



# Validation Report

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Reference Number: PCV: TAJ 2009-01  
Project Number: 32514  
Loan Number: 1819(SF)  
December 2009

## Republic of Tajikistan: Road Rehabilitation Project

Independent Evaluation Department  
**Asian Development Bank**

## ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	-	Asian Development Bank
ADF	-	Asian Development Fund
EIRR	-	economic internal rate of return
IED	-	Independent Evaluation department
km	-	kilometer
OCR	-	ordinary capital resources
OFID	-	OPEC Fund for International Development
OPEC	-	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCR	-	project completion report
RRP	-	report and recommendation of the President
TA	-	technical assistance

## NOTE

In this report “\$” refers to US dollars.

## Key Words

tajikistan, transportation, lessons, asian development bank, independent evaluation department, performance evaluation

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## PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT VALIDATION

A. Basic Project Data		PCR Validation Date:	December 2009	
Project and Loan Number:	32514 Loan 1819-TAJ(SF)		Approved	Actual
<b>Project Name:</b>	Road Rehabilitation Project	<b>Total Project Costs (\$M):</b>	26.80	27.52
<b>Country:</b>	Republic of Tajikistan	<b>Loan/Grant (\$M):</b>	20.00	20.98
		(SDR M)	15.63	14.45
<b>Sector:</b>	Transport/Roads & Highways	<b>Total Cofinancing (\$M):</b>	4.00	3.90
<b>ADB Financing (\$M):</b>	<b>ADF:</b> 20.00	<b>Borrower (\$M):</b>	2.80	2.64
	<b>OCR:</b> 0.00	<b>Beneficiaries (\$M):</b>		
<b>Cofinanciers:</b>	OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)	<b>Others (\$M):</b>		
		OFID-financed	4.00	3.90
<b>Approval Date:</b>	20 Dec 2000	<b>Effectiveness Date:</b>	27 May 2001	7 Aug 2001
<b>Signing Date:</b>	26 Feb 2001	<b>Closing Date:</b>	31 Mar 2005	21 Mar 2007
<b>Project Officers:</b>	<b>Name:</b>	<b>Location: (HQ or RM)</b>	<b>From (yr)</b>	<b>To (yr)</b>
	J. Miller	HQ	2000	2001
	K. Saari	HQ	2002	2004
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### B. Project Description (summarized from the report and recommendation of the President)

- (i) **Rationale.** The breakup of the former Soviet Union, civil conflict, and major natural disasters have resulted in a dramatic decline in economic activity and increase in poverty in Tajikistan. The poverty incidence at appraisal was estimated at 91% in the project area and 83% in Tajikistan overall. Rehabilitation of the country's road infrastructure was considered necessary to sustain the ongoing economic recovery and reduce poverty. Roads are the most important mode of domestic freight and passenger transport, and maintenance of a good road network is vital for agriculture, which accounts for 65% of total employment in Tajikistan. Roads allow access to markets for the sale of produce and provide access to sources of agricultural inputs, and provide the rural population with access to economic opportunities and social services.

The project road links Tajikistan's third and fourth largest cities (Khulyab and Kurgan-Tyube) with Dushanbe, the capital and largest city. The existing railway line in the Khatlon region does not link the project area to Dushanbe. Large sections of the 250 kilometer (km) Dushanbe-Khulyab road were last rehabilitated in the early 1970s and have deteriorated due to inadequate maintenance, making rehabilitation necessary to extend the road's useful life. Although improvement of rural roads was a distinct project component, the report and recommendation of the President (RRP) did not provide a justification in the project rationale. At the time of project preparation, rural roads were often routinely included to provide increased benefits to rural populations in addition to benefits from main road improvements.

- (ii) **Objectives or Expected Outcomes.** The main objective of the Project was to enhance incomes and reduce poverty in the Khatlon region by improving road transport infrastructure and thereby support the creation of productive employment opportunities. The Project was to (a) increase incomes by reducing transport costs on the Dushanbe-Khulyab road; (b) provide agricultural and industrial enterprises with improved all-weather access to markets; (c) improve access of the rural poor to social services, markets, and other economic opportunities; and (d) strengthen the Government's institutional capacity for efficient management of the national road network.

