



Consultants' Report

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Scoping Study on Capacity Development for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Report for Capacity Development Workshop, 3 September 2007

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Asian Development Bank

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	–	Asian Development Bank
CB	–	capacity building
CCB	–	Citizen Community Board
CD	–	capacity development
CIDA	–	Canadian International Development Authority
CMIPHC	–	Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary Health Care
DAC	–	Development Assistance Committee
DAD	–	Development Assistance Database
DFID	–	Department for International Development
DMG	–	District Management Group
DPHE	–	Department of Public Health Engineering
DSD	–	Directorate of Staff Development
EAD	–	Economic Affairs Division
EC	–	European Commission
ECDPM	–	European Centre for Development Policy Management
ESRA	–	Education Sector Reforms Assistance
FGoP	–	Federal Government of Pakistan
GIS	–	Geographical Information System
GoPj	–	Government of Punjab
GoS	–	Government of Sindh
JICA	–	Japan International Co-operation Agency
M&E	–	monitoring and evaluation
MDB	–	Multilateral Development Bank
MDG	–	Millennium Development Goals
MWD	–	Ministry of Women's Development
NGO	–	nongovernment organization
NHMP	–	National Highways and Motorway Police
NPIWC	–	National Program for Improvement of Water Courses
NRB	–	National Reconstruction Bureau
OECD	–	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PESRP	–	Punjab Education Sector Reform Program
P(M)IU	–	Project/Program (Management) Implementation Unit
PMDFC	–	Punjab Municipal Development Fund Company
PMSIP	–	Punjab Municipal Services Improvement Program
PPAF	–	Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund
PPP	–	public-private partnership
PRMP	–	Punjab Resource Management Program
PRSP	–	Punjab Rural Support Program
SAP	–	Social Action Program
SIUT	–	Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation
SPU	–	Strategy and Planning Unit (of Faisalabad District)
SWAp	–	Sector Wide Approach
TPE	–	Third Party Evaluation
UNDP	–	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	–	United States Agency for International Development
WB	–	World Bank
WDR	–	World Development Report
WTO	–	World Trade Organization

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"Make an inventory of successful pilot projects in the country and then study them carefully.....We should learn lessons from these success stories' 'Also make an inventory of abandoned schemes..."

"Let us see some success stories that show that, with courage of conviction and an honest effort, it is possible to achieve the desired results. History is being made all round us in bits and pieces."

– Siddiqui (2005), p. 176 and p.185

"If you believe there is no possibility of change, you guarantee there is no possibility of change."
– Noam Chomsky

"Donors spend more time undermining public sector capacity than they do creating it."
– Senior aid agency official, Islamabad

"Donors often tend to sap local capacity by over-designing development projects and by distorting incentives of local agents."

– Parveen Rehman, Director, OPP

"It's about time donors started backing devolution by building Local Government capacities, instead of building up PMUs at Provincial level."

– Senior NRB Official

"We like to be beseeching supplicants, not 'demanders.'"

– Tasneem Siddiqui (2005), p. 102

"Ordinary public services that should be provided to the citizens by right in developing societies are procured through *sifarish*.¹"

– Islam (2004), p. 322

"To be effective, competent people have to act independently. This nobody likes."

– Tasneem Siddiqui (2005), p. 114

"In order to gain capacity, trainees have to DO whatever is the focus of capacity development."

– Mary Skarie, Director, USAID Pakistan Health Office

"Kinship connections are vital in cementing and negotiating bureaucratic hurdles."

– Islam (2004), p. 322

"For friends, everything, for enemies nothing, and for the rest, strict application of the rules."

– Ex-Foreign Minister of Pakistan quoted in Islam (2004), p. 323

"Capacity Development is basically all about Change Management."

– Zafar Hasan Reza, Joint Secretary, EAD

¹ Sifarish = an Urdu word meaning 'a recommendation or a connection'. It involves finding relative or close friend who knows a functionary or has some influence to get things done.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report is responsive to the requirements of the first phase of the ToRs at Appendix A, and is intended for presentation and discussion at the planned workshop in the ADB Conference Room on 3 September 2007. Among other purposes, it seeks to propose a short-list of 'candidate' case studies in capacity development, which would be researched in more detail and written up by case stakeholders in 'write-shops' in Phase II. It is based on literature review and discussions in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore over the past four weeks.

As expected, the **notion of "capacity" and particularly "capacity development"** are open to a variety of interpretations in Pakistan. One—very typical—interpretation was to *associate capacity building with training programs of various types*. The latter is the most commonly-used term in Pakistan on the basis of our consultations.¹ However, other discussions illustrated that *the capacity of a group of individuals to deliver a service can be improved by changing the way they are managed*, even in the absence of additional training. It illustrated how "capacity"—perhaps especially in the public service—can be "latent" (invisible, unrealized, yet present nonetheless: all that is needed to reveal these capacities is a more enlightened, efficient, consistent (and autonomous) management regime.

The most graphic illustration of the elasticity of definitions of capacity development here is the *variety of activities which currently are deemed to be capacity-oriented in budgets* for projects or initiatives related to "capacity building." See Appendix D on Budgets for "Capacity Building."² More work may be merited to explore trends in budgets and donor-supported activities in the field of capacity development *on the assumption that this would indeed be useful. [Could workshop participants comment on this, please?]*. There are also some interesting variations on the essential *preconditions* for this notion of capacity to be realized. Opinions differed as to whether a *narrow definition of capacity development*—improving (individuals') skills through training, and rationalizing staffing structures or modernizing organizational procedures—was adequate, *or whether "governance" factors* (connected with incentives; public and political accountability structures, and the exercising of power relationships; the relevance of the legal or policy framework) *were an essential and inseparable element of the capacity development process*. The socio-political context in Pakistan implies that this position—seeing governance issues as entwined in capacity issues—has value and relevance for analysis of capacity development in the public sector.

Another conclusion based on discussions was that the **operational "environment"** *was the most crucial determinant of an organization's capacity to perform, in Pakistan's governance context*. The key "environmental" issues were absence of political or "pressure group" interference with assignment/recruitment/promotion/posting or dismissal of staff; a supportive and materially adequate working environment; and focus on a limited set of tasks and standards to uphold. This echoes the observations of the recent OECD/DAC review of capacity development (OECD/DAC 2006, p.8) that "an organization's capacity depends on its 'enabling environment.'"

¹ The OECD/DAC paper on capacity development good practice differs in this regard, and disputes whether the "building" analogy is applicable: since it depicts construction of a new structure on a plain surface, according to a preconceived design. "Experience suggests that capacity is not successfully enhanced in this way" (OECD/DAC 2006, page 9). Throughout this report, the term "capacity development" is used except where it is referring to a statement or document in Pakistan or elsewhere where "capacity building" is used.

² Three illustrative budgets' provisions for capacity development have been consulted and presented at Appendix D: the Punjab Development budget for 2006/07; the Federal budget 2007/08 (distilled by Dr. Awan in JICA), and the Development Assistance Database (all of which use "capacity building").

The main characteristics of the **historical, political economy, and bureaucratic cultural environment** of the Pakistan public service are covered in Section 3. The OECD/DAC review of international capacity development experience lists the conditions which have made public sector capacity development difficult. Pakistan has demonstrated, and to a large extent still displays, some of these conditions (see Box 2). Partly as a consequence of these characteristics, little sustained capacity has survived after the termination of a range of earlier capacity development initiatives (summarized in Appendix E). The main **problems reported in the histories of earlier capacity development cases** include inadequate (and therefore misleading) analysis of both the precise needs (and absorptive capacity) of the target institutions and groups of prospective capacity development efforts; limited consideration of the operational environments; political interference was a problem in certain cases (e.g., SAP); lack of ownership by senior officials of some CD programs; deficient capacities of the (private-sector-oriented) consulting industry to deal with public sector realities; public sector training and manpower development establishments unable to analyze public sector performance problems and address them effectively; large numbers of trainees per training program; thereafter little or no "on-job" follow up or coaching, and absence of supportive legal provisions.

However, it is encouraging to note—as a counterweight to the often negative previous experience in capacity development—that there are **clear success stories within the Pakistan public sector**. We have identified at Appendix G a "long-list" of such cases from which it is hoped that government and donor representatives will be able to choose a "short-list." These represent unambiguous capacity development within the Pakistan public service, both **with and without external (donor) assistance**, "against all the odds." These will form the cases for more detailed analysis by national consultants and some of the stakeholders in the write-shops planned for Phase II.

The **issues affecting capacity development in the public sector in Pakistan** are in two categories: those affecting the **public service**; and those arising within **donor (or MDB) institutions** affecting their readiness, flexibility, and ability to address capacity development effectively. In the first category, the **historical political context** is inevitably a major factor: democracy in Pakistan has had a flawed history with the state largely retaining the capacity to operate autonomously of popular pressures. The colonial practice of curtailing local politics and privileging executive/bureaucratic systems of rule established a model of patrimonial politics. There are few incentives for parties to organize themselves to formulate a social manifesto through which to create ties with constituents. This enables those already dominant to use legislative, fiscal and administrative instruments to protect the status quo. The presence of entrenched local informal power networks weakens the ability of state to ensure or enforce basic citizens' entitlements. This is borne out by Pakistan's development experience which is marked by significant social development gap and by grave inequities of development outcomes. Demands for better services are muted in part because public awareness (and expectations) of various sectoral reforms appears to be low. Some observers cast doubt on the efficacy of greater public awareness. This absence of pressure for better performance is due in their view to the legacy of the feudal structure of Pakistan society.

Issues within the civil service include the propensity to transfer senior officials (and even middle-ranking officials at District level) frequently. This has been cited by most informants as a factor diminishing the impact of any specialized training provided by donors as part of capacity-developmental initiatives. Rapid turnover of key managerial staff also precludes team building and development of organizational units as better-functioning entities, and impedes the establishment and sustained operation of improved processes or career development for

immediate subordinates. There is a lack of incentives to apply consistently and over a period of time, any learning or innovative approaches derived from training, workshops or international study tour exposure. "Environmental" factors frustrate any efforts to manage, develop, reward, and utilize human resources objectively and efficiently over a sustained period in the public sector. Furthermore, officers working at district level are usually members of their respective provincial government's establishment (or of a Federal cadre such as the District Management Group). Hence their promotion, transfers and postings, leave, etc., are essentially decided by levels of government other than their district 'home' working base.

Issues related to **conceptions about and approaches to training** include the "immobility" of public service training providers. Thus, *on-site* (e.g., actually in a district government) problem-diagnosis and needs-analysis rarely happen. Perceived low status and low priority for resource allocation negatively affect the capacity of such staff development centers. There is a tendency to consider individual officers as subjects of training rather than teams. This militates against the possibility of a "critical mass" of officials being similarly equipped by training to collaborate productively. The "bosses" of trainees are rarely oriented to the nature and subsequent possible implications for application, of training to be attended by their subordinates. Opportunities for training tend to be allocated first to relatively senior staff, and only thereafter to middle level officials. However, in certain sectors (including some of the case studies), key functions are performed by relatively lowly-graded staff.

Within and among **donors in capacity development**, a variety of factors have emerged, which impinge on their own capacity to embrace capacity development issues, and support to the public sector in Pakistan. For example, no single adviser, in any of the Pakistan offices of development partners consulted, was specifically responsible for their agencies' work towards this over-arching goal. Thus, donor cooperation towards the capacity goals of the Paris Declaration in-country appears to have been impeded. Government and donor players lack clear accountability structures for handling capacity development as an element of their programs. Speed and flexibility of response by a multilateral or bilateral agency to a government request or invitation to collaborate in capacity development is crucial. However, it appears that donors' procedures—and inadequate access to information or networks of specialized institutions—often obstruct rapid, technically optimal, locally appropriate technical support to capacity development in Pakistan. External partners and institutions other than just consulting firms are needed to support Pakistan's capacity development. It appears that this poses a challenge for some development agencies.

All agencies acknowledged that—to varying degrees—pressures to disburse committed volumes of financial and technical assistance were a factor inhibiting gradual, pragmatic, decentralized, small-scale, pilot-project initiatives which might cast light on the effectiveness—and especially the sustainability—of capacity development initiatives. Such pressures also make it difficult for an aid agency to "say no." Professional and career incentives within development agencies are generally not conducive to cautious and careful assessment of the effectiveness and sustainability of capacity development support or investments.

Notwithstanding these issues (on both sides), the past few years have seen a **growing international consensus that "capacity matters" in development co-operation**, and that lessons from international experience—positive and negative—need to be learned and put into practice in future capacity programs. The OECD/DAC 2005 paper represents a **synthesis** of such experience. The other major international initiative in reviewing capacity in recent years

has been the ECDPM-coordinated study on Capacity Change and Performance (2003–2007).³ The ECDPM study has thrown up other important **insights** as to the characteristics of "capacitated" organizations (and networks), which were the subject of cases reviewed in the overall study. These included having *time and "space" to experiment, to learn and renew itself* on the basis of real experience and changing environments; to be seen as *accountable to, and legitimate* in the eyes of, those it serves; to possess *a shared vision* of what it is trying to achieve. These **factors** appear to be the characteristics which most often resonate with the success stories which feature in the "long-list" of cases in the tabulation at Appendix G. One of the most significant findings of the ECDPM study was the apparent relevance of "systems thinking" to considerations of capacity development (see Box 5 for a summary of key features of this approach to thinking about capacity). This raises questions as to the feasibility of planning capacity development initiatives in detail at the start, and puts emphasis on creating environments in which learning—about "what is changing, what works?"—is promoted.

The shaded category in Appendix G describes the **suggested "long list" of cases**. They have been identified based on the **criteria** at Appendix F. They are as follows (not in priority order):

1. Punjab PERSP PMIU (WB assisted)*
2. Faisalabad District Devolution Support (SPU) (DFID assisted)
3. Punjab Municipal Service Improvement Project (and PMDFC) (WB)*
4. Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund approach to enhancing *partners'* capacity to deliver services through developing and utilizing *networks* (WB/PPAF)
5. Support to Elected Women's Political Empowerment (UNDP/Norwegian/Aurat Foundation Assistance)
6. Punjab Teacher Training (in English language) (GoPj funded)*
7. HIV/AIDs Surveillance Programme (CIDA)
8. Orangi Pilot Project (Squatter Upgrading) Karachi (Own resources + GoS)
9. Punjab Literacy Promotion Pilot Project (JICA assisted)*
10. Education Sector Reform Assistance (USAID)*
11. Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary Health Care (Government of Punjab)*
12. National Highways and Motorway Police (FGoP; NHMP)
13. National Water Course Improvement Programme – Sindh (GoS)
14. District/Public Safety Commission (Faisalabad) (GoPj and ADB)*
15. Gender Justice Through Musalihat Anjuman Project (UNDP Norwegian, SDC)
16. Punjab Resource Management Program (GoPj and ADB)*
17. Trade Related Technical Assistance WTO/EU (EC)

* Indicates cases which involve a provincial-level PM(I)U oriented in some way to supporting capacity development at district or TMA level, and which therefore raise questions about the optimal approach to capacity development for local governments (see Box 6). We propose as a "shadow" case study (worthy of investigation into capacity aspects), but not through the present study, the issue of whether positive capacity "spin-offs" from such units' work at local government level are happening. Please see Appendix G.

The aim of workshop discussion is to narrow down the "long-list" into approximately 12 cases.

³ All the 18 cases, and related Theme Papers, are available on www.ecdpm.org by accessing the link to the Study of Capacity Change and Performance.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report is responsive to the requirements of the first phase of the ToRs at Appendix A, and is intended for presentation and discussion at the planned workshop in the ADB Conference Room on 3 September 2007. Among other purposes, it seeks to propose a short-list of "candidate" case studies in capacity development, which would be researched in more detail and written up in "write-shops" in Phase II. The resulting cases would be "raw material" for a synthesis of contemporary approaches to capacity development which have been shown to "work" in the public sector, as a basis for the formulation of a policy to guide future support to capacity development in the Pakistan public sector. Such a policy would be discussed at a conference in the new year, in the third phase of the study.

2. The consultants, David Watson and Adnan Qadir Khan, have consulted the people at Appendix B in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore, and referred to the documents at Appendix C. They are most grateful for the time and ideas their informants contributed to their discussions.

3. The paper summarizes and reflects on some of the notions of, and budget provisions for, "capacity," "capacity development," and "capacity building" derived from discussions with donor, departmental and candidate case study interviewees, and perusal of budgeted provisions.¹ It then outlines the main characteristics of the public sector institutional environment and bureaucratic culture in Pakistan. With evidence from earlier attempts at public sector capacity development (mainly focused on improving education services, dating from the late 1990s to 2004) it summarizes common pitfalls in previous capacity development programs. These earlier cases in capacity development are summarized in Appendix E. These sections provide a basis for a synthesis of the issues affecting capacity development within the public sector, *and* those affecting donors' abilities to support capacity processes effectively. The issues give rise to paradoxes in capacity development thinking and activities in the public sector in Pakistan. These are summarized in Box 3.

4. The paper then puts the Pakistan discussion in the context of broader international research and debate: the MDGs; the Paris Declaration; the DAC Governance Network's synthesis of donor agencies' diverse experience in the capacity field, and the long-running international research for DAC's Governance Network on capacity, change and performance conducted by ECDPM. The paper concludes with a commentary on "long-listed" candidate cases, against a list of criteria (Appendix F) applicable in making a "short-listing." Appendix G presents an annotated list of "long-listed" cases, as well as others worthy of study but for a variety of reasons are not within the scope of the present study.

