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# **Toward a New Pacific Regionalism**

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## **Pacific Islands Police Peacekeeping Operations: a Cost-Benefit Analysis**

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Suva, Fiji Islands

# Preface

This report was prepared for the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PFIS) in Suva, Fiji Islands. The report is one output of an Asian Development Bank (ADB) technical assistance project (TA 6226 REG): “Developing and Implementing the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration.” The Commonwealth Secretariat provided funding to the project.

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The report is published in three volumes. Volume 1 is the Executive Summary. Volume 2 is the main report. Volume 3 contains the working papers commissioned for the report—a series of independent studies assessing potential benefits and costs of implementing a variety of possible regional initiatives. Volume 3 has been printed in hard copy in only limited numbers. However, it is available on the websites of ADB ([www.adb.org](http://www.adb.org)) and at [www.pacificplan.org](http://www.pacificplan.org).

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Pacific Islands policing services have been involved in offshore peacekeeping missions since 1987 when the Fiji Police Force seconded officers to the Fiji Military Forces in the Sinai and Lebanon. Since then, Pacific policing services have served in many theatres including Europe, Africa and Asia. More recently, deployments have been close to or within the region, including to East Timor and the Solomon Islands. Most of the deployments have been under the auspices of the United Nations while in recent times deployments have also occurred within the Biketawa Declaration. Pacific Islands policing services have represented their countries and the region with distinction.

There are now more global crises in the last ten years requiring intervention than in the last thirty years combined.

Apart from Fiji Islands, the level of representation in offshore missions from other Pacific police services has been low. While this reflects lower police numbers in these countries, it also reflects a generally lower level of capacity across the region. Increasingly, there is a growing demand for civilian police to be involved in peacekeeping operations with up to 7,000 officers currently deployed worldwide. These operations require police officers to be equipped with contemporary and specialist knowledge and skills to effectively perform their role in peacekeeping. The United Nations (UN) requires a high level of literacy and skills competency for peacekeepers within their deployments and in some cases these levels have precluded involvement of police officers from some Pacific countries.

In the Pacific region, measures are being undertaken to raise the level of police skills with key interventions from the Australian Federal Police in relation to transnational crime and from Australian and New Zealand funded community policing initiatives and institutional strengthening programs, including the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI). However these are medium-to-long term programs that will not deliver higher-level capacity in the immediate future.

Pacific leaders also have recognised the need for countries to increase their appreciation of regionalism and have agreed to create a "Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration". This aims to deepen and broaden regional cooperation by pooling regional resources. The Plan inter alia, seeks to increase participation, ownership and regional collective action and to facilitate the inclusion of regional initiatives in Pacific Islands countries national development strategies. The Pacific Police Peacekeeping Proposal is one such initiative.

The Terms of Reference requires a detailed examination of the costs and benefits of establishing a regional policing force for export. While the raising of such a force provides many opportunities and benefits, it is not a panacea to solving problems of insufficient police capacity in the region. Such a force also brings with it many risks, none more evident than HIV/Aids. Other risk factors such as sustainability and loss of police officers to other employment pathways are major areas for concern. Further, the exposure to overseas instances of policing "best practice" need to be reflected in the Pacific police forces so that the experience and insight in to policing gained overseas is returned to the Pacific.

There are three fundamental outcomes for establishing a Pacific Policing Peacekeeping Force (PPKF):

1. provision of civilian police for UN (and other) peacekeeping Missions overseas;
2. income generation within the region; and
3. increased capacity for Pacific police services.

It is considered the most effective means of achieving the above outcomes is to establish a regional PPKF Training Centre in a Pacific Island Country. It is assessed that this centre would be located in Fiji Islands because of its size, stability and infrastructure, including communications, support services and international air transport hub.

However, for the PPKF to be viable, effective and sustainable, there must be funding provided to support backfilling of officers deployed overseas and to recruit new officers into the police services to cover shortfalls and to maintain the integrity of national policing operations. Pacific Island countries are not in a position to support this type and level of funding.

Pacific policing services must also develop strategies to retain the skilled resources produced by the PPKF. Careful management of personnel, including career pathways will be essential. Some form of "return of obligation agreement" or contract may need to be introduced to guarantee service post-deployment. There are media reports that the earnings of 250 ex-Fiji military personnel serving as security guards in Iraq totalled nearly United States dollars (US\$)3 million in a six-month period. While the PPKF, largely through its Training Centre, will deliver increased income into the Fiji Islands economy, all participating Pacific Island countries will benefit from remittance moneys.

The PPKF will deliver greater interoperability through standardised, competency based training, common equipment and standard operating procedures. This key mix of knowledge, skills and attitudes will develop and enhance the overall capacity of Pacific police services providing a significant return on investment. One of the major contributing factors in enhancing interoperability is the level of English language capacity and consequently, over time, English language capacity of Pacific police services would increase.

The development of a "police-keeping" capacity, both in terms of a dedicated regional police training centre, and the increase in police skills offered to each police members, offers a tangible increase in local police capacity, rather than a "drain" on existing police resources.

There are many challenges confronting Pacific policing services including issues of integrity, credibility, funding levels, conditions of service and the capacity to effectively address changing national and transnational criminal environments. A significant addition to this list is establishing, maintaining and sustaining a PPKF.

While there is cause for optimism, this must be balanced by well-informed decision making and careful judgment from all key stakeholders.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) requested support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to assist in the development and implementation of the Pacific Plan. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), in conjunction with the Commonwealth Secretariat (COMMSEC) is providing technical assistance to the PIFS.

The joint ADB/COMMSEC Technical Assistance Team will focus inter alia, on providing a rigorous analytical framework for understanding regionalism in the Pacific. This analysis will be detailed through a series of studies measuring the qualitative and quantitative costs and benefits of specific regional interventions proposed by the Pacific Plan Task Force.

Subsequently, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP – then known as the South Pacific Chiefs of Police) Secretariat was approached by officers from COMMSEC in March 2005 in relation to the establishment of a regional Pacific Policing Peacekeeping Force (PPKF) for export. The PPKF initiative is viewed by COMMSEC as a "big regional win". Following discussions with Mr. Sacha Silva, Consultant, Economic Affairs Division COMMSEC, the PICP Secretariat undertook to provide a paper by 10 May 2005 on the costs and benefits of establishing a regional PPKF for export.

The Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police considered the concept of a PPKF at their annual meetings in 2003 and 2004. At the 2004 meeting, Mr. Amod Gurung, Chief of Policy and Planning, Civilian Police Division, United Nations, New York, provided a presentation on civilian police peacekeeping operations. The meeting was also informed by presentations on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands and the Australian Federal Police's International Deployment Group.

The Chiefs at their 2004 Retreat Business Session agreed there is an opportunity as a collective to provide police to support peacekeeping efforts. Their strong view was not to follow a military model of a "standing force" rather, a pool of trained officers would be provided as required. The Fiji Police Commissioner was requested to approach the Secretary-General of the PIFS to seek advice on ways in which to advance the proposal of a regional peacekeeping force. It is understood this has been a step in the link into the Pacific Plan.

The PICP Secretariat Report has been diminished by time constraints, despite being provided with a short extension. This has seriously hampered research efforts and coupled with poor communications and lack of responses from some police services, the final product is not as informed as would have been anticipated. In particular, cost data are estimates and at worst, speculative. Despite the constraints, the PICP Secretariat is grateful for the opportunity to act as a consultant in relation to this matter.

