

REBUILDING SRI LANKA: ASSESSMENT OF TSUNAMI RECOVERY IMPLEMENTATION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. MAIN CONCLUSIONS

1. The demands on both the public sector and the donor community have been enormous since the tsunami struck Sri Lanka. In the initial emergency phase, despite some inevitable confusion, all parties acquitted themselves reasonably well, resulting in many potential secondary deaths and much suffering being averted.

2. As we move into the reconstruction phase however, a phase necessarily more complex and fraught with potential pitfalls, it has become clear that the country needs to make better use of the wealth of knowledge, skills, energy and goodwill that exists beyond Colombo. This means adopting practices that significantly increase accountability at the sub-national levels. It means involving the affected populations more directly in the shaping of the recovery effort. And it means taking more fully into account the context in which the recovery is being carried out.

3. Thus, at the risk of over-simplifying the many recommendations that have emerged from the district consultations, the following is a list of core recommendations that we believe need to be considered as the recovery effort moves forward:

- Key policies that can only, in practice, be elaborated at the national level need to be defined and communicated to all concerned. These include in particular those related to land, housing and livelihood support. It is important that these policies be defined only broadly and in terms of principles, leaving sufficient flexibility to each district to adapt them to local needs and preferences.
- The responsibilities of each level of government should be clearly defined with regards to each of the above policies, giving the maximum amount of authority possible to the lower levels of government in order to increase transparency and accountability. The management of human resources within the public sector, in terms of incentives and controls, should reflect these levels of authority.
- Methods of consultation with the affected populations, leaving some flexibility as to the precise way this is done locally, should be promoted at the highest levels of government, with a means of follow-up defined to ensure that this is being done. Care needs to be taken to ensure that all parts of the population are reached by these methods, including women, the disabled and the elderly.
- More attention should be paid to setting up appropriate coordination mechanisms at all levels (national, provincial, district and division) to ensure that an inclusive approach is taken with regards to the many actors in the recovery effort. For this

coordination to be effective, adequate data needs to be compiled and made available, including data that is gender disaggregated.

- These coordination bodies should pay particular attention to how the needs of the tsunami-affected population are being addressed in the different districts, versus the needs of conflict-affected families and those who are suffering simply from endemic poverty. The principles of equity and avoidance of increased tensions should guide how these needs are addressed.
- The recommendations in this summary and in the district reports need to be articulated further before they can be applied in practice. We suggest this can best be done via a series of multi-stakeholder sectoral workshops in each of the districts and at national level, aimed at developing detailed action plans that allocate responsibilities, identify resource needs (including capacity ones) and set clear timelines.

B. BACKGROUND

4. A preliminary joint assessment of post-tsunami damage and of recovery needs was carried out in January by the Asian Development Bank, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the World Bank, with contributions from various UN agencies, bilateral donors, members of civil society and the Government. It was intended that this assessment serve as a technical support to the preparation of the national recovery plan for the tsunami disaster zone. The drafting of the assessment report involved numerous consultations with all major stakeholders in the recovery plan, including agencies and representatives of the government, the LTTE, civil society organizations and, of course, the disaster victims themselves.

5. However, during this preliminary assessment, it was recognised that the severe time constraints resulting from the G7 request to produce, for the end of January, a rapid report on the economic impact and estimates of the cost of recovery would not allow for as full a process of consultation as would be necessary to ensure a broad sense of ownership and commitment with regards to the eventual recovery effort.

6. It was therefore agreed that a second phase would be required, in which government, civil society, local stakeholders and donors would work closely together so that a wider range of stakeholders could be consulted, a variety of issues connected to implementation mechanisms could be examined and, in consequence, more emphasis could be placed not so much on **what** needed to be done as on **how**. It was also agreed that this phase of the assessment would strive to explore practically how the implementation of the recovery plan could reasonably incorporate the “Guiding Principles of the Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy” already endorsed by the major stakeholders.

7. To carry out this mandate, nine field teams were formed, composed of multi-sector experts proposed by the Government (Colombo and district based), civil society and donor organizations. In the case of the teams focusing on the North and East, the LTTE was invited to also designate resource persons, while the Eastern district teams included a representative of the local Muslim community. Each field team was thus composed of five to nine individuals and

was assigned one to three districts, depending on geographical contiguity and the extent of damage to be addressed. In addition, a “support/advisory team” was formed of stakeholder representatives and crosscutting experts to provide advice to the field teams and input into the drafting of the final reports.