II. NOTIONS OF CAPACITY AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAKISTAN PUBLIC SECTOR

BOX 1: SOME DEFINITIONS OF CAPACITY AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Capacity: "The ability of people, organizations and society as a whole to manage their affairs successfully."

Capacity Development: "The process whereby people, organizations & society as a whole unleash, strengthens, creates, adapts & maintain capacity over time."

Definitions used in OECD/DAC 2006

¹ See Appendix D for an account of some budgets for capacity development.

Capacity: "The ability of people and organizations to perform tasks and produce outputs."

Capacity Development: "Is defined as a process by which people and organizations create and strengthen capacity over time."

*Definitions from
EC Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development. Why, what and how?*

Capacity: "That emergent combination of individual competencies, collective capabilities, assets and relationships that enables a human system to create value for others."

*Definition adopted in the ECDPM Study on
Capacity Change and Performance 2007: Final Synthesis Report (forthcoming)*

5. As expected, the notion of "capacity" and, particularly, "capacity development" are open to a variety of interpretations in Pakistan, if the dialogues we have had over the past few weeks are anything to go by. One—very typical—interpretation was to *associate capacity building with training programs of various types*. "Capacity building" (CB) is the most commonly used term in Pakistan on the basis of our consultations.² For example, the Punjab Resource Management Programme's Capacity Building Framework (GoPj 2006) presents a comprehensive array of training programs to support a noticeably more "managerial" public sector environment in the next few years. One of our interviewees made a distinction between capacity development and changed management practices: "All we did was change the management arrangements, and this improved service delivery performance. We could not pursue extensive capacity building [interpreted as off-job training] because that would take staff away from the service delivery centers." This statement describes how *the capacity of a group of individuals to deliver a service can be improved by changing the way they are managed*, even in the absence of additional training. It illustrates how "capacity" can be "latent" (invisible, unrealized, yet present nonetheless): all that is needed in this case to reveal these capacities was a more enlightened, efficient, consistent (and autonomous) management regime.

6. The most graphic illustration of the elasticity of definitions of "capacity development" here is the *variety of activities which currently are deemed to be capacity-oriented in budgets for projects or initiatives related to "capacity building"*. See Appendix D on Budgets for "Capacity Building."³ Budget items in the Punjab for "Capacity Building" range from civil works, to equipment, to routine staff expenditures. It is also interesting to see what is not deemed to be CB when in fact a broad definition would so classify it.⁴ The Federal Budget 07/08 illustrates the sheer volume of resources being devoted to this (broad) category of activity. The Development Assistance Database (DAD) data illustrates problems in donors' filing their data consistently (both in terms of regularity and in terms of definitions). Our conclusions are that

- a) A wide range of activities and conditions contribute to the growth (or destruction and depletion of, or damage to) capacity.

² The OECD/DAC paper on capacity development good practice differs in this regard, and disputes whether the 'building' analogy is applicable: since it depicts construction of a new structure on a plain surface, according to a preconceived design. 'Experience suggests that capacity is not successfully enhanced in this way' (OECD/DAC 2006 page 9). Throughout this report, the term 'capacity development' is used except where it is referring to a statement or document in Pakistan or elsewhere where 'capacity building' is used.

³ Three illustrative CB budgets' provisions have been consulted and presented at Appendix D: the Punjab Development budget for 2006/07; the Federal budget 2007/08 (distilled by Dr Awan in JICA), and the Development Assistance Database.

⁴ In the case of the Punjab police, CB is one of three items (at Rs30 million in 06/07). The others are development of a model system in 4 Thanas (Rs10 million) and Creation of Citizens Councils and Social Audit Systems for Thanas. Yet all three could plausibly be classified as Capacity Development. (p594).

- b) Any empirical analysis of "capacity building" presupposes a strict yet comprehensive definition of the sorts of items, activities, and programs which are contributory to public sector capacities. Expenditures which should be incorporated in such activities, has to be defined before comparisons between provinces, years, departments, sectors, and donors are meaningful.
- c) Such definitions would be difficult to draw up.
- d) Quantitative fiscal movements may indicate major "environmental" shifts affecting prospects for devolved capacity development (e.g., the apparent halving of Punjab's District government grants between 05/6 and 06/7). These should be taken into account in any overall assessment of the impact of fiscal provisions on "capacity."
- e) More work may be merited to explore trends in budgets and donor-supported activities in the field of "capacity building" *on the assumption that this would indeed be useful. [Could workshop participants comment on this, please?]*

7. While there is an apparent tacit consensus—even in Pakistan—that the *notion of "capacity" is concerned with the capabilities of an individual or organization or work unit to "perform"*—to undertake effectively the tasks assigned to it—there are some interesting variations on the essential *preconditions* for this notion of capacity to be realized.

8. Opinions differed as to whether a *narrow definition of capacity development*—enhancement of improving (individuals') skills through training, and rationalizing staffing structures or modernizing organizational procedures—was adequate, *or whether "governance" factors* (connected with incentives, public and political accountability structures and the exercising of power relationships, the relevance of the legal or policy framework) *were an essential and inseparable element of the capacity development process*. As we shall examine below, the latter is becoming the "accepted wisdom" in international discussion of the theme. The socio-political context in Pakistan implies that this position—seeing governance issues as entwined in capacity issues—has value for analysis of capacity development in the public sector. The statement above about changed management arrangements leading to improved performance clearly (implicitly) relates to this broader notion of capacity development.

9. Another senior informant in response to a question on the place of "capacity development" in his organization, made the point that "capacity development" is only one part of the components and factors for the organizations' relative success. *For him, the operational "environment" was the most crucial determinant of an organization's capacity to perform, in Pakistan's governance context*. The key "environmental" issues were

- a) absence of political or "pressure group" interference with assignment/recruitment/promotion/posting or dismissal of staff; (thus permitting managers to reward good performance and punish wrongdoings or incompetence without fear of politically-inspired retribution or reversal);
- b) a supportive and materially adequate working environment (in terms of access to essential equipment, running costs, and service infrastructure and accommodation conditions); and
- c) focus on a limited set of tasks and standards to uphold.

10. In conceptualizing capacity in this way, he shared the observations of the recent OECD/DAC review of capacity development (OECD/DAC, 2006, p.8) that "an organization's capacity depends on its 'enabling environment.'" See below for a summary of the public service political, historical and cultural context, and thereafter a summary of previous capacity development experience within it.

III. THE PAKISTAN PUBLIC SERVICE CONTEXT

11. The OECD/DAC review of international capacity development experience lists the conditions, which have made public sector capacity development difficult (OECD/DAC 2006, p.13), summarized in Box 2 below. It appears, from our own and other analysts' observations, that many of these conditions have relevance for Pakistan.

BOX 2. DAC CAPACITY SYNTHESIS REPORT'S SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS IN WHICH CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IS DIFFICULT

Lack of a broadly enabling environment

- Lack of human security & presence of armed conflict
- Poor economic policies discouraging pro-poor growth
- Weak scrutiny of the legislative branch on the executive branch
- Lack of effective voice of the intended beneficiaries
- Entrenched corruption
- Entrenched & widespread clientelism or patrimonialism

Aspects of government ineffectiveness environment

- Fragmented government with poor overall capacity
- Absent, non-credible and/or rapidly changing policies
- Unpredictable, unbalanced or inflexible funding & staffing
- Poor public service conditions
- Segmented & compartmentalized organizations
- Only a formal commitment to performance-oriented culture

12. The DAC paper goes on the comment that country political economy studies provide a valuable first step in approaching capacity development (OECD/DAC 2006, p.17). It is widely acknowledged that Pakistan inherited a competent and well-organized bureaucracy at Independence but that the capacity and influence of the bureaucracy has diminished over the past four decades. Cheema and Sayeed (2004) ascribe this to tendency to use bureaucratic employment as a patronage mechanism and growing politicization of the bureaucracy. Internal factors have also promoted bureaucratic decline, reflected in growing levels of malfeasance and incompetence.

"The declining cohesion and fragmentation of the bureaucracy allowed individual bureaucrats to increase their discretionary powers, while outmoded and ineffective performance management measure left such actions unchecked. Low salaries and a modest benefits package exacerbate rent-seeking tendencies, and contribute to low morale and poor performance. Politicians were unable to enforce accountability on the part of bureaucrats while at the same time failing to provide an over-arching policy framework and appropriate set of incentives to guide bureaucratic behavior. Institutional reforms, political interference and changing incentive structures have had adverse consequences for the developmental performance of the bureaucracy and its capacity to deliver services and public goods effectively" (Cheema and Sayeed 2004).

13. A World Bank report, *A Framework for Civil Service Reforms in Pakistan* (1999) points to weaknesses such as an over-centralized organizational structure, inappropriate skill mix of staff, erosion of accountability within the civil service and to the public at large, and political

interference in service matters as underlining the need for reforms in the civil service. Furthermore, it highlights other issues affecting the working of public sector as lack of coordination between different cadres of the civil service, rising public sector wage costs at the expense of development expenditure, and widespread corruption.

14. Local Government Order 2001 and the parallel judicial reforms (the ADB-supported Access to Justice Program) and police reforms (Police Order 2002) aim at impacting how basic entitlements—for health, education, water and sanitation, public safety, etc.—are delivered, and how basic rights—for security of tenure over land and irrigated water, for protection of human rights and personal security—are being regulated.

15. However, decentralization reforms to the local level are not new to Pakistan, and two major experiments with local bodies under Presidents Ayub Khan and Zia ul-Haqqe have already been tried prior to the present one. Both reforms failed to bring about substantive improvement in public service delivery.

16. In many ways, the most recent local government reform is a break from this tradition in that it is far more wide-ranging than the previous plans and that it has created significantly greater autonomy for the elected local tier. These reforms have a significant potential as a driver for public sector reform. However this *potential* has been compromised so far due to a number of factors – the limited nature of the reforms, the limited space for political empowerment and electoral accountability, and the prevalence of entrenched informal control mechanisms at the local level (Cheema and Mohmand, 2003; Khan, 2007).

IV. RECENT EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

17. As is to be expected in a country context such as presented by Pakistan, there is evidence of a long history of externally—and internally—supported projects designed and intended to enhance public sector capacity, which however resulted in little sustained capacity surviving after their termination. We attach as Appendix E a series of short descriptions of capacity development initiatives in the field of education in Pakistan.⁵ The main deficiencies and problems which recur in the case histories include

- inadequate (and therefore misleading) analysis of both the precise needs (and absorptive capacity) of the target institutions and groups of prospective capacity development efforts;⁶
- limited consideration of the implications of the socio-political, bureaucratic cultural, and institutional environments into which resources were to be devoted. Political interference was a problem in certain cases (e.g., SAP);
- lack of ownership by senior officials of some CD programs, resulting in dilatory attendance and attention given to them, by their subordinates (the target trainees);
- deficient capacities of the (private-sector-oriented) consulting industry to deal with public sector realities (leading to skepticism on the part of some senior officials as to their suitability to impart "capacity building"). Public sector training and manpower

⁵ Research into the documentation of these cases was undertaken by the Scoping Study consultants as part of the Punjab Devolved Education Study for ECDPM in 2004.

⁶ The PRMP is wary of "training needs analyses" conducted on the basis of "wish-lists" of training requested by staff. Departments currently have no clear performance targets, and staff are not yet subject to objective performance evaluation. Secretaries are reportedly reluctant to permit key staff to attend training because the benefits are unclear in comparison to the considerable time-costs of absences from work which are involved.

development establishments were not able to analyze public sector performance problems and address them effectively;

- existing training programs, often relying on lectures by "visiting experts" and emphasizing information-type courses (and not acquisition of practical skills), do not challenge traditional approaches or encourage fresh perspectives;
- large numbers of trainees per training program, make participative training difficult or impossible, especially as time available was short. Thereafter, little or no "on-job" follow up or coaching to support application of new learning was provided;
- over emphasis on observance of formal rules and procedures pertaining to finance, planning and development, and personnel management often to the neglect of a more strategic examination of the rationale for public decision making and investment proposals;
- inability to translate the substantial investments in formal capacity development—through training—into improved practices for analyzing public policy issues or for implementing new ways of delivering public services; new legal provisions were sometimes necessary to provide a basis for application of a new system or approach government-wide (i.e., the content of the training). This was not forthcoming in one case.⁷

18. **Success in the Pakistan Public Sector.** It is encouraging to note—as a counterweight to the often negative previous experience in capacity development—that there are clear success stories within the Pakistan public sector. We have identified at Appendix G a "long-list" of such cases—unambiguous capacity development within the Pakistan public service—both with and without external (donor) assistance—"against all the odds"⁸ from which it is hoped that government and donor representatives will be able to choose a "short-list." These will form the cases for more detailed analysis by national consultants and some of the stakeholders in the write-shops planned for Phase II.

19. We summarize some emerging issues below (generally militating against public sector capacity development), and then relate them to some of the recent international research and literature on the subject.

V. ISSUES AFFECTING CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

20. Given the public service context summarized above, and the evidence of recent attempts at capacity enhancement, we note the broad issues here in two categories: those affecting the public service, and a second of those arising within donor (or MDB) institutions affecting their readiness flexibility and ability to address capacity development effectively.

⁷ This issue arose more recently in Punjab in connection with police training under the Access to Justice Program: legally-approved detailed procedures for conducting investigations did not exist. They had to be formulated and approved before training could take place.

⁸ In Sindh for example, there were nine major donor-funded programs to improve water courses for irrigation over a period of 24 years. Together, the total number of courses improved was 7,000. Recent experience with a largely government-resourced (and government-staffed) program has yielded 5,750 courses improved in *one year* (2006/7).

A. Within the Public Service of Pakistan

21. A range of indigenous factors and practices appear to affect capacity development within the public service. They include

1. The historical, political, and cultural context

- a. Pakistan's democratic tradition has remained questionable, at best. Having inherited a highly centralized colonial state, dominated by a strong bureaucracy and military, **democracy in Pakistan has had a flawed history** with the state largely retaining the capacity to operate autonomously of popular pressures. Prior social structure (*biraderi, tribes, etc.*) considerations reigned supreme in the colonial government's calculus of co-opting native elites that helped establish territorial nexus of administration with patrimonial politics (Waseem 1994).⁹ The colonial practice of **curtailing local politics and privileging executive/bureaucratic systems of rule established a model of patrimonial politics**. Craig and Porter (2005) argue that this engineered political system provided **little incentives to organize parties as a mechanism to consolidate power or stand on a social manifesto through which to create ties with constituents** and enabled those already dominant to use legislative, fiscal, and administrative instruments to protect the status quo.¹⁰ Politics in Pakistan is characterized by the **personalization of the political sphere**. Within this model of patrimonialism, political ties are largely based on leadership-centered, informal groupings. The presence of such **entrenched local power weakens the ability of state to ensure or enforce basic citizens' entitlements** (Mohmand 2005).¹¹ This is borne out by Pakistan's development experience which is marked by **significant social development gap and by grave inequities of development outcomes** and by an emphasis on providing targeted goods rather than universal goods (Easterly 2003).¹²
- b. A factor which may be significant in terms of the context in which reforms are being attempted, and in which relevant capacities developed, is the fact that **public awareness (and expectations?) of various sectoral reforms is low**. This is reportedly the case among professionals such as lawyers in the case of the major Access to Justice Reforms Program. This factor may be a cause of limited public, pressure-group, media, and parliamentary pressures on the executive to deliver, or at least account for the huge volume of resources devoted to pursuit of these reforms.

⁹ Waseem, M. 1994. *Politics and the State in Pakistan*. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research.

¹⁰ Craig, D. and D. Porter. 2005. *Development Beyond Neoliberalism: Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political Economy*. Routledge, in press 2005.

¹¹ Mohmand, S. 2005. *Local Government Reforms in Pakistan: Strengthening Social Capital or Rolling Back the State*, Working Paper. Lahore University of Management Sciences.

¹² Easterly, W. 2003. *The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of Pakistan*, in D. Rodrik (eds.). *In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic Growth*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

- c. Other commentators are more pessimistic, and implicitly cast doubt on the efficacy of greater public awareness. They opine that **lack of concerted public or user-group pressure for social service improvements is at least in part due to the legacy of the feudal structure of Pakistan society.**¹³ Historical and cultural factors impede the abilities of civil servants to serve the public without favor (as outlined above in the "context" section).

