

ASSESSMENT OF THE TSUNAMI RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION IN KILLINOCHCHI AND MULLAITIVU DISTRICTS*

A. OVERVIEW OF DISTRICT

“We have no belief in life”

(from a fisherman mending his nets on the beach in Mullaitivu)

1. The effects of the tsunami that struck Sri Lanka on the 26th December, 2004 brought further suffering and destruction to the people of Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts. While reliable poverty estimates are not available, anecdotal evidence suggests that the poverty rate in these districts was already significantly higher than the national average. This is largely a result of more than two decades of conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which has subjected the population to multiple displacements while devastating the local economy.

2. The tsunami killed over 3,000 people and destroyed over 5,000 homes in Mullaitivu, while killing 30 and destroyed about 1,250 homes in Kilinochchi (according to LTTE and TAFREN assessment reports). It was reported by the District Secretary that there are 800 tsunami widows in Mullaitivu district, which is in addition to the 3,300 war widows already in the district. Along the coast there has been considerable damage to natural ecosystems and coastal infrastructure and people's livelihoods have been devastated, especially in Mullaitivu. The financing needs for recovery post-tsunami in Kilinochchi are \$ 35 million and Mullaitivu \$98.5 million which are 2.6% and 7.4% respectively of the total island wide post-tsunami recovery needs (ADB, JBIC and WB Joint Needs Assessment- JNA).

3. Fishing, the most important source of livelihood for the coastal population, has been shattered. Almost the entire population along the coast depended on fishing, either directly or indirectly through activities such as ice making and packing, fish transportation, boat engine repairs, markets and grocery shops. Since most of the affected people were living in kadjan huts, and many have already moved or will soon be moving into the temporary shelters, their first priority is the restoration of livelihoods in order to provide for themselves. The second priority is their need to return to their own homes close to where they earn their livelihood. While the above two are the priority needs, simultaneous re-establishment of basic services like health, education, water, sanitation and social protection is required during the emergency period as well as for the long-term recovery phase.

B. FINDINGS OF POST-TSUNAMI DAMAGE & NEEDS ASSESSMENTS FOR DISTRICT

4. Of the two districts, Mullaitivu was much more seriously affected by the tsunami than Kilinochchi, since the majority of the coastline of the Vanni falls in Mullaitivu. The table below summarises the three needs assessments that were carried out by the Government of Sri Lanka (TAFREN), the North East Needs Assessment done by the Planning and Development Secretariat of the LTTE, and the Joint Needs Assessment done by the donor

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community. There are some, at times significant, discrepancies between the assessments, although, at the time of writing, work was advancing on reconciling the costs within a common framework.

Table 1: Comparison between the needs assessments regarding damage

	Mullaitivu			Kilinochchi		
	Donors Joint Needs Assessment	TAFREN Needs Assessment	LTTE North East Needs Assessment	Donors Joint Needs Assessment	TAFREN Needs Assessment	LTTE North East Needs Assessment
Displaced Families		6,007	5,484		318	407
Deaths		3,000	2,771		560	30
Injured		2,590	2,590		670	0
Missing		433	552		1	1
Completely Damaged Houses	10,585	5,033	5,033	3,400	1,250	246
Partially Damaged Houses	5,270	400	400	4,250	400	0
Number of Schools Damaged	11	12	12	0	0	0
Number of Health Institutions Damaged	6	6	6	1	1	1

5. It is estimated¹ that the post tsunami recovery needs in Mullaitivu would be more than USD 46 million for housing, USD 19 million for roads, USD 14 million for fisheries, just over USD 11 million for water & sanitation, USD 6.5 million for health, and USD 1.4 million for education. In Kilinochchi, it is expected to be USD 18 million for housing, USD 12 million for roads, almost USD 4 million for water & sanitation, and USD 1 million for fisheries.