8. Each team travelled to their respective districts for a period of four to seven days and met with a wide range of local stakeholders to gather their views on the current state of the recovery implementation and on how the implementation could best be moved forward. Several thousand individuals were consulted in the districts, from all walks of life.

9. Each team then drafted an initial report and, in most cases, either returned to the district to fill in gaps in information from the previous visit or carried out supplementary telephone interviews for the same purpose. This Executive Summary presents an overview of the team findings and their key recommendations. In annex are the reports of each of the respective teams, where the reader can find more details as to specific conditions and ways forward in each district.

C. TSUNAMI AND AFTER

10. The tsunami that struck Sri Lanka on the morning of December 26, 2004, killed over 31,000 people, destroyed over 99,000 homes, damaged natural ecosystems and left behind widespread destruction. Vulnerable groups, such as poor fishermen living close to the shore, suffered the brunt of the negative impacts. Apart from striking already comparatively poor coastal communities, the tsunami compounded previously existing vulnerabilities resulting from civil conflict by making the North East the hardest hit region. The percentage of the coastal population affected ranged from an estimated 35% in Kilinochchi to 80% in Mullaitivu and 78% in Ampara coastal district divisions, compared to the southern districts of Galle, Matara, and Hambantota, where less than 20 percent of the coastal population was affected, albeit with scattered pockets of severe damage.

11. In the months following the disaster, much has been accomplished. The general consensus is that emergency relief was singularly successful in meeting the immediate needs of the affected people. The unprecedented outpouring of private and institutional generosity meant that families were provided with a place to stay, food was distributed, medical assistance was made available, orphaned children were taken into care. Basic public services such as education, electricity and security were soon restored to close to pre-tsunami levels.

12. As a result, the epidemics and deaths that many feared following the disaster never happened. This rapid stabilization of a traumatized population has allowed attention to thus quickly be turned towards the, in many ways, more difficult and complex challenge of assisting the affected areas to return to normalcy and the affected families to begin to rebuild their lives.

D. THE RESPONSE

13. At the time of writing, work on refining the estimates of how much post-tsunami reconstruction will cost are continuing. Significant variances remain in a number of sectors regarding cost estimates prepared by the Government and those drawn up by the multilateral

donors. This is in part due to continued uncertainty with respect to the real degree of damage, notably in sectors such as housing. Nevertheless, it appears that the total cost of rebuilding social and economic infrastructure, as well as restoring livelihoods to those who lost them, will be in the range of US \$2 billion. The greatest costs are in the housing sector and transport, with large amounts also identified for livelihoods (including fisheries and tourism), water/sanitation and power. The annexed district reports explain the needs in more detail.

E. THE CONTEXT

14. Clearly a reconstruction effort of this scale and complexity is not solely a technical challenge, but needs to carefully take into account the context in which it will be implemented. Who will be responsible for the different aspects of the recovery? How will the efforts be coordinated? What will be the impact of the local socio-political dynamic on the recovery work and vice versa? Are there likely to be winners and losers? How will the most vulnerable be provided for and what opportunities will they have to contribute to the recovery effort? Will the recovery activities be sustainable environmentally, economically and politically? Do the key actors have the capacity to play an effective part?

15. These are all questions that have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the recovery plan and on whether the recovery will contribute to the long-term development of the country or whether it will represent a missed opportunity. The main contextual issues identified by the teams are the following:

16. **Socio-political tensions.** All the district reports emphasise the growing frustration, anger and impatience among local stakeholders. These emotions appear to cut across all ethnic groups, social classes and professional groups and are, rightly or wrongly, largely focused on the central government. The source of these tensions is the perception that the affected populations are not being provided with sufficient nor clear information as to where the recovery effort is going, nor do they feel that they are being consulted as to the shape the recovery will take. The escalating alienation is particularly linked to local confusion over land and housing, as well as to livelihood support. Finally, and far from least among the sources of tension, is the looming disparity between the treatment of post-tsunami victims versus post-conflict ones, those who have suffered from previous disasters (such as floods) and those suffering from chronic poverty. This is in addition to the perceived disparity between the different districts and ethnic communities who were victims of the tsunami. As the weeks have passed since December 26, it has become ever clearer that both the public authorities and donors will need to more clearly articulate and apply principles of equity with regards to the support being offered to these categories of people.