The PICP Secretariat is strongly supportive of the proposal that, if adopted, would provide opportunities for Pacific Islands Police Services and their members, both professionally and personally; exposure to overseas "best practice" in policing; and an avenue for a strengthened local and regional economy. The current initiatives to support policing at a community level within the Pacific will be further strengthened, and not weakened, by the creation of, and active participation in, a PPKF.

## **II. CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS**

### **A. Constraints**

- The proposal has been developed within a tight time frame, which has limited the amount of data collection and input by PICP members and from other sources such as the UNDPKO.
- The proposal has relied on responses to requests for data and where data has not been readily forthcoming this has not been further pursued due to the time constraints.
- Facts provided in the data collection have not been rigorously tested or independently verified, but where discrepancies have been noted these have been corrected wherever possible.

### **B. Assumptions**

- The proposal is based on participation in a Regional Pacific Policing response, and not on the formation of a Regional Pacific Standing Police Force or Response Capability.
- The proposal is "speculative" and has adopted both a "green fields" and a "blue skies" approach.
- No commitment to the ongoing advancement of the proposal has been given or been presumed by any party.
- The proposal covers all of the PICP members, other than Australia and New Zealand, and is not limited to only the PIF member countries.
- A regional training centre would be established in a Pacific Island Country.
- For the sake of analysis, this country has been assumed to be Fiji Islands.
- Those nominated for regional training will possess and demonstrate sufficient skills prior to being accepted for training at a level to meet the UN requirements for deployment, in both language and basic police skills.
- The proposal is based on the establishment of a Regional Response Capability of 250 civilian police members available for deployment at any one time.
- Deployments will be for a period of 12 months.
- Up to 50 police members will be trained at a time.
- Training time is four weeks at the regional training centre.

## **III. PAST AND PRESENT LEVELS OF SUPPLY OF PACIFIC POLICING FORCES IN THE WORLD**

### **A. Key Findings**

Pacific Island countries have had a wide range of experience in civilian peacekeeping operations. Some countries have also contributed to Military Missions, as police officers, and have then moved to a civilian police role as the missions' role has changed.

New Zealand and Australia, while perhaps not being "Pacific countries" in a sense, are members of the PICP. Each has extensive background in civilian police peacekeeping operations and have had, or continue to have, people deployed in international roles in Cyprus, Namibia, East Timor, Solomon Islands, Jordan, Afghanistan and Bougainville.

## B. Past United Nations Operations

Countries have participated in Missions in Lebanon, Sinai, Namibia, Iraq, Cambodia, Angola, Croatia, Bosnia, East Timor, Solomon Islands, Kosovo, and Liberia.

The highest level of ongoing commitment has been from Fiji Islands, which has contributed members in 14 missions through 39 deployments. A total of 829 Fiji Islands Police Officers have served in overseas missions. Overseas commitments have been made from PNG, Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Niue and Nauru.

## C. Current UN Operations

Civilian Police officers from Fiji Islands and Samoa are currently working with UN missions in East Timor, Liberia and Kosovo.

A number of countries including Fiji Islands, Samoa and Tonga have indicated their commitment to the mission planned for the Sudan due to commence on 1 July 2005.


The UNPKO reports that 7,542 civilian police officers are currently employed in operations. (It is noted that this is the total number of police deployed on missions, and not the level of deployment from just the Pacific). The details are:

Location	Established in	Civilian Police Deployed
Cyprus	1964	43
Western Sahara	1991	6
Georgia	1999	11
Kosovo	1999	3391
Sierra Leone	1999	79
Congo	1999	175
East Timor	2002	138
Liberia	2003	1074
Cote d'Ivoire	2004	218
Haiti	2004	1622
Burundi	2004	85
Sudan <sup>1</sup>	2005	700
<b>Total</b>		<b>7542</b>

The number of civilian police peacekeepers deployed since 1995 to the present day has steadily increased.

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<sup>1</sup> To be implemented from 1 July 2005.



1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
1088	2739	3132	2718	4435	7725	7642	5333	4635	6765	6466

Source UNDPKO

#### D. Current Non-UN Operations

Solomon Islands Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI) - up to 250 Police staff from up to 11 countries within the region, including Australia, New Zealand, Fiji Islands, Tonga, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Niue, Nauru, Cook Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu.

Papua New Guinea Enhanced Cooperation Programme (PNG ECP) - up to 250 Police staff from Australian jurisdictions.

Bougainville - up to 6 New Zealand Police staff to support the development of community policing.

Afghanistan - two New Zealand Police officers.

Jordan - two AFP officers.

### IV. CURRENT AND POTENTIAL DEMAND FOR POLICING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

#### A. Key Findings

The following are the indications of the demand for police peacekeeping operations.

"There have been more global crises in the last ten years, requiring intervention, than in the last 30 years combined. This will continue to occur."

*Hon Bruce Billson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Australian Minister of Foreign Affairs - April 2005*

The past and current levels of demand give confidence in an expectation that the level of civilian police peacekeeping operations will continue at the current level and in fact will increase over the next ten years. It is reasonable to anticipate that up to 10,000 civilian police peacekeepers will be required to support missions over the next ten years.

## **B. Regional Interventions**

In the last three years, interventions in the Pacific Region in support of the members of the Pacific Island Forum, under the auspices of the Biketawa Declaration on Regional Cooperation, or through bi-lateral arrangements between Governments have significantly increased. These include:

- Solomon Islands Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI) - up to 250 Police staff from up to 11 countries within the region, including Australia, New Zealand, Fiji Islands, Tonga, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Niue, Nauru, Cook Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu.
- Papua New Guinea Enhanced Cooperation Programme (PNG ECP) - up to 250 Police staff from Australian jurisdictions.
- Bougainville - up to 6 New Zealand Police staff to support the development of community policing.

It is reasonably expected that similar interventions will continue to occur within the Pacific region at either the "Intervention" level of RAMSI and the PNG ECP, or at an assistance level such as in Bougainville.

## **C. External Contributions to UN Missions <sup>2</sup>**

Beginning with the United Nations mission in Namibia in 1988, UN Civilian Police have become an increasingly important element of UN peacekeeping in helping war-torn societies restore conditions conducive to social, economic and political stability.

United Nations Civilian Police play a crucial role in UN peacekeeping operations and other UN field missions. They currently participate in 13 different missions around the globe. Every day, more than 7,000 police officers from 80 countries go on patrol, provide training, advise local police services, help ensure compliance with human rights standards and assist in a wide range of other fields.

The benefits of this work are clear: UN Civilian Police help to create a safer environment where communities will be better protected and criminal activities will be prevented, disrupted and deterred. The diverse national experiences of United Nations Civilian Police officers and their commitment to peace and security are their best tools to promote the rule of law.

The mandate of United Nations Civilian Police is different in each mission. In some missions, the mandate has been limited to monitoring the local police services. In more complex missions, the mandate includes advising, training, helping establish local police services and enhancing their work, and, in some cases, law enforcement. This complexity is compounded by the need to integrate all components of the criminal justice system to ensure comprehensive and sustainable rule of law.