C. KEY CONTEXTUAL ISSUES

6. **Socio-political tensions.** Although the three-year ceasefire and MoU between the LTTE and GoSL has brought some reconstruction and development in the area, the lack of elected political bodies, transparent and accountable governance, and the tight control exercised over the districts means that existing socio-political tensions have not been resolved. These have now been exacerbated by the tsunami, especially issues related to the housing and resettlement of conflict-affected IDP's still in transit camps vis-à-vis post-tsunami IDPs. The urgent need for the resettlement of all displaced persons cannot be overemphasized, as many have suffered repeated displacements, loss of property and goods in the past two decades and are deeply traumatised, angry and without trust.

7. The team was informed that it was the LTTE who took the initiative to clear dead bodies and debris along the Mullaitivu coast, and provided food and cash handouts to the affected population. Fisher folk in the area wanted to know why new fishing boats were being distributed in Jaffna and along southern coast whilst not one had yet come to Mullaitivu. Those who lost livelihoods have yet to receive the LKR 5,000 being distributed elsewhere. The bulk of assistance to date has come from local and International NGO's via the Tamil Relief Organisation (TRO) who is managing the camps. Whilst many are still in tents in Mullaitivu, semi-permanent houses with electricity are under construction, with

¹ Joint Needs Assessment, 2005, p. 22.

bathing areas and toilets being built and water sources close at hand. In Kilinochchi, many are already living in semi-permanent housing with toilet and bathing facilities.

8. **Local capacity of governance structures.** As stated above, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi are districts under the control of the LTTE, with parallel administrative systems managed by the GoSL and the LTTE. While the LTTE has all its sectoral agencies present in the district alongside those of the GoSL line agencies, the security forces (police, army, navy) and the judiciary (courts) are solely those of the LTTE. In addition, there are no elected local and provincial bodies in the North East Province, resulting in a lack of democratic accountability and transparency. Compounding this is the severe shortage of human resources in the district administration that affects its ability to effectively carry out its responsibilities. There is also a lack of support facilities in the form of infrastructure and transport, staff housing and public services.

9. The tsunami emergency has greatly improved coordination and cooperation in the two districts with the establishment of a Task Force comprising the PDS of the LTTE, the GAs and their administrators, as well as national and international NGOs. The Task Force has been meeting regularly. However, this mechanism needs to be further formalised and strengthened as we move from emergency response to recovery.

10. **Gender.** The post-tsunami recovery needs of men and women differ depending on the roles they play in family and society. Neither men nor women interviewed in the camps had been adequately informed or consulted on matters affecting their lives. Although some women had been consulted on the design of semi-permanent houses, most had not been able to comment. Although the semi-permanent shelter being constructed comprises only one room, affording little privacy to women, they appeared grateful to be out of their hot tents and up from the ground on a concrete floor. Aid agencies have considered differences in gender needs related to bathing areas and toilets. Water provided is adequate. The Fishermen's Cooperative Societies are seen by some as representative of the whole fishing community, but they are comprised of only male members and not all members are fishermen, especially those who have re-settled from other areas. Besides, not all fisher families are members of cooperatives. The tsunami has resulted in the creation of additional single (widow/er) headed households. Traditionally dependency on "male" family members involved in fishing makes women particularly vulnerable in the event of loss or disablement of husbands or fathers. Paid job opportunities are limited, especially for women, who lack education, skills and the opportunity to voice their needs. The tsunami has also left numerous men without their wives, making them now responsible for childcare, for which they are not prepared and hence will need special support and guidance.

11. **Environmental considerations.** The relatively deep seabed close to the shore, combined with the flat, low lying and extensive coastal plain generated 40-foot waves that travelled far inland destroying all in their path including coastal vegetation, palmyra trees and mangroves in lagoons. There has been surface and ground water contamination, including salination of wells. Soak pits that have been laid open by the water are a cause of concern in terms of health and sanitation. It is assumed that the tsunami has also affected the marine environment and caused damage to the coral and marine vegetation; however the extent of this has not yet been validated.

12. The recovery phase could further negatively affect the environment during the construction of houses: natural vegetation may be destroyed, local supplies of wood may be tapped, leading to problems of deforestation. Rebuilding toilets and drainage systems will require proper waste disposal systems to be put in place. Construction of housing settlements must also consider the location of mass burial sites to avoid contamination.