17. **Governance.** There are a number of concerns linked to governance and the lack of application of the provisions of the 13th Amendment that have emerged from the district consultations. One is that the sub-national levels of government are not sufficiently informed, especially through official channels, of what government policy is (and the reasons for the policy) and feel that the information that arrives at their level is too often contradictory. Faced with this lack of communication, or indeed conflicting information, the result has often been a paralysis in decision-making, especially when local authorities are not clear as to what decision-making powers they have been granted. In addition, the policy-making authority of certain coordination bodies, such as TAFREN, versus the policy-making authority of the various

line ministries, is a source of confusion in many in the districts. Finally, despite a desire to take on more responsibility at the district and divisional levels for directing the recovery effort, there are clear gaps or weaknesses in the capacity of these local structures to do so effectively, notably in the areas of planning and monitoring, human resource management, financial management, inclusive urban development and community consultation/mobilization. They will thus need urgent and substantive support if they are to effectively carry out such responsibilities. Finally, in line with the agreed guiding principles, safeguards against corruption will need to be assured at all levels of the recovery effort, notably by implementing regular audits of financial flows and by reinforcing the accountability of all those responsible for recovery activities.

18. **Gender.** The particular needs of women appear to have been largely neglected in the disaster response to date, due to the infrequency of direct consultations with them. These encompass issues such as sanitation, privacy and personal security. As a result, reports of various types of abuse have been an all too frequent feature of the recovery to date. In addition, there has been a general failure to perceive of women not only as victims of the disaster, but also as key actors in shaping the recovery. This would involve systematically including them in consultations regarding such issues as housing design, livelihood support programs, new locations for resettlement projects, access to land, the planning of social infrastructure, public transportation, etc. A particular feature of the post-tsunami environment is the significant number of men that have been forced into the role of prime care-givers in the family, due to the death of their spouse, and who thus could benefit from assistance and advice in taking on this new role. It was frequently noted in the district reports that the collection of gender-disaggregated data is an essential starting point for the formulation of effective, gender-sensitive approaches.

19. **Environment / risk reduction.** Environmental concerns following the tsunami are many and range from the environmental destruction wreaked by the tsunami itself, to disaster mitigation efforts that need to be carried out in order to minimize the impact of future natural disasters, to the impact of situating new communities and infrastructure in new locations, not to mention the disposal of debris and the procurement of the vast quantity of construction materials required for the reconstruction phase. While much useful data appears to be available (ex: the earlier coastal conservation study), little of it appears to have been used in devising new policies since the tsunami, which often appear to the local populations to be overly simplistic (ex: a 100 m or 200 m buffer zone) or subject to baffling exceptions when it comes to the application of such policies. The result has been either, in some cases, paralysis while local people wait for clarification of what these new policies actually are, or, in other cases, de facto rejection as individuals proceed with their own rebuilding. The lack of local consultation appears to be a major factor in creating this situation.

20. **Land.** The issue of land is connected, in one way or another, with most of the frustrations mentioned earlier and is perceived by many to be an issue of fundamental human rights. Given the disruption resulting from the 100/200 m buffer zone, where can families rebuild their homes? Will women have equal access to land and land titles? What will be the impact on the social fabric of communities who have lived together for generations? What will be the impact on their livelihoods? What are the socio-political consequences of obliging ethnic groups or castes to live together or in close proximity, when those groups have traditionally not mixed? What happens when local geographic realities (ex: lagoons) hugely complicate relocation plans? The consultations confirm that these are all questions to which there are

unlikely to be easy answers. But the consultations also confirm that, because of their inherent sensitivity, these questions need to be resolved with the input of those directly concerned, so that despite eventual outcomes that are unlikely to be wholly satisfactory for all stakeholders, there will at least be a sense of ownership of the result which will help avoid destabilization in the long-term.

21. **Human rights.** In the rush to respond to immediate relief needs and then the confusion over how best to respond to the longer-term rebuilding needs, little attention appears to have been devoted to the issue of how basic human rights impact on the planning and implementation of the reconstruction. These range from the right to be consulted about all issues affecting them, including any eventual relocation, to the right to express one's grievances to the appropriate authorities when one feels that one is not being justly treated. The right to security and the right to equal treatment are other examples of rights that, at best, have been unevenly applied. Included in this latter category are the rights of those who are especially vulnerable, such as women, children, the disabled and the elderly, to have appropriate access to the programs and services that are being offered. These deficiencies point to a need to ensure that local officials are sufficiently aware of the human rights implications of the programs or services they are administering, in order to ensure their even-handedness and effectiveness.