2. Issues within the civil service

- d. A generic issue affecting all levels of state bureaucracy is **the propensity to transfer senior officials (and even middle-ranking officials at District level) frequently.** This may relate to established norms of service duration; fears of abuse of office from over-long familiarity with associated organizational or personal networks, or other factors (including political/electoral factors, and perceived "loyalty"). This has been cited by most informants as a factor not only negatively affecting the impact of any specialized training provided by donors as part of capacity-developmental initiatives. Continuous "churn" of incumbents of key posts means that there is often too little time for productive and sustained application of new learning. Rapid turnover of key managerial staff also precludes team-building and development of organizational units as better-functioning entities. Frequent change of top management bodes ill for the establishment and sustained operation of improved processes or coaching and nurturing of the careers of the immediate subordinates of key managers.
- e. One of the other generic factors at play within the public service as a whole is the perceived **lack of incentives**—for individuals undertaking or participating in some form of capacity development program—**to apply consistently and over a period of time, any learning or innovative approaches derived from training, workshops or international study tour exposure.** Job descriptions—even if they are available and up to date—are rarely stated in terms of performance standards or key (measurable) competences; there is usually no obligation to undertake specialized training (or to demonstrate associated competences) before career progression through promotion or upgrading. **"Environmental factors**—public sector pay, working conditions (including availability of essential equipment for example transport ...and fuel to operate it...), and the ever-present threat of "political" interference with managerial decisions related to staff recruitment, postings, transfers, and promotions—**impede or completely frustrate any efforts to manage, develop, reward, and utilize human resources objectively and efficiently over a sustained period in the public sector.**
- f. The resulting frustrations often lead to the **exit from the public service of talent**, a growing concern with many top public servants, as well as to the perpetuation of systemic under performance.

¹³ Siddiqui (2005) for example "We like to be beseeching supplicants, not demanders" (p.102).

- g. A specific factor affecting both **incentives, and apparent accountability and "loyalty" of officers working for district governments**, is that they are members of their respective provincial government's establishment (or, for the most senior, are indeed members of the District Management Group, a Federal cadre), and therefore seconded from another service. Hence their promotion, transfers and postings, leave, etc. are essentially decided by levels of government other than their district "home" working base. The establishment of a specific District Government Cadre for local government officers has been made part of the current civil service reform program, but is yet to be enacted and introduced.¹⁴

3. Issues related to conceptions about and approaches to training

- h. Public service training providers are located in a few centers. Their staff deliver training courses in them (not in the workplace of trainees). On-site problem-diagnosis and needs-analysis rarely happen. **Low status (in terms of postings) and low priority for resource allocation negatively affect the capacity of such staff development centers.** There are very few centers or staff oriented, or physically equipped, to apply contemporary learner-centered training methodologies: they appear to be unfamiliar with good training practices in the private sector (Khan, 2006). They generally have a supply driven orientation and are not subjected to competitive pressures from within and outside the public sector.
- i. The **content** of the training in public sector training institutions is often **irrelevant** to the current needs of the public sector and the trainees. Reading lists are of highly variable quality and the normal practice does not include proper background research or survey of policy makers' specific needs before selecting a theme or its treatment (Banuri et. al., 2003).
- j. A related factor is the general **tendency to consider individual officers as subjects of training rather than teams** of officials from the same organization or functionally inter-related units. This militates against the possibility of a "critical mass" of officials being similarly equipped—in terms of new abilities or attitudes—to collaborate productively to forge some improvement or change in working practices related to prior training. The **"bosses" of trainees are rarely oriented to the nature and subsequent possible implications for application, of training to be attended by their subordinates.** If so exposed, they might as well be more supportive of innovation by trainees on their return. Some informants cite the related tendency of **opportunities for training to be allocated first to relatively senior staff, and only thereafter, from what possibilities remain, to middle level officials.** However, in certain sectors, key functions are performed by relatively lowly-graded staff.¹⁵
- k. There are examples where capacity development programs **managed and resourced from different levels of government are being**

¹⁴ A census of local government staff will precede final decision-making in the Punjab. Clearly such a far-reaching policy must await the outcomes of the imminent elections.

conducted in the same Districts and unions: methodologies differ, as do the conditions of employment of respective key field staff of the programs.¹⁶

4. Issues related to planning management and financing of "capacity development"

- i. **Growing volumes of public and donor "investment" in programs, institutions, activities, and initiatives are apparently being devoted to pursuit of capacity development, without commensurate attention to assessment of "value for money," or systematic learning from experience.**¹⁷ This was observed in the 2004 Capacity for Devolved Education Study in the Punjab (Watson and Khan 2005a), and appears to be representative of the scene at federal level. The constraints go beyond the typical problems (apparent in the international literature) of difficulties in defining what CD is, and how to assess its impact (see Watson 2006), and relate to a generic tendency to avoid close monitoring of progress and results, in favor of pushing ahead with implementation of plans, and expenditure of allocated resources. It remains to be seen whether the current concerns over introduction of "Managing for Development Results" will overcome what appear to be both systemic and attitudinal problems. On a related note, it appears that the Service Delivery Surveys (2002 and 2004) undertaken by CIET Pakistan¹⁸ have not been used as fully as intended as "mirrors" to key public service delivery agencies: providing feedback on the opinion of users on the standards of service provided.
- m. The usual observation must be made that the notion of capacity development (and what contributes, or detracts from it) is **nowhere defined within government, nor in its budgeting for CD/CB related activities.** Instead, the *usual association*—when capacity building is mentioned—**is with training** programs of varying nature. Vital complementary factors (essentially concerned with the governance environmental conditions and measures) are usually not considered as influences on the potential value of training, nor is "training" usually seen as only one of a range of complementary capacity-developing measures.¹⁹

¹⁵ The courts depend for their smooth operation on the work of Court Administrators and Clerks. Opportunities for their job and career development have been almost non-existent before the advent of the ADB-supported Access to Justice Program. The "Community Mobilisers" in the Punjab Pilot Literacy Project (JICA-supported) are a crucial element of the project, and play a vital role, but their posts are graded modestly, and they do not receive pay commensurate with the responsibilities which their jobs carry.

¹⁶ The Punjab Pilot Literacy Project for example, is taking place as the NCHD runs similar (but methodologically untested) programs in the vicinity, with a more favorable pattern of resource-availability.

¹⁷ See Appendix D on illustrative orders of magnitude of expenditure on capacity development at Federal level and in Punjab Province, and from the DAD database on some donor programs.

¹⁸ See DTCE (2005)

¹⁹ These may include framing supportive regulations or laws; organizational restructuring or role-redefinition (and definition of inter-relationships with other related organizations); personnel management improvements including rationalization of staffing levels and/or definition, assessment and perhaps certification of core competencies for key posts; rationalization of remuneration, recruitment, selection, distribution, postings and transfers, and criteria for promotion of staff; revision of organizational and individual performance assessment and disciplinary

B. Within and Among Donors in Capacity Development

22. A variety of factors have emerged, from discussions with donor representatives during the mapping exercise, which impinge (often negatively) on their *own* capacity to embrace capacity development issues, and support to the public sector in Pakistan.

- a. While all of those agencies consulted regard capacity development (either explicitly or implicitly) as a cornerstone of their public sector aid policies and strategies, **no single adviser, in any of the Pakistan offices of development partners consulted, was specifically responsible for their agencies' work towards this over-arching goal.** The most common arrangement is for sector and or program specialists and managers to regard it as an issue with which they are very concerned, but are not specifically responsible for, nor prepared to handle. Development agencies' headquarters' policy units usually have specialists "on call" to support country offices when required in institutional or capacity development analyses. One implication is that donor co-operation towards the goals of the Paris Declaration *in-country* is impeded. Not only is the notion of "capacity development" vague but the government and donor players lack clear accountability structures for handling capacity development as an element of their programs.

- b. Speed and flexibility of response by a multilateral or bilateral agency to a government request or invitation to collaborate in capacity development is crucial. The presence of a political or official "champion" of a reform, or capacity development initiative, is illustrated by many of the 'success stories' in Appendix G. However, it appears that *donors' procedures—and inadequately developed networks* of information or specialized institutions, **often impede rapid, technically optimal, locally appropriate technical support to capacity development in Pakistan.** Factors and obstacles relate to formal competitive bidding obligations; tying of sources of TA, twinning partners or training providers; agencies' lack of familiarity with, and inability to mobilize, appropriate professional, academic groups or "peer practitioners" (including service providers) especially those in similar countries of "the South" for capacity development initiatives. For example, the need is often for innovative non-conventional types of inter-institutional partnerships (e.g., intermittent "twinning" and coaching relationships with peer agencies' staff in Pakistan). Thus, external partners and institutions **other than just consulting firms** are needed to support Pakistan's capacity development. It appears that this poses a challenge for some development agencies.²⁰

procedures; career development and succession planning; provision of career guidance, in-service training or coaching (especially in leadership, for managers); production of operational job guidelines and codes of conduct; improved communication and co-ordination procedures; public relations and user awareness policies and campaigns (including complaints management). Technical assistance may have a role to play in some or all of the above.

²⁰ This statement is inevitably a generalization: the extent to which these factors pose impediments to effective collaboration in capacity development vary considerably between development agencies.

- c. All agencies acknowledged that—to varying degrees—**pressures to disburse committed volumes of financial and technical assistance** were a factor inhibiting gradual, pragmatic, small-scale, pilot-project initiatives which might cast light on the effectiveness—and **especially the sustainability**—of capacity development initiatives. Such pressures are also a factor in making it difficult for an aid agency to "say no." If they did refuse funding, it sends a negative political signal,...and anyway another aid agency would probably agree to pick up the bill....
- d. As discussed in a review of the literature on M&E of capacity and capacity development (Watson 2006), **professional and career incentives within development agencies are generally not conducive to cautious and careful assessment of the effectiveness and sustainability of capacity development support or investments.** Hence, the factor mentioned in the previous subsection (apparent indifference on GoP's part to the results of its capacity development expenditures) is **partly attributable to donor corporate indifference too.**

23. Reflecting upon these issues, it is apparent that there are a number of paradoxes present in the current circumstances surrounding capacity issues within the public service in Pakistan. They relate to the way both government and donors approach the issue, and are partly in response to the extremely challenging environment posed by the civil service. We summarize some of these paradoxes below in Box 3.

BOX 3. PARADOXES OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

It seems that there are some important paradoxes in the capacity field in Pakistan.

Donors tend to be looking for measurable outputs of their aid investments...**capacity development** is difficult to measure, and (therefore?) **rarely features as an indicator of program success.** Capacity Development as a 'vogue' is (at least currently) **driven by** the Paris declaration, MDGs, and the DAC Principles, but these are **essentially external drivers compared to the more "integral" drivers** (e.g., sectoral progress indicators, disbursement; loan volumes and agreements).

Apparently **large volumes of funds** (donor-supplied and domestic) are devoted to the nebulous and elastically-defined concept of "**capacity building.**" However, very **few objective, rigorous, evaluations** have been conducted. The only case of "Third Party Evaluation" in our sample—Punjab English Upgrading Training for Teachers 2003/4—revealed an expensive futile disaster. There may well be many more cases where funds for "capacity building" were wasted, but evidence was lacking, and the waste went undetected.

Capacity development "**is not rocket science....**" The **basic principles** of sound people-development and -management are **well-tried** over the past 50 years, and not inherently complex (despite the efforts of management scientists and some donors to make it so). Unambiguous responsibility for achieving an organizational unit's clearly-defined goals, and un-diluted authority over (all) resources available to it, provide a director with a firm basis to "develop its capacity." The paradox is that **these (simple) conditions are rarely found facing public sector managers in the governance environment in Pakistan.**

However, in many of the cases mentioned in Appendix G, despite the inauspicious "environment" surrounding their organizational units, and despite the poor reputation of the Pakistan public service, **enormous "latent" capacities were demonstrated**. A favorable combination of factors led to impressive achievements often without any technical contribution or intervention from donors. In only some cases was the activity of training ("capacity building" in current parlance hereabouts) a major contributory factor.

VI. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE: SOME COMPARATORS WITH RECENT PAKISTAN PUBLIC SERVICE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

24. The past few years have seen a growing international consensus that "capacity matters" in development co-operation, and that lessons from international experience—positive and negative—need to be learned and put into practice in future capacity programs (always more difficult!). The major drivers of this interest in capacity development have been the "Millennium Development Goals" and the subsequent "Paris Declaration" of OECD/DAC member states in 2005 (see Box 4 below). The Governance Network of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD conducted a major review of international public sector capacity development experience and published the results in 2006 (OECD/DAC 2006). This distillation of good practice commenced with the words "adequate country capacity is one of the critical missing factors to meet the MDGs."²¹

BOX 4. PARIS DECLARATION PROVISIONS WITH DIRECT RELEVANCE FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

The Paris Declaration—an agreement of principles to enhance aid effectiveness, and indicators of their achievement—was made in 2005, between international development organizations, and partner countries. The following have the most relevance for capacity and capacity development:

"Capacity development is the responsibility of partner countries with donors playing a support role. It needs not only to be based on sound technical analysis but be responsive to the broader social, political and economic environment, including the need to strengthen human resources." We observe that a considerable part of the generally disappointing history of public sector capacity development efforts in Pakistan is attributable to non-adherence to this tenet in the past.

"Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated support." The indicator is that "50% of technical co-operation flows are implemented through coordinated programs consistent with partners' national development strategies." (EU members' Ministers agreed earlier—in November 2004—that capacity building (!) assistance should be delivered through coordinated programs with an increasing use of multidonor arrangements).

"Strengthen capacity by avoiding parallel implementation structures" (the target is to reduce by 2/3 the current stock of parallel PIUs). The EU has adopted the indicator "no new PIUs to be established." However, there are several "PIU" type-structures in the list of cases in Appendix G. They are NOT "parallel" in the sense used in the Paris declaration. They are often resourced by, and closer to, the host (provincial) government's sector department than the "parallel" variety.

²¹ OECD/DAC (2006) *The Challenge of Capacity Development: Working Towards Good Practice* DAC Network on Governance February 2006 Paris

Other Paris Declaration provisions indirectly affect capacity development initiatives:

"Partners have operational strategies" (implicitly this could suggest capacity development strategies: several of our informants opined that Pakistan needs such a strategy to guide development partners' programming)

"Reliable country systems" where partner countries have procurement and financial management systems that adhere to broadly-accepted good practices (implying that these core systems be the focus for capacity development as matter of urgency—as indeed has been the case over the past few years).

"Use of Country Systems" (for aid flows) – essentially the corollary of the previous indicator.

"Use of common arrangements or procedures" (proportion of aid provided as Program-Based Approaches: e.g., SWAs).

"Encourage Shared Analysis": where the indicator is the proportion of field missions and analytical work, including diagnostic reviews, which are joint. The EU proposes to reduce uncoordinated missions by 50%. The current Scoping Study is a 'joint' exercise with government. The study emerges directly from government (EAD) concern about the (relative) disarray amongst donors and development partners on the subject of capacity development. It is hoped that the proposed workshop and national conference will pose adequate opportunities for dialogue between government and donors on the subject of capacity development.

Results Oriented Frameworks: These are to be adopted as a tool to assess progress with key MDG-related government programs. In principle, these should encompass capacity development initiatives.

Mutual Accountability: the recent "baseline" survey commissioned by EAD of the levels in 2005 of adherence to PD principles (EAD 2007) is an example of government and its development partners sharing information: an essential stage in mutual accountability.

Conditionality: It is possible that, in order to improve the probability of positive capacity development outcomes, some basic pre-conditions may well need to be established affecting donor support to the public sector in Pakistan, as part of a future capacity development policy framework.

VII. RECENT RESEARCH INTO "CAPACITY"

25. Apart from the OECD/DAC review mentioned above, the other major international initiative in reviewing capacity in recent years has been the ECDPM-coordinated study on Capacity Change and Performance (2003–2007).²² The DAC Governance Network (GovNet) commissioned the study, and it fed into and informed the 2005 distillation of capacity development. The authors of the present report researched a case study on capacity dimensions of devolved education services in Punjab Province as part of this global review.²³ As well as the fundamental aspects of capacity around which the DAC definitions revolve, the ECDPM study has thrown up other important insights as to the characteristics of "capacitated" organizations (and networks), which were the subject of cases reviewed in the overall study.

²² All the 18 cases, and related Theme Papers, are available on www.ecdpm.org by accessing the link to the Study of Capacity Change and Performance.

²³ See case study 57G (July 2005) on the ECDPM site.

26. The complementary characteristics of "capacity" revealed in the ECDPM study include the capability of an organization, or a system for delivering public services:

- to *relate* internally and to other elements of the public sector and the society it serves;
- to *organize itself* in a coherent manner;
- to have *time and 'space' to experiment, to learn and re-new itself* on the basis of real experience and changing environments;
- to be seen as *accountable to, and legitimate* in the eyes of, those it serves. This legitimacy is crucial for its capacity to generate financial and popular (ultimately political) support; and
- to possess a *shared vision* of what it is trying to achieve.

27. Of the above characteristics, the "time and space" "legitimacy" and "shared vision" factors appear to be the characteristics which most often resonate with the success stories which feature in the "long-list" of cases in the tabulation below. The first—time and space—is vital in insulating public sector organizations from the political interference, under-funding, and ill-discipline which tend to affect many public sector organizations in developing countries. Most successful public sector organizations or counterpart agencies of foreign assistance in Appendix G have (somehow) managed to obtain high-level political commitment to create special conditions: representing a "sheltered" environment.

28. The second—legitimacy—follows if the organization "proves its worth" by delivering results which not only meet objectives, but represent an exception to the somewhat unimpressive public sector "norm." In several cases, success (and ensuing credibility) in achieving the organization's primary objective results in it being tasked to address other major problems (hitherto unsolved by "conventional" public sector organizations and resources).²⁴

29. The third—shared vision—has been observed in many of the success stories, as a result of information flows (feedback) from top management to staff on levels of performance, and because of an open style of management which provides the opportunity for staff to contribute ideas—and therefore share resulting outcomes and innovations.

30. One of the most significant findings of the ECDPM study was the apparent relevance of "systems thinking" to considerations of capacity development (see Box 5 below).