13. **Land titles and access to land.** Unlike some other districts, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi appear to have no major problems in identification of land for resettlement. There seems to be sufficient state-owned land for distribution to the affected population. Care should nevertheless be taken to identify land that will facilitate people's recovery of their livelihood, i.e. close enough to the sea for them to return to fishing. The challenge, as elsewhere, will be equity in land distribution in terms of quality as well as family size. Keeping communities together and promoting social cohesion during relocation is an important consideration that is often overlooked.

14. **Reduced risk.** Environmental organisations, NGO's and the Coastal Protection Department (CPD) together with environmental scientists should study and identify local solutions to reduce the risks from natural disasters. The Government, together with civil society, police and navy will need to develop early warning systems. It is very important that awareness programmes on natural disasters should be conducted to alleviate fear and heighten awareness of appropriate responses. This will take time and can be done through programmes in communities and schools, ensuring that those facing communications barriers are not excluded. There is also a need to initiate construction of sandbars along the coast and planting of natural vegetation such as mangroves in lagoons as primary protection against disasters.

15. **Human Rights.** The provision of tents as shelter in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami was immediately deemed inappropriate and inadequate. Semi-permanent shelters are in the process of being completed. Adequate safeguards and structures for participation of communities, youth, women, children, disabled persons and elders in planning and recovery are not in place. The accountability of those in positions of responsibility towards the displaced people needs to be strengthened. People's right to information about where assistance is being provided, to whom and according to what criteria has been neglected as they have not been informed or consulted.

16. **HIV/AIDS risks.** According to the tsunami-affected people as well as the service providers, HIV is not perceived as a threat to the affected communities. It is important to note that in situations such as transit camps where crowding is common and privacy is limited, the potential for non-consensual sex is increased, leading to possibilities of transmission of HIV. It is also expected that with the recovery phase in motion there will be increased movement of people from outside the communities. This may pose a potential threat of transmission of HIV, hence the need to initiate awareness programmes on a broad scale with free access to condoms.

D. IMPLEMENTATION OVERVIEW

17. **Housing Needs.** We saw no evidence of permanent house reconstruction work having yet started. The immediate need is for land allocation to re-house those who were located within 300 metres of the sea. The people to whom we spoke in Mullaitivu do not object to this ruling by the LTTE, but requested a hut for their fishing tackle and engines beside the sea. To effectively address the housing needs, the recently signed North East Housing Reconstruction Programme (NEHRP) should be revised and expanded to include tsunami as well as conflict IDPs. NEHRP plans to provide the poorest families in the North East with affordable housing units, entailing a cash grant paid in instalments, with support from civil society. In addition, it will contribute to training skilled construction workers, ensuring regularisation of land title to beneficiaries, supporting partner organisations and providing technical assistance for programme implementation. Mechanisms and modalities may need to be reviewed to also provide the option of contractor constructed homes. The challenge will be to balance the need for many thousands of homes in the shortest possible

time with the dearth of skilled labour, the difficulty in accessing building materials and the number of single-headed households that may require additional support.

18. **Education Needs.** There is ample evidence that many of the donors who have been allocated schools for reconstruction and/or relocation have started on the designs and location surveying. However, locating schools should be done only after the locations for permanent housing have been decided, so that the schools will be easily accessible to the children. There has not been sufficient discussion with the communities and School Development Societies concerning the building of the schools, which may lead to non-participation of the communities in the process of rebuilding and maintenance of the schools. The need to ensure that the new schools meet adequate standards regarding child friendliness and accessibility for disabled children has not been sufficiently communicated to the districts by the Ministry of Education. There is also a need to address the issue of making teachers available, especially for schools in more remote areas, where proper living quarters are essential.