United Nations peacekeepers include civilian police. In the 1960s, civilian police were deployed

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<sup>2</sup> From UN DPKO sources.

in the UN Operation in the Congo, and for more than 25 years, they have been part of the UN Force in Cyprus. Beginning with the UN mission in Namibia in 1988, "CivPol" elements have become an increasingly important part of UN peacekeeping. By mid-2000, some 7,000 civilian police from more than 70 countries are participating in 10 UN missions. Some recently missions have been predominantly staffed by civilian police.

In Haiti, CivPol helped to build a new Haitian National Police. In Croatia a UN Civilian Police Support Group was established to monitor the actions of Croatian police in Eastern Slovenia, and to encourage respect for the rights of residents and returnees alike. In Bosnia and Herzegovina more than 1,600 police officers from 42 countries serve with the United Nations International Police Task Force, which forms part of the United Nations Mission (UNMIBH) in that country. Their tasks include monitoring the performance of local police, conducting investigations, and providing guidance aimed at building a multi-ethnic police service respectful of the rights of all the country's people, regardless of ethnicity. In Kosovo, as many as 4,700 UN civilian police have been charged with maintaining civil law and order as well as developing a future police for the Territory.<sup>3</sup>

The surge in UN peacekeeping signals that some of the world's intractable conflicts are coming to an end. But the increased demand has placed huge additional strains on UN resources and personnel, and on Member States ability to provide funds, troops and equipment.

#### **D. Prediction of Future Demand for Civilian Peacekeeping Operations**

The demand for peacekeepers, both military and civilian police, has been constant over the last 15 years.

The original operations in Cyprus and the Congo, which are still ongoing, have continued alongside a significant deployment to Namibia, which commenced in 1988. The trend in the last 8 years has been for a significant increase in the demand for UN civilian police peacekeeping operations. In 1999 four operations commenced, and in 2004 a further three were established. In the intervening years individual operations have been established.

The UN reports that as long term regional conflicts are resolved and move to a "peacekeeping stage" civilian police will be required. Regions such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Kashmir are all potentially new requirements for civilian police keeping operations. Both Afghanistan and Iraq have civilian police working alongside military forces in a training assistance role, but these are not defined as "peacekeeping operations." While there is currently no "police peacekeeping" response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (beyond civilian observers in Hebron) the issue is periodically mooted. If this became a mission in due course, it would create a significant demand for civilian "police-keepers" over a long period.

The numbers of civilian police peacekeepers required in each operation has shown an upward trend. However each operation is assessed on the specific demands and it is therefore difficult to quantify the actual requirements. The current number of civilian police peacekeepers deployed in UN missions worldwide is over 7,500.

The past and current levels of demand give confidence to an expectation that the level of civilian police peacekeeping operations will continue at least at the current level and in fact will increase

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<sup>3</sup> From UN DPKO sources.

over the next ten years. It is reasonable to anticipate that up to 10,000 civilian police peacekeepers will be required to support missions over the next ten years.

Some recent academic papers and analysis by Government Agencies offer a useful insight:

The contemporary era of peace operations, dealing principally with intra-state conflicts, engendered anew the requirement to help rebuild or reform indigenous criminal justice systems. From January 1989–August 2000, the UN launched peacekeeping operations in 21 different locations, of which 14 have involved police in some capacity. These missions (listed in chronological order) took place in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Western Sahara, Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Mozambique, Haiti, Rwanda, Guatemala, Central African Republic, East Timor, and Sierra Leone. From 1992–97, the average number of UN personnel deployed monthly was 2,345. The advent, in 1999, of the UN administrations in Kosovo and East Timor increased dramatically the requirements for police participation.

There are now four broad tasks related to the indigenous criminal justice system, which must be accomplished by a mixture of military and civilian peacekeepers and local actors:

- provision of basic law enforcement and public order for an interim period;
- reconstitution of indigenous police forces;
- monitoring and mentoring of local police units; and
- re-establishing and reforming the judicial and penal systems, as well as the legal code.”<sup>4</sup>

*Major police missions à la Kosovo, East Timor, or even Bosnia may not be the exception to the rule, but rather indicative of the range of post-conflict situations that will continue to test international capacities to deliver post-conflict public security. It is reasonably anticipated that these current operations may move into this sphere and therefore require a UN style of response for ongoing civilian peacekeeping.*<sup>5</sup>

*In recognition of such realities, the European Union has moved to create a standby force of 5,000 police officers available on short notice to respond to crisis situations.”*<sup>6</sup>

*We live in an age of ‘heavy peace.’...There will be other Kosovos; and whether for strategic or humanitarian reasons— or just muddled impulses—we will not be able to resist them all...We cannot enter upon such commitments under the assumption that they will be temporary and brief...We must stop pretending those challenges will disappear—that ‘something will turn up’—and prepare to meet them”*<sup>7</sup>

*The main problem following a US-led international intervention in Iraq will be re-establishing widespread and sustainable governance. It is probable that with the removal of repressive political authority, state control will falter and crime rates boom. This can be countered through an international civil administration with law and order as a guiding mandating principle. Order could be ensured by ‘police-keeping’, via a large ‘blue force’ of primarily Muslim gendarmerie from surrounding nations. Reliance on military peacekeeping is precarious because of the political sensitivities in the case of Iraq. The blue force would form the foundation of the new internal security architecture in Iraq, and*

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<sup>4</sup> Evolution of police monitoring in peace operations, J. Matthew Vaccaro.

<sup>5</sup> Canadian Defence Force Review of the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> Canadian Defence Force Review of the Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2003.

<sup>7</sup> Ralph Peters, 2003.

*would act to prevent fragmentation and civil war. The role of police-keeping is to pre-empt and combat ethnic, religious, and political violence, economic crime and the establishment of shadow networks, as well as policing regular crime including those of property and public order. A further vital task would be the development of domestic judicial and policing capacity, which provide an exit strategy for the international mission and the beginnings of a representative and regionally devolved governance structure.*

*These tasks could be financed through a modification of the current oil for food programme, finally transferring this wealth back into Iraqi society.<sup>8 9</sup>*

*The focal point of this argument is the need to develop the capacity to quickly deploy civilian capabilities, such as police, to conflict hot spots. Military success for crisis management missions depends critically on civilian success--and civilian success depends on effective law enforcement.<sup>10</sup>*

## **V. CURRENT REGIONAL AND NATIONAL MECHANISMS TO SUPPLY POLICING SERVICES**

### **A. Regional**

Research indicates that only Australia, New Zealand and Fiji Islands possess capacity and mechanisms to raise, train and deploy police officers to overseas peacekeeping missions. In particular, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) has established an International Deployment Group (IDG) that specifically addresses all aspects of deploying police officers overseas. IDG has established purpose designed training facilities in Canberra including the construction of a generic "village" where police officers undertake training in a realistic situation based on actual scenarios from overseas experiences.

The training village was constructed in partnership with local technical colleges who provided free apprentice labour while the AFP funded project management and building material costs.

The cost of training at the AFP International Deployment Group Training Centre is approximately **United States dollars (US\$)13,000 per person (US\$3.25 million per annum for 250 persons)**. This includes return airfares, accommodation, meals, incidental allowance, uniform and equipment, transport, medical and training costs but does not include salary of the deployed officer.