BOX 5. SYSTEMS THINKING: MAIN CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS

This school of thought posits that the view of development problems adopted in results-based management *impedes* comprehensive understanding of the true nature of, and the "boundaries" to development problems; *underestimates* the inter-connectedness of units within organizational systems, and, therefore, the difficulties of attributing impact to discrete interventions, or even predicting their probable effects; may *obstruct learning* from practical experience, because it attempts to measure progress in achieving predetermined objectives (which may detract attention from vital, though unanticipated features, insights or variables) and thereby *disempowers* stakeholders involved in implementation;²⁵ and *constrains capacity development, performance and progress* towards optimal solutions or development goals.

²⁴ The PIMU of PESRP was tasked with similar resource management and M&E approaches for the health sector and irrigation services in Punjab; the NWCIP in Sindh was tasked with addressing one of the most intractable (yet, for rural dwellers, most crucial) sectors: land tenure and revenue.

²⁵ Wheatley and Kellner-Rogers (1999) suggest that "measurement" will not produce favorable behavioral changes, and indeed may damage the quality of working relationships, and "trivialize the meaning of work."

Systems thinking acknowledges that the interconnectedness—or complexity—of (inter-) organizational systems is such that it is impossible to predict the consequences of any particular policy action. One of the central tenets of this school is that a pragmatic approach, based on reflection on practical experience in attempting to achieve goals, provides the best frame of reference for deciding "what works, what doesn't, and why," and is therefore the best guide for future decision making.²⁶

Monitoring and evaluation of experience is central to systems thinking, in so far as *providing feedback* to stakeholders on the practical results of an organization's work contributes to *learning*. Involvement of a *range of stakeholders* in processes of reflection—including those in, and served by, the organization—can contribute to the "*emergence*" of analytical capacities and "*ownership*" of the organization's mission. Some donor initiatives are consistent with systems thinking approaches.²⁷ For example, DFID's "Drivers of Change" analyses at country level contribute to enhanced donor understanding of the socio-political, historical, and cultural context in which aid operations are taking place.

Source: Watson (2006)

31. There are several important implications for capacity development: for example, systems thinking raises questions as to the feasibility of planning capacity development initiatives in detail at the start, and instead puts emphasis on creating environments in which learning—about "what is changing, what works?"—is promoted. The implications donor support to capacity development include promotion of an 'enabling environment' where effective learning can take place (including strengthening local institutions for research, policy analysis, and information dissemination), and allowing longer time horizons for operations. Drivers of change analyses can also assist with capacity needs assessments, especially if the analysis reveals "how things really work in practice."

VIII. COMMENTARY ON SUGGESTED CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT CASE STUDIES

32. The tabulation at Appendix G has several subsections with different categories of cases. The shaded **(first) category describes the suggested "long list" of cases**. They have been identified based on the criteria at Appendix F.

33. They are (not in any priority order):

- a. Punjab PERSP PMIU (WB assisted)*
- b. Faisalabad District Devolution Support (Education Sector and SPU) (DFID assisted)
- c. Punjab Municipal Service Improvement Project (and PMDFC)* (WB)
- d. Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund approach to enhancing *partners'* capacity.
- e. Support to Elected Women's Political Empowerment (UNDP/Norwegian/Aurat Foundation Assistance)
- f. Punjab Teacher Training (in English language)* (GoPj funded)
- g. HIV/AIDs Surveillance Programme (CIDA)
- h. Orangi Pilot Project (Squatter Upgrading) Karachi (Own resources + GoS)
- i. Punjab Literacy Promotion Pilot Project (JICA assisted)*
- j. Education Sector Reform Assistance (USAID)*
- k. Chief Minister's Initiative of Primary Health Care (Punjab)*

²⁶ For an excellent introduction to the terminology of various systems thinking approaches, and an illustration of their application to the UK National Health Service, see Chapman (2002).

²⁷ See Unsworth (2003).

- l. National Highways and Motorway Police
- m. National Water Course Improvement Programme – Sindh (GoS)
- n. District/Public Safety Commission (Faisalabad)
- o. Gender Justice Through Muslihat Anjuman Project (UNDP Norwegian, SDC)
- p. Punjab Resource Management Program (ADB)*
- q. CB through Trade-Related Technical Assistance (EC)

* Indicates cases which involve a provincial-level PM(I)U oriented in some way to supporting capacity development at District or TMA level, and which therefore raise questions about the optimal approach to capacity development for local governments (See Box 6 below).

34. The **second category might be called "shadow" cases**: i.e., they merit thorough assessment, but separately to the present exercise, resourced with donor support. Two other cases are put forward as very large complex cases with major capacity dimensions/implications. They are

- a. DTCE/CCB Capacity development (UNDP + Donor consortium);
- b. Earthquake Relief (Donor Consortium); and
- c. Local Government Capacity Development (Provincial Governments and Various Donors) (See Box 6 below).

35. A **third category was those local authorities where local leadership had reportedly made a major difference** in capacity terms. One TMA was investigated as a possible case in this category. This was subsequently considered a low-priority case (there was inadequate evidence or 'history' to make it substantial):

- a. TMA Gulshan Iqbal (Karachi)

36. The **final category was for those cases where their teams would face problems in participating in write-shops**. This category included:

- a. Citizen-Police Liaison Committee (Karachi) (GoSindh + UNDP support in past)
- b. Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (GoS)

37. **The aim of workshop discussion is to narrow down the 'long-list' into approximately 12 cases.**

38. The tabulation contains information on

- our assessment of the **merits of the case**, especially in terms of the criteria and capacity issues and characteristics the case illustrates;
- the **disadvantages** of the case (as an example of capacity development to be studied);
- **key informants** (for the present, and in future); and
- our comments on the **feasibility of the case** with the "write-shop" modality.

39. We have deliberately not developed a "scoring" system, because that would inevitably be subjective....hence, the final selection is for discussion at the workshop!

BOX 6. CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PAKISTAN

Several candidate cases marked with an asterisk * are based at *provincial level*, but are engaged in providing some type of sectoral support to local governments' capacities. They typically involve a PMIU-type structure, and planning, financial control, procurement, advisory, and monitoring machineries which are sector- or program-specific. The sectors involved are legally the responsibility of local governments. According to the NRB, a better approach would have been for government and donors to inject human and other resources directly into local governments, and to strengthen their capacities in generic functions (planning, etc.) for ALL sectors in their legal domain, and to activate political and popular *institutions* in sector investment priority-setting and monitoring progress (Council Committees, Monitoring Committees, etc.).

The NRB has a point, and the principle it espouses is an important one. It implies that the choice of * cases is indeed contentious. In only one case in the list above is capacity strengthening truly integral to local government institutional capacity development (i.e., focused on supporting capacities in generic cross-sectoral functions): the Faisalabad Decentralization Program (case 2). The * cases were included because they represent unambiguous capacity development at provincial level, which appears to have had significant positive spin-offs and benefits in terms of pro-poor capacity development in the "parent" sector department at provincial level and especially in local governments. The extent to which this is in fact true, and the whole issue of local government development in the Pakistan context, can and should be explored in the planned "write-shops" in the second phase. The Workshop on 3 September should also discuss this issue.

Previous commentaries by the consultants have drawn attention to the issue:

The PMU model of Capacity Development has been popular with the provincial government for getting certain high-priority tasks accomplished. It has the advantage of being an effective vehicle for execution and for managing reform. These PMUs not only have developed their own capacity but have often helped others to develop theirs. In some of these units, a number of factors (salaries, better staff, motivation, external support, non-hierarchical working etc.) have produced good specimens of development of indigenous capacity. But the system has disadvantages and limitations. There is risk of non-institutionalization of capacities and innovation.' The eagerness of some in government to attempt to expand the role of the PMIU reflects the responsiveness of government both in recognizing what the PMIU delivers and in trying to replicate successful models. However it also demonstrates the lure of short-term ad hoc approaches to capacity development. A tendency is becoming apparent to latch on to any 'success' (individual, unit, system) and then instead of contextualizing and studying the success and trying to reform the established systems and processes in government departments, and thus institutionalize the reformed systems and processes, there is an effort to burden the 'success' with more responsibilities through sometimes bypassing the regular systems and procedures. Establishment of parallel structures—such as PMUs—generally entails better prospects of achieving the short term goals but also entails the risk of further undermining the permanent structures and systems. The provincial government needs an exit strategy encompassing 'cross learning' and capacity development from the PMUs to the regular departments. This may necessitate relaxing and amending rigid rules and systems that make it difficult to encourage innovations, model building and learning spillovers. (Watson and Khan 205b)

..And on the CMIPHC ...the subject of case 11...

Such "delegation" (in this case of health service management) is usually done on efficiency grounds but it has major implications on mechanisms of electoral accountability at the local level that operate through the actions of political parties /entities, acting on elected leaders and through this, on the administrative bureaucracy. A broader question is how these provisions for direct participation in the affairs of local government are contributing or otherwise impacting on local government 'legitimacy' and on arrangements for representative participation (Khan 2005). Such delegation also has implications for the issue of provincial-local government tensions and bureaucratic control. Invariably the "delegation" of functions between RSPs and district and tehsil governments is negotiated by federal or provincial politicians. The proponents of the "delegation" argue that it allows for the adoption of better incentives as the RSPs are not constrained by the "rules of business" that governments need to follow. As opposed to this, many Nazims argue that the "delegation" lessens their control, creates opacity in the assignment of credit between local and provincial/federal politicians, and reduces the "pressure" to reform the very "rules of business" that constrain the functioning of local governments. Thus such arrangements do not enhance the institutional ability of local governments to manage the delivery of services. (Khan 2007)

TERMS OF REFERENCES

SCOPING STUDY ON CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT FOR SERVICE DELIVERY IN PAKISTAN Draft 8 June 2007

I. BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

A. Overview of Capacity Development in the Context of the International Development Effectiveness Discussion

1. Despite huge external investments over many decades, progress in enhancing capacities in developing countries has been disappointingly slow. Since 2000, when the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted, the challenge of accelerating capacity development (CD) has taken on a new urgency. Monitoring reports on MDG progress have consistently revealed that public sector capacity lagged behind all other MDG benchmarks.

2. In the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,¹ partner countries, including Pakistan, committed to capacity strengthening objectives and country-led implementation strategies. In turn, donors committed to align support with partners' CD objectives, to make greater use of country systems and to harmonize support. To help implement these commitments, ADB has adopted a CD Framework and Action Plan in January 2007 aiming at strengthening ADB's assistance for CD in DMCs so that it becomes more demand-driven, effective, and efficient.²

3. Since the adoption of the Paris Declaration, a number of follow-up initiatives have been taken to strengthen the effectiveness of CD programs. A recent publication by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Governance³ reviewed 40 years of development experience and concluded that donors and partner countries alike have tended to look at CD as mainly a technical process, or as a transfer of knowledge from North to South. The publication explains how donors have failed to recognize the critical importance of country ownership and leadership, and how they underestimated the importance of the broader political context within which CD efforts take place. The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) has analyzed the linkages between capacity, change and performance through a study that began in 2003.⁴ The study includes 18 field studies, two of them on Pakistan.⁵

4. Increasingly, partner countries and donors are reviewing their CD experience to improve country-wide, sector-wide or local-government-wide strategic CD planning and the effectiveness of future CD interventions.⁶ Future challenges and open questions include (i) modes of delivery

¹ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2005. *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment and Results*. Paris, March.

² ADB. 2007. IN.9-07. *Integrating Capacity Development into Country Programs and Operations. Medium-Term Framework and Action Plan*. Manila.

³ Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Network on Governance. 2006. *The Challenge of Capacity Development. Working Towards Good Practice*.

⁴ ECDPM Interim Report.

⁵ Watson, David and Adnan Qadir Khan. 2005. *Capacity Building for Decentralized Education Service Delivery in Pakistan*. July; and David Watson. 2005. *Capacity Building for Decentralized Education Service Delivery in Ethiopia and Pakistan*, June.

⁶ For instance Pacific countries are in the process of conducting a Scoping Study on Capacity Development supported by ADB and Aus-AID. Numerous studies have been conducted by donors to evaluate the role of project administration units, the provision of technical assistance, and the provision of technical assistance personnel. See

in the future aid architecture (role of long-term experts, can financial aid be CD?); (ii) does mutual accountability imply mutual ownership, can ownership be a process?; (iii) monitoring and evaluation of CD and of non-tangible issues, such as ownership, leadership, legitimacy, credibility, trust, confidence; and (iv) methodologies and scaling up of capacity needs assessments.

B. Overview of Capacity Development for Service Delivery in Pakistan

5. A recent workshop on CD conducted by the working group on Sector Wide Approaches and Capacity Development confirmed an earlier finding⁷ that there is no agreed official definition of CD in Pakistan. CD is usually seen in a narrow way limited to individual skills development to perform jobs better. A CD strategy that prioritizes future CD interventions is lacking, but the Economic Affairs Division (EAD) has recently recognized that in the context of implementing the Paris Declaration there is a need to improve strategic oversight and guidance on CD for service delivery.

6. However, if service delivery data are taken as a proxy for capacities, it does not appear that this support has been successfully targeted at CD. Pakistan is classified by the World Bank as low income country with a GNI per capita of \$690 in 2005 and a Human Development Index ranking of 134 out of 177 countries.⁸ In 2004, primary school enrolment stood at 82.1%, secondary school enrolment at 27.2%, and the adult total literacy rate at 49.9%.

7. The ECDPM study on capacity development in the education sector⁹ concluded that

“The government faces a real capacity development dilemma. There is an urgent need for effective and rapid development of capacities in civil society (citizen community boards and elected councilors) and the public sector (...). However, there are severe constraints on enhancing capacities to design and deliver programmes that will induce sustained behaviour change and more effective organisational performance.”

8. Such constraints comprise¹⁰

- Incomplete devolution in the sense that district roles in relation to provinces and federal authorities have been inadequately defined, districts have little fiscal discretion, and conflicts between members of national and provincial assemblies and district councilors persist.¹¹
- There is little incentive to perform at all levels of the delivery system, particularly at the district level and accountability to client is lacking.
- The bureaucracy still exhibits characteristics forged during colonial times which is prone to political pressure, patrimonialism, and interference.

for instance ADB. 2005. *Special Evaluation Study on the Role of Project Implementation Units*. Manila: and ADB. 2007. *Special Evaluation Study on the Performance of Technical Assistance*. Manila.

⁷ Watson/Khan, p. vi.

⁸ UNDP. 2004. Human Development Index Database.

⁹ Watson, Khan. 2005, p. viii.

¹⁰ Based on Watson, Khan. 2005, p. vii and viii.

¹¹ In August 2001, the President introduced a devolution plan, to be implemented through the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB). The aim of the plan was—through community empowerment—to enhance bottom-up accountability, and thereby improve service delivery. See for details: ADB, World Bank, DfID, Devolution in Pakistan, 2004.

- The socio-economic context with relatively low literacy rates, with huge gender disparities and no tradition for popular pressure on politicians or service providers, especially in rural areas.
- There is little experience and learning among key players about capacity development.

9. There are indications that, faced with unsatisfactory results from earlier CD initiatives, donors are increasingly adopting more innovative approaches to CD. Such approaches include

- stimulating accountability for service delivery,
- analysis and policy dialogue on operational aspects of devolution,
- experimenting with organizational development approaches to enhance local government capacities, and
- experimenting with organizational development approaches to enhance sector agency capacities.

10. The more recent and innovative initiatives have not been systematically analyzed¹² and “success” will have to be defined and often qualified. This achievement may have been due to certain strong leaders and other individuals. It may have arisen through an independent status that freed operations from social or political constraints. After decades of extensive effort and expenditure including external assistance to build domestic capacities in the public sectors in Pakistan, it is time that the main stakeholders better understand how capacity can be successfully built and sustained.

C. Defining Capacity Development in Operational Terms

11. Given that there is no agreed concept of capacity and CD in Pakistan, it is suggested that the concepts which have been discussed in the Capacity Development Seminar of the Pakistan Working Group on Sector Wide Approaches and Capacity Development will be used. The discussion was based on ADB’s CD Framework and on the Action Plan and the European Commission’s aid delivery methods concept paper which provides useful insights on how to operationalize CD concepts.¹³ The main concepts are defined in Box 1.

Box 1: Main Concepts

Capacity: ‘the ability of people and organizations to perform tasks and produce outputs’

CD is defined as a process by which people and organizations create and strengthen capacity over time.

Support to CD is defined as inputs and processes that external actors use to support capacity development.

Source: EC Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development. Why, what and how?

12. The CD concept employed here presupposes that public sector agencies will remain the key entry points for CD operations, but that other key organizations and groups in the private sector, nongovernment sector, and civil society will be given larger roles. Organizations are

¹² However, there are indications in an ADB special evaluation study on the social sectors in Pakistan that they have been more successful than previous approaches.

¹³ European Commission (2005). Institutional Assessment and Capacity Development, why, what and how? September.

seen as open systems and entry points for CD interventions exist at individual, organizations/networks of organizations, institutional/enabling environment levels.

II. SCOPE OF THE ASSIGNMENT

A. Objective and Scope of the Study

13. The objective of the study is (i) to enhance understanding of CD processes that have been employed to strengthen service delivery in Pakistan; (ii) to provide recommendations to support the effectiveness of interventions in Pakistan, both domestic and external, aimed at improving capacity and service delivery performance. This will input into country development strategies and donor programming and operations.

