



Validation Report

Reference Number: PCV: UZB 2008-56
Project Number: 33137
Loan Number: 1737
November 2008

Uzbekistan: Senior Secondary Education Project

Operations Evaluation Department
Asian Development Bank

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	–	Asian Development Bank
CSSE	–	Center for Senior Secondary Education
EA	–	executing agency
EMIS	–	education management information system
IDSSE	–	Institute for Development of Senior Secondary Education
M&E	–	monitoring and evaluation
MOHSSE	–	Ministry of Higher and Senior Secondary Education
NPPT	–	National Program for Personnel Training
PCR	–	project completion report
PIU	–	project implementation unit
SDR	–	special drawing rights
TA	–	technical assistance

NOTE

In this report, "\$" refers to US dollars.

Key Words

center for senior secondary education, education management information system, instructional materials development, model secondary high schools, monitoring and evaluation, national program for personnel training, senior secondary education, teacher training

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OED PCR Validation Form

A. Basic Project Data		PCR Validation Date:	October 2008	
Project Number:	33137			
Loan Number:	1737		Approved	Actual
Project Name:	Senior Secondary Education Project	Total Project Costs (\$M):	132.3	116.5
Country:	Uzbekistan	Loan (\$M): (SDR equivalent)	57.0	37.3
Sector(s):	Education	Total Cofinancing (\$M):		
ADB Financing (\$M):	ADF:	Borrower (\$M):	75.3	79.2
	OCR: 57.0	Beneficiaries (\$M):		
Cofinancers:		Others (\$M):		
Approval Date:	8 February 2000	Effectiveness Date:	27 June 2000	1 February 2001
Signing Date:	29 March 2000	Closing Date:	30 June 2005	23 November 2007
Project Officers:	Name: I. Matsumoto E. Izawa W. Kubitzki	Location: Headquarters	From February 2001	To November 2007
Evaluator:	E. Breckner, Consultant	Director:	R. B. Adhikari, OED1	
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ADB = Asian Development Bank, ADF = Asian Development Fund, OCR = ordinary capital resources, PCR = project completion report, SDR = special drawing rights, UZB = Uzbekistan.

B. Project Description (summarized from Report and Recommendation of the President)

- (i) **Rationale.** To advance its economic and social transition, Uzbekistan needs a labor force with new skills and knowledge. The Government aims to establish an education system capable of imparting skills and knowledge in a market-oriented economy through the National Program for Personnel Training (NPPT). As private education is not yet developed, public education must remain strong until private alternatives are developed. The Senior Secondary Education Project (the Project) was designed to establish longer-term support to the education sector.
- (ii) **Impact.** The Project aimed to provide necessary skills for a market-oriented economy.
- (iii) **Expected outcomes.** The Project envisaged establishment of a broad-based senior secondary education system, with balanced general and vocational education that supports a transition toward a market-based economy.
- (iv) **Components and/or outputs.** The Project had four components: (a) establishment of 45 model secondary schools; (b) capacity development of school directors and teachers; (c) creation of instructional materials; and (d) subsector planning, management, and policy development.

C. Evaluation of Design and Implementation (project completion report [PCR] assessment and validation)

- (i) **Relevance of design and formulation.** The PCR considered the Project *highly relevant* because it was consistent with the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) country operational strategy at that time and with the Government's education reform program, including the NPPT goal of introducing a compulsory 12-year education system by 2009. The Project addressed the Government's key priorities in the transition of the education system by (a) formulating and piloting new senior secondary education curriculum at 45 model secondary schools; (b) developing effective management and teaching staff; (c) developing the domestic capacity to produce teaching materials; and (d) fostering cost-effective planning, management, and policy development for senior secondary education. The PCR considered the project design to fit with the Government's plans and reform program. Project inputs, activities, and implementation arrangements were also clearly identified.

The Evaluator considers the Project *relevant*, because the Project did not have any special design features that stand out.