F. SECTOR VIEWS

22. **Housing.** Clearly, housing is intimately tied to the issue of land. Urgent efforts, integrating local perspectives, need to be invested in clarifying how the buffer zone rule will, in practice, be applied, including what this means regarding the options available to those who are resettling. One aspect of this is whether it is advisable for partially damaged but still habitable houses within the buffer zone (a large majority according to some estimates) to be razed and their owners forcibly relocated or whether the policy needs to be reviewed for social and economic reasons. There also needs to be clarification as to the mechanisms to be used to finance the construction of the new houses (or the repairs of the former ones). The district reports contain a number of suggestions as to how this can be done. Consultation with all categories of beneficiaries on both the design and location of the new houses is extremely important, as is the integration of new social infrastructure (schools, medical facilities) with the new communities.

23. **Education.** In some districts, there is confusion over the treatment of national versus provincial schools. The urgency of getting children who are now coping with temporary and often inadequate educational facilities into adequately equipped ones is growing. As with other types of needs, it will be important to ensure that all children, including girls and the disabled, have sufficient access to the new facilities. Available land is also a factor here, especially as most donors in this sector originally offered to reconstruct schools without considering the cost of installing them in new locations where electricity and water connections would be needed, as well as transportation access. Teams have also reported potential tensions between tsunami-affected communities who will receive a well-equipped school and nearby communities who function with poorly equipped facilities. The Ministry of Education is considering this disparity and how best to address it.

24. **Health.** The reconstruction issues in this sector are much the same as those in education: delegation of authority for rebuilding down to the appropriate levels, urgency of constructing or expanding existing facilities, identification of the required land and integration with the target communities, as well as the need for sensitivity in the support being offered to tsunami-affected communities versus those affected by conflict or simply by endemic poverty. To these points, one can add the heightened risk of HIV/AIDS infections associated with social and economic dislocations and therefore the need to plan awareness-raising activities for tsunami-affected communities, the need to ensure that reproductive health issues are adequately addressed in the recovery phase, the need to provide adequate rehabilitation facilities for the disabled, the need to revise health facility requirements in the light of current needs, as well as the need to set up a psychosocial counselling service that is accessible, respectful of cultural norms and operational in the shortest possible time.

25. **Livelihoods.** Along with housing, this sector has emerged as one of the most critical for a viable recovery and one of the most complex. District reports indicate that there is some danger in focusing too much on just a few critical sectors such as fishing and tourism, without considering the need to also regenerate the many secondary occupations that support these sectors. These secondary occupations are especially critical in that they often represent key areas of opportunity for women. Several have noted the need to situate the aid that is given within a wider strategic vision (ex: fishing methods versus the sustainable exploitation of marine resources) in order to ensure that the result is both economically and environmentally viable. There also seems to be some problems with the delivery mechanisms of some programs that are not inappropriate in themselves, such as low interest loans to entrepreneurs. The difficulty that has emerged is the lack of incentives for the delivery institutions to collaborate actively, beyond a very limited scale, given the costs that they are being asked to incur. Finally, as part of the general complaint that national policies are unclear in their scope and inequitable in their application, there is a need to clarify who is eligible for cash transfers or loans and what are the parameters of these programs. As was highlighted already, these programs also need to be carefully thought out and designed to ensure equitable access for all affected members of the population, including women and the disabled.

26. **Social protection.** As was noted in the previous section, vulnerable groups are in special need of attention to ensure that their basic rights are protected. These include children, the disabled and the elderly, as well as ethnic minorities in any area. According to the district teams, these needs are particularly acute in the temporary camps, where security, sanitation and access to counselling are priority concerns. Teams have thus highlighted the need to reinforce existing social welfare services to allow them to deal with the sudden increase in clients to serve.

27. **Transport.** Roads (and, in some areas, rail transport) are seen as key to an effective recovery, a fact reflected in the size of the budgets allocated to this sector. Although the transport sector was relatively little affected by the tsunami as such, the needs emerging in the post-tsunami period have highlighted the neglect and general lack of development that the transport network has suffered for many years. Although, because of its size and the number of levels of public authorities who are involved, it will be a complex sector to manage, transport appears to have been the source of few controversies at the local level for the moment. Nevertheless, how the new transport infrastructure will impact on the lives of key categories of the population, such as women, the disabled and children, is a question that needs to be asked in the course of planning and implementing transport recovery activities. One issue already

appearing on the horizon is whether the relevant departments will be accorded the resources required in the future to adequately maintain the roads that will be constructed.