Operating costs for the AFP IDG Training Centre were unavailable prior to the release of this report.

The cost to deploy 35 New Zealand Police Officers to the Regional Assistance Mission - Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is **approximately US\$4.65 million per annum. (US\$133,000 per person, includes salary)**.

Fiji Islands Police research indicated that a Fiji Islands Police contingent of 100 officers return up to **Fiji dollars (F\$)6 million per annum** to the local Fiji Islands economy. It also indicated

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<sup>8</sup> Review of US Defence participation in Iraq, United Nations DPKO, 2004.

<sup>9</sup> See also discussion on "who pays" at page 20.

<sup>10</sup> NATO--Upholding Ethics in International Security Policy.

that for a 50 member contingent cost of allowances, uniforms, training and replacement officers (backfilling) would be approximately **F\$300 - 400,000**.

## **B. Key Constraints and Level of Efficiency**

The capacity to train a 250-member regional PKF is beyond the Pacific countries, including New Zealand and Fiji Islands. The AFP IDG would struggle to cope with the additional demand without expanding its capacity.

This paper has been developed around the premise that Pacific island Countries could “currently” contribute 250 members to a regional peacekeeping proposal. This could be done from their existing capacity, but on the understanding that the positions would be backfilled.

If a proposal to develop a capability of 250 people is taken up, it is reasonably anticipated that the success of this model could be expanded to grow the size and scope of the regional civilian police peacekeeping capability. While an increase in capacity could not be met immediately, principally due to the potential inability to recruit suitable people and to provide basic police training skills to these replacements, the anticipated increase could be achieved through the provision of a regional police training facility, alongside the specific peacekeeping training centre and as an integral part of that facility. The provision of a purpose built regional police training facility offers a direct benefit to the peacekeeping proposal, and equally offers a high quality and multi jurisdictional police training facility for the Pacific.

## **C. Ability to Meet Potential Demand in the International Market**

There are two options to meet the potential demand of the international market.

Option 1 is to expand the facilities of the AFP IDG Training Centre.

Option 2 is to establish a purpose designed training centre in Fiji Islands. Fiji Islands is the only pragmatic location for this facility due to its central location, air transport hub, infrastructure and security situation.

Option 1, while delivering short-term outcomes, does not provide the regional identity or ownership desired by Pacific Island countries. It also does not return the higher level of income to the Pacific economy.

## **VI. Benefits of Pooling Resources**

### **A. Key Areas**

There is no current existing infrastructure or facilities within the region to support policing in a general sense, or to provide support to training or regional missions such as peacekeeping. While some assistance has been provided through the Fiji Police Academy, and through both New Zealand and Australian Police training facilities, this is ad hoc and generally limited to specific events or requirements. This generally occurs at the expense of other activities that are either deferred or cancelled to accommodate the specific and higher priority needs.

The following are the key areas where pooling resources at the regional level would bring increased benefits:

## **B. Participation**

The pooling of resources, especially human resources, allows the smaller Pacific policing services to participate in the peacekeeping force (as is the case in RAMSI) with a consequent increase in their capacity.

## **C. Establishment of a Regional Law Enforcement Training/Support Facility in the Pacific**

The establishment of a civilian police peacekeeping training or support facility in the Pacific opens the opportunity for this investment to be capitalised on for police training in a general, and a specialist investigation, sense. While this is outside the scope of the current “peacekeeping proposal” the potential benefits are readily visible and achievable, if the proposal is adopted.

The current initiatives of the Pacific Regional Police Initiative (PRPI), which is a minimum five-year commitment by the Australian, Fiji Islands and New Zealand Governments to improve police capability in the PIF member countries police forces, could readily be linked to the peacekeeping proposal. The PRPI offers specific training development and capability development in each of the member countries through increased skills in a “train the trainer” model, as well as specific interventions in senior police management and practice. Support is also offered in areas such as forensic services.

While much of the PRPI delivery occurs within the member countries, and this is a crucial element in ensuring that local capacity is developed, there is considerable scope for the pooling of specialist training at a regional centre.

There is currently no facility to support the training of serious crime investigators (detectives or similar) in most Pacific island Countries. In some countries this training is either non-existent or based on outdated “rote teaching” based on the manuals and procedures of neighbouring Pacific regional countries such as New Zealand or Australia. The potential to offer specialist training to meet specific Pacific law enforcement needs such as detective training, could be facilitated through a regional centre.

The Pacific Island Forum Law Enforcement Unit, along with the agencies supporting the development of the Transnational Crime Units (TCU’s) and their parent Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC), are currently offering specialist investigation and intelligence training and development. The provision of a specialist police training facility would offer the opportunity for greater skills training to be provided in region, rather than having people from the Pacific attend specialist training in Australia, New Zealand and others “Pacific neighbours.”

Financial Intelligence Units (FIU) have been established within the central banks or justice ministries in a number of Pacific island countries. There are currently at least three separate initiatives to support the further development of the FIU network. While these facilities are not within the Police environment, much of their work is directly related to transnational crime and serious crime within the countries that is a police responsibility. The existence of a specialist law enforcement training centre offers the potential for the multiple streams of work to support the FIU’s to be concentrated at the one point, to the mutual benefit of the FIU’s and the police.

The enforcement arms of Customs, Immigration, Fisheries and other agencies could be joined to a regional facility where common investigative skills and competencies could be delivered to a universal standard.

The practical benefits of common training are further enhanced through delivery to multiple agencies, and multiple disciplines, in a multi agency environment, such as a regional law enforcement training centre.

The expertise developed in such a centre can then be provided through topic experts, or mentors and technical assistance experts, to support specific in country investigations.

The PIF Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) will consider a proposal for a technical assistance investigation support mechanism for law enforcement at the June 2005 meeting in Auckland. If this proposal is adopted, it offers a tangible link to this concept of a regional law enforcement support centre.

#### **D. Cost Savings**

Facilities. The establishment of a regionally designed and constructed Peacekeeping Training Facility provides significant savings for contributing countries, particularly for the smaller nations. Accommodation, messing, classroom and field training facilities are major areas of financial investment.

Administration. Having one administrative support service, even if it comprises members from different Pacific countries, is a major cost saving.

Equipment and Uniforms. The bulk purchasing of items such as police equipment (batons, handcuffs, whistles, torches etc) and uniforms, including boots provides significant scales of economy. In particular, communications equipment and computers are able to be more widely used.

Training Staff. Training staff can be attached to a regional training centre obviating the need to provide trainers in individual countries training facilities.

#### **E. Relationship Building**

The establishment of a regional police peacekeeping force provides the opportunity to build and enhance both personal and institutional relationships. A key mix of culture and skills enriches the force and inculcates a regional identity through Pacific police ownership.

#### **F. Operational Issues**

A regionally established peacekeeping force will deliver greater interoperability through common training, equipment and standardised operating procedures. This key mix of knowledge, skills and attitudes develops and enhances the overall capacity of the force resulting in more effective outcomes. This in turn underpins the reputation and credibility of the force.

## G. Training Issues

A standardised, competency based training curriculum would not only enhance interoperability but also deliver greater capacity to the force. This training investment would return significant dividends to individual policing services over time.

## H. Language Skills

One of the major contributing factors in enhancing interoperability is the level of English language capacity. English Language Training (ELT) at IELTS Level 5 would be a prerequisite for entry to the force.

