADB's performance. This rationale may also include other country-specific factors impinging on the assessment of ADB's performance.

15. **Aggregate Countrywide Rating.** An aggregate countrywide rating is derived by adding up the scores accorded to the positioning, results contribution and ADB performance rating. Countrywide performance, from a top-down perspective, is assessed as highly successful if the total score is equal to or greater than 20, successful if the total score is between 16 and 19, partly successful if the total score is between 11 and 15, and unsuccessful if the total score is 10 or less.

D. Overall Program (CAPE) Performance Assessment

16. An overall program (CAPE) performance assessment is derived as a combination of the bottom-up assessment of performance in ADB-supported sectors and the top-down assessment of country positioning, contribution to key results and ADB performance. Equal weightings will be accorded to the bottom-up and the top-down assessments. The overall CAPE performance score is derived by adding up the total-sector rating and the countrywide rating. This is assessed as highly successful if the total score is equal to or greater than 40, successful if the total score is between 30 and 39, partly successful if the total score is between 20 and 29, and unsuccessful if the total score is 19 or less.

**TERMS OF REFERENCE
(BHUTAN COUNTRY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EVALUATION EXAMPLE)**

1. Under the guidance of the principal evaluation specialist, the evaluation will be supported by two international and two domestic consultants. The consultants are expected to coordinate their work assignments and schedules, and to exchange information in areas of mutual interest and where exchanges will be beneficial to the outcome of the evaluation.

2. Each international consultant is expected to deliver a report on his or her subject matter. The report outline will be agreed among those in the group to ensure that individual reports are comparable and useful in preparing the final country assistance program evaluation (CAPE) report.

A. International Consultants

1. Multisector Project Evaluation and Strategy Specialist (3.0 person-months)

3. The consultant will be responsible for key evaluation of Asian Development Bank's (ADB) country assistance program (CAP) from the perspective of lending and nonlending program analyses in comparison with the Government's strategies, policies and plans as well as those of other donors. The consultant should have a background on development issues and extensive work experience in development planning, macroeconomics, project design, implementation and evaluation in various sectors. Field experience in similar developing countries is essential. As counterpart, a domestic consultant will be engaged to assist the international consultant.

4. The consultant will perform the following tasks:

- (i) Assist in the preparation of an approach paper that details the methodology to be followed for the study, including (a) a matrix of key questions that will serve as guide during discussions with government officials and other stakeholders; (b) an assessment of Bhutan's development strategies and plans, including socioeconomic performance; and (c) preliminary assessment of major donors' strategy and assistance programs.
- (ii) Review documents and obtain necessary information on ADB's country operational strategy from 1991–2003, and information on activities of other donors which are relevant to the study.
- (iii) Analyze ADB's economic work (economic report and updates, analyses, publications) and assess whether these reports provided a comprehensive and accurate assessment of the situation in Bhutan.
- (iv) Assess whether the economic/sector analyses were taken to a logical and practical conclusion that could be used for strategic planning.
- (v) Evaluate the appropriateness of the CAP formulation in light of implementation issues and problems identified and encountered for each sector as discussed with stakeholders.
- (vi) Supervise and coordinate activities of the domestic consultant, particularly on data collection (documents, reports and statistics), including indicators for measuring outcomes.
- (vii) Based on design analyses, and in consultation with the principal evaluation specialist and domestic consultant, identify projects for which field surveys will be conducted.

- (viii) Conduct field assessments in coordination with the domestic consultant to deepen the analyses and assessment of loan projects and technical assistance (TA) grants.
- (ix) Assess the relevance of the development strategies of both the Government and ADB to various issues in Bhutan, including macroeconomic, sectoral and crosscutting concerns.
- (x) Coordinate with other ongoing ADB exercises relating to Bhutan.
- (xi) In coordination with the other international and domestic consultants, evaluate ADB's CAP and operational strategy from 1983 to the present by measuring its sectoral relevance, efficacy, efficiency, sustainability, institutional development and other impacts.
- (xii) Identify lessons from the CAP, including lending and nonlending programs undertaken by ADB, and formulate recommendations on how to further improve on a per-sector basis.
- (xiii) Draft relevant parts of the CAPE report by incorporating the findings and analyses in consultation with the institutional development evaluation specialist.
- (xiv) Complete the revised draft of the relevant part of the CAPE report by incorporating relevant comments and suggestions received and the results of the participatory workshop.
- (xv) Undertake related assignments related to the CAPE as required by the principal evaluation specialist.