- (iii) **Components and/or outputs:** Project components included (a) rehabilitation of approximately 80 km of the most deteriorated sections of the Dushanbe–Khulyab road, and in particular, repair and strengthening of embankments, bridges, protection structures, drainage facilities, and pavement; (b) improvement of approximately 150 km of rural roads, including grading dirt road surfaces, building appropriate drainage facilities, and surfacing some important sections with gravel; (c) procurement of appropriate equipment for road maintenance, laboratory and field material testing, technical surveys, and design computerization; (d) consulting services for construction supervision, contract management, and training needs assessment; and (e) training in contract management, pavement management systems, and other areas critical for maintaining the rehabilitated road sections.

Advisory technical assistance (TA) for institutional and policy support to the road subsector, including development of a road maintenance strategy and associated procedures, was approved coincident with the Project.<sup>1</sup>

### C. Evaluation of Design and Implementation (PCR assessment and validation)

- (i) **Relevance of design and formulation.** The Project was considered highly relevant to the Government's development strategy and to the Asian Development Bank's (ADB's) lending strategy for the country and its strategic objectives at the time of approval. The project road is one of the main international corridors connecting Dushanbe with the big cities of Khatlon region, further to Gorno–Badakshan and providing the outlet through Murgab–Kulma to the People's Republic of China and Karakorum highway. The Project covered separate sections of the Dushanbe–Kulyab road, which required urgent repair and rehabilitation. Its design was consistent with ADB's approach for several first time ADB road projects in other countries that combines physical infrastructure investments with capacity development of road institutions. The outcomes have proven the close relevance of the Project to ADB's country strategy and the Government's development objectives, as well as the need to rehabilitate and extend the length of road to be improved. During formulation, there was an implicit assumption that there would be no significant delay between preparation of tender documents and commencement of civil works. Such delays cause the designs to become outdated, necessitating redesign or significant contract variations, as happened in this case. The rural roads were not identified at the formulation stage, but the criteria for their selection were stated.
- (ii) **Project outputs (or conditions in the case of program loans).** The outputs expected at appraisal and those achieved at completion are shown in Table 1. The project completion report (PCR) adequately explains the details.

**Table 1: Outputs Expected and Achieved**

Component		Expected Amount	Unit Cost	Actual Amount	Unit Cost
Main road system	80 km rehabilitated	\$16.60 M	\$207,500 per km	103.9 km rehabilitated	\$20.96 M
Rural roads	150 km rehabilitated	\$1.00 M	\$6,667 per km	90.7 km rehabilitated	\$0.98 M
Equipment	Numerous items listed	\$2.00 M	—	All equipment procured	\$2.12 M
Consulting services	International: 75.0 PM National: 825 PM	\$2.00 M	\$2,222 per PM	International: 106.8 PM National: 254.5 PM	\$2.84 M
Capacity building (training)	International: 24 PM	\$0.20 M	\$8,333 per PM	International: 25 PM	\$0.20 M

— = not available, km = kilometer, M = million, PM = person-month.

Source: Asian Development Bank. 2008. *Project Completion Report: Road Rehabilitation Project*. Manila.

<sup>1</sup> ADB. 2000. *Technical Assistance to Republic of Tajikistan for Institutional and Policy Support in Road Sector*. Manila (TA 6302-TAJ, for \$500,000, approved on 20 December).

Appraisal was completed in 1999/2000, but the Project was implemented in 2003–2005, requiring an update of the design and revision of priorities. As a result, the length of the main road system (Dushanbe–Kurgan–Trube–Dangara–Kulyab) was increased to 103.9 km, because seven additional sections of the main road were found to have deteriorated substantially between appraisal and implementation.<sup>2</sup> The rehabilitated roads were reported to be of good quality, with surface roughness within the international roughness index for a comfortable ride. The drainage and systems and safety facilities were built and installed as designed.