## VII. THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE COSTS OF ESTABLISHING A REGIONAL POLICING FORCE FOR EXPORT TO MEET INTERNATIONAL DEMAND

The following data is based on the establishment of a regional police peacekeeping training centre in Fiji Islands to support a deployable force of 250 personnel.

**Table 1: The Cost of Establishing and Maintaining a Regional Police Peacekeeping Force.**

Activity	Initial Cost <sup>a</sup> (US\$ millions)	Ongoing Costs <sup>b</sup> (US\$ millions)
Construct Self-contained training facility	10.00	1.5
Salary/backfill costs (@ US\$6,000 per person per year)	1.50	1.5
Airfares - return economy @ US\$1,500 per person	0.225	0.225
Meals/Incidental costs @ US\$30 per person per day	2.80	2.80
Uniform and equipment @ US\$500 per person	0.125	0.125
Training costs (incl training staff) @ US\$500 per day x 200 days	1.00	1.00
Training Centre personnel costs (not including training staff) x 10 persons @ US\$35,000 pa	0.350	0.350
Vehicle leasing costs	0.150	0.150
Computer leasing costs	0.125	0.125
Pre-deployment costs - Selection Criteria (6 x PIC @ US\$5000	0.030	0.030
Deployment costs - airfares return economy @ US\$2,000 per person	0.50	0.50
<b>Total Costs</b>	<b>16.805</b>	<b>8.305</b>

<sup>a</sup> The initial costs are "best estimates," and include: Project management costs, salaries - builders etc, accommodation block for male/female, mess facility, administration block, classroom facilities, theatre, field training facilities (village), range, armoury and magazine facilities, vehicle compound, perimeter fence, furniture and fittings, roads, bridges as required, and connections to all utilities.

<sup>b</sup> Ongoing costs include: utilities (power, water, light, phone), cleaning contract, ground maintenance contract, vehicle leasing, computer leasing, accommodation contract, depreciation, insurance, and stationery.

## A. Existing Capacity for Training

While some of the larger Pacific Islands countries such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji Islands arguably have the capacity to train their own peacekeeping contingents, a regional PKF of 250 personnel requires training that is predicated on common standards, competency based and

consistency. Currently, this is beyond the capacity of any Pacific Island country. Consequently, a regional PKF training facility needs to be established.

## **B. Staffing and Infrastructure Needs at Regional and Country Level**

### **1. Regional Level**

Staffing and infrastructure needs are identified in Table 1. A key infrastructure requirement within the PKF training facility is the construction of a "generic town/village" that training scenarios can be developed around to provide realistic training. This model has been developed by the Australian Federal Police at its International Deployment Group in Canberra.

Experienced training staff will be required in the short-medium term to provide effective training in the period before experienced training capacity is developed within Pacific Island countries. These staff may initially be attached from Australia and New Zealand. But Fiji Islands also has developed experienced training staff due to its extensive overseas UN deployments.

### **2. Country Level**

The major issues at the country level are recruitment and initial training to backfill deployed personnel. It should be noted that both these issues are currently being addressed by the PICP.

It has been identified by a PICP Integrity Working Group that robust selection criteria and policy needs to be developed to reduce the risk of selecting inappropriate personnel to Pacific police services. It has also been acknowledged that for this to be effective, there is a cost involved in establishing dedicated "vetting teams" to service this requirement. In smaller countries, this added cost may be able to be subsumed within the current operating budget. However, in the larger countries, new teams will have to be formed and could typically comprise up to 3-5 personnel in two-three office areas. This may cost, including wages, vehicles, computers and forms, approximately US\$125,000 per annum.

Initial training for Constable is being addressed by the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI) following input from PICP. A regional, competency based, common standard initial training program is being developed and will be introduced in Tonga, Vanuatu and Kiribati as pilot programs in 2005-2006. Over time, as other countries adopt and adapt the training, this will provide a solid cadre of trained personnel with well developed fundamental community-based police skills.

## **C. Who will Benefit? Who will Pay?**

The benefits of a police-keeping mission are two fold, at least. The primary beneficiaries are the people living in the country where the deployment occurs. Both the country itself, and the population, benefit by a return to the rule of law and the increase in public safety and confidence that this brings. Through the re-establishment of a safe environment investment and confidence in the economy of the country can commence. These are core tenets of the intervention by the UN or other regional intervention. The UN meets the deployment and operation costs of an intervention or mission. These funds are in turn provided from the general subscriptions of the UN member countries.

The Pacific island countries that are direct members of the UN are therefore contributors to the overall funding of the UN and therefore contribute to the peace keeping or police-keeping

missions. While not all Pacific countries, or more correctly territories, are direct members of the UN, they are represented through their governing powers such as France and the United States.

Each country which currently contributes to a peacekeeping mission is required to train and equip the contingent to the required UN level. In some cases this is minor, while in others it requires a considerable direct contribution through the provision of specific "kit". The experience of New Zealand Police is that the cost to fully prepare a police member for an overseas deployment in a tropical environment, is US\$1,400 per person. These costs are not recoverable at the conclusion of the deployment as the "kit" is generally due for replacement.

The analysis undertaken in the development of this paper concludes that the proposal for a regional police training centre to train and support civilian police members from the Pacific to participate in overseas deployment missions will not make the process financially self sufficient or allow for setup costs to be recovered.

The income generated through deployment in overseas civilian police peacekeeping missions will not be sufficient to create a "cost recovery" formula.

The funds generated in payments to officers on peacekeeping missions are paid to the officer, not to the country who provides that officer. If a percentage of the payment is taken to offset the development and operating costs this is unlikely to be at a sufficient level to achieve cost recovery within a reasonable or realistic time frame.

Funding will be required from a donor to establish the regional training centre. Further or ongoing funding will be required to support the ongoing costs of operating the regional training centre.

There is little likelihood that any individual Pacific country could consider long term and ongoing commitment to the financial support of the project.

Once the centre is operating it is proposed that the UN assume responsibility to fund the ongoing running costs of the centre and the delivery of ongoing training and skills enhancement is achieved as part of the overall delivery through UNDPKO. It must be noted that this proposition has not been explored with the UNDPKO.

If the role is not achieved through the UN, then alternative avenues of financial support will require to be identified.

Should this process be followed and an ongoing sponsor engaged, the potential benefits to the contributing countries will be achieved at an early point and the flow on benefits to the individual countries and to the region collectively realised.

Without this supporting process, and ongoing direct financial support, the project is not considered to be financially sustainable.

## **VIII. The Qualitative and Quantitative Benefits of Establishing a Regional Policing Force for Export**

While arguably, larger Pacific Island countries would benefit most from contributing police officers to a regional PKF, in a relative sense, smaller countries also benefit. Fiji Islands in particular would derive most benefit from the establishment of a regional PKF Training Centre.

### **A. Employment**

A regional PKF of up to 250 officers provides increased employment opportunities for persons seeking policing as a vocation. Major "pull" factors are the chance to serve overseas and receive additional income.

Fiji Islands in particular will benefit from increased employment of persons associated either directly or indirectly with the regional PKF Training Centre. While numbers are difficult to estimate, possibly up to 100 people may be employed.