- (ii) **Project outputs.** The PCR noted that almost all project outputs were limited to development of the 45 model secondary schools, and the results were not applied to the entire senior secondary education system as was envisaged at appraisal. The PCR reported the outputs achieved under the following components:
- (a) **Establishment of 45 model secondary high schools.** The Project successfully rehabilitated schools and provided educational equipment. However, it experienced significant delays in rehabilitation and construction of model secondary schools because it failed to coordinate civil works and equipment installation and to update technical specifications and bidding documents. Additional government funds were secured to finish all rehabilitation activities and to meet installation needs.
- (b) **Capacity development of school directors and teachers.** The Project helped to develop a teacher in-service training master plan and teacher training courses. However, achievements in improving the teaching and learning environments were limited to the 45 model secondary schools, and training was not scaled up as originally planned due to low ownership of the Center for Senior Secondary Education (CSSE), the Executing Agency (EA). Despite this, the Project positively impacted the in-service training system through policy dialogue and discussions at seminars and workshops financed by the Project. In February 2006, the Government adopted a decree on introducing an improved system of pre- and in-service teacher training. Training activities were implemented by the Institute for Development of Senior Secondary Education (IDSSE), but the Project did not provide assistance to IDSSE's organizational development as was intended at appraisal.
- (c) **Creation of instructional materials.** Two hundred writers and potential writers were trained in 120 general and 80 specialized subjects during a series of central and regional workshops. The Authors' Resource Center was set up in CSSE with international and local teaching and learning materials, including computers with transliteration software. A writers' guide for both general and specialized subjects was developed for publication and distribution. After a competition for 56 special subject manuscripts was held, 19 were tendered under international shopping. The new textbooks for general subjects were not developed under the Project, but CSSE published them using state budget funds. While these textbooks are near international design standards, they require significant improvement in terms of pedagogy. No rights purchases were made under the Project as initially anticipated at appraisal. Competitive bidding for textbooks was introduced on a pilot basis under the Project, and positive learning was reflected in a government decree on textbook procurement. In addition, a textbook management system for the CSSE Textbook Department was specified and installed, which the PCR Mission noted is no longer operating. Moreover, two study visits by six domestic specialists in textbook and curriculum development were completed. The Uzbek language rights for a computer title were purchased. The Government adopted the decree Program of Textbook Publishing for 2005–2009, which stipulates procedures for competitive selection of authors, transparent financing, and publication and printing of textbooks and other learning materials.

(d) **Subsector planning, management, and policy development.** Sixteen CSSE staff members participated in management training provided by the Project. However, senior secondary education policy makers have not been addressed. Ten research topics were identified under the Project during a national conference. Teams comprised of member government institutions and independent domestic experts completed research activities in November 2004. Reports were submitted to CSSE with recommendations discussed during a conference in January 2005. The Project contributed to the existing education management information system (EMIS) by providing information related to tracer studies and labor market surveys. A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was established, but the Department of M&E, which carried out all related activities under this component, was formally abolished by a government decree in July 2004 as the Government did not recognize its value.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's assessment of partial achievement of the Project's outputs given above.

(iii) **Project cost, disbursements, borrower contribution, and conformance to schedule.** The loan was approved on 8 February 2000 and became effective on 1 February 2001. The PCR noted that the delay in loan effectiveness was caused by delay in the recruitment of consultants, which was a condition for effectiveness. The Project was to be implemented over 5 years, with the expected closing date of 30 June 2005. The actual closing date—23 November 2007—was more than 2 years later because the initial 1-year consultant recruitment delay caused subsequent project implementation delays. The loan closing date was first extended to 30 June 2006 to allow CSSE to complete the delivery and installation of equipment and disbursements of outstanding contracts. However, progress was slow due to lengthy procedures to conclude contracts and required contract registration with the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, Investments and Trade. This led CSSE to request the second extension of the loan closing date to 31 December 2006. Outstanding contracts were settled by CSSE until 23 November 2007.

At appraisal, the total project cost (including taxes and duties, and interest during construction) was estimated at \$132.3 million, with a \$57.0 million ADB loan from its ordinary capital resources. The Government committed to financing about \$75.3 million equivalent in local currency, which was 57% of the estimated total cost. The actual project cost was \$116.5 million, 12% lower than the appraisal estimate. The Government actually contributed \$79.2 million in local currency, 68% of the actual total cost. Disbursements totaled \$37.3 million equivalent, 35% lower than the appraisal estimate. Disbursements during the first 3 years were low, mainly because of the late recruitment of project consultants and delay in equipment procurement. As a result of misprocurement, \$3.9 million of available funds under the equipment component were canceled followed by the cancellation of the second loan of \$14.0 million. The final unutilized loan balance of \$1.8 million was canceled on 23 November 2007. Initially, the Project was provided with an imprest account ceiling of \$50,000; this was increased to \$100,000 on 12 May 2003. The increase provided an opportunity for CSSE, the Implementing Agency, to meet the high turnover demand. In October 2003, the Project adopted the statement of expenditure procedure with a ceiling of \$15,000. The imprest account was used efficiently and properly replenished, and the statement of expenditure procedure was implemented with adequate supporting documents throughout project implementation. The Government could not fulfill some of its commitments (e.g., to finance staff development and costs associated with equipping 45 model senior high schools). The Government limited its contribution to financing civil works and operating costs of the project implementation unit (PIU).

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's assessment and notes that although the Government funded a large portion of the project cost, some commitments by the Government were not fulfilled.

(iv) **Implementation arrangements, conditions and covenants, related technical assistance, and procurement and consultant performance.**

(a) **Implementation arrangements.** The PCR notes that implementation arrangements were in line with those envisaged at appraisal. The head of CSSE was appointed as the project director. The

Government appointed a full-time project manager to oversee daily project implementation activities and agreed to finance PIU staff salaries. Policy coordination and guidance for the secondary schools was assumed by an interministerial project steering committee, headed by the minister of finance and comprising representatives of the Ministry of Higher and Senior Secondary Education (MOHSSE), the Cabinet of Ministers, CSSE, the Ministry of Economy, two state-owned commercial banks, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the PIU. Although the committee was established in March 2000 through a government decree, it never formally met and did not operate during the project years.