2. Institutional Development Evaluation Specialist (2.0 person-months)

5. The consultant will be responsible for a macro-level assessment of policy reform issues that affect institutions across sectors in Bhutan. The consultant will be responsible for evaluating the country program from the perspective of institutional aspects and primarily through the comprehensive performance assessment of TA operations. The consultant should have a background in economics or related fields, and extensive work experience in project design, implementation and evaluation in different sectors. Field experience in similar developing countries is required. As counterpart, a domestic consultant will be engaged to assist the international consultant.

6. The consultant will perform the following tasks:

- (i) Review established institutional settings in 1983 when ADB began its operations in Bhutan to identify conditions and key issues at the time.
- (ii) Review documents and obtain necessary information on ADB's CAP from 1983–2003 and information on other donors' activities which are relevant to the study.
- (iii) Provide inputs to the paper on methodology for the study to be prepared by the multisector project evaluation and strategy specialist.
- (iv) Discuss and identify implementation issues and problems with stakeholders at ADB and in Bhutan in relation to institutional limitations.
- (v) Supervise and coordinate activities of the domestic consultant, particularly on data collection (documents, reports and statistics).
- (vi) Verify and improve collection of information through discussions with government officials concerned, other donors and stakeholders.
- (vii) Evaluate overall performance of ADB's nonlending services, such as aid coordination and policy through policy/institutional reforms.

- (viii) Evaluate overall performance of ADB's nonlending services, such as institutional capacity building advisory TAs, as well as policy-based economic, thematic and sector work and regional TAs.
- (ix) Mainly from the standpoint of institutional development, and in coordination with the other international and domestic consultants, evaluate ADB's CAP from 1983 to the present by measuring its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact.
- (x) Identify lessons from the country assistance undertaken by ADB, and formulate recommendations on how to further improve on institutional development and public sector performance.
- (xi) Draft relevant parts of the CAPE report by incorporating the findings and analyses in consultation with the multisector project evaluation and strategy specialist.
- (xii) Complete the revised draft of the relevant part of the CAPE report by incorporating relevant comments and suggestions received and the results of the participatory workshop.
- (xiii) Undertake related assignments related to the CAPE as required by the principal evaluation specialist.

B. Domestic Consultants (2.0 person-months each)

7. The domestic consultants will assist the international consultants (one for the multisector project evaluation and strategy specialist, and another for the institutional development evaluation specialist) in the sourcing and review of relevant country program documents, government plans and reports, and documents from other sources, and will undertake interviews with selected local beneficiaries of ADB's assistance.

8. Each of the domestic consultants will undertake the following:

- (i) In collaboration with his or her international counterpart, review the key macroeconomic and sector policies of the government and assess sector performance since 1983 in light of the government's strategies and plans.
- (ii) Evaluate the effectiveness of ADB's intervention in the sectors as perceived by beneficiaries, executing agencies (EAs) and other stakeholders.
- (iii) Assist in reviewing country assistance plans and strategy papers, relevant economic and sector work, and policy dialogue with the government since 1983.
- (iv) Assist in reviewing the relevant sector assistance programs as stipulated in the CAPs, and assess their relevance, consistency and impact towards the strategic objectives in the sector.
- (v) Assess the extent of support provided to the sectors concerned by other donor agencies based on available studies and reports carried out.
- (vi) Review other relevant program and project documents, such as country economic reports, the Government's development plans, appraisal reports, and project completion reports that are relevant to ADB's operation in Bhutan.
- (vii) With the international consultant, facilitate field surveys and assessments through close coordination with EAs of selected projects.
- (viii) Discuss with EAs and other government and nongovernment entities development issues and concerns, including outcome and impact of ADB's assistance in the sectors.
- (ix) On the basis of the review made in (iii) to (vi), as well as discussions in (vii) to (viii), identify key sectors of ADB's assistance and assess the level of

achievement of stated sector objectives in terms of (a) economic growth for improving the standard of living and quality of life, (b) poverty reduction, and (c) institutional development and capacity building.

