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I. Executive Summary
II. The Policy Context
III. International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism
IV. The Policy
>> A. Regional Context and Challenges
B. Operational Content of the Policy
V. Implementing the Policy
VI. Recommendation
Enhancing the Asian Development Bank's Role in Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism : IV. The Policy

A. Regional Context and Challenges

56. In assuming any role in the overall international efforts to combat ML and FT, it is important for ADB to identify and then address the unique challenges, needs, and circumstances faced by its DMCs in the Asian and Pacific region. By viewing the ML/FT problem in its regional context, ADB will be better able to determine what appropriate complementary measures it might usefully take in addition to those adopted at the global level, to address the specific needs of its DMCs.

57. The typology exercises carried out by FATF and APG have highlighted a number of the prominent features of the ML problem in the Asian and Pacific region. First, among the Asian DMCs, the primary source of ML is domestic criminal activity, while in the Pacific DMCs, ML appears to derive largely from external criminal activity. Second, informal financing mechanisms are quite prevalent in Asia. Third, the use of cash figures prominently in business and financial transactions; and cash smuggling across borders is believed to be significant.

58. In addition, the findings of RETA 5967 provide a useful perspective on the critical needs and problems faced by DMCs in combating ML. The nine countries presented a very interesting regional sample or cross-section of DMCs for analysis and, as such, enabled ADB to better understand the ML problem in its regional context and also to identify its own future role in assisting DMCs in this area.

59. The key findings of the RETA include the following:

(i) There is considerable variance among the AML regimes in these countries. Major differences include limitations in the number of predicateoffenses, threshold amounts for STR, bank secrecy laws, little or no regulatory oversight over offshore entities, and insufficiency of sanctions. The main risk flowing from these wide variances in AML laws is that they enable criminals to engage in regulatory arbitrage (i.e., to choose to launder their funds through more lax jurisdictions) and also hinder international cooperation and mutual assistance efforts.

(ii) Most AML laws focus on financial institutions, thereby leaving a major loophole that would effectively permit several other types of entities or persons (e.g., alternative remittance systems; international business corporations, shell companies, and trusts; real estate agencies; automobile dealers; jewelers; casinos; and “gatekeepers” such as accountants, financial advisers, and lawyers) to continue ML activities.

(iii) AML laws are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the establishment of a truly effective AML regime. Institutional capability in AML agencies to effectively implement AML laws is equally important, but in most of the countries surveyed this was still inadequate. In the small Pacific DMCs, the problem is particularly acute, and cries out for innovative solutions. In all countries, the need for additional TA to beef up organizational arrangements and develop systems and procedures is critical.

(iv) Many of the AML agencies are “operating in the dark” in this relatively new and highly sophisticated area of AML, with little or no technical expertise at this time, particularly in the Pacific DMCs. To fill this skills gap, it is essential that TA be directed towards providing hands-on training in financial analysis, financial intelligence, and investigation techniques. The conduct of in-country training programs and secondment of local staff to established foreign AML agencies or FIUs would be highly desirable.

(v) International cooperation and mutual assistance arrangements in the region are generally very weak. Given the transnational characteristics of ML, international cooperation and mutual assistance should be substantially strengthened to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of ML.

(vi) Between the two groups of countries, priority should be given to addressing the critical needs of the Pacific countries, which, by dint of their small size, location, relatively weaker legal frameworks and institutional capacity, and larger offshore financial sector, have the most urgent need for TA.

(vii) Social and cultural factors and business traditions in Asian and Pacific societies have also posed obstacles to enforcing customer identification requirements and STR. This is a problem that is best addressed through the holding of public workshops and public awareness programs to highlight the dangers posed by ML to the economy in general and to financial institutions in particular.



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IV. The Policy
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B. Operational Content of the Policy