### **B. Benefits to Contributing Police Services**

Personal benefits to police officers deployed to UN missions include:

- enhanced financial security;
- increase in self-confidence and self-esteem;
- increased experience;
- opportunities for advancement and promotion;
- improved lifestyle, including for families;
- opportunities to network with other police officers; and
- opportunities to establish personal and institutional relationships.

The overall increase in police numbers and the accompanying higher skills both at a community policing level and at an investigative and management level would flow through as a direct benefit to the local police services and to their communities. The collective benefits to the Police and to their communities include:

- increase in resources available to support local initiatives or campaigns, subject to their availability;
- increase in visibility of the police service which raises the collective standing of the police service;
- increase in public safety and confidence through an increased visible police presence;
- potential reduction in the levels of crime through an enhanced and more capable police service;
- potential increase in the "clear up rate" of reported crime through increased skills and capabilities;
- uptake of overseas best practice in policing;
- potential reduction in the levels of corrupt practices through exposure to international standards and best practice while in overseas deployments.

While these benefits are very difficult to quantify, they potentially offer a safer community and a reduction in the levels of crime and victimisation. The outcome, as opposed to an output, is a safer community and a reduction in crime and criminality.

However, there are inherent risks to police officers serving in UN Missions. These include:

- possible exposure to and risk of infection from HIV/Aids;
- sexual contact may lead to breakdown in personal/family relationships;
- officers may choose not to return to country or their family; and
- officers used to working at a higher level with better facilities overseas, may lead to frustration on return to lower capacity, lower pay and poor conditions, resulting in officers choosing to leave their police service.

### **C. Longer-Term Benefits of Income**

A Pacific PKF of 250 officers has the potential to provide **approximately US\$3 million per annum** additional funding from remittances (25%) and unused salary. This additional funding would leak into regional economies and provide wider economic benefits to local communities.

While in the short-term, this allows for increased financial security and improved lifestyle for families, it is nevertheless, of significant benefit to the region. Police officers may choose to serve overseas on more than one occasion.

By establishing a regional PKF Training Centre in Fiji Islands, the most economic benefits would flow into Fiji Islands from income generated by the goods and services provided by local contractors including vehicles, fuel, computers, office equipment, ground and building maintenance, food and beverages, accommodation, hospitality etc. Government taxes on salaries and charges on goods and services also provide additional income.

### **D. National Capacities**

Individually, Pacific police services would benefit from the additional knowledge, skills and attitudes gained from deployment to UN Missions. This is already evident for those Pacific countries contributing to UN Missions and to RAMSI. Over time, if this skill base is retained, the capacity of national police services will increase, realising a return on investment. Consequently, the flow-on effect is that local communities are better served by higher quality police officers.

However, there is a risk that police officers, once provided with additional skills, will choose other career paths, either within or external to their country of origin.

### **E. Security**

It could be argued in the short-term, that deploying a regional PKF comprising experienced police officers outside the Pacific region could lead to a diminution of capacity in national police services, particularly in the larger forces. But over time, as capacity is balanced due to back-filling and increase in experienced police officers returning from overseas duty and up-skilling "on-the-job", police services will be in a better position to provide enhanced services to the community.

## IX. SWOT (STRENGTHS-WEAKNESSES-OPPORTUNITIES-THREATS) ANALYSIS

**Table 2: SWOT Analysis**

<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High level of current participation and exposure to Peacekeeping Operations</li> <li>• Experience through involvement in RAMSI</li> <li>• Concerted will of PICP Members for a regional police peacekeeping project</li> <li>• Strong regional voice in policing through PICP</li> <li>• Strong interest of UN DPKO, visible through 33<sup>rd</sup> SPCPC meeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Current involvement is generally at bi-lateral level only</li> <li>• Low capacity to provide skilled staff, both in numbers and quality</li> <li>• Not all PICP countries are UN members</li> </ul>
<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional participation through all PICP members</li> <li>• Supported by Pacific Plan</li> <li>• Immediate benefits to members and to countries</li> <li>• Short term benefits to members and to countries</li> <li>• Strengthened regional identity and ownership of own policing destiny</li> <li>• Off shore income generated for participating countries</li> <li>• Overseas police experience</li> <li>• Experience in multi national operations</li> <li>• Enhanced regional policing capacity</li> <li>• Development of UN "Formed Police Unit"</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High risk to personal safety and possibility of compensation claims for death or injury of a member</li> <li>• Personal health, and environmental health risk, through HIV/AIDS</li> <li>• People may not return home though taking up other opportunities available to them while off-shore</li> <li>• Requirements for contracts or "bonding" of members following deployments</li> <li>• Reduced expertise in home forces through experienced staff being deployed overseas, and replaced by junior staff within the home forces.</li> <li>• Lack of support from Foreign Affairs Agencies of NZ and Aust perhaps through FRSC forum</li> <li>• Creation of an uncontrollable export of skills from the Pacific</li> <li>• Low levels of payment and compensation will reduce the likely cost benefit</li> <li>• Abuse of generated income through corrupt practices in Governments</li> <li>• Disaffection from members who are part of a FPU if they are not adequately compensated</li> <li>• Cost Benefit Analysis may defeat the proposal</li> <li>• The proposal may not be sustainable in the long term through loss of trained staff to take up opportunities</li> <li>• Staff who return from deployments may be disillusioned in the conditions in their home forces</li> <li>• The high cost of establishing the process may not be cost recoverable within a reasonable time frame</li> <li>• Increased overseas deployments may in time lead to a move to arming Pacific Police Forces</li> <li>• There may be insufficient suitable applicants to backfill positions in countries</li> <li>• UN participation may be restricted to only UN member countries</li> </ul>

## **A. Explanation of Weaknesses and Threats through the SWOT Analysis and Mitigation Strategies:**

### **1. Weaknesses**

#### **Not all PICP countries are UN members**

The primary market for civilian police peacekeeping operations is through the United Nations. While the majority of the PICP/SPCPC members are members of the United Nations, some are not. American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas are not members of the Pacific Island Forum but are members of the PICP/SPCPC. In addition two nations, the Federated States of Micronesia and Niue, are a member of the Pacific Islands Forum but not a member of the UN.

**Mitigation strategy** - The current proposal is for all PICP members to be able to participate in any regional initiative. The UNDPKO has indicated that this is acceptable to them.

#### **Current involvement is generally at bi-lateral level only**

Where member countries are already participating in peacekeeping missions, this is undertaken on a bi lateral basis between the country and the UN. Countries may wish to continue to be involved in individual missions on this basis. This has the potential to weaken their ability to participate in a regional mission.

**Mitigation strategy** - The benefits of regional cooperation will potentially cause the bilateral process to reduce as the regional benefits are seen and taken up.

#### **Low capacity to provide skilled staff, both in numbers and quality**

Many of the PICP police forces are either small or operate at a level suitable to their own country needs. In many cases English (which is the required language by the UN) may not be widely taken up. In other cases the police members may have only received minimal training sufficient for their own requirements but which may not be suitable on an international deployment. In order that potential participants may join a mission they are required to reach the required skill level set by the UN.

**Mitigation strategy** - Participation in regional initiatives will raise the skills levels of countries. However, the basic level of skills will have to be met before selection and training can be facilitated within the proposed framework. The PRPI initiative will help to overcome this deficiency in the 5 to 10 year plan.