- (x) Undertake related assignments related to the CAPE as required by the principal evaluation specialist.

ASSESSING OWNERSHIP IN A COUNTRY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EVALUATION

1. Ownership is the extent to which governments are fully committed to, directly involved in, in control of, and accountable for a program of country assistance.¹ It is an important determinant of program performance. In recent years, evaluation of the links between policy-based lending operations and country ownership has become more sophisticated and more candid. More attention is focused on the country-specific factors that determine ownership of policy-based lending and on the role that the multilateral development banks (MDBs) can play in fostering greater country commitment to the reform process.
2. Often the treatment of ownership is too superficial in country evaluations. As Johnson (1993) remarks: "Ascertaining borrower ownership is usually subject to two caveats: first, no objective standards exist for making even an *ex post* determination of what constitutes adequate ownership of a program; and second, the relationship between program success and ownership can be prone to a *post hoc ergo propter hoc* type circularity in argument: if the program succeeds, then there was ownership, and if it falters, then ownership was absent." While few question the importance of ownership to program success, the evaluation challenge is to introduce a systematic and robust set of tools for assessing credible commitment to the design and implementation of an agreed assistance program.
3. A number of different tools for assessing ownership have been proposed and adapted by the MDB evaluation units. Those include leadership analysis, stakeholder analysis, and reform readiness analysis. Such tools can be used in post-evaluations, to examine the *ex post* link between program performance and country commitment.
4. Leadership analysis assesses the locus of initiative in formulating the program, intellectual conviction among key policy makers, political will among top leaders, and efforts to build consensus among constituencies. It begins with an understanding of the political process and its interaction with policy change supported in an assistance program. It identifies reform champions and assesses the degree of support that they may require to sway political support in favor of one set of program-supported reforms or another. A key focus of leadership analysis is the degree to which the most important political constituencies that support those in power are likely to react to various proposed reforms.
5. Stakeholder analysis is used to map out which groups are affected by the program and to formulate a plan for involving different stakeholders in the definition and implementation of the assistance program. It identifies the main objectives that each would have in the assistance program, including those who likely win and lose from program supported reforms. Strategies for organizing probable winners into coalitions in support of the program, compensating losers, and winning over neutral parties to support reform are explored.
6. Reform readiness analysis assesses the rationale that MDBs, as well as government and other parties, have for supporting different aspects of the program, and it examines the institutional arrangements that affect the ability of different actors to influence program decisions

¹ See the following sources for a more detailed discussion of issues that arise in the measurement of country ownership: (i) Bolt, Richard, M. Fujimura, C. Houser, F. de Guzman, F. Nixon, and J. Weiss. 2003. *Economic Analysis of Policy-Based Operations: Key Dimensions*. Economics and Research Department Special Study. Manila: ADB. p. 64; (ii) <http://www.adb.org>; and (iii) Johnson, John H. and Suliman S. Watsy. 1993. *Borrower Ownership of Adjustment Programmes and the Political Economy of Reform*. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 199. World Bank.

or implementation. The starting point for reform readiness analysis is an understanding of the varying objectives motivating those party to the agreement on the contents of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) country assistance strategy and program. Reform readiness analysis also includes an assessment of the institutional incentives and capacities for managing the process of change. Either changes in design or implementation arrangements can be made if reform readiness analysis reveals that motivation and ability to manage the program are deficient in some respects.