14. The study will provide a mapping of CD interventions for service delivery conducted since the devolution plan came into effect. Based on the mapping, 8–10 case studies will be identified for a more detailed analysis of capacity and CD support. Emphasis will be placed on a comprehensive range of CD entry points (individual, organization/organizational network, institutions/enabling environment, and more innovative support, such as the four areas described in section IB).

15. Given the importance of the devolution context for service delivery, capacity and CD of provincial and local government agencies and other stakeholders will be a key entry point of the study, building on the findings of the Devolution in Pakistan study conducted by World Bank, DFID and ADB¹⁴ and a follow-up study that was recently conducted by ADB.

16. Service delivery will be defined for the purposes of the study as comprising health and education, water and sanitation, and access to justice and dispute resolution. This is consistent with the concepts employed in the Devolution in Pakistan study.

B. Methodology and Key Activities

Phase 1 (August–September 2007)

17. This phase would aim to a) establish key issues from literature and working group experience; b) prepare a comprehensive mapping of CD interventions implemented from August 2001 to 2006; c) produce a long list of possible “successful” case studies covering a range of approaches used by different donors; d) validate the proposed focus and methodology of the study; e) propose an initial framework for further case studies; and f) present the proposed framework and discuss with the working group.

Phase 2 (October–January 2007)

18. The second phase will consist of field visits and would result in the preparation of 8–10 case studies. It is anticipated that the case studies would be prepared by international and local CD specialists with strong inputs by those directly involved in the respective CD interventions. One write-shop will be held in each of the provinces from which cases are selected or involving specialists in comparative studies in a single sector to help finalize the first drafts of the case studies (for a short overview of the write-shop methodology, see Attachment 1). The donor

¹⁴ Devolution in Pakistan. 2004. Overview of the ADB/DFID/World Bank study, p. 3, figure 1.

working group would be briefed on the initial findings of the write-shops and on the themes evolving through them and will assist with creation of a framework and agenda for a conference including likely invitees, venue, and costing. The aim of the meeting would also be to further validate the focus of the study, establish some provisional, general, common themes.

Phase 3 (January–April 2008)

19. Phase 3 will consist of the further elaboration of issues, themes, possible best practices and principles, and the preparation and conduct of a conference on “Capacity Development for Service Delivery – Building on Experiences” to be held in Islamabad in April 2008 under the auspices of the Working Group on Sector Wide Approaches and Capacity Development. The 2–3-day conference will serve to discuss the findings of the study. The objectives of the conference will be (i) to enhance understanding of past experience of CD for service delivery in Pakistan in order to generate recommendations for improved CD support from development partners; (ii) identified ToRs for a joint process of diagnosis and design of joint CD support. The workshop and study will be documented in a publication.

20. The case studies will include an assessment of the following aspects of CD:

- (i) Capacity Assessment – what was assessed at the design stage? The part focuses on external as well as internal factors which shape capacity and begins with a focus on the outputs of the organization(s).
- (ii) Capacity Assessment – How was the capacity assessment conducted? The part focuses on the capacity assessment process, including ownership and participation issues.
- (iii) CD and Change-Enabling Environment and Commitment. In how far was the feasibility and likely success of CD and change determined by the domestic drive for and commitment to change, as well as by resistance and constraining factors in the context.
- (iv) CD and Change-Goals and Design Issues. In how far did the CD process benefit from clear results identification. Did the design consider promotion of change by working both on internal and external factors, and on both functional/technical and political dimensions of capacity?
- (v) External Support to CD – the demand and supply side. To what extent did the demand for external support, as well as the quality of design and delivery of the external support analyzed. Were development partners aligning to domestic processes, and harmonizing initiatives and approaches?

21. The analysis will be broadly based on the checklist for Assessment for Capacity and Capacity Development Support which is based on the European Commission’s Aid Delivery Methods Concept Paper. It is intended to further analyze lessons learned with a view to isolating key issues and themes, and best practices, if not principles, that might guide future CD operations in Pakistan and to summarize and promote the same as a guide to future CD.

C. Implementation Arrangements

22. The study will be supervised by the Working Group on Sector Wide Approaches and Capacity Development which is jointly chaired by the Economic Affairs Division and ADB's Pakistan Resident Mission.

23. The study will be conducted on an intermittent and phased basis over the period September 2007 to April 2008. The consultants will work closely with all relevant ADB and other funding donor staff, Resident Missions and Offices and will support ADB and the other donor's staff to engage in the study as and when available during the course of other work.

24. It is intended that both the consultancy and the workshop(s) seek the involvement of all relevant development partners in Pakistan, including the provincial and local levels.

25. It is proposed that ADB hire a CD systems specialist/Team Leader who has strong CD experience and at least some experience of working in Pakistan and a local consultant with extensive experience in social sectors in a devolved context on an intermittent basis.

D. Detailed Tasks of the Consultant

Consultant A (international): Capacity Development Specialist (international, 3 person-months)

26. The CD specialist will have a degree in social science, political science, or public administration and at least 15 years experience in designing and implementing CD programs in the region. Experience with local government service delivery is required. The consultant will have contributed to the recent CD debate and should have experience in developing and applying capacity assessment tools at the local or sector level. The position requires strong facilitation and communication skills and long-term experience in the Asia and Pacific Region. The consultant will be responsible for the following tasks:

- (i) Review all relevant documentation and other literature pertaining to CD in service delivery in Pakistan. This will include a) the ECDPM and DFID studies on Capacity Building for decentralized education service delivery in Pakistan and Punjab;¹⁵ b) The Devolution in Pakistan study conducted by ADB/DfID/World Bank and the follow up study conducted by ADB; c) ADB and other donors evaluations of CD and service delivery in Pakistan, ADB and other donors evaluations of CD and modalities; d) CD policy papers of various donors.
- (ii) Review and report on new and emerging approaches to CD, including any which have not been trialed in Pakistan.
- (iii) Review ADB's and other development partners' CD documentation pertaining to service delivery in Pakistan. This will include documentation to be requested from EAD, provincial governments, World Bank, DfID, UNDP, CIDA, GTZ, and JICA through the working group on SWAps and CD.
- (iv) Discuss successful CD in Pakistan with EAD, ADB and other major donors with a view to preparing a long list of potential case studies.

¹⁵ Watson, David and Adnan Khan. 2005. *Capacity and Capacity Building in the Punjab for Devolved Education Service Delivery: Comparing current approaches with international experience.*

- (v) Analyze lessons learned based on review of the literature and personal communications with a view to isolating possible key issues (in particular, those issues that are likely to influence the demand for CD and incentives in a devolved context), themes, good practices, and principles that might guide future CD in Pakistan and summarize them in a way which could be used as a guide to further conduct of the study, including possible case studies, possible workshop(s) agenda, and future CD in Pakistan.
- (vi) Review the CD checklist and propose a common set of questions and otherwise prepare an initial methodology for the preparation of proposed case studies of more successful CD.
- (vii) Visit two provinces and solicit the views of provincial and local governments and civil society stakeholders as to which CD interventions in service delivery were considered successful, what makes CD successful and sustainable, how development partners might better assist CD, and identify examples of more successful interventions.
- (viii) Draft a summary of possibly 8–10 initial example case studies of more successful CD. Selected case studies should reflect stakeholder interest to contribute to the study, coverage of a variety of CD circumstances, and ability to represent more innovative CD processes. Identify local case study writers, subcontract and support them during the initial drafting process.
- (ix) Conduct two write-shops (one in each of the provinces involved). Prepare a detailed outline, agenda, suggested invitees, facilitators, program of support and management, and costing for two write-shops on CD in service delivery in two provinces that are likely to be held in the provincial capitals in December 2007 to January 2008.
- (x) Prepare a detailed outline, agenda, suggested invitees, facilitators, resource persons, program of support and management, and costing for a workshop(s) on CD in the Pakistan that is likely to be held in Islamabad in April 2008.
- (xi) Consult widely throughout Pakistan with government agencies, civil society, and donor agencies to incorporate views and to build support for the proposed workshop(s).
- (xii) Serve as presenter and supervise the conduct of the workshop(s) and report on same.
- (xiii) Based on all works undertaken (literature review, interviews, case studies, and workshops), analyze lessons learned with a view to isolating key issues, themes, good practices, and principles that might guide future CD in Pakistan and summarize them in a way which could be used as a guide to future CD in the region.
- (xiv) Briefly analyze and comment on the demand for CD, including for specific forms of CD, in the Pakistan and any patterns of demand apparent at the provincial and local level.
- (xv) Rationalize and provide tentative suggestions as to what characterizes more successful CD in Pakistan with a clear focus on the necessary supporting actions of development partners, governments and other stakeholders.
- (xvi) Ultimately identify by the end of the consultancy any changes needed in the roles and responsibilities of governments and development partners to build more successful partnerships to guide more effective CD interventions in the future.
- (xvii) At the completion of the study, review CD definitions and develop a proposed taxonomy of the different forms of CD, their objectives, different approaches, and other characteristics that meet the demands of successful CD in Pakistan and in the light of the findings of the study.

(xviii) Produce a report on the entire exercise with executive summary detailing major lessons and directions to improve CD in Pakistan.

27. The CD specialist will prepare an initial report to be presented to the funding donors at the end of the second phase, possibly end January 2008. Report(s) on each workshop(s) will also be prepared. A draft final report will be prepared toward the end of the third phase, possibly by mid April 2008. This will be submitted to funding donors for review and comment prior to finalization of the report.

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED**ISLAMABAD****Federal Government**

Hina Rabbani	State Minister, EAD
Syed Tariq Ali Bokhari	Establishments Secretary (and top management team)
Syed Asif Riaz Bukhari	DG Civil Service Reform Unit
Javed Sadiq Malik	Federal Ombudsman
Riaz Khan	Member, National Reconstruction Bureau
Hasnat A Qureshi	Consultant, Local Government Finance, NRB
Ijaz Rahim	Member, Social Sectors, Planning Commission
Aman Ullah Niazi	Chief, Governance, Planning Commission
Akram Malik	Secretary, EAD
Sabeena Qureshi	Deputy Secretary, Economic Affairs Division
Tariq Mahmood	Section Officer, Aid Effectiveness, EAD
Farrukh Bashir Moriani	Secretary to Federal Ombudsman
Javed Hasan Aly	Ex-Secretary Establishment Division (Principal Author, White Paper on Education)

Development Partner / Donor Agencies

John Moore	Counsellor and Head of Aid, Canadian Embassy
Steve Passingham	Senior Regional Education Adviser, DFID
Wajahat Anwar	Programme Officer, DFID
Mosharraf Zaidi	Governance Specialist, DFID
Farhan Sabih	Asst Resident Representative UNDP
Mikiko Tanaka	Head of Programmes, UNDP
Rabia Khattak	Poverty Reduction and Gender P.O. UNDP
Jorg Nadoll	Aid Co-ordination Adviser EAD
Sissel Volan	Minister Counsellor Norwegian Embassy
Eriko Murata	Economic Advisor, Embassy of Japan
Shigeki Nakanishi	Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Tomoharu Otaka	Chief Rep, Japan Bank for Intl Cooperation
Ishizuka Kenji	Deputy Resident Rep, JICA
G. M. Awan	Special Advisor, JICA
Shahnaz Arshad	Senior Urban Specialist, World Bank
Inaam ul Haq	Senior Health Specialist, World Bank
Sofia Shakeel	Senior Education Specialist, World Bank
Asfandyar Zaman	Programme Officer, World Bank
Randy Hatfield	Education Office Director, USAID
Mary Skarie	Health Office Director, USAID
Myra Emata-Stokes	Deputy Programme Officer, USAID
M Mujtaba Piracha	Technical Director, Education Sector Reform Assistance Programme (ESRA) USAID
Thorsten Bargfrede	First Secretary, European Commission Delegation, Pakistan

ADB

Peter Fedon	Country Director, Asian Development Bank
Safdar Parvez	Country Economist, ADB
Anne Sweetser	Social Development Specialist ADB
Emma Xiaojin Fan	Senior Public Resource Management Specialist ADB

John Blunt	Institutional & Gov Specialist, ADB
Aurangzeb Zia	M&E Specialist, ADB
M. Sarwar Khan	Consultant, Access to Justice Program, ADB
Md. Altaf Afridi	Project Officer – Governance ADB (DSP)
Waqas ul Hasan	Project Officer – Governance ADB (AJP)
Mahmood Rai	Decentralization Support Program (ADB)
Kamal Hyat	Chief Executive, Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund
Ahmad Jamal	Chief Operating Officer, PPAF
Zaffar P. Sabri	GM, Water Mgt Centre, PPAF
Kamran Akbar	Chief Operating Officer, PPAF
M. Raffat Pasha	Inspector General, National Highways and Motorways Police M
Javed Chaudhary	PRO to Minister for Communications and NHMP

KARACHI/SINDH PROVINCE

Yahya Waliullah	Secretary, Planning and Development Department, Sindh (by telephone)
Parveen Rahman	Director, Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi
Shahid Ahmed	Deputy Controller, Citizen-Police Liaison Committee, Karachi
Md. Younus Dagha	Special Secretary to Chief Minister / Project Director National Programme for Improvement of Watercourses, PMU, Chief Minister's Secretariat, Karachi
Tasneem Ahmad Siddiqui	Chairman, Saiban (Action Research for Shelter) Ex Director, Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority
Dr. Rana Muzaffar	Professor and Section Head Molecular Diagnostics, Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation Karachi
Md. Safiqur Rahman	Tehsil Municipal Officer, Gulshan Iqbal TMA, Karachi
Md. Ikram Ullah Khan	DTO (IT), Gulshan Iqbal TMA, Karachi

LAHORE/PUNJAB PROVINCE

Khizar Hayat	Secretary, Housing (ex MD of PMDFC)
Farhan Khwaja	Add. Sec. Director, Public Policy, Public Policy and Change Management Wing, S+GAD, Punjab
Asad Sumbal	Programme Manager, Punjab Resource Management Programme
Zulfikar Younas	Deputy PD (Financial Management), PRMP
Mehnaz Bhaur	Deputy PD (Capacity Building), PRMP
Syed Ali Murtaza	PD (Punjab) Access to Justice Program, ADB
Saif Anjum	Consultant, Access to Justice Program (Public Safety Reforms)
Tayyab Shah	PD Punjab Literacy Pilot Project, Department of Education
Dr. Ali Razaque	Punjab Provincial Coordinator, National Aids Control Programme
Asad Rahman	Provincial Coordinator, Aurat Foundation
Salman Abid	Task Manager for Women Elected Representatives' Resource Centers
Noor ul Zaman	Bunyad Foundation
Javed Ahmed	Project Director, Chief Minister's Initiative for Primary Health Care (Punjab Rural Support Programme)
Abdul Razaq	Principal Officer, Programme Services Unit, CMIPHC
Rukhsana Zia	Director, Staff Development, Department of Education

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BUDGETS FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

(1) NOTES ON ANALYSIS OF PUNJAB PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BUDGET, 2006–2007

1. The purpose of this exercise was to extract some indicative figures for "capacity building/development" and assess the feasibility of a more elaborate investigation of the budgetary provisions for capacity development and related activities in this, and perhaps other, provinces.

General Observations and Questions Arising

2. Attention can in practice focus on the "Revenue" Development estimates. The "Capital" section is exclusively civil works of various sorts (including under headings such as "TA for institutional capacity building for renewable energy... " But the development estimates contain major provisions for civil works and equipment too:

- the only expenditure found on Management and Personnel Development Department is construction of a 50 room hostel for Rs4 million). [Need to check Routine / Recurrent Estimates for annual outlays on this centre].
- CB of Home Department (of 9 million provision, 8 is on purchase of plant and equipment);

3. The extent to which any provision is foreign-supported is stated in places, but it is not clear whether the provision is counterpart funding for, or the Rs equivalent of, a foreign assistance program, or in fact the routine costs of a newly-established centre or service initiated with foreign assistance.¹ Therefore, the estimates beg questions as to

- which is which;
- which foreign-assisted programs do not mention in fact they are foreign assisted; and
- which items, therefore, could imply double-counting if data from donors was compared to these estimates.

4. Should we classify as CB "establishment of a Pesticide Laboratory" or "upgrading training facilities" (when 2/3 of expenditures are on employees, in the first instance, and the same proportion goes on operational expenditures in the second)? The "funds for the scheme CB of Commerce and Industry Department (in policy analysis...etc.)" is made up of employee, operational, and general expenditures.

5. In the case of the police, CB is one of three items (at Rs30 million in 06/07)... the others are development of a model system in 4 Thanas (Rs10 million) and Creation of Citizens Councils and Social Audit Systems for Thanas...yet, all three could plausibly be classified as Capacity Development. (p594).