During implementation, the allocated cost of \$1 million at appraisal (from government funds) was found to be inadequate to fully cover the appraisal target. A total of 90.7 km of rural roads were rehabilitated, well below the appraisal target of 150 km. These were reported to be of fair quality. Equipment was procured without any apparent difficulty. International consulting services were increased due to the enlarged scope of rehabilitation works (i.e., extension in consulting services for construction supervision and additional project management costs). The PCR states that the need for local consulting services was overestimated at appraisal. Capacity building was accomplished, and the trainees are disseminating the required knowledge.

The main outputs of the attached advisory TA were recommendations in three broad areas: (a) policy initiatives, (b) sector and institutional studies, and (c) institutional strengthening and capacity building (footnote 1). The TA consultants reviewed and commented on various aspects of the Government's transport policy. These include cost recovery mechanism, budget allocation, commercialization of transport operations, sector development planning, feasibility study guidelines, and human resources development.

- (iii) **Project cost, disbursements, borrower contribution, and conformance to schedule (as relevant to project performance).** The PCR covers these aspects in adequate detail. The cost of civil works for the main road system was higher than expected at appraisal due to its enlarged scope. (Table 1) The higher cost of the rural road component was due to unit costs per km of around 60% above appraisal estimates. Due to higher international consultant inputs, the cost of consulting services also increased.

There was a small change in the pattern of financing from ADB, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Fund for International Development, and the Government. (Table 2).

The share of ADB of financing increased from 74.6% at appraisal to 76.2% at completion. The actual loan amount was \$20.98 million as compared to \$20 million at loan approval. The difference was created by the appreciation of the special drawing rights (SDR).<sup>3</sup> The contributions of OFID and the Borrower were about the same as expected at appraisal. Direct payment procedures were used for all payments, including those for civil works, equipment, and consulting services. Disbursements followed a normal pattern for works of this type and were completed in 2007 rather than in 2004, as expected at appraisal.

**Table 2: Financing Plan (\$ million)**

Item	Appraisal (A)	% of Cost	Actual (B)	% of Cost	Ratio (B/A)
ADB	20.0	74.60	20.98	76.20	1.049
Government	2.80	10.50	2.64	9.60	0.943
OFID	4.0	14.90	3.90	14.20	0.975
Total	26.80	100.00	27.52	100.00	1.027

ADB = Asian Development Bank, OFID = OPEC Fund for International Development.

Source: Asian Development Bank. 2008. *Project Completion Report: Road Rehabilitation Project*. Manila.

<sup>2</sup> The main difference between appraisal and implementation were: (i) 88.6 km of roads were rehabilitated instead of 80 km planned at appraisal; (ii) seven additional sections of the main road totaling 15.3 km in length were rehabilitated; and (iii) longest bridge (along the main road) was widened to 12 meters instead of 7 meters planned at appraisal.

<sup>3</sup> ADB financing was reduced from SDR15.65 million at approval to SDR14.45 million at completion.

The start of implementation was delayed by about 11 months (Table 3). The rehabilitation of the main road was completed in November 2005 (about 14 months late than projected at appraisal), excluding the added sections (completed in November 2006). The rural road component was also completed about 14 months late than projected at appraisal. The loan closing date was extended three times from 31 March 2005 to 21 March 2007 to accommodate changes to the project scope. The first extension reflected procurement delays. The second and third extensions were to (a) allow completion of outstanding civil works and facilitate outstanding payments on contracts, and (b) additional road rehabilitation contracts.