28. **Power.** This sector is similar to transport in that the need is generally agreed by all parties and the level of need is more a result of years of neglect and non-development than of the tsunami itself. Nevertheless, the post-disaster period is seen as an opportune moment to overcome this neglect. However, even more so than in transport, there is a need to balance the power requirements of those families who were affected by the tsunami and those who were not, including conflict-affected victims. In addition, the need to have connections authorized by the appropriate authorities, in a context where building permits and land entitlements are still subjects of controversy, means that substantial delays are likely until sufficient policy clarification is provided.

29. **Water and sanitation.** Obviously, water and sanitation are closely connected with the issues that impact on housing and the environment. One of the more urgent facets of this sector is improving the conditions in the camps and locations where there will be transitional shelters. For the medium and longer-term reconstruction needs, the NWSDB appears to have a reasonable base from which to respond to these needs, although all teams concur that they will require more staff and equipment. Given the importance of water and sanitation to habitations and businesses, it will be key that these services are closely integrated with the planning of any resettlement and are a part of the same inclusive consultative processes being recommended in other sectors.

30. **Coastal protection.** The key issues here are closely linked to those summarized in the earlier section on the environment. The consensus from the district visits is that there is a need to better use previous studies in this field, to consult local populations, including women, as to their preferences and to give priority to natural protection methods such as mangroves and reefs rather than expensive man-made barriers. In this sector, a sense of local ownership and responsibility, beginning with an awareness of the options, is particularly important if the protection methods are to be sustainable. Finally, several teams noted the jurisdictional complexity of this sector. Multiple government departments, as well as the security forces and myriad community groups all have a stake in the coastal protection methods adopted. Coordination, consultation and devolution are thus vital to success in this sector.

31. **Loss compensation.** Compensation for human losses, i.e. deaths, appears to have been reasonably well carried out, although there are concerns in some localities that not all eligible families have benefited, due to lack of documentation or information. In the case of material losses to households or businesses, the teams have reported many unmet needs, given that insurance levels were often inadequate and documentation of losses poor. Some of these losses will nevertheless be compensated for by the provision of housing or through livelihood support. However, for both very poor families and the larger businesses, it appears that significant gaps will remain in assisting a return to normality, which will require further thinking among the concerned stakeholders.

32. **Governance capacity.** The problems and the opportunities in this sector were highlighted previously. To adequately exploit these opportunities, there is a need to clearly communicate to all concerned the relevant broad national policies, including operational procedures, with regards to the recovery, as well as to define the nature and level of responsibility of the various public authorities. The aim should be to devolve decision-making

responsibility to levels as close to the affected people as possible, including the Pradeshya Sabhas, with the intention of such devolution increasing both transparency and official accountability¹. Because of the number of actors involved in the recovery, the degree of coordination needs to be improved, a task that can only be done if better information management systems at all levels are put in place and maintained. Naturally, to manage these increased responsibilities, a careful program of capacity building support will need to be included as an integral part of the recovery effort, tailored to the needs of each area but probably including the strengthening of financial and human resource management, planning skills, monitoring approaches and community consultation/mobilization techniques.

33. The sheer size of the reconstruction effort will put enormous demands on the country's capacity to implement it, in terms of adequate supplies of materials, skilled labour and managerial expertise, not to mention the processing of imports and the monitoring of project activities. Thus, beyond the elaboration of policies and national standards, there is an urgent need for each sector to carry out detailed logistical planning to ensure that the capacity will be there to reach the identified objectives, not only within that particular sector but also with respect to other sectors that will also be making their demands on Sri Lanka's delivery capacity.

G. DISTRICT VIEWS

34. The following is a brief summary of the core recommendations emphasised in each of the district reports. For a fuller view of the context and specific recommendations, the reader is invited to consult the district reports that are attached to this Executive Summary.

35. Jaffna.

- Local solutions should be found to local problems, using local human resources, including the issue of shoreline setbacks.
- A District Planning Unit under the GA, composed of representatives of all major stakeholders, should be established to guide post-tsunami planning and implementation.
- A balance needs to be struck between support to conflict-affected and tsunami-affected families.
- Consultation and participation should be incorporated in the approaches used in the various sectors.
- Local financial institutions should redirect savings back to the community for development purposes.