6. "Training" is rarely explicitly mentioned as an activity. One exception is the IT training program for Punjab Government officials (Phase II) (p416). Typical CB activities which lie buried within lists of relatively routine expenditures include "conferences...workshops..." or "internships..." Major rural (health) service delivery infrastructure expansion is budgeted at Rs10 million in 05/06, rising to Rs450 million in 06/07 ("stores and stocks" accounting for Rs300

¹ P326 "Funds for Scheme called CB of Home Department..." foreign assisted? "Initiatives under Policy Loan" (p 114) Rs20 million on civil works. Provisions for Establishment of a Literacy MIS (not mentioning JICA involvement) and significant related District initiatives (which do) (p351 ff).

million of that amount, "purchase of transport" Rs100 million; maintenance costing Rs50 million). This clearly improves (develops) the capacity of the health system...but is not called 'capacity development'.²

7. PMU costs (construction, other infrastructural, and running expenses) occur throughout the estimates (e.g., P+D Department has a cluster pp 494ff... labeled as "Grants subsidies and write-off Loans") Provisions for PMUs in P+D Department total nearly Rs50 million in 06/07 (of Rs45 million is for the ADB/DFID supported Resource Management Program... donors are not mentioned).³

8. A block grant for "research and capacity building" (for districts and TMAs) was a single line item in the original 2005/6 budget: Rs200 million. This and other "priority" and "unfunded schemes" items seem to have been conflated into much greater Grants to District governments and TMAs in 05/06 and 06/07⁴ (p591). The substantial "Tameer-e-Punjab" Program remains at the same provision.

Tentative Conclusions

9. After this foray into the depths of the Punjab Government's budget for 2006/7, it may be possible to draw the following tentative conclusions:

- a) Any empirical analysis of "capacity building" presupposes a strict yet comprehensive definition of the sorts of items, activities, and programs which are indeed contributory to public sector capacities.
- b) Such a definition is extremely difficult to draw up (and certainly does not exist).
- c) It can be argued that a wide range of activities contribute to the growth (or destruction and depletion of, or damage to) capacity. In turn, the types of expenditure which should be incorporated in such activities, has to be defined and "agreed" before comparisons between provinces, years, or departments/sectors.
- d) There are no such agreements currently.

10. Quantitative fiscal movements (e.g., the apparent halving of District government grants between 05/6 and 06/7) mark major "environmental" shifts affecting prospects for devolved capacity development. These should be taken into account in any overall assessment of the impact of fiscal provisions on "capacity."

² See below comments on local authority block grants.

³ NB A WTO Cell has been established in P+D at a cost of Rs12 million in 06/07.

⁴ From just over Rs2 billion in 05/06 in the original estimates for these two items, these became conflated into much larger grants of Rs20 billion for Districts and Rs3.3 billion for TMAs in the revised estimates of the same year. These grants decline to Rs9.6 billion for Districts and Rs2.4 billion for TMAs in 06/07. This raises questions about predictability of local authority grants year to year. Extreme variation may well sap capacities at district level to consolidate support for service provision.

**(2) LIST OF CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECTS INCLUDED IN THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
SECTOR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, 2007–2008**

(Million Rupees)

Name of the Project	Cost	Allocation
1. Capacity Building of Pakistan Met Department	107.3	13.7
2. Project of Technical Assistance to Access to Justice Program Revised (ADB)	1692.5	773.0
3. Federal Program under Access to Justice Program (ADB)	6420.0	1248.0
4. Provincial Program under Access to Justice Program (ADB)	11880.0	2000.0
5. Tax Administration Reforms Project (WB/IDA)	9500.6	880.0
6. Support to Good Governance (Phase-II) UNDP	235.3	50.0
7. Institutional Strengthening & Efficiency Enhancement of EAD	59.0	10.0
8. Institutional Capacity Building of DISCos (ADB)	162.0	92.0
9. Capacity Building of Pakistan Nuclear Reg. Authority	497.0	108.0
10. Institutional Strengthening of Nuclear Reg. Authority	480.0	108.0
11. Strengthening and Capacity Building of Mineral Wing	95.0	30.0
12. Capacity Development of Hydrocarbon Dev: Institute	255.0	64.0
13. Capacity Building of Teachers Training Institutions and Training of Elementary School Teachers Punjab	3137.0	300.0
14. Same Nomenclature of Scheme for Sindh	1261.0	200.0
15. Same Nomenclature of Scheme for NWFP	1035.0	120.0
16. Same Nomenclature of Scheme for Balochistan	588.0	80.0
17. Same Nomenclature for FATA, NA, AJK, ICT	669.0	100.0

Name of the Project	Cost	Allocation
18. Capacity Building of Executives of Universities	36.0	10.0
19. Capacity Building of EGD Islamabad	39.5	16.6
20. Institutional Strengthening of PCB	38.9	10.2
21. Strengthening of P & D Wing NCST & Projects Monitoring Cell Ministry of SC & Technology	39.9	17.2
22. IT Training for Elected Lady Representatives	15.4	1.4
23. Capacity Building of Officers of Overseas Pakistanis Division	25.5	5.0
24. Activity Based Capacity Development Project (Env, Div)	133.4	55.0
25. Inst, Strengthening and Capacity Building of Energy Wing P & D Division	24.2	5.3
26. ADB, TA for Results Based Monitoring of Projects P & D Division (ADB Grant)	42.0	0.2
27. Infrastructure Institutional Capacity Building & Preparatory Facility through TA from ADB Loan No: 2178 Pak (SF), Umbrella Project	2118.5	633.0
28. (i) Promoting Professional Excellence in P&D, Div	41.9	36.3
(ii) Institutional Strengthening & Efficiency Enhancement of Planning Commission	95.0	33.0
29. Institutional Cooperation Program (Norwegian Grant)	59.0	17.1
Total	40782.9	7017.0

Source: Dr. Awan, Special Adviser
to Resident Representative, JICA

(3) Capacity Building Projects recorded in DAD Pakistan

Funding Source / Project	Title	Committed (USD)	Disbursed (USD)	Expended (USD)	Project Count	1st Level Implementing Agency	Sector	Province or Area	Implementation Status
Total		46,278,029	29,657,967	4,631,716	23				
To be specified		1,230,000	1,230,000	137,461	2				
PAK/001296	Capacity Building for Improving Quality & Scope of Literacy Programmes in Pakistan	980,000	980,000.00	137,461		UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)	Education	To be specified	Ongoing
PAK/000881	Building Enabling Governance and Institutions for Earthquake Response" (BEGIN-ER)	250,000	250,000			UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)	Crisis Prevention and Disaster Reduction	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); AJK (Azad Jammu and Kashmir); Unallocated	Ongoing
Canada Gov		14,449,154	11,931,375	-7					
PAK/000883	Capacity Building of Community Workers in Sindh	60,391	60,391.00			Takhleeq Foundation	Governance; Unallocated	Sindh; Unallocated	Completed
PAK/000909	Awareness and Capacity Building of Women Workers in the Bangle Making Industry	33,895	1,017,265.00			PSWS (Pak Social Welfare Society), Hyderabad	Gender and Women Development; Unallocated	Sindh; Unallocated	Completed
PAK/001106	Reproductive Health Training and Capacity Building Project for Killa Abdullah	43,469	40,181.00			Mehac Trust Helping Council	Health and Nutrition; Unallocated	Balochistan; Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/001114	Empowerment of Rural Women Through Capacity Building	38,506	19,873.00			Participatory Community Development Program	Social Welfare; Unallocated	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000910	Social Policy Development Centre (SPDC)	14,197,371	10,718,143			SPDC (Social Policy and Development Centre)	Governance	Sindh; Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000914	Gender and Rights within Education Development in Hunza	59,649	59,649			HERP (Hunza Education Resource Project)	Education	Unallocated; FANA (Federally Administrated)	Ongoing

Funding Source / Project	Title	Committed (USD)	Disbursed (USD)	Expended (USD)	Project Count	1st Level Implementing Agency	Sector	Province or Area	Implementation Status
	Schools							Northern Areas)	
PAK/001314	Technical Assistance for NAC, for the Peer Review of the GFATM	15,873	15,873			UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)	Health and Nutrition	Unallocated; Federal Capital Territory	Ongoing
EC (European Commission)		6,738,937	5,578,722	-7					
PAK/000703	Building-up rights based approaches to HIV/AIDS in Pakistan: A national civil society capacity building project.	3,953,860	3,558,470.00			Interact Worldwide	Health and Nutrition; Unallocated	Country Wide; Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000833	Knowledge and capacity building for disaster resilience: earthquake affected region in Northern Pakistan	1,197,319	957,855.00			OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)	To be specified	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); AJK (Azad Jammu and Kashmir); Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/001235	Provincial level capacity building of relevant stakeholders on "Counter Trafficking"	67,191	35,972.00			Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme	Governance; Unallocated	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/001257	Capacity Building and Social Rehabilitation of victims of torture in NWFP Pakistan	531,610	223,506.00			European Perspective	Governance; Unallocated	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000470	Creation of social deterrence to prevent extreme forms of violence on women	117,536	105,783			Baidarie Sialkot	Gender and Women Development	Punjab; Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000624	EU-SPF: Study on the Elimination of Textile Quotas and Pakistan - EU Trade	84,053	67,242			SPDC (Social Policy and Development Centre)	Trade	Sindh; Unallocated	Completed
PAK/000694	Block Grant: Istituto Sindacale Per La	787,368	629,894			Istituto Sindacale Per La Cooperazione Allo	Social Welfare	Country Wide; Unallocated	Ongoing

Funding Source / Project	Title	Committed (USD)	Disbursed (USD)	Expended (USD)	Project Count	1st Level Implementing Agency	Sector	Province or Area	Implementation Status
	Cooperazione Allo Sviluppo					Sviluppo Italy			
Japan Gov		226,000	226,000.00	175,376	1				
PAK/001297	Capacity building of district education officers in educational planning, implementation and community participation	226,000	226,000.00	175,376		UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)	Education	To be specified	Ongoing
Other		969,201	-	-6					
PAK/000703	Building-up rights based approaches to HIV/AIDS in Pakistan: A national civil society capacity building project.	439,318				Interact Worldwide	Health and Nutrition; Unallocated	Country Wide; Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/001235	Provincial level capacity building of relevant stakeholders on "Counter Trafficking"	14,129				Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme	Governance; Unallocated	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/001257	Capacity Building and Social Rehabilitation of victims of torture in NWFP Pakistan	354,407				European Perspective	Governance; Unallocated	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000470	Creation of social deterrence to prevent extreme forms of violence on women	13,060				Baidarie Sialkot	Gender and Women Development	Punjab; Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000624	EU-SPF: Study on the Elimination of Textile Quotas and Pakistan - EU Trade	9,339				SPDC (Social Policy and Development Centre)	Trade	Sindh; Unallocated	Completed
PAK/000694	Block Grant: Istituto Sindacale Per La Cooperazione Allo	138,948				Istituto Sindacale Per La Cooperazione Allo Sviluppo Italy	Social Welfare	Country Wide; Unallocated	Ongoing

Funding Source / Project	Title	Committed (USD)	Disbursed (USD)	Expended (USD)	Project Count	1st Level Implementing Agency	Sector	Province or Area	Implementation Status
	Sviluppo								
Switzerland Gov		328,084			1				
PAK/001268	USAR Capacity Building	328,084				To be specified	To be specified	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province)	Approved
UK Gov		5,396,893	5,396,893	1,084,903	3				
PAK/000738	IGEQ 171581003-CA-002 Education Capacity Building - UNESCO ERP	1,385,120	1,385,120.00	761,344		UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)	Education; Unallocated	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); AJK (Azad Jammu and Kashmir); Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000743	IGEQ 171581003-CA-001 Health Capacity Building	323,558	323,558.00	323,559		WHO (World Health Organization)	Health and Nutrition; Unallocated	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); AJK (Azad Jammu and Kashmir); Unallocated	Ongoing
PAK/000881	Building Enabling Governance and Institutions for Earthquake Response” (BEGIN-ER)	3,688,215	3,688,215			UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)	Crisis Prevention and Disaster Reduction	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); AJK (Azad Jammu and Kashmir); Unallocated	Ongoing
UN (United Nations)		5,939,760	4,309,977	3,233,976	3				
PAK/000281	Capacity Development for Aid Coordination	1,498,902	310,000.00	310,000		UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)	Governance	Country Wide	Ongoing
PAK/001028	00014124-National Capacity Building for Program Development and Implementation (NATCAP)	440,881	-			To be specified	To be specified	To be specified	Ongoing
PAK/000881	Building Enabling Governance and Institutions for Earthquake Response”	3,999,977	3,999,977	2,923,976		UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)	Crisis Prevention and Disaster Reduction	NWFP (North-West Frontier Province); AJK (Azad Jammu and Kashmir);	Ongoing

Funding Source / Project	Title	Committed (USD)	Disbursed (USD)	Expended (USD)	Project Count	1st Level Implementing Agency	Sector	Province or Area	Implementation Status
	(BEGIN-ER)							Unallocated	
WB (World Bank)		11,000,000	985,000		-1				
PAK/001091	Balochistan Education Support Program (Cr.No.4203-Pak)	11,000,000	985,000			Balochistan, Government of	Education	Country Wide	Ongoing

REVIEW OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES IN PAKISTAN AND PUNJAB RELEVANT TO EDUCATION SERVICES DELIVERY¹ (from 2004)

National Programs

Social Action Program (World Bank-led consortium)
President's Task Force on Human Development (FGoP)
Fiscal Decentralization Technical Assistance (ADB/DFID)
Devolution Support Program (ADB) (2004 position)
Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (UNDP et. al.) (2004 position)

Other Provinces

Northern Areas Education Program (DFID)
Essential Institutional Reforms Operationalization Program (EIROP) (UNDP)

Punjab Specific Programs

Performance Budgeting Technical Assistance (DFID)
In-Service Teacher Training Program in English Language (GoPj)

¹ These hitherto unpublished notes were prepared in 2004, as part of the research for the ECDPM Case Study on Punjab decentralized education capacities (Watson and Khan 2005a)

National Level Programs

Social Action Program (SAP)

SAP was launched in 1991 in an attempt to redress historic low allocations of funding for, and poor quality of government social services. Large volumes of donor financial (and some TA) support was provided to GoP on an expenditure reimbursement basis, to provide an incentive and leverage for increased GoP spending on social services benefiting poor people: basic education, preventative health, water and sanitation. The aggregate magnitude of GoP and donor investment in SAP I (ending 1996/7) and SAP II (which ran up to 2002/3) was estimated to be \$10 billion in total (80% of which was GoP funding). Building government capacity for planning, monitoring and implementing social service programs was a major objective of the World Bank's SAP II project (1998-2002).² Donor support however started in 1993, and lasted until 2002. The World Bank led a consortium of donors to the program.

Needs Assessment

In the late 90s, a series of SAP Capacity Building Needs Assessments were conducted in various Provinces, supported by donors, to help plan the second phase of the program. We have been unable to establish from the available documentation what the fate of these CB assessments was. The fact that they were in part funded by DFID, and DFID's support to Pakistan was suspended for a period in 2000, may account for this.

Approach Adopted

The capacity development element of the *Social Action Program* was to be approximately 2% of the financial envelope of the \$250 million World Bank SAP II program launched in mid 1998. It provided for a Multidonor support unit (MSU), Federal and Provincial SAP cells (housed in Planning and Development Departments), technical assistance and training (including in procurement) to federal and provincial implementing sector agencies. A separate participatory development program was initially established, but abandoned after ineffective implementation.

Impact

The World Bank's Completion Report on the SAP II program provides a negative account of the impact of capacity development (and many other) aspects of the SAP II experience.³ To some extent, the report criticizes the lack of effort to build political commitment and "ownership," and lack of effort to bring on board Provincial governments in SAP design, especially Finance Departments (since one of the reasons SAPII failed was due to inadequate resources being made available, in part due to overall stringency, in part because of the way the program was viewed as donor-pushed at that level of government). Variable absorptive capacities of provincial and District counterparts were another factor, as were (more significantly) the continued recruitment bans affecting service delivery capacities, frequent transfers of trained personnel, persistent absenteeism of service personnel,⁴ and political interference in site selection for facilities and in non-merit selection of new staff, despite numerous training courses being run and consultants fielded.

Planning capacity, according to the World Bank's Completion Report, did show some signs of improvement, in that Departments were able to prepare annual operational plans eventually unaided, but even these gains were deemed to be probably unsustainable because of the way SAP was seen as a donor-driven program. These gains also appeared to be only at provincial level: inadequate effort was made at district level, and here capacities remained weak.

Little headway was made in organizational restructuring or improving management systems (both seen as essential for improved service delivery). Monitoring systems were seen as being necessary for reporting (rather than operational systems to feed back via corrective measures into future implementation).

School Management Committees were established and reportedly strengthened as a major SAP initiative. However, from recent evidence, they were later suspended and are being reconstituted as School Councils in Punjab.

Other reasons for slow progress and poor impact of the CB component of the SAP II was "missing procedures for procuring consultancy services, inordinate fear of accountability mechanisms in operation since 2001, and lack of conviction on the part of decision makers in the utility and ability of consultants to provide capacity strengthening services." (World Bank 2002, page 17).

² Capacity dimensions included development of strategies, reform plans that laid out sectoral priorities in consultation with key stakeholders; preparation of operational plans; adequate budgetary provision to meet them; strengthening MIS and monitoring mechanisms.

³ A basic reason for the poor performance of the capacity building aspects of SAP II was the delay in initiating activities due to delays in processing PC1 proformas by respective Provincial Planning and Development Departments. This resulted in most activities being implemented at the end of SAP II rather than at the beginning when their impact would presumably be greater.

⁴ Checks on absenteeism were made under Army auspices at least in Balochistan and Sindh provinces in 2000, which helped (temporarily) to reduce absenteeism.