19. A common problem faced in all sectors will be the lack of skilled construction labour for the recovery phase. While contractors from outside the district can fulfil a small part of the need, capacity building in the district should be undertaken. The team sees three possible construction modalities: (a) donors directly bring in contractors for the schools allocated to them by the government, on condition that transparency is assured, (b) funds can be channelled through the government network via the Government Agent to the Zonal Education Directorate, which will then follow the government's standard procurement process. (The problem with this is the limitation in the ZED's authority for bidding amounts, which is too low for such construction, as well as the time required, and (c) NECORD-led school procurement. NECORD has already been working in the North East in school reconstruction. This proven mechanism can be used to initiate the construction of schools without delays involved in establishing new mechanisms. For all of the above options, adherence to national school standards should be maintained, including those pertaining to physical accessibility.

20. **Health Needs.** As in many other sectors, there has for a long time been a shortage of human resources in the health sector in the North East. Construction and rehabilitation of the health institutions in themselves will not be sufficient to address the need for health services. Simultaneously addressing human resource deficiencies is essential for the recovery of health services in Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi. Construction of staff quarters along with appropriate policies for deployment of health staff to the North East will go a long way towards addressing this issue. There is also a need to enhance cooperation between the GoSL health network, which is the Provincial Directorate of Health Services (DPDHS) at the district level, and the Tamil Eelam Health Services (TEHS), along with the Planning and Development Secretariat of the LTTE.

21. The Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau (CECB) under the Ministry of Mahaveli which undertakes large government construction projects is very much involved in providing the technical expertise and undertaking construction of larger health facilities for the Ministry of Health. All large construction and rehabilitation needs for the health sector should be channelled through this bureau. However, they may well face capacity constraints that will need to be addressed, given the complexity of the recovery phase. For smaller construction work like Gramodaya Health Centres, which CECB may not be willing to undertake, funds could be channelled through the GAs to the DPDHS, who could follow government procurement procedures. Again, regulations on procurement limits of the DPDHS may need to be amended for expedited action, or the bidding may need to be done at the Provincial level, which has higher authority ceilings. Flexibility to allow donors to

follow their own modalities for construction should be possible, although co-ordination, adherence to government standards, and transparency should be maintained.

22. **Livelihood Needs and Needs of Fisher folk.** The tsunami brought profound destruction to much of the fishing industry, not only from the loss of lives, but also from the loss of productive assets such as boats, engines, nets, and related infrastructure. We recommend that people should be given cash or in-kind replacement of their losses at this time, not least because donor governments have pledged grants to tsunami-affected people. For fisher folk this should be in the form of replacement boats and engines, nets and cash for drying equipment and other related economic activities.

23. For Mullaitivu, we recommend that boats, engines, fishing gear, and cash support be delivered directly to beneficiaries as far as possible. If direct provision is operationally not possible, it should be done through the fishing societies and cooperatives. The Union of Cooperative Societies has in the past provided marketing, transport, cold storage, fuel and engine repair services. Most, but not all, fisher folk are members of this Union. The Union needs to be strengthened, after suffering losses in the tsunami, to be able to provide the support that will be essential to the small fisher folk. They will need to widely consult with their members to agree on specifications, purchase, transport and distribution of boats and equipments. The list of beneficiaries should be vetted by community groups and posted for all to see in an effort to minimise exclusion and inclusion errors.

24. For Kilinochchi, an alternative method will be required, given that the needs are not so extensive and the cooperative societies are less strong. This could be through local CBOs or NGOs. At the local level, the Department of Fisheries neither has the capacity nor the staff to undertake this task. Initiatives by the Department to hire staff locally should be undertaken to fill the gap in this very important sector.

25. The fisher folk to whom we spoke were not interested in cash for work, for instance, in construction projects. They wanted to get back to fishing because, despite the sea having taken their families and homes, they maintain that they have the skills and experience that brings them a good living from the sea. In addition, the caste-based system is still a part of the culture in this part of the country, which limits occupational mobility.