**Table 3: Project Schedule**

<b>Item</b>	<b>Appraisal</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>Delay (months)</b>	<b>Reasons for Delay</b>
Recruitment and mobilization of consultants	May 2001	Mar 2002	10	Delay in declaring loan effective from May 2001 to August 2001, delay accrued at various steps of the procurement process, and absence of advance procurement action
Civil works contract award	Oct 2001	Dec 2002	14	Delay in start of bidding of main works due to late recruitment of consultants
Completion of main road/ rural roads rehabilitation	Sep 2004/ Apr 2003	Nov 2005/ Jun 2005	14	4.5 month extension in the construction period of the main civil works contract

Source: Asian Development Bank. 2008. *Project Completion Report: Road Rehabilitation Project*. Manila.

- (iv) **Implementation arrangements, conditions and covenants, related technical assistance, and procurement and consultant performance.** These subjects are well covered in the PCR. Implementation arrangements were appropriate and aided by retention of an individual consultant to help the executing agency with the initial stages of the project, prior to the selection and fielding of the supervision consultant.

The PCR states that the Government generally complied with most of the loan covenants. The most serious instance of noncompliance has been the failure to apply the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) criterion for the selection of rural roads. The criteria for rural road selection were identified in Appendix 6 of the RRP, but the PCR does not confirm whether these criteria were applied during the selection process; more importantly, there is no evidence to confirm that the EIRR was above benchmark levels for the rural roads component.

A separate TA completion report was prepared for the TA provided in conjunction with the loan (footnote 1). The advisory TA was rated successful. It accomplished all of its scope providing recommendations for addressing the policy and institutional constraints, introducing modern planning tools and providing training for Ministry of Transport and Communication (MOTC) staffs in various facets of modern transport planning and management. During implementation, international training was taken out of the TA scope and of work and replaced with (a) introduction of the Highway Development and Management Model, and (b) assistance to MOTC in developing community-based maintenance of rural roads and training for local communities. The procurement process followed ADB's *Procurement Guidelines* and other procedures acceptable to ADB. The consultant performance was assessed to be satisfactory.

- (v) **Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency.** Performance of the Borrower and the executing agency was rated satisfactory by the PCR. This validator agrees, considering this was the first project of such magnitude undertaken by the executing agency and implementation was relatively smooth. Detracting from this was slow payment processing and the Government's need to pay interest on late payments.
- (vi) **Performance of the Asian Development Bank.** The PCR rated ADB's performance satisfactory. The PCR provides little information to justify this rating but given the relatively smooth implementation once the Project got under way, the rating is validated. The Project did suffer from frequent changes to ADB staff assigned to the Project, resulting in a lack of supervisory continuity on the part of ADB; this situation is common among ADB-funded projects in the Central Asian republics.

#### D. Evaluation of Performance (PCR assessment and validation)

- (i) **Relevance.** The Project was rated “highly relevant” by the PCR, both at approval and at completion. It reflected the Government’s development priorities and ADB’s lending strategy for the country. The Project was designed as a time slice of critical rehabilitation works on the 250-km Dushanbe–Khulyab road and initially involved 80 km of the most deteriorated sections of the road. A major time lapse between project preparation/appraisal (1999/2000) and implementation (2002–2005) further enlarged the scope of ADB assistance. This revision reflected changing needs on the ground and the availability of funds, whether through shortfalls or through savings in different funding categories. While a “highly relevant” rating is appropriately argued by the PCR, a couple of factors detract from giving this full rating at this time. First, this validator notes that project formulation and subsequent country programs did not obtain financing or commitment to rehabilitate the remaining sections of the Dushanbe–Khulyab road. To date, the Project Implementation Unit in Ministry of Transport confirmed that there are no ideas for financing of rehabilitation of these sections. The continuing deterioration of unrehabilitated sections will adversely affect the efficiency and sustainability of the entire road.<sup>4</sup> Second, the ADB loan covenant on feeder roads was inconsistent with appraisal targets. The selection criteria allowed roads with rehabilitation costs of up to \$10,000 per km. This was 1.5 times higher than the appraisal budget. In summary, although the project remains highly relevant from the point of the country’s needs, these issues related to the project design have reduced the relevance of the Project. Overall, the Project is rated “relevant.”
- (ii) **Effectiveness in achieving outcome.** The Project achieved most of its designated objectives and contributed to a significant improvement in transport conditions in the southwest of Tajikistan. (Table 4) Overall, this validator agrees with the PCR rating of “effective.”