### **2. Threats**

#### **High risk to personal safety and possibility of compensation claims for death or injury of a member**

Participation in peacekeeping missions is a high risk activity, which may be well beyond the risks currently faced in local policing in the contributors own country. A significant number of peacekeepers die or are seriously injured in these missions. The increased risk to personal safety and the negative impact on a home community through death or injury, especially if it were to occur on a large scale (such as an IED) could significantly reduce the support the project. This may result in the sudden withdrawal of participants, as has occurred in the UN missions in Iraq. The Governments of the contributing countries may become liable for the loss incurred by their police members or the families.

**Mitigation strategy** - High levels of personal skills through competent and comprehensive selection, training and supervision will help to ameliorate the risk. Governments will need to develop strategies to support the deployments when the "going gets tough."

### **Personal health, and environmental health risk, through HIV/AIDS**

HIV/AIDS is serious risk to peacekeepers and in due course to their communities. In many of the countries where deployments occur HIV/AIDS is over 40% in the sexually active sector.

**Mitigation strategy** - The PIOC and the UN HIV/AIDS task force have developed a project to increase awareness and to protect all police members within the PICP catchment. A primary focus of this project is to ensure that all staff working on overseas missions receive appropriate awareness training and protective measures. This project will commence in 2005/2006.

### **People may not return home though taking up other opportunities available to them while off-shore**

Police officers who are deployed overseas will be exposed to opportunities for employment outside of the Police. This may result in them seeking to leave the Police service and to work in private industry. Media reports indicate the Fijian people employed in the security industry in Iraq are earning up to US\$3,000 per month, while the majority earn in the region of US\$2,000 per month.

**Mitigation strategy** - The risks of people leaving for "greener pastures" is a real one which cannot readily be mitigated. However, the risks of death or injury are high and many of the employees are exposed in the highest risk areas without the support offered in peacekeeping missions. The benefits of personal safety and support can be capitalised on to lessen the

### **Requirements for contracts or "bonding" of members following deployments**

To ensure that skills learnt in overseas deployments are brought back to the home forces, there may be a requirement that members enter into a contract or bonded period following their deployment. The enforceability of such a contract may be difficult in some countries during to lack of process and/or corrupt practices. Without a pay back period the potential benefits are significantly reduced.

**Mitigation strategy** - Develop standards contracts of service with a bonded period following deployment.

### **Reduced expertise in home forces through experienced staff being deployed overseas, and replaced by junior staff within the home forces.**

The most suitable people for an overseas deployment, and those will meet the UN requirements, are likely to be the most successful in their home forces. Removing the best from the forces will potentially create a gap in experience. The best performers are also likely to be the most motivated who will actively seek the opportunities for advancements and skills enhancement, this increasing the risk.

**Mitigation strategy** - While experienced staff will be required initially, and especially until replacements are recruited and trained, and gain experience, the overall increase in skills and experience will gradually flow through to the home forces. The initial "pain" will be overcome by the "long term gain."

### **Lack of support from Foreign Affairs Agencies of NZ and Aust perhaps through FRSC forum**

The Foreign Affairs Ministries of New Zealand and Australia have indicated their opposition to peacekeeping as a proposal in the Pacific because of the risk of it reducing the capability of the local forces. The inputs through ODA are focussed on improving the conditions within countries and the deployment of staff overseas has the potential to adversely impact on the desired outcomes of ODA. The forthcoming FRSC round will have the opportunity to be briefed on Peacekeeping and an adverse finding in that Forum may adversely impact on any later proposal as part of the Pacific Plan.

**Mitigation strategy** - The Fiji Police Commissioner seeks to raise this matter at the FRSC and to address it in a positive light with anticipated support from the Pacific nations at the FRSC.

### **Creation of an uncontrollable export of skills from the Pacific**

The increase in skills gained through peacekeeping will potentially cause a trade in people changing to other opportunities and trades, or to them leaving the region in search of other opportunities.

**Mitigation strategy** – To a lesser or greater degree this trade already exists. The opportunity to gain experience in a career they have chosen and to be compensated for this career, may be sufficient in itself to retain the skilled people.

### **Low levels of payment and compensation will reduce the likely cost benefit**

The levels of compensation for working in a UN mission are based on the socio economic analysis of the destination country. In countries where the cost of living is low, the rate of allowances is equally low. For instance, the projected rate in the Sudan is US\$47 per day. There is a possibility that countries will choose to only provide staff to the areas where the cost benefits are perceived as higher, and this will cause new nations or regions to be forced to take apparently less desirable opportunities. The rate of apparent return to the member's home country will appear to be lower and therefore less desirable. In turn the cost benefit, or repayment of investment, will take longer to achieve. This may place the whole concept at risk.

**Mitigation strategy** – While the rate may be lower, the cost of providing accommodation and food is also lower. It is therefore still possible to generate income which will return to the members host country but the return on investment may be greater.

### **Abuse of generated income through corrupt practices in Governments**

There are documented instances of officials taking the “cream” off peacekeeping operations through outright fraud or through the creation of excessively high overheads. This causes mistrust in the process. In turn the return on investment and on work is significantly reduced.

**Mitigation strategy** – The creation of transparent practices to ensure that the transfer of funds, and the management of overheads and income, is legitimately managed. In a joint and multi country operation it is probable that instances of corruption at a local level will be readily identified and the risk is therefore reduced.

### **Disaffection from members who are part of a FPU if they are not adequately compensated**

Two systems are available for UN deployments. The first is by membership of a peacekeeping operation, and the second through the delivery of a Force Protection Unit of FPU. An FPU is a fully funded operation where all of the resources of the force are provided by the home country. The level of compensation is higher, in the range of US\$1,000 per person per month, but the set-up and maintenance costs are also much higher. Not all deployments require a FPU. Because the funds are managed by the providing members Government the opportunity to increase overheads, and therefore reduce the amount of money received by each member, is higher. In turn, members will become disaffected through this process.

**Mitigation strategy** – It is initially unlikely that the region could effectively provide a FPU because most are fully armed units and this required expertise is generally lacking in the region. If a FPU was established then the multi country membership would help to ensure that the costs are carefully itemised and the benefits realised.

### **Cost Benefit Analysis may defeat the proposal**

The cost of a project such as this, and the length of time it may take to recover any investment, may be such that the proposal fails. While the CBA and the proposal are speculative, the expectation of a successful proposal is raised. Failure of the proposal could be an impediment to acceptance and support of the overall Pacific Plan.

**Mitigation strategy** – Clear statements that the process is speculative from the PIF and also the parties involved. The message that the process is speculative should be conveyed at all possible times so that expectations are not unfairly raised, and later dashed.

### **The proposal may not be sustainable in the long term through loss of trained staff to take up opportunities**

While members have indicated support to the concept, their ability to provide people of suitable skills is currently limited. In the long term this pool may be even further reduced as people tire of the adverse impact an overseas deployment has on family life. This may in turn cause “fatigue” in the providing countries. Examples of this are already apparent in the RAMSI and in East Timor deployments.

**Mitigation strategy** – Careful management of people before, during and especially after deployments to ensure that they re-integrate effectively in their own communities.