26. The sequencing for fishing recovery will be first an independent assessment of losses, especially debts to moneylenders, and of the type of boats needed, including better preservation of the catches. This should be followed by repair of boats and engines, and then the provision of fishing gear. For people other than fisher folk, the ILO Rapid Income Recovery programme is seen as a viable solution for these people. Existing women's groups and other civil society organisations involved in income generating activities need to be reformed and supported with cash and equipment. Fish drying processes, where the women are more involved, could be greatly improved with more up to date technologies.

27. The coverage of micro-finance organisations and their capacity to deliver need to be rapidly expanded for the development of small and medium enterprises. Banks, NGO'S and CBO's, savings and credit societies and multi-purpose cooperatives, popular in the North East, must be assisted in their efforts to expand their services. These services should be designed to be also accessible to marginal groups, including disabled people. This should be supplemented by training in business organisation and management. In addition, there is a need for recognised vocational skills training, especially in the construction trade.

28. **Social Protection Needs.** There is a severe shortage of human resources in the North East in this sector. There are not enough Probation Officers, Child Rights Promotion Officers or Social Service Officers posted to Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, since candidates are

not very keen on being posted to these districts. In addition to the existing vulnerable population in the districts, the tsunami has added many more orphans or children with one parent, women and young girls that are alone, elders that do not have support and disabled people. They are at greater risk of abuse and exploitation, especially with the overcrowding in camps and the lack of privacy and security. The central level needs to appoint sufficient staff with the appropriate language skills to these districts and initiate mechanisms to encourage other stakeholders in this sector to work together effectively.

29. A major issue in this sector is that the above government officers do not have a legal system in place for them to report cases of abuse and exploitation. Only the LTTE courts supported by the LTTE armed forces function. This has created a situation where these officers have become ineffective. However, cases that have come to the attention of the LTTE have been dealt with, severely in many instances. The joint mechanism recommended for the recovery and reconstruction phase should also incorporate mechanisms to address the legal side of social protection.

30. To ensure effective social protection, awareness programmes need to be launched throughout the districts, especially in the transit camps. Children's rights (including the right to be protected from child recruitment), rights of the IDPs, of women, of disabled people and of the elderly need to be explained and advocated. Since the affected people are going to remain in the transit camps until permanent housing is constructed, which may take from 6 months to a year, it is essential that social protection be strengthened in the transit camps themselves. This will entail a mechanism that will foster closer coordination between the social protection officers and the justice system in the district.

31. **Transport Needs.** The roads affected by the tsunami are 'C' and 'D' class roads, under the jurisdiction of the Road Development Department (RDD) of the North East Provincial Council. Class 'A' and 'B' roads, which are the major roads mostly away from the coastal belt, fall under the jurisdiction of the Road Development Authority (RDA), which is under the central Ministry of Highways. During the time of conflict, LTTE had maintained all roads in their areas of control. Since 'A' and 'B' class roads were closed for vehicular traffic during the conflict, 'C' and 'D' class roads were more in use, which eventually caused significant deterioration. In this class, there were 108 km of metal roads in Kilinochchi prior to the conflict, which has now been reduced to just 1 km. The rest are gravel roads.

32. The transport sector needs to be looked at in totality, not just the roads affected by the tsunami. A lot of the fisheries sector recovery will depend on how the produce can be transported not only to the towns in the district but to bigger markets around the island.

33. The transport sector also needs to consider the improvement of tsunami-affected roads vis-à-vis the conflict-affected roads, as well as potential road-crossing difficulties for the disabled and elderly. We recommend that, where possible, tsunami-affected road repairs should be implemented directly by the funding agency (whether government, bilateral or multilateral) by way of calling competitive tenders locally and nationally, with standard procurement checks and balances. Wherever this is not possible, it may be advisable to follow the procedures laid down in existing projects such as NECORD and NEIAP. In all cases, the choice of roads to be repaired should be done in an open, transparent manner.

34. **Power Needs.** During the pre-conflict period the power supply to Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts was restricted to a few towns in both districts through the national grid. During the time of conflict these links were destroyed. During the current ceasefire period, private sector diesel-powered generators supply power in Kilinochchi town, with a fuel

surcharge being added to the electricity bills. In Mullaitivu town, pre-tsunami, there were 270 consumers of electricity whereas now there are only 25.