36. Kilinochchi/Mullaitivu.

- The establishment of a joint mechanism is essential for more effective implementation of the recovery.
- Existing administrative structures should be used to direct the recovery work, rather than setting up new ones.
- Implementation modalities should be flexible, as long as there is transparency and national standards are adhered to.

¹ The individual district reports give more details on this type of devolution of responsibilities.

- An effective information and communication system is essential for involving communities in the recovery effort and for promoting accountability.
- Building trust in the course of implementing the tsunami recovery can open opportunities for restarting the peace process.

37. **Trincomalee.**

- Local authorities need to be empowered to take maximum responsibility for the recovery work, despite the lack of local elected bodies.
- Cooperation and coordination among all aid actors, with an effective coordination mechanism, is essential for an effective recovery effort; the UN could play a more important role in this sense.
- Equitable treatment between conflict-affected and tsunami-affected people is essential to avoid frustration and anger.
- Information management needs to be strengthened so that key actors know what the others are doing.

38. **Batticaloa.**

- Beneficiary communities, for example via Village Rehabilitation Committees, need to systematically consulted about recovery planning and implementation; it is important that these VRCs be inclusive of all sections of the community.
- More financial and administrative autonomy should be given to district administrators within a national framework; their capacity to take on these responsibilities should be reinforced at the same time.
- The GA's office should take charge of district coordination, with representation from TAFREN.
- Public information techniques such as a newsletter and public hearings should be further explored.
- Cross cutting issues such as gender, environment and disability should be integrated in all recovery activities.

39. **Ampara.**

- An information transmission system should be set up to allow both more effective communication of government policies to the local population and feedback to the Government from the people.
- Affected people should have the opportunity to be consulted and to participate in recovery implementation; this may require providing them with training in certain skills.
- Recovery activities need an effective monitoring mechanism; this could be done through a district committee composed of representatives of all major stakeholders.
- Existing management structures should be used to manage recovery activities, to save time.
- Land acquisition for relocated houses and infrastructure needs to be made a priority.

40. **Hambantota.**

- “Cash for work” programs should be expanded beyond immediate needs; other livelihood support should include skills training and be better coordinated.
- Provision of fishing boats needs to be more transparent and better coordinated to ensure the industry remains viable.
- Criteria for the allocation of houses need to be urgently clarified; prospective beneficiaries should be consulted on the design and location of their houses.
- Water and sanitation projects need to be expanded to include neighbouring communities and should beneficiaries of new housing should be consulted regarding water and sanitation provision.
- Camp security and hygiene needs to be reinforced.
- Donors should work closely with “Helping Hambantota” and share information on activities among themselves and with the Government.

41. **Matara.**

- The Government needs to clarify policy and improve communications with the district; transparency at the local level should be improved.
- Beneficiaries need to be more involved in the housing construction process, from planning to implementation; innovative examples of participative housing provision elsewhere in Sri Lanka need to be assessed for lessons learned.
- Innovative options to public sector provision of services, such as cash grants, should be explored.
- Psychosocial counselling needs to be expanded and made more effective.
- Gender disaggregated data needs to be collected and analysed.
- A more nuanced approach to shoreline setbacks should be considered; natural coastal protection measures are preferred.

42. **Galle.**

- A systematic coordination mechanism at district level needs to be established.
- An effective information strategy that aims to both inform the population and channel feedback to the Government should be set up.
- Island-wide criteria for identifying beneficiaries of post-tsunami support programs would ensure proper targeting, minimise political influence and improve transparency.
- Communities should be involved in selecting beneficiaries and in choosing and implementing environmental protection measures.
- Ministries and departments should receive appropriate budget allocations immediately to allow them to fulfil their increased responsibilities; they should also explore redeploying staff according to the post-tsunami needs.

43. **Kalutara/Colombo/Gampaha.**

- Community consultation and participation is an essential part of an effective recovery effort; this will require capacity building for local authorities and NGOs.

- An implementation mechanism involving a “cascade” of coordinating bodies from the national to the district to the divisional to the community level should be put in place, using the Guiding Principles as a point of reference.
- Innovation should be encouraged to use alternative technologies and look beyond stereotypes, in order to use approaches that are more inclusive and more environmentally friendly.
- Capacity building, adapted to the locality and the organisation, is a key element in making subsidiarity work; it should be budgeted for.