### **Staff who return from deployments may be disillusioned in the conditions in their home forces**

Staff employed on overseas missions work in an artificial environment of community policing, because they are the focus of attention and the resources are generally readily available to support them. On return to their home countries these facilities are unlikely to be available. People have the skills, but not the resources, to continue to provide the services they have while overseas. Examples of this are apparent in some Pacific countries that have significant experience in overseas deployments.

**Mitigation strategy** – The continual upgrade of local resources through initiatives such as the PRPI. The management of expectations that are created overseas to ensure that they are realistic upon the members return to their homes.

### **Increased overseas deployments may in time lead to a move to arming Pacific Police Forces**

Members of UN peacekeeping forces are required to be competent in the use of firearms for self protection and force protection. While the deployments may not be armed, the training is still required. The general aim in policing in the Pacific region is to disarm police forces where this is possible. This reduces the trade in illegal or stolen weapons from police armouries. Members who have experience in working in a higher risk environment where firearms may be available, may in turn create that expectation of carriage of police firearms in their home countries.

**Mitigation strategy** – Realistic management of the training and carriage of firearms as part of a deployment. Pro-active debriefing and follow up at the conclusion of a deployment.

### **There may be insufficient suitable applicants to backfill positions in countries**

Some countries are already finding difficulty in identifying and recruiting suitable applicants. The increase in recruitment to backfill positions given to peacekeeping may in fact make the problem even greater. In turn this may lead to a reduction in standards for recruitment which in turn will increase the risks to the police service

**Mitigation strategy** – Careful management of the number of positions made available to peacekeeping operations. Implementation of integrity standards and robust HR processes.

## X. FINDINGS

The following are the key findings of the report:

- The establishment of a Pacific Police Peacekeeping Service supports the aims of the PIFS Pacific Plan through the implementation of specific regional initiatives;
- Pacific police services have varying degrees of experience in UN and other offshore missions and to date have served with distinction.
- There are fundamental benefits to the Pacific region in establishing a PPKF for export including:
  - regional identity and ownership leading to enhanced credibility and reputation of Pacific policing services;
  - increased employment and income generation within the region; and
  - increased capacity for Pacific policing services.
- The PPKF should not be a "Standing Force". Rather it will be a pool of officers who can be deployed at short notice.
- The concept of a "force" is misleading, because what is proposed is not a standing force but a standby system.
- A Regional Training Centre (RTC) needs to be established, most probably in Fiji Islands, to support the extensive training requirements of the PPKF. A comparative scoping study should be undertaken to determine the most suitable location for the RTC.
- The RTC would become a "Centre of Excellence" for peacekeeping in the Pacific region and include issues such as UN Human Rights investigations and HIV/Aids into its curriculum.
- Enhanced police capacity will deliver more effective police services to the community and over time provide greater regional stability.
- The development of a "police-keeping" capacity, both in terms of a dedicated regional police training centre, and the increase in police skills offered to each police members, offers a tangible increase in local police capacity, rather than a "drain" on existing police resources.
- A PPKF will enhance interoperability across police jurisdictions in the Pacific.
- The establishment of a PPKF is not a panacea for increased police capacity. Programs such as the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative, Institutional Strengthening Programs and specific bilateral interventions will need to continue.
- There is concern at the number of suitable personnel available to recruit as police officers, particularly in relation to higher education levels and increasing demands from private companies for workers overseas.
- The sustainability of the PPKF over the longer-term will provide significant challenges for donor organisations, particularly in relation to the RTC.
- On completion of a tour of duty with the PPKF, police officers may choose other career pathways, particularly if there are a lack of resources and infrastructure in their home police services (the frustration of returning to operate in a low capacity police service).
- Income may not flow back into Pacific countries at the (higher) levels anticipated.
- Police officers may suffer from adverse effects of serving in traumatic areas leading to discharge and costly counselling. This could have significant effect on families and relatives.
- Police officers serving offshore may become involved in corrupt practices or inappropriate behaviour.

## APPENDIX: TERMS OF REFERENCE

**Consultant:** Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Secretariat

**Post:** Consultant to the Pacific Plan Office, Pacific Forum Secretariat, Suva

**Background:** To implement their enhanced vision for regional development, Pacific Islands Forum leaders have recently agreed to create a 'Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration', which aims to deepen and broaden regional cooperation by pooling regional resources. The Pacific Plan will assist all Pacific Forum member countries to increase their appreciation of regionalism, including issues related to the costs and benefits of Pacific regional cooperation and integration. The Plan aims to increase participation, ownerships and regional collective action. The Plan also aims to facilitate the inclusion of regional initiatives in the Pacific Islands countries' national development strategies.

In 2004 the PIF Secretariat requested support from ADB for the development and implementation of the Pacific Plan. Given the limited availability of budget resources and skilled personnel in the region, it was suggested that the technical assistance should focus on increasing stakeholders' appreciation of the benefits and costs generated by regional cooperation and integration for each country, and the opportunity-cost of non-integration for the overall region. The ADB, in conjunction with the Commonwealth Secretariat in London, is providing technical assistance in the form of a consultants team based at the PIF Secretariat in Suva.

The joint ADB-Commonwealth TA team will focus, *inter alia*, on providing a rigorous analytical framework for understanding regionalism in the Pacific. This analysis will be detailed through a series of studies measuring the quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits of specific regional interventions proposed by the Pacific Plan Task Force. The intention of the individual studies is to provide a complete stand-alone policy paper which is of publishable quality as well as much briefer input into the body of the text.

The studies must consider the implications for sovereign nations to allocate resources at the regional level, vis-à-vis their use to sustain national budgets and the effect in terms of resource creation or resource diversion of regionalism, especially when new areas and sectors are taken into consideration for regional cooperation and integration. In particular, the studies should focus on the analysis of the current costs for PIF members to participate in regional institutions, regional programs and benefit from provision of regional public goods and services as well as other positive feedback and spillovers due to regionalism.

**Terms of Reference:** The consultant shall:

Prepare a report on the costs and benefits of establishing a regional policing force for export. This report should address, at a minimum:

- The past and current levels of export supply of Pacific policing forces in the world;

- The current and potential demand for policing in the international arena, and what share of this demand could be captured by Pacific forces;
- The current regional and national mechanisms to supply policing services, including:
  - Their institutional framework;
  - Their running costs (budget, training, equipment);
  - Their key constraints and level of efficiency;
  - Their ability to meet the potential demand in the international market.
- Areas where pooling resources at the regional level would bring increased benefits;
- The quantitative and qualitative costs of establishing a regional policing force for export to meet international demand, including:
  - Staffing and infrastructure needs both at the regional and at the country level
  - Length of time involved in recovering costs of establishing regional mechanisms
- The quantitative and qualitative benefits of establishing a regional policing force for export, including the longer-run benefits on incomes, employment, national capacities and security, based on clearly laid out assumptions and analytical frameworks.

**Responsible:** Dr. Roman Grynberg  
 Regional Integration Specialist / Team Leader  
 Pacific Plan Office, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat  
 Suva, Fiji Islands

**Duration:** First Draft due no later than April 30<sup>th</sup> 2005  
 Comments will be provided by Pacific Plan Office by May 10<sup>th</sup>  
 Final draft due ten days after receipt of comments (but no later than May 30<sup>th</sup> 2005)

- report to a standard acceptable to the Pacific Plan Office