35. There are plans to connect Kilinochchi to the national grid via Vavuniya and also from Jaffna. The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) feels that these connections can be expanded to cover towns in Mullaitivu district as well. However, the LTTE feels that connecting Mullaitivu to the national grid is not appropriate, as it will over-stretch the national available sources and due to the scattered population. As with other sectors, the power sector recovery needs to take into consideration the comprehensive needs of the district, which would include recovery from both tsunami and conflict damages.

36. Power to Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts should be supplied through the national grid as it is cost effective and sustainable. People of these two districts are extremely poor and cannot afford electricity from diesel-powered generators. However, alternative energy sources such as solar and wind power can be promoted among populations living in remote and isolated hamlets, on condition that a participatory approach is used to reach decisions.

37. **Water and Sanitation Needs.** As in many of the sectors, water and sanitation is also faced with the lack of skilled human resources. There is also a lack of local contractors able to undertake large water schemes, thus requiring either local capacity building or the invitation of outside contractors. Subsidised water might be considered for a limited time period, while people regain their livelihoods. In the district of Mullaitivu, the GoSL does not have a National Water Supply and Drainage Board (NWSDB) presence. A unit of the NWSDB needs to be set up to initiate the re-establishment of services in the district.

38. The NWSDB has the capacity to undertake large water schemes; hence bigger projects should be channelled through them, using their approved procurement mechanisms. For donor agencies that have their own mechanisms, there should be signed MoUs regarding firm deadlines and the commitment of the NWSDB to ensure operation and maintenance after completion. Smaller schemes can be channelled through local governments, i.e. Divisional Secretariats or Pradeshia Sabhas. Community water supply and sanitation, which should be accessible to all, can also be implemented through local government, with technical support from Public Health Inspectors. It should be noted that housing designs should incorporate toilets as an integral part of the housing schemes.

39. **Coastal Protection Needs.** Most of the North East coastline remains unprotected. To date no comprehensive study has been undertaken to assess its potential for development or need for protection. A comprehensive survey focussing on environmental damage and risks, protection options and development potential should be undertaken.

40. **Governance Capacity Needs.** During the tail end of the conflict, i.e. 2000-2001, the Government formulated a framework for relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction (triple R) with the technical support of the donor community and with tacit approval of the LTTE. Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding by the GoSL and the LTTE in February 2002, the then new government established a triple R secretariat in the Prime Minister's office to oversee the implementation of the triple R framework. Peace talks between the GoSL and the LTTE (beginning September 2002) resulted in the establishment of a Sub Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) in late 2002 to speed up relief & rehabilitation to the internally displaced people who were spontaneously returning to their places of origin after the ceasefire.

41. Since the LTTE expressed dissatisfaction with implementation delays, withdrawing from peace talks and this joint mechanism in April 2003, gaps have persisted in terms of governance in the N&E Province in general, and in LTTE-controlled areas in particular. In

the absence of a joint institutional mechanism the government machinery functions directly under the District Secretary, the LTTE has its own Planning and Development Secretariat (PDS), and the civil society has its own institutions. All of these lack adequate and competent personnel to undertake the huge task in the aftermath of the tsunami. There also seems to be reluctance by Tamil speaking administrative personnel and professionals to work in LTTE-controlled areas in the North & East.

42. There is thus a dire need to set-up or reactivate a joint mechanism for the delivery of services to the tsunami and conflict-affected people of the north east, especially for the districts of Mullaitivu & Kilinochchi that are under the control of the LTTE. There is no guarantee that a joint mechanism in the future will be long lasting, but this does not mean that the GoSL and the LTTE should abandon the search for an effective mechanism to serve the tsunami and conflict-affected people in the N&E. Until this is agreed there will continue to be indecision, uncertainty, disparity and lack of funds to plan and undertake rehabilitation.