**Table 4: Achievement of Project Outcomes**

Project Component	Expected Outcomes	Achievements	Assessment
1. Main road System	<p>(i) Reduce transport costs on the Dushanbe–Khulyab road</p> <p>(ii) Provide agricultural and industrial enterprises with all-weather access to markets in the region, the rest of the country, and abroad</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Average car speed of about 80 km per hour on the rehabilitated sections, compared with 50 km per hour on un-rehabilitated sections.</li> <li>• Transport expenses reduced from 7.8% to 5.8% of product price.</li> <li>• Product transportation losses to farmers have been reduced from 5% to 4%.</li> <li>• More farmers and businesses have gained access to markets.</li> <li>• Freight traffic volume has increased by about 30% per year (2001 to 2006)</li> <li>• Total traffic increased by 25% in 2006.</li> <li>• Private car ownership up by 36% in 2006 and an average of 10.8% from 2001 to 2006. Private vehicles in project area increased to 88% of the total traffic.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Effective.</b> The Project rehabilitated about 89 km of the main road or 10.75% above the appraisal target. Additional sections totaling 15.3 km were also rehabilitated because these have deteriorated substantially during the long gap between appraisal and implementation. The enlarged scope resulted in an increase in international consultant service inputs. All planned equipment procurement was done.</p> <p>Despite the clear positive outcomes, more than half of the project road has not been rehabilitated at completion. Between 2000 and 2008, the remaining sections not included in the project significantly deteriorated hence require urgent rehabilitation in some sections.</p>
2. Rural roads	3. Give the rural poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to health and education</li> </ul>	<b>Less effective.</b> Rural roads rehabilitated totaled 90.7 km or only

<sup>4</sup> The sections of the Dushanbe–Khulyab road not covered by Loan 1819 were not included in any of the subsequent ADB road projects. The unrehabilitated sections of the road are in poor conditions and require rehabilitation. Some sections are severely deteriorated and need urgent action. As confirmed by PIU, there are no ideas for financing of rehabilitation of these sections at the moment.

Project Component	Expected Outcomes	Achievements	Assessment
	better access to social services markets and other economic activities	<p>bus and taxi services along the project road and rural roads.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stimulated small business development along the project road and in project area (i.e., increased by about 20% in 2006).</li> <li>More women are encouraged to engage in entrepreneurial activities by the availability of safer travel.</li> </ul>	60.5% of appraisal target. The reason is higher per km investment cost of selected rural roads. The actual per km cost was \$10,800 (for 90.7 km) compared with the appraisal budget of \$6,700 (for 150 km).
3. Capacity building	Strengthen institutional capacity for efficient road subsector management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Government has improved its institutional capacity to manage transport projects and to operate and maintain roads efficiently.</li> </ul>	<b>Effective.</b> Capacity-building programs and training, both international (for 25 person-months) and in-country, were provided under the Project. The attached advisory TA supported training for MOTC staff and local communities in the use of the HDM model in road maintenance management. Self-evaluation found the TA to be "successful." The PIU gained substantial experience in managing investment transport projects.

Source: Asian Development Bank. 2008. *Project Completion Report: Road Rehabilitation Project*. Manila.