7. Even when formal ownership assessment tools are not used, high-quality country assistance program evaluations tend to address issues related to the strategic leadership of government in setting program strategies and priorities, the breadth of support for the program, the breadth of ownership in civil society, and the extent to which country strategy and program design reinforced national ownership. The sorts of questions that evaluations address would include the following:

- (i) Did government strategies and programs truly serve as a sound basis for ADB's program of country assistance?
- (ii) Were there program champions in government and did they have high-level political support?
- (iii) Did the executing agencies (EAs) and the agencies responsible for program implementation fully support the program's implementation?
- (iv) Were the purpose, objectives, and likely effects of ADB's country assistance program (CAP), including support for policy and institutional reforms, adequately communicated to key interest groups and the public?
- (v) Did government actively participate in the design of the country assistance strategies and programs?
- (vi) Was the program designed to build capacity or otherwise reinforce national ownership?

8. Some of the other indicators of ownership that are used in MDB evaluations include the extent to which participatory processes involving widespread stakeholder consultation contributed to program formulation and the degree to which the rationale for and likely impacts of the program were explained to and accepted by the general public.

9. Johnson and Watsy have developed a framework that has been used to assess ownership in World Bank evaluations. Their system treats ownership as a four-dimensional independent variable. The four dimensions are (a) locus of initiative, (b) level of intellectual conviction among policy makers, (c) expression of political will by top leadership, and (d) efforts towards consensus building among various constituencies. Each of these dimensions has four levels reflecting the intensity of ownership. The four levels are: very high, high, low, and very low. By order of intensity, the criteria are defined as follows (to reflect ADB's role):

- (i) Locus of initiative:
 - (a) the initiative for formulating and implementing the adjustment program was clearly the borrower's;
 - (b) the program was inspired and developed in close collaboration between the government and ADB;
 - (c) the program was designed by ADB, and it received the borrower's broad commitment to adhere to the program without major dissent; and

- (d) the program was prepared by ADB and funding was extended, despite governmental disagreement and reluctance to implement some aspects of the program.
- (ii) Level of intellectual conviction among key policy makers:
 - (a) there was an observable and detailed consensus among identifiable key ministries/decision-makers about the nature of the crisis and the necessary remedial actions;
 - (b) the diagnosis of the crisis and a common approach to reform became gradually entrenched in policy making circles;
 - (c) there was some disagreement about the nature of the crisis and resistance from the implementing agencies as to the extent and/or the pace of reform; and
 - (d) there was very little agreement among policy makers on the nature and causes of the crisis and/or on the possible courses of action.
 - (iii) Expression of political will by top leadership:
 - (a) specific and dramatic up-front actions were initiated either before or at the inception of the program;
 - (b) there was a very strong and detailed public statement by the top political leadership of its support for reform;
 - (c) the top political leadership expressed lukewarm commitment to reform, albeit the exact nature of some key specific provisions was left for later definition, opening the door for reversals or retrogression; and
 - (d) at the outset of the program, there was no clear-cut indication as to whether the government would actually act to overcome the obstacles or opposition, public or private, to the proposed policy reforms.
 - (iv) Efforts toward consensus building among various constituencies:
 - (a) the government launched a broad-based public campaign to help in designing the program and/or to elicit support outside the central government;
 - (b) major efforts by top policy makers were made to evoke cooperation from the key implementing agencies in the delivery of the reform program;
 - (c) approval was made by centralized decision-makers, while other agencies were involved only in executing some aspects of the program; and
 - (d) the important sectoral and provincial EAs were neither consulted in advance nor involved in the execution of the program.

10. These criterion were applied in the case of an evaluation of World Bank's *Structural and Sectoral Adjustment, 1980–1992* (footnote 1 [iii]). That study found a significant correlation between program ownership and success. In that example, five countries had very high ownership, 14 had high ownership, 42 low and 9 very low. The criteria have also been utilized in World Bank country evaluations in which the assistance program was dominated by support for policy reform.

**LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:
COUNTRY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EVALUATION CLIENTS/STAKEHOLDERS SURVEY**

Name of organization.....

1. What is your perception about the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) role in providing lending and nonlending assistance to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic?

- 1 = as major donor in general
- 2 = as major donor in many sectors
- 3 = as major donor in a few sectors
- 4 = as minor donor

2. Please specify the sectors in which you think ADB has been lead donor.

.....