43. An overall coordinated approach is needed to prevent overlaps and duplication of activities. The tsunami emergency has greatly improved coordination and cooperation in the two districts with the establishment of a Task Force that has been meeting regularly and has agreed on areas of responsibility. However, as we move from the emergency response phase to the longer-term recovery phase, the task force needs to be formalised and strengthened, with clear roles and responsibilities for all the parties involved.

44. A clear National Policy Statement is required that takes into account the needs of post-conflict families and those displaced by the tsunami in an equitable manner. Separating post-conflict and post-tsunami affected people is neither realistic nor just because the suffering of both categories is equally extensive. This mission concluded that Government and donors need to be flexible in allowing funds to be used for both groups of affected people as well as for adjacent poor communities.

45. There should be provision of adequate financial authority and budget for rehabilitation at the appropriate levels. The NEPC Secretariat and local government structures have limited financial authority, which is an obstacle to effective planning and implementation of the recovery. This limit does not allow local bodies to undertake bidding processes over a certain amount, for which they need to go to higher authorities, either at the provincial level or even to the national level, causing delays in the entire process. Raising ceilings, with proper transparency mechanisms, at the district level on a special basis for the post-tsunami reconstruction could be a viable solution for overcoming delays.

46. Although the districts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu have parallel structures of administration, co-operation and co-ordination between the LTTE and the GoSL seems to be occurring. For instance, the LTTE health system addresses gaps in the health service that the DPDHS cannot address and the Urban Development Councils have been quite effective in coordinating the response in the urban areas. These informal relationships of cooperation and coordination need to be encouraged, strengthened, and regularised with clearer mandates.

47. Unlike other areas of Sri Lanka, there has not been a large influx of neither INGOs nor NGOs. The reason could be security concerns and the scarcity of qualified Tamil speaking staff. However, those who were already present have responded in a timely and efficient manner to the emergency. In general they work through partner CBOs, of which most are in need of capacity building. Undertaking capacity building activities in these districts is essential to effectively address the huge task of the recovery phase.

E. OBSERVATIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS

48. The **establishment of a joint mechanism** for recovery efforts will require time and considerable resources to put in place, but will in the long run save time and money by minimising duplication and streamlining implementation. In the short term there is an urgent need to formalise and strengthen the Task Force with additional skilled personnel and resources. While it acknowledges that the Task Force mechanism has worked well during the emergency and relief phases, the LTTE believes that for the recovery stage a more elaborate and formal system needs to be put into place. It is recommended that, since the recovery phase requires greater stakeholder involvement to ensure ownership and sustainability, the Task Forces in the districts be strengthened and formalised so that they can work more closely together. This can be achieved, along with capacity development, with the clear delineation of roles and responsibilities of the members of the Task Force.

49. **Use established structures to deliver.** Experience has shown that establishment of new project structures usually takes over a year before implementation can begin, not to mention the considerable expense involved. Therefore, our recommendation is to either “piggy-back” on existing projects such as NEHRP, NECORD, NIEAP, etc. and work through existing cooperatives, NGOs and CBOs, as appropriate, although admittedly this may be difficult for donors that have specific criteria for their support, including standards of visibility. Therefore, the recommendation is to undertake actions in line with mechanisms that have already been tested i.e. NECORD for school construction, NEHRP for housing, etc., instead of developing new mechanisms.

50. Some donors have their own mechanisms for delivery of support, especially with regards to construction. There should be flexibility to allow donors to execute construction according to their own modalities as long as there is transparency and a co-ordination mechanism that will ensure **adherence to standards set by the Government and non-duplication** by aligning with a master plan.

51. The involvement of communities in the identification, planning and monitoring of recovery activities will, in the short term, be time consuming and costly. However, the cost will be outweighed by the benefits of greater accountability, sustainability and non-discrimination. The recommendation is to establish an **information and communication system** to support transparency and accountability and to provide communities with updated information, taking care to include marginalized groups such as those facing communications barriers, which would ensure the communities’ involvement as an integral part of the recovery process.

52. The above observations and recommendations are founded on the expectation of an equal voice for and participation of all the parties involved, opening opportunities for facilitating and strengthening the **peace process**.