(iii) **Efficiency in achieving outcome and outputs.** While the PCR does not rate the project, the Project may be assessed "highly efficient" at completion based on its economic reevaluation. This is borne out by the 18% annual increase in traffic volume from 2001 and 2006, reflecting the increased efficiency of road travel, the privatization of transport and transport services, and pent up demand. The recalculated EIRR for the completed Project was 21.5%, compared with 15.9% estimated at appraisal. This is despite a reduction of industrial and agricultural production in the project area as reflected in a reduction in large bus and truck traffic. The latter trend is not explained in the PCR.<sup>5</sup>

The EIRR calculation assumes that maintenance costs will be met and that the surface will remain relatively smooth. However, as mentioned in the assessment of sustainability (Section C [iv]), maintenance will not be adequate and the recalculated EIRR should, in fact, be lower owing to possible road deterioration and the resulting inefficiencies. The sensitivity test conducted by the PCR showed that a 50% increase in maintenance costs would decrease the EIRR to 18.8%. The PCR's Appendix 11 states that the economic analyses does not take into account the poor condition of the rehabilitated road sections due to lack of maintenance. Taking into account the uncertainty surrounding the maintenance of the project road sections and the insufficient data provided in the PCR, a high rating for efficiency cannot be substantiated. Moreover, the implementation efficiency of the Project was found lacking in several instances especially in start-up delays. With an implementation delay of 14 months, it would be difficult to rate the Project highly efficient. In view of this, the Project is rated "efficient."

(iv) **Preliminary assessment of sustainability.** The PCR rated project sustainability "less likely" to meet the needs of socioeconomic and traffic development in the area. Although the area is expected to develop rapidly, a lack of funds, staff, and equipment will result in poor maintenance and rapid deterioration of the rehabilitated road sections and the rural roads. Additionally, sections of connecting

<sup>5</sup> During interdepartmental review, the concerned regional department helped clarify the seeming contradiction regarding traffic and growth, although a more thorough understanding may require more study. Total freight traffic (in terms of both tons and ton-km) was reported to have substantially increased in Khatlon Oblast, but this mainly involved small vehicle traffic. The decline in state-owned industry and agriculture resulted in large trucks not being well maintained and operated. At the same time, private vehicles increased sharply to take over the freight transportation market.

roads have deteriorated and their continued deterioration will lead to less efficient traffic movements. Accordingly, this validator agrees with the PCR rating. The concern expressed in the PCR about the deterioration of the connecting roads could have been strengthened through a brief analysis of other road rehabilitation and/or improvement projects either under way or scheduled for Tajikistan. The Project is rated "less likely to be sustainable."

- (v) **Impact (both intended and unintended).** Environmental, sociocultural, and other impacts appear to have been well monitored under this Project. The goals of the Project were largely met. No significant adverse environmental impacts were noted upon review, as the rehabilitated road sections were within the right-of-way of the existing road. There was no resettlement or land acquisition. No issues relating to indigenous peoples were encountered during implementation. The socioeconomic impact of the rehabilitated main road and the rural roads was said to be significant, as measured by income, and access to public and private services and markets. The Project contributed to economic development of the project impact area by generating more employment opportunities during and after project implementation. At completion, it had encouraged growth of road side businesses. The PCR rated the project impact as "positive." However, this is not in line with the IED guidelines for project ratings. The PVR rates the project impact as "significant" in line with the IED evaluation guidelines.<sup>6</sup>

#### E. Overall Assessment, Lessons, and Recommendations (validation of PCR assessment)

- (i) **Overall assessment.** Preparation of the PCR was made considerably easier and more credible due to a comprehensive benefit monitoring mechanism incorporated and carried out as part of the project design. The Project met its goals and most of its outputs (total outputs were not achieved due to budgetary constraints). These, combined with the quantitative assessment of its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, result in the Project being rated "successful."
- (ii) **Lessons.** This validator concurs with lessons identified by the PCR:
- (a) This was the first project of its type in Tajikistan. The executing agency was not familiar with ADB procedures and policies. When projects are new to a sector, ADB should exert extra effort to ensure that the startup and implementation will be carried out smoothly.
  - (b) Frequent changes of ADB project officers negatively affect project performance, and efforts should be made by ADB to minimize such changes.
  - (c) Delay in implementation from the time of project identification and appraisal often results in significant changes at the start of construction and during implementation. Means should be sought to minimize the impact of changes in design and civil works contracts.