President's Task Force on Human Development: leading to National Commission on Human Development, (NCHD)

Needs Assessment

The principal GoP-sponsored capacity needs assessment in respect of service delivery was the *President's Task Force on Human Development*, which reported in January 2002 after 6 months deliberations. It led directly to the establishment of the *National Commission on Human Development*, (NCHD). This was a response to a critical situation facing social service delivery. Its diagnosis was that failures in implementation were due to shortfalls in structure and management of interventions:

- lack of community participation and decision-making rights
- limited public access to what are poor-quality services
- lack of integration in planning and implementation of programs
- limited skills of providers, including NGOs and CBOs
- lack of management capacities of line departments.

It recommended more public/private collaboration, including PPPs, and NCHD presence in Districts as an orchestrating body.

Within its education policy analysis, "governance and management" (at the level of individual institutions) were particularly in need of reform, and their deficiencies contributed directly to poor service quality. Service providers the Task Force consulted "emphasized performance evaluation, training and respect for the work they are doing....predictable working conditions, decentralized authority for prompt and appropriate services and professional management with career advancement prospects" (p.44 of Task Force Report). Management issues included lack of accountability, complicated procedures, lack of incentives for performance, and poor planning of curricula and evaluation."

Approach to be Adopted

Capacity development under the *NCHD* is to be done by district-level "Human Development Incubators"⁵ focused on three drivers: community participation, capacity and competence building, and communications and social marketing. Critical drivers of success (in using resources) were identified from some innovative pilot projects as integration (e.g., with health programs). These included accountability and partnerships, as well as participation and capacity development. "Change management, premised on behavioural change and restructuring the delivery system is at the core of the solution" (p. 50). Sustained engagement and back up support are essential characteristics of the required approach: incubators being seen as acting as a "catalyst for social transformation," funding small organizations, building commercial, technical, and administrative competences in line Departments, NGOs, and CCBs.

⁵ Human Development Incubators (based on models of 'Business Development Incubators') are to be staffed by specialists in change management, and business process engineering, recruited from private, NGO and public sectors, up to four District Incubators will be established by 2005, according to NCHD plans, and country-coverage by the end of the decade. They would create and fund partnerships between public, civil society, academic, and private sectors. Volunteers are to assist core staff.

Fiscal Decentralization Technical Assistance

Needs Analysis

The ADB-supported *Fiscal Decentralization Technical Assistance* project (2001–2002) was intended to facilitate the preparation of accounting and financial control systems and related skills to support fiscal decentralization. The Project Completion Report on the TA (Gray 2003) indicates that "the need for education, training and instruction in management, financial management and implementation of new systems was totally underestimated in the project design." The pressures the consultants were put under by the client (National Reconstruction Bureau) impeded the consultants' understanding of the "as is" (present) situation in their Inception Period. Thus, the absorptive capacities of the beneficiaries (provincial and district governments) were never assessed accurately. This assessment was also affected by the NRB's reported unwillingness or inability to facilitate access by the consultants to other stakeholders at the center (e.g., the Accountant General's office) and the Provincial Finance Departments. Another factor was the unfamiliarity of local (and international) consultants with the financial systems in use in Provincial and District agencies at the time. The outputs of the FDTA were to feed directly into the District Support Program (see below).

Approach to Capacity Development

The approach to capacity development in the *Fiscal Decentralization TA Project* included system design and related training. The evaluation (Gray 2003) indicated that the budget code, accounting code, and procurement manuals were deemed by the client (NRB) to be drafts, and much more work would be needed to bring them up to a standard where provinces could interpret and use them readily. Despite this, the Budget Codes were issued in February 2003. Accounting codes had still not been released by the Accountant General at the time of the evaluation (June 2003).

Training to introduce these systems was judged to have been of an orientation nature only. Since most of the local consultants who delivered the training had no public sector finance experience, they could not illustrate learning points with practical examples. Training of master trainers was not achieved despite it being an integral component of the "capacity building" element. Much of the material connected with performance management, internal financial control and quality standards was alien to the culture of the Pakistan civil service. Internal audit materials were deemed "impractical" in the conditions prevailing in local authorities. The material on this and other components lacked practical problems and worked solutions and illustrations; comprised PowerPoint slides only (no explanatory handouts, nor interactive sessions); toolkit, or solution checklists, and was comprehensible only with the help of a trainer. It did not include a Trainers' Manual. Difficulties were experienced during the training by the coordinator in attracting all the target trainees. Senior staff from departments—the target for the training—often sent substitutes.

Impact

The only data we have seen relates to reactions of trainees to their training. The vagueness of the responses of those interviewed during the evaluation from the 1,900 trainees of the *Fiscal Decentralization TA training* indicated that they had difficulties applying the concepts presented, or even remembering which course the evaluators were referring to. The evaluators found that "people are going on so many training courses that they become cynical about their purpose" and "there is more training for some people than they can absorb"; "attendance ...is peripatetic in terms of ...late arrival, early departure and absenteeism" (Gray, p.51/2). As far as we know, there has been no ex-post evaluation of impact on trainees' work performance or operational aspects of the systems introduced.

Decentralization Support Program (DSP) (ADB-Supported)

Needs Analysis

The *Decentralization Support Program (DSP) (2003-)* adopts a demand-led approach in its \$23 million Local Government Performance Enhancement component. This provides training and systems development to support devolution. One component is TA for inter-governmental fiscal transfers. Civil servants, elected representatives and civil society groups make applications in the form of proposals, the formulation and appraisal of which is facilitated by advisers attached to the four DSP Provincial Support Units.

Approach to be Adopted

DSP's capacity development is yet to get fully underway. One constraint is related to capacity for capacity development: despite bids being launched for public / private consortia to handle batches of similar training demanded by Districts, the public providers in the Punjab have been reluctant to participate. However, a recent event was the first of four provincial policy dialogue workshops on the establishment of Citizen-Community Boards. This we suggest is a significant aspect of "capacity development" in terms of the implementation of decentralization policy, and we mention it in our discussion of stakeholders' (donors') influences on capacity and performance. It has also mounted internationally-resourced seminars on aspects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers.

Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE), Supporting CCBs

Needs Analysis

The *Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE)* program was established in 2003, with the task of promoting community empowerment through citizen participation at the grass-roots by facilitating the organization of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) and the implementation of CCB projects as envisaged in the Local Government Ordinance of 2001. Its approach to needs analysis will be to survey annually the opinions of users of social services on their effectiveness and standards, through a so-called "Social Audit" process. DTCE is the client of the surveying agency Community Information, Empowerment and Training (CIET) for a series of annual impact assessments of the effects of devolution in relation to the original Baseline Survey in 2001/2 which covered all Districts of Pakistan. No separate needs analysis of CCBs for organizational skills has taken place.

Approach to be Adopted

DTCE is in the late stages of planning a major nation-wide exercise for dissemination of guidance on the establishment of CCBs. Manuals have been prepared, an MOU with the Rural Support Program Network (RSPN) related to capacity development and institutional support, with a view to facilitating outsourcing capacity development to the partners of the RSPN network. It is intended that Unions will "self-select" to join the CCB program, and after registration receive a three-day Mobilization Campaign Capacity Building activity (delivered by outsourced "contractors" including NGOs), and result in a Union Action Plan for CCB Mobilization. Union teams will receive a social communications "Awareness Raising Campaign Kit." NGOs or CSOs will mentor unions on the implementation of the action plans and ultimately on project management. Another NGO/CSO will build union associations' capacities in monitoring and evaluation.

One major NGO we spoke to was on the point of withdrawing from the program because they had the impression that little flexibility was to be given to implementers to tailor their approach. It remains to be seen how this mass-orientation program develops. The past experience of at least the NRSP indicates that very intensive, and repeated, support is needed if community-based organizations are to take off.⁶

⁶ It is salutary that the NRSP Program Update to March 2004 assessed that of the 11,414 Community Organizations their members had worked with in six Districts of Punjab, 2,413 were inactive after their intervention, and another 1,579 were having irregular meetings and savings, with credit overdue. Both were in the same broad category "not ready for any activity." Thus, 35% of COs, despite intensive RSP work, had not (yet) taken off. (NRSP 2004, p.8)

Experience in Other Provinces

Northern Areas Education Program (NAEP) (DFIDP-supported, 1998–2002)

NAEP was a comprehensive TA program (including innovative infrastructure development) to improve education services in Northern Areas.

Needs Analysis

Three needs analyses to support the management capacity development component of *Northern Areas Education Program (NAEP)* were carried out, at Directorate level in 1998, 2000 and in and for District Education Offices between December 2002 and January 2003. According to the evaluation of this component, "All of the three TNAs had their focus restricted to problem identification. These TNAs lacked in-depth comparison and analysis of required and existing knowledge, attitude and practices among the management related officers" (Ashraf 2004, p.25). The third TNA was needed after none of the courses planned on the basis of the first two TNAs were run, the resumption of DFID support, and due to the fact that changes in staff since the first TNAs rendered the results unreliable.

Approach Adopted

The *NAEP's* capacity development activities in part fell victim to the events of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent withdrawal of technical support. The District-based Management Training was compressed into the final year of the project, and no follow-up "on-site" was possible. Objectives for only some of the training program elements were specified: hence the evaluator faced difficulties in assessing whether training content achieved its goals. Most programs (except that for Village Education Committees) were pursued without trainers' guides: hence, training, according to trainees in various districts, appeared not to be uniform in content or style. However, participants reported the use of participative approaches in training, despite very high numbers (over 40) on many of the latter courses, which must have affected feasibility of such techniques in the opinion of the evaluator, as did the unusually heterogeneous mix of trainees (from several grades of staff).

Impact

The evaluation of *Northern Areas Education Project's* management component indicated that the participants of the courses reported positive outcomes in terms of awareness of management practices, better communication and presentation skills, planning (including use of time) and teamwork. The evaluator admitted however that he was unable to verify these statements with observations or evidence. Over 80% of participants he consulted could not remember the content of the training they received. Sustainability of the effects of training was questioned: no on-job follow-up will be feasible in the current funding climate. This was also identified as a major concern in the case of the Education Management Information System component: while system design and training were deemed effective, the system's operation at the time of its evaluation (November 2003) was dependent on two staff who had not been paid their salaries for five months due to bureaucratic delays in Islamabad (the authorizing centre for new posts such as those); low grading of posts was another concern, which is expected to affect feasibility of staff retention. Leadership of the EMIS was in the hands of a person assigned due to rank into the job, rather than technical aptitude or experience (see Dean 2003, p.11).

Essential Institutional Reforms Operationalization Program in NWFP (UNDP)**Needs Analysis**

This project was designed in response to the Local Government Plan (2000) and the Local Government Ordinance (2001). The evaluation (UNDP 2003) commented that was generally well-designed in relation to the decentralization policy and remains relevant to the needs of NWFP. It was intended to support the design and implementation of the decentralization framework at provincial and district level, including strengthening the roles and responsibilities at those levels "through human and institutional capacity development" and improve decision taking quality and transparency via improved information collection and sharing.

Approach Adopted

The approach to capacity development was classroom training and based on NRB modules, not organizational development. This was "not conducive to institutionalization of local governance," nor focused or participatory. The policy impact of the program was adversely affected by the "absence of mechanisms for feeding back lessons learned to central government" (UNDP 2003, p.4) (it is unclear whether this referred to the program itself or NRB's mechanisms). The program's contribution to financial management information system development had not translated into improved accountability, because little progress had been made with improved public information provision on annual plans and budgets. The project's mandate to promote involvement of women in local governance was impeded by the de-facto incumbency of elected governments by men (despite LGO provisions on female representation). The Capacity Building Advisory Board established by the project proffered more potential than realization of progress. Frequent changes of (government officials) in National Project Director and National Project Manager positions impeded progress. UNDP comparative international experience was not adduced to the extent expected in project development.

Impact

This was not assessed in the evaluation, which was formative in purpose, to inform the next phase planned to start later in 2004.

Punjab-Specific Education Capacity-Related Development Programs

Performance Budgeting in the Punjab

Needs Analysis and Background

Based on an initiative of the Chief Minister of Punjab, who had been exposed to Performance Budgeting during an orientation study tour/visit to UK, the Punjab Provincial Government took basic steps from 2000 to introduce notions of Performance Based Budgeting (PBB) at Provincial level. In response to a request from the Chief Minister, the Department for International Development agreed to sponsor a technical assistance project, including needs analysis, preparation of guidance materials and training program design and implementation for senior finance and sector department staff at Provincial and District level in Punjab (initially Multan and Faisalabad as pilot Districts). This training—imparted in Faisalabad in January 2003, and Lahore and Multan in March 2003—was to provide the knowledge and skills for participants to move beyond the conceptual stage of the introduction of PBB principles towards practical introduction of PBB systems in their departments.

Approach and Results

The evaluation report on the initiative (Gray 2003a) indicated that

- after introductory courses in January, PBB pilot exercises were pursued in health and education departments of Faisalabad and Multan.
- health staff had gone further in these pilots than education staff, (and produced a booklet on the concept and its possible application) because the latter had no previous experience of management or budgeting before taking up their posts, and appeared to need more orientation in management concepts than participants from Health Department.
- most of the (46) participants in the Multan course were new to the concept, and therefore found it difficult to absorb content in the limited time available (2 days);
- while the subsequent workshop in Multan had been intended for staff who had participated in the previous course in January, once again, most of the participants had not received any previous orientation, therefore had difficulties following the workshop.
- in the first section of the four-day Provincial course for January course participants, District staff were expected to attend, to consolidate earlier training, but none showed up. In the subsequent 2-day program for provincial staff, fewer Provincial staff turned up than expected, and several were not sufficiently senior to "roll-out" PBB in their Departments. Two others were new to PBB.
- it appeared that a number of participants of the January training had already been transferred by March, so that in these cases, no consolidation of PBB concepts was feasible, and effort was therefore wasted.
- the attitude of participants in the Provincial training appeared half-hearted in respect of the training. None had undertaken the tasks/assignments previously agreed in January with respect to PBB in their Departments, therefore the Multan Health Department PBB booklet had to be used as a makeshift focus for discussion.
- the Provincial participants opined that a circular from the Finance Secretary would be required to facilitate the introduction of PBB across Departments.

Impact

From this account, and discussions during the case study fieldwork, it appears that

- the PBB initiative was never consistently and broadly "owned" at provincial level, in key technical Departments (particularly Finance and Planning and Development). Booklets on PBB were produced in 2000, 2001, and 2002, by the principal GoP counterpart of the expatriate consultant for several departments (including education). These were never backed by any law, which would have obliged departments to adopt the approach before presenting their budgets to the Provincial Assembly. The booklets were never referred to by departments.
- given the de-facto influence of provincial government over district governments, and given the lukewarm response at provincial level, even the apparently enthusiastic and positive responses from many of the District participants could not be expected to manifest itself in implementation of PBB at District level;
- the working and systemic norms of the civil service in Pakistan are not conducive to PBB concepts, so without determined and senior "championship," experimental initiatives are doomed to remain just that, and will never be "rolled out" across key operational departments.
- it remains to be seen whether the current DFID-supported District Development Program in Faisalabad (where consultants are adopting a facilitatory organizational development role) will be successful in "mainstreaming" PBB concepts based on this early PBB orientation exercise.

In-Service Teacher Education Program, Punjab

Needs Analysis

The *In-Service Teacher Education Program, Punjab* was a costly (Rs250 million) and ambitious attempt to improve the skills of over 150,000 teachers in the Punjab conducted by the University of Education, Lahore between 2001 and 2003. It was, according to the third-party evaluation (AKUIED 2004), preceded by inadequate needs analysis. This was non-existent in the English language component, and only used as an indication that there was need for training, rather than a diagnostic or design tool for the mathematics and science teaching subcomponents. There was reportedly confusion over the nature and status of "pre-tests" and "post-tests." Instead of being used as a tool for assessing the impact of the programs, an expectation arose that participants would score 100% on the post-test. If they did not, they were threatened with dismissal by the Minister of Education for the Punjab. This led to a strike by government schoolteachers (quoted on page 16 of AKUIED 2004). The evaluation report also notes that the tests in the second batch were divulged by Master Trainers, then the requirement was eased and the strike called off. The evaluators also noted that the tests were not subject to piloting before use. "The testing programme seems not to have been developed properly nor its uses communicated properly" (p.7).

Approach Adopted

The approach adopted by the *IST program for teachers in the Punjab* was "cascade" training: 12 key trainers were assigned to develop materials, and to train 142 lead trainers, who would disseminate the materials to 3,175 Master Trainers, who were to be the "interface" with the ultimate trainees: up to 120,000 trainers of English (who received a 2-week course) and math/science (a one-month course) in nearly 850 training centers. The evaluation indicated that

- materials were not pre-tested, were poorly-prepared, ill-structured, prone to encourage teacher-centered non-interactive knowledge-transfer approaches, and had no clear learning objectives;
- the recruitment of the material-writers was not systematic, and the time they had available so limited that they relied on existing material rather than developing innovative and creative material;
- many master trainers and some lead trainers had limited competence in English (their trainees even less);
- training techniques were predominantly lecture-based, rather than group-centered, or practical presentation-based; and
- there was no follow-up monitoring or evaluation of trainees once they returned to work, nor any on-job support.