3. Are there any sectors where you think ADB should reduce/withdraw assistance? If yes, please specify sector(s) and reason(s).

- 1 = no
- 2 = yes (specify sector[s]).....
(specify reason[s])—you may tick more than one answer below.

- a = ADB does not seem to do well in such sectors
- b = ADB is doing well, but other donors’ roles are more prominent
- c = ADB is doing well, but there should be more joint efforts with other donors
- d = others (specify).....

4. What is your perception about the level of aid coordination in the country?

- 1 = highly satisfactory
- 2 = generally satisfactory
- 3 = needs some improvements
- 4 = needs a lot of improvements

5. What level of aid coordination do you think the country needs most?

- 1 = strategic level (needs more consultations among development partners in order to harmonize country strategies and programs to align more with the Government’s priority areas/sectors to achieve Millennium Development Goals in a coherent manner, and to avoid duplicative/piecemeal efforts)
- 2 = dialogue level (needs more collective policy dialogue among donors to pursue key policy issues with the Government in a coherent manner and to increase Government’s commitment to the required reforms while avoiding inconsistent/conflicting policies)
- 3 = technical working group level (needs more meetings or joint efforts at the technical working group level, including preparing country joint portfolio review)
- 4 = other levels (specify).....

6. What do you think about ADB's efforts in aid coordination with other development partners (e.g., government agencies, donors, private sector groups, civil society, and nongovernment organizations)?

- 1 = highly satisfactory
- 2 = generally satisfactory
- 3 = needs some improvements
- 4 = needs a lot of improvements

7. Please suggest ways in which ADB should improve aid coordination activities (you may tick more than one answer).

- 1 = doing more discussions/consultations with other development partners to increase harmonization of its country strategy and program with those of other donors and with the Government's development priorities/needs
- 2 = doing more collective policy dialogue
- 3 = doing more joint meetings with other donors to harmonize implementation procedures (including preparing country joint portfolio review)
- 4 = others (specify).....

8. How do you perceive ADB's assistance in terms of relevance to the country's development priorities?

- 1 = highly relevant
- 2 = relevant
- 3 = partly relevant
- 4 = not relevant

9. How do you perceive ADB's assistance in terms of achievement of development outcomes/impacts in the key sectors assisted?

- 1 = highly effective
- 2 = effective
- 3 = partly effective
- 4 = ineffective

10. How do you perceive ADB's assistance in terms of sustainability of its projects in the key sectors assisted?

- 1 = very likely
- 2 = likely
- 3 = less likely
- 4 = unlikely

11. How do you perceive ADB's assistance in terms of contributions to strengthening institutional capacity of government agencies to deliver services more effectively?

- 1 = substantial
- 2 = significant
- 3 = moderate
- 4 = negligible

12. How do you perceive ADB's assistance in terms of contributions to improving governance (e.g., improving rules and regulations to increase transparency/accountability of government agencies and to facilitate private sector development)?
- 1 = substantial
 - 2 = significant
 - 3 = moderate
 - 4 = negligible
13. What is your perception about the role of ADB's Lao Resident Mission (LRM) in helping improve ADB's operations?
- 1 = very useful
 - 2 = useful
 - 3 = not very useful
 - 4 = not useful
14. Please suggest ways to improve LRM's operations in the future (you may tick more than one answer).
- 1 = LRM staff should discuss/consult with development partners concerned more often
 - 2 = LRM staff should visit project sites more often
 - 3 = LRM staff should be more client-oriented
 - 4 = others (specify).....
15. What do you perceive as the strengths of ADB's operations (you may tick more than one answer)?
- 1 = responsiveness to the country's development needs
 - 2 = continuity in key sectors
 - 3 = fostering beneficiary/country participation and ownership
 - 4 = others (specify).....
16. What do you perceive as the weaknesses of ADB's operations (you may tick more than one answer)?
- 1 = lack of a well-integrated, programmatic modality (e.g., sector wide approach [SWAP]) to provide systematic and coherent assistance in some sectors
 - 2 = overly ambitious and complex project/program design in some sectors
 - 3 = lack of synergies between related sectors
 - 4 = others (specify).....
17. Please suggest ways to improve ADB's operations in the future (you may tick more than one answer).
- 1 = focusing on a smaller number of sectors (specify sectors).....
 -
 - 2 = delegating more projects to LRM to administer
 - 3 = adopting the SWAP in some sectors
 - 4 = others (specify).....