This validation exercise also identified additional lessons for consideration in future ADB operations:

- (a) To have a good road for 250 km, arrangements for parallel or cofinancing should have been explored at the start. In the absence of other financing source, this could have been part of a rolling program to ensure the entire road length was brought to a sustainable and trafficable standard. Without doing this, a piecemeal intervention provides no assurance that the situation could improve significantly in the longer term.
  - (b) Where appropriate, candidate project roads (in this case feeder roads) should be identified at the time of appraisal to strengthen the accuracy of budget estimation.
- (iii) **Recommendations.** The PCR makes several recommendations that are both project-related and general in nature. The recommendations are considered comprehensive and appropriate. In addition, the validation recommends the following. The Project involved rehabilitation of a section of the Dushanbe–Khulyab road. The PCR makes no mention of other efforts to improve this main road, which potentially reduces the effectiveness of the project road. In a letter to ADB, The Government has requested inclusion in the ADB program of the unrehabilitated sections of Dushanbe–Kurgan–Tyube–Dangara–Khulyab road. ADB should assess the condition of the entire corridor and engage in a dialogue with the Government on ensuring optimum quality of the road infrastructure. This Project

<sup>6</sup> ADB. 2006. *Guidelines for Preparing Performance Evaluation Reports for Public Sector Operations*. Manila.

is a classic case where assistance should have been provided under a sector program approach linked to an integrated road plan that ensured fiscal and institutional sustainability of both investments and maintenance. The validation report emphasized the need for integrated planning. Fiscal and macroeconomic impact analysis should be mandatory for large project like these in smaller countries.

#### **F. Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation, and Utilization** (PCR assessment and validation)

The project design and validation was strengthened significantly by a well-formulated monitoring component. Data collection appears to have been adequate and the data used appropriately.

#### **G. Other** (e.g. Safeguards, including governance and anticorruption; Fiduciary aspects; Government assessment of the Project, as applicable) (PCR assessment and Validation)

According to the PCR, safeguards were implemented efficiently, and good construction practices were followed. Governance and fiduciary aspects could be improved. Delayed payments to the contractor resulted in higher interest costs for the Government, which could have been avoided.

<b>H. Ratings</b>	<b>PCR</b>	<b>IED Review</b>	<b>Reason for Disagreement/Comments</b>
Relevance:	Highly relevant	Relevant	Project design was found lacking in several instances (Section D[i]).
Effectiveness in Achieving Outcome:	Effective	Effective	
Efficiency in Achieving Outcome and Outputs:	Highly efficient	Efficient	Taking into account the uncertainty surrounding the maintenance of the project road sections and the insufficient data provided in the PCR, a higher rating for efficiency cannot be substantiated (Section D[iii]).
Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability:	Less likely	Less likely	
Borrower and EA:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Performance of ADB:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Impact:	Positive	Significant	See Section D[v].
Overall Assessment:	Successful	Successful	
Quality of PCR:		Satisfactory	

#### **I. Comments on PCR Quality**

The PCR was well prepared and comprehensive. Para. 48 of the PCR states that industry and agriculture in the project area has declined. However, according to Appendix 2 and para. 46, freight transport and agriculture have increased at a high rate. This apparent conflict should be clarified (footnote 5). It would be helpful if the PCR analyses provided details on road standards. Finally, the PCR has used an outdated model of the design and monitoring framework in its Appendix 1. Future PCRs from the Tajikistan Resident Mission need to use the current model.

#### **J. Recommendation for Independent Evaluation Department Follow-Up**

The Project can be evaluated as part of IED country assistance program evaluation process.

#### **K. Data Sources for Validation**

The validation report has relied primarily on the PCR; RRP; loan documents; back-to-office reports of the supervision missions and the PCR review; and IED evaluations of previous projects, including PCR validations.

**REGIONAL DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT  
VALIDATION REPORT**

On 19 May 2009, Director, IED2, Independent Evaluation Department, received the following comments from the Tajikistan Resident Mission, Central and West Asia Department.

TJRM has reviewed the draft and does not have any comments to offer.