Apart from the above factors, other negative influences on the program included

- Trainees' perception that they were being coerced into program attendance;
- It being conducted during the most humid part of the year, in poorly equipped training centers, with inadequate allowances for refreshments; and
- Master trainers were degree holders in the subject of instruction: given education standards in Pakistan, this was no guarantee that they mastered the content of the subject: hence, more emphasis was given to methodology, rather than content.

Impact

There was no positive impact on the classroom performance of the trainees of the *In-Service Training of Teachers in the Punjab*. Many of the participants contacted during the evaluation expressed negative comments about the appropriateness of materials and trainers, the location and style of training, and conditions (including allowances). As a result of the conclusions of the evaluation report, a high-level decision was taken by Punjab Education Department to discontinue plans for further phases of In-Service Training using the cascade approach. We understand that teachers' unions have been invited by the University of Education to discuss future approaches to in-service teacher training.

CRITERIA FOR CHOICE OF CANDIDATE CASES FOR PHASE II WRITE-SHOPS

Emerging criteria for making judgments on the final short-listing of candidate cases include

- a) "**Successful**" in CD terms (at least deemed to be by a broad range of stakeholders);
- b) **Demonstrates Modest CD Incrementalism** as opposed to the more common "Big Bang"/"Fast-track" imperatives;
- c) **Addresses common, apparently intractable, contextual conditions** yet is an example of how their negative impact on prospects for capacity development can be overcome...at least for a while....;
- d) ...which may mean that it may be appropriate to seek out cases which **explode/debunk myths...** and disprove defeatist mindsets about the apparent impossibility of capacity development in the Pakistan public service.¹
- e) **Disastrous-ness**: It will be instructive to have at least one CD disaster: to illustrate common pitfalls, and possibly to act as a tutorial tool in CD discussions/coaching/workshops later.
- f) **Duration** of implementation. There must be some substantial length of experience ...and some objective evidence of "success" ...good plans or proposals are not an adequate basis for a case.
- g) Degree of "**contested-ness**" If the "constituency" for a case is very divergent and/or politically vocal in terms of views of its likely or even actual success, it will be very difficult to draw sound conclusions from the case.
- h) **Manageability** of the Case Given limited time and research resources, it will be important to ensure cases are manageable in terms of size, scale, and numbers of stakeholders.
- i) The case should be **interesting and potentially "representative."** It must grab attention and be to an extent capable of future emulation.
- j) **Level of Administration**: Federal/**multi**-Provincial/District/Local cases are all needed, ideally.
- k) **Sectoral Mix**: Government; Nongovernment/Government Partnership; and a variety of public service – and "hardware"? – cases are needed.
- l) **Funded by Donor AND indigenous (GoP) Support**: The sample should also contain some "indigenous" cases: "where there was no donor." It will be very useful to examine cases where capacities were developed though indigenously-generated and supported means.
- m) Some cases should demonstrate **sustainability** after donor support was terminated (especially for those cases where donor support was very instrumental in CD). There are indications that this will be a difficult criterion to meet...but some examples are coming in (see tabulation).
- n) **Examples of "political" propulsion** of capacity development would be instructive, because they certainly exist, and are illustrative of the importance of influential "champions" in an administrative context such as Pakistan.

¹ The Punjab Education Capacity Study (Watson and Khan, 2005a) cited a senior official as stating that "capacity development within the public service in Pakistan is an oxymoron."

SUGGESTED LONG LIST OF CANDIDATE CASE STUDIES: AND OTHERS

INDICATIVE CASE STUDIES: IDENTIFIED DURING SCOPING WORK

POSSIBLE CASE	MERITS AS A CASE	DISADVANTAGES	KEY INFORMANTS	LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY AS A WRITESHOP CASE
1. Punjab PERSP PMIU (WB assisted)	Example of "enlightened" impactful PIMU, much valued as CD model in Punjab. It is a powerful illustration of potential impact ...to be emulated.	Demonstrates CD 'pitfalls' of PMUs (parallel structure, etc). But spin-offs are a redeeming feature.	PMIU Lahore, Khalid Gilani Secy Edu	Team very busy, but potentially accessible and analytical enough for fast write-shop inputs. DFIDP study 2005 is a basis on which to build.
2. Faisalabad District Devolution Support (Education Sector and SPU; DFID assisted)	Clear capacity improvement demonstrated; internalized CD from consultants at district, subdistrict and provincial levels. Unique district level CD example case. Poses opportunity to discuss (likely) sustainability.	Sustainability prospects untested.	Wajahat Anwar (DFID) Mosharraf Zaidi (DFID), Khatib Alam (Faisalabad)	Ditto
3. Punjab Municipal Service Improvement Project (and PMDFC) (WB)	Demonstrates fund-supported capacity development in performance management "Managing for Development Results" framework for TMAs. Uses Company (Punjab Municipal Development Fund Company, established in late 90s) with independent Board as technical assistance source for the PMSIP.	Quite early in implementation cycle: only end of first round of PMSIP; results still being assessed. Several "interested parties": PMDFC players; TMAs; Department of Housing Urban Development; and DPHE.	Shahnaz Arshad (Program Officer in WB). Khizar Hayat (Secretary HUDPHE) ex MD PMDFC. Selected TMAs?	Probably fair accessibility despite seniority of key informant(s).
4. Pakistan Poverty	An instance of positive CD thru	Hard to disentangle "other"	Kamran (Chief Operating	Probably good: well-

POSSIBLE CASE	MERITS AS A CASE	DISADVANTAGES	KEY INFORMANTS	LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY AS A WRITESHOP CASE
Alleviation Fund (WB, KfW, etc.) Institutional Development of Partner Organizations	partner organizations. Demand-driven CD model CD thru networking. Preparing government for working with private sector.	factors in play in CD of POs	Officer, PPAF) recommended as an optimal case to pursue.	organized organizational framework. However may need to pursue geographically dispersed Pos.
5. Elected Women's Representatives Empowerment: Ministry of Women's Development and Aurat Foundation (UNDP + Aurat Resources)	Prepares women Councilors for duties as representatives in female-hostile environments. Critical CD issue; Aurat Foundation involved; excellent insights into grassroots CD where illiteracy and cultural barriers are very real.	Possible differences of opinion on value of "pre-packaged" training models and modules where illiteracy and unfamiliarity with abstract notions (e.g., "rights" ... "roles").	Implemented by the Aurat Foundation, Lahore. Long experience of working with government on policy and implementation. Innovative use of women councilors as Master Trainers by MWD Resource utilized by other agencies.	Unambiguously strong case. Should attempt to bring together Ministry and field implementers.
6. Punjab Teachers' (English) Training Programme (GoP /DFID – other?)	Disaster Case '03-'04 according to AKU (2004), but teacher development has since been reformulated organizationally and methodologically on a firmer footing.	Too-negative beginning of case? Relatively recently reformulated: still work in progress... sustainability (beyond change of Chief Minister) untested.	Dr. Rukhsana Zia, Director, Staff Development Dept. of Education, Lahore	Basis is an independent "Third Party Evaluation" (AKU, 2004). Positive Case Study in a systematic approach to constituency development, and rigor of training.
7. HIV/AIDS Surveillance (CIDA)	TA on mapping and blood sampling really taken on board...has led to demonstrated Cap Devt. NB Firm CD base already existed in Laboratories (SIUT and AFMC), and field researchers (Bunad in Punjab). Positive example of selective CB approach by donor TA team:	May be rather early in its evolution...but sound nevertheless. Some issues arising on involvement of government institutions AND NGOs in field research component. Many potential informants/ perspectives/players nationally.	Dr. Rana Muzzafar, SIUT Karachi (now greater proven sample testing capacity than at any other centre globally). Dr. Noor ul Zaman Tafiq, Bunad Foundation Lahore; Dr. Ali Razaque, Punjab Provincial HIV/AIDS	"Group dynamics" of write-shop group could be a challenge given multiple players and variety of institutional backgrounds and hierarchies of seniority. Research methodology has been disputed between

POSSIBLE CASE	MERITS AS A CASE	DISADVANTAGES	KEY INFORMANTS	LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY AS A WRITESHOP CASE
	building on existing capacities and not micromanaging.		Prog. Director	NGO and GoPj institutions involved.
8. Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi (Squatter settlement upgrading, microcredit)	Became a model for replication of low-cost sanitation founded by Akhtar Hamid Khan. Illustrates CD and especially community empowerment and partnership aspects. Awarded World Habitat Award 2000.	Some wariness towards donor engagement. Availability of informants perhaps difficult.	http://www.urckarachi.org/orangi.htm Perveen Rahman	Well-documented. Very accessible materials; Agrees story is worth telling. Probably good co-operation
9. Punjab Literacy Promotion Pilot Project (JICA)	Met all objectives, and MIS has been "institutionalized," along with field "mobilizers" and approved resources for wider "roll-out." Illustrates dangers of near-duplication of nationally-launched initiatives, with locally-based programs.	Sensitivities about possible implicit critique of federal initiatives?	JICA, Consultant coming here again end August: can meet and get brief on informants. Hassan? PD Literacy in Literacy Dept. Lahore Tayyeb Ikram Shah (JICA Technical Adviser)	Probably good: documentation, access to staff, should be no problem.
10. Education Sector Reform Assistance (ESRA) USAID in 12 Districts of Sindh + Balochistan	School Improvement Plans/School Improvement Grants implemented thru SMCs. Major disbursements and apparent grassroots capacity strengthening. Debunks myths of inadequate community capacity, and of weak District oversight capabilities.	Parallel implementation unit.	Mujtaba Piracha, ESRA See USAID Reps.	No problems anticipated.
11. NGO Management of District Health Facilities (Punjab) (by Punjab Rural	Chief Minister – backed; WB Third Party Evaluation report positive in performance terms. Adopted as future model for	Raises questions about sustainability and impact on District capacity (and curative services in general), a casualty	Punjab RSP Javed Ahmed (PD); Abdul Razaq (Principal Officer) Health Department Punjab	Need to clear PjRSP participation in write-shops with Chief Executive of PjRSP.

POSSIBLE CASE	MERITS AS A CASE	DISADVANTAGES	KEY INFORMANTS	LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY AS A WRITESHOP CASE
Support Programme) Funding from GoPj (WB supported TPE)	local government curative health service delivery nationally: an interesting model and well worth examining.	of political tensions in Punjab?	World Bank Health Specialist Dr. Inaam Haq	
12. National Highways and Motorway Police (Federal GoP budget)	Indigenous model of creation of a new component of an ineffective police system with better "environment" for CD. Strong and unique case: proves basic axioms of organizational capacity development.	Too much of a special case...and as such so untypical that no relevant lessons can be drawn?	Inspector General NHMP Riffat Pasha	Ministry of Communications need to be asked for permission to proceed. No access problems thereafter.
13. National Programme for Improvement of Water Courses (NPIWC) (Sindh) (GoS)	Spectacular increase of capacity to manage, support and monitor progress of Water Users' enhancement of irrigation feeder channels. All (GIS-based) monitoring systems "home grown" with no donor input (but some World Bank finance) Strong Case: likely to yield important findings and insights.	No documentation of story (apart from PowerPoint presentation).	Younus Dagha Project Director	Staff keen "to tell story."
14. District Safety Commissions (ADB), Punjab – Faisalabad Case	4 District initiative for improving public safety that seemed to be working well (up to 2004)...then more problematic.	Evidence conflicting...some indications of politicization since change of Law in 2004.	Syed Ali Murtaza PD AJP Punjab Saif Anjum in P+D Dept Lahore..can put in touch with Faisalabad.	If researched at same time as Faisalabad District devolution Support poses no great extra burden.
15. Gender Justice through Muslihat Anjuman ADR (UNDP + Norwegian + SDC)	The only ADR case in Access to Justice: positive achievements	To be explored in Islamabad (Punjab team not available)		
16. Punjab Resource	Diverse strategic program with	CD mainly training so far.	Asad Sumbal and	No major problems. Could

POSSIBLE CASE	MERITS AS A CASE	DISADVANTAGES	KEY INFORMANTS	LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY AS A WRITESHOP CASE
Management Program (ADB)	active CD components, in a very challenging but auspicious environment.		colleagues	pose a CD-awareness raising possibility at opportune time among GoPj constituencies.
17. CB for Trade / Meeting WTO requirements (EC)	Some definite achievements; Minister EAD asked for WTO capacity case.	Still issues in incentives for (e.g.) fishermen's compliance due to governance factors	Roshan.Ara@ec.europa.eu	
Worthy 'Shadow' Cases				
1. Earthquake Relief, NWFP, AJK ADB + Consortium of Donors	Massive, rapid, crucial mobilization of resources; major capacity issues raised; some innovative approaches; vital to learn lessons on strategies for planning and organizing implementation for "next time."	Probably too large and complex (also contentious and politically sensitive currently) to qualify as a manageable case during present exercise. However, should become a "Shadow case," mentioned in study reports.	Donors and GoP, to undertake jointly a capacity analysis, given the likelihood of further major natural disasters in future and the importance of an effective response.	Not feasible in present study.
2. DTCE (UNDP + DFID + Norwegian + SDC)	Major strategic plank of future governance in devolution: CD for bottom-up pressures on providers, and community projects.	Very politically sensitive, and contested within the donor (and academic?) communities. Too early to review as a <i>capacity</i> case?	There are no objective assessments available on the (mixed) results so far.	Not feasible in present study.
3. Analysis of the Local Government Capacity Development advantages (spin-offs) and disadvantages (undermining?) of Current "Vertical" Sector Programs	Responds to concerns expressed by (amongst others) NRB about the prevalence of "parallel" vertical PMU structures at Provincial level driving sector-specific CD (including monitoring) at LG level.	Major issue; complex to research; difficult to adduce firm conclusions....or at least conclusions which would radically alter current entrenched practices.	Sample of LGs in a variety of provinces. PMUs Donors to sectoral programs	Not feasible in present study.

POSSIBLE CASE	MERITS AS A CASE	DISADVANTAGES	KEY INFORMANTS	LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY AS A WRITESHOP CASE
Others 'Where there is no Donor'... but facing problems of participation				
1. Citizen-Police Liaison Committee (Karachi)	Citizen-Group voluntary Initiative to fight crime...now replicated in all Districts. Home Dept. has taken up vehicle and crime MIS Indigenous model evolved from watch and ward to a major player in partnering with govt. Enjoyed wide success and credibility.	Untypically well-resourced and close to Governor's support and influence.	Official site: www.cplc.org.pk . Paper at IDS: http://www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/drc-pubs/summaries/summary%2017-Masoud-CPLC.pdf	Karachi team very busy. May well prove difficult or impossible to access/retain for several days' write-shop. Operating since 1989. Appreciated as a useful model in WDR 2004. UNDP supported for a time: poses therefore a "sustainability case."
2. Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority	Sustainable model of government-community-private sector collaboration in upgrading of squatter settlements and low cost housing. Indigenous model of reform from within govt. Official introduction: http://www.lgdsindh.com.pk/skaa.htm	Fate/future status of KAA still in balance. Not a good time to "open it up."	Tasneem Siddiqui, founder-reformer, receiver of Ramon Magsaysay Award 1999 http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awards/Citation/CitationSiddiquiTas.htm COHRE Housing Rights Award 2005 http://www.cohre.org/view_page.php?page_id=246	Case already well-documented in UNDP publication: Zaidi (2001)
Other possible candidates:				

POSSIBLE CASE	MERITS AS A CASE	DISADVANTAGES	KEY INFORMANTS	LOGISTICAL FEASIBILITY AS A WRITESHOP CASE
Public Sector Capacity Building (WB), Federal	Major WB-funded initiative aimed at top and middle management levels.	Too soon (and too contested?) to be a case? No objective evidence (e.g., tracer study) available yet (one is planned by CSRU)	Zaman – Program Officer (WB) Syed Asif Riaz Bukhari (DG CSRU)	No hard data for "story."
National School for Public Policy: Gender (UNDP)	Integration of Gender in mid-career civil service training.	Impact difficult to verify at this stage?		Not researched yet.
Punjab Education Foundation (WB)	Original governance formula abandoned and restructured. Apparently positive results. Public-private sector service delivery interface case.	Too "young"?	Shahid Karder (Member of NCGR, Lahore)	Not researched yet.
Debt Management Financial System (UNDP)	System survives... and is being actively operated and developed.	?	?	Not researched yet.
IRDC Quetta (Quratul ain Bakhtiari)	Example of indigenous capacity development over 20 years.	?	Quratul ain Bakhtiari	May be preoccupied with current flooding crisis... therefore impossible to meet QB?
Urban Unit, Lahore (Urban Think Tank)	Institutional CB for all urban interventions inc. WSS reform, GIS, tax reform.	Too soon? Not enough evidence.	Dr. Nasir Javed, PD	Not researched.
CB of LG Trg Institute, Lala Musa, Punjab	Internalization of externally-driven CB interventions. CB for undertaking future CB	?	?	Not researched.

Possible Cases from Local Governments		Illustrating influence of key political figures		
DG Khanewal, Punjab	Adnan, Zaman (WB)	Reforms championed by Nazim		
TMA Chiniot, Punjab	Adnan	Reforms driven by Nazim. Extensive CCBs		
TMA Gulshan Iqbal, Karachi, Sindh	Adnan	Interventions in PPP championed by Nazim	Very busy key staff: difficult for write-shop.	Probably not enough "raw material" to make full case.