18. What do you perceive as the main obstacle for adopting the SWAP?

- 1 = different definitions of the SWAP concept among donors
- 2 = insufficient capacity of government agencies concerned to adopt/implement the SWAP
- 3 = insufficient coordination among donors to encourage the Government to start adopting/initiating the SWAP
- 4 = others (specify)

19. To what extent do you think the country's development agenda (e.g., the national growth and poverty eradication strategy [NGPES] and current medium-term plan) have been led by the Government?

- 1 = fully led by the Government
- 2 = generally led by the Government
- 3 = generally led by donors
- 4 = fully led by donors

20. What do you think is the most important way to improve Government's leadership and ownership in the country's development agenda?

- 1 = improving overall aid coordination among development partners
- 2 = improving coordination system among government agencies responsible for planning, aid mobilization, and poverty monitoring
- 3 = increasing government participation in the design of donors' projects and country strategies and programs
- 4 = others (specify).....

21. To achieve sustainable poverty reduction, what do you think should be the country's development priorities in the next 5 years?


.....
.....

22. Do you think the country will have sufficient budget to achieve long-term development objectives identified in the NGPES?

- 1 = no
- 2 = yes

23. What do you perceive as the major development constraints/challenges of the country?

FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGY QUALITY ASSESSMENT



Ex = excellent, Ad = adequate, Mod = moderate.

A. Progress Indicators Identified, Baseline Described and Quantified, Time-Bound Targets Over Baseline Established?

1. These three indicators assess the extent to which the expected results from the strategy were specified in measurable terms over a quantified baseline situation.
2. The maximum score means comprehensively present overall and for sectors (2).
3. Rating: any score between 2 and 0.

B. Strategic Gap Identified?

4. Related to the above, this indicator assesses whether the gap between target and baseline is clearly stated.
5. The maximum score means that the size of the task to be addressed by the strategy is clear overall and for each sector (4).

C. Asian Development Bank's Broader Strategic Agenda

6. This indicator assesses the extent to which Asian Development Bank's (ADB) broader strategic agenda (overarching, crosscutting, and sector policies and strategies) influenced choices made in the country strategy. De facto, it may be an assessment of the ability of those policies to exert an influence.
7. The maximum score means that ADB's general, sector, and thematic strategies and policies were explicitly taken into account and were influential in setting the boundaries or parameters for what is in or out of the strategy at the country level (10).

8. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

D. Country Policies

9. This indicator assesses the extent to which stated country strategies, plans, and policies were assessed and taken into account in the strategy. It goes beyond a simple assessment of alignment. Alignment with a flawed strategy or alignment to a policy to which the government is not really committed is not positive.
10. The maximum score means that country policies were carefully assessed, their relevance determined and, where relevant, ADB's strategy was aligned with these (10).

11. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

E. Coordination with Other Partners

12. This indicator assesses the extent to which the programs of other development partners were taken into account and influenced the choices made by ADB, i.e., "aid coordination." Real coordination should go beyond mere avoidance of duplication to exploit opportunities for synergy, including pooling of funds were appropriate.

13. The maximum score means that an assessment of the programs and strategies of other development partners was made, that demonstrable efforts to achieve synergy were made and that dialogue was held with partners. Opportunities for two-way partnership should be evident (10).

14. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

F. Analytical Basis (10)

15. This indicator assesses the extent to which the strategy was based on evidence from sound analysis.

- (i) The number, coverage, and rigor of economic, sector, or other studies—where commissioned/carried out by ADB or others—upon which the strategic analysis is based.
- (ii) The economic context and the consequences of this are clearly spelled out.
- (iii) The policy context and the consequences of this are clearly spelled out.
- (iv) The political economy context and the consequences of this are clearly spelled out.
- (v) Institutional analysis has been carried out and the consequences of this incorporated.
- (vi) Stakeholder analysis has been carried out and the consequences of this incorporated.
- (vii) The lessons from previous strategies have been identified and incorporated in the new strategy.
- (viii) Economic modeling has been carried out to compare alternative approaches, particularly with respect to exploring policy options.

16. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

G. Option Identification

17. This indicator assesses whether ADB has explicitly considered more than one option before settling on its strategic approach. Did ADB approach strategy preparation with an open mind or was the strategy written to justify decisions already made? Evidence of option consideration indicates that a “closed mind” approach may not have prevailed.

18. The maximum score means several alternative strategic approaches were explicitly considered and the reasons for the preferred approach clearly given (10).

19. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

H. Stakeholder Involvement

20. This indicator assesses the extent to which stakeholders had influence and have demonstrated ownership of the strategic choices made.

21. The maximum score means that all key stakeholders participated in the strategy development and that their input demonstrably affected the choices made (10).

22. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

I. Consistency and Coherence

23. This indicator assesses the extent to which the strategy avoids internal contradictions in its strategic choices and the extent to which the various elements of the strategy link together as a coherent overall program.

24. The maximum score means that there are no internal contradictions in the strategy and that there is a coherence and synergy demonstrably evident in the total of ADB operations (public and private sector operations, technical assistance, economic and sector work, and policy dialogue) (10).

25. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

J. Critical Mass/Focus

26. This indicator assesses the extent to which ADB's strategy and proposed package of resources to any one area is likely to be sufficient to produce sustained results. A key limiting factor is likely to be ADB's human resources. Are these stretched too thin to provide a critical mass of ideas and support?

27. The maximum score means a clear and limited focus by sector and/or subsector, target group and/or geographic area, consistent with the size of the overall resource envelope, such that substantial and sustainable results are likely to be achieved (10).

28. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

K. Assumptions and Risks

29. This indicator assesses the extent to which the strategy explicitly identifies the risks that could prevent strategy realization and the assumptions upon which success is predicated. Mitigation measures for risks should be identified. Particularly important are political economy risks.

30. The maximum score means that assumptions and risks associated with the strategy are explicitly identified and that mitigation measures for risks are identified (10).

31. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

L. Continuity

32. This indicator assesses the extent to which ADB's strategy provides critical mass over time. Is the strategy building on past experience with clearly identified learning?

33. The maximum score means that there is clear evidence of a medium- to long-term commitment to an area of focus such that results can expect to build over time based on accumulated knowledge and experience (10).

34. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

M. Partnerships

35. This indicator assesses the extent to which the strategy incorporates genuine partnerships (not always with ADB as the lead partner) such that results are likely to be greater than those that would be achieved by ADB working alone.

36. The maximum score means that synergistic partnership opportunities are identified with other funding agencies, nongovernment organizations, private sector, and civil society (10).

37. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

N. Positioning

38. This indicator aims to assess the extent to which the strategy identifies and justifies a position of comparative advantage for ADB.

39. The maximum score means that ADB's comparative advantage(s) are clearly identified and justified and the strategy is demonstrably consistent with those comparative advantages (10).

40. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

O. Performance Monitoring and Evaluation

41. This indicator assesses the extent to which the strategy incorporates the means for monitoring and evaluating the attainment of strategy and the results of strategy.

42. The maximum score means that the process of monitoring and evaluation is fully provided for in terms who will do this, how, and when. Costs provided for (10).

43. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

P. Innovativeness

44. This indicator assesses the degree to which the strategy demonstrates innovation.

45. The maximum score means a high degree of innovativeness based on learning and with a well justified rationale (10).

46. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.

Q. Flexibility

47. This indicator assesses the degree to which the need for, and means of, flexibility is incorporated.

48. The maximum score means the role and justification for emergent strategy is explicitly covered and the process for decision-making is clearly spelled out (10).

49. Rating: any score between 10 and 0.