A January 2003 review mission noted the Project's inadequate implementation arrangements. In particular, the working arrangements—the Project shared its PIU with a Japan Bank for International Corporation project—and the PIU's remuneration scale failed to attract qualified staff. The mission and the Government subsequently reorganized the PIU and introduced standard systems of recruitment and remuneration scales. The PIU became independent from other in-country projects, and six new positions were introduced. Although the new PIU became operational with new staff (except for the accountant), it still encountered performance issues and high turnover due to low salaries and delays in salary payment. The PCR concluded that the PIU's low efficiency throughout project implementation contributed to the low project performance and achievement of objectives.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR assessment and observes that the PIU's low efficiency was also affected by the Government's lack of ownership and commitment.

- (b) **Conditions and covenants.** The PCR stated that all major loan covenants were complied with, except (1) the EA did not make any arrangements for project facilities' insurance; (2) the project steering committee did not operate; (3) the CSSE Department of M&E was abolished in July 2004; and (4) the technical education certification system was never implemented. These noncompliances adversely affected the project performance. For example, although the Project did not face significant risks at project sites, insurance was crucial for maintaining the operational sustainability of the senior secondary education system. When the Department of M&E was eliminated, activities for EMIS development and installation were canceled, including the M&E functions to assess senior secondary education outcomes and impacts. Moreover, although the technical education certification system was vital for the senior secondary education system in providing an opportunity to improve the marketability of graduates and the quality of vocational services, it was not introduced.

In addition, some loan covenants were only partly complied with, including maintaining an operational project steering committee and monitoring and reporting requirements. CSSE, with the assistance of international consultants, reviewed the selected senior secondary education curriculum; however, achievements and lessons from the Project were limited to the 45 model secondary schools. New equipment procured under the Project was not sufficiently integrated into the curriculum. With regard to the Government's obligation to revise strategies for teacher recruitment, retention, and training in the senior secondary education system, the Government partially complied with the covenant related to teacher training and incentives, although a teacher recruitment strategy was never developed during the Project. The covenant related to international study visits and fellowships was partially complied with. Only 73% of those who received the training continued working in the senior secondary education system; 34 of the 263 selected for training had not been previously employed in the system nor had a direct relationship with it.

The Evaluator considers the PCR assessment mentioned above to be a fair and comprehensive evaluation of compliance with covenants.

- (c) **Technical assistance.** The PCR reported that a technical assistance (TA) project, the Interim Review of Senior Secondary Education, contributed to (1) identifying implementation bottlenecks at the initial stages of NPPT, (2) recognizing management structure problems and the necessity

of decentralizing education administration and budget allocations from CSSE to regional governments, (3) establishing an initial M&E function in CSSE and assessing its training needs, (4) providing a basic model for EMIS, and (5) preparing recommendations for policy dialogue and discussion. The TA project's recommendations were generally appropriate, and it provided the Project with statistical data on education and related indicators for planning and organizing project activities. Although the TA project was designed to address MOHSSE's needs, the TA consultants established a solid framework for ensuring strong EA ownership of outcomes, as noted in the TA completion report. A midterm review of NPPT was based on the TA analysis and resulted in adoption of a new decree allowing colleges to adjust the NPPT implementation arrangements and schedules to local needs. The TA project was rated *successful*.

The Evaluator appreciates the PCR's detailed description of the TA project's performance. However, since it produced mostly outputs but not outcomes (e.g., CSSE had very limited involvement with the TA project and consequently did not fully accept its outputs), it should be rated *less successful*.

- (d) **Procurement and consultant performance.** According to the PCR, consulting services were provided for all four project components. Selection and engagement of the consulting firm and individual consultants were carried out in accordance with ADB's *Guidelines on the Use of Consultants*. At the initial stage, ADB rejected the first-ranked firm due to inadequate technical qualifications of individual consultants. The second-ranked firm was selected after a long delay in concluding the contract. The amount of the consulting services contracts exceeded the budget allocated at appraisal. A total of 563 person-months of consulting services, comprising 256 person-months of international and 307 person-months of domestic consulting, were utilized compared with the 426 person-months total planned at appraisal. An additional two short-term international consultants (2 person-months), both specialists in strategic development, were recruited to assist the PIU in implementing the fourth component. Moreover, a group of domestic consultants (procurement, project finance, education and strategic development experts) for a total of 85 person-months were engaged to assist their international counterparts. This arrangement was not envisaged at appraisal.

Procurement under the project loan was generally carried out in accordance with the appraisal plan and ADB's *Guidelines for Procurement*. The Project had to undertake four international competitive bidding and five international shopping packages. The following procedures performed by the Government were not in accordance with ADB's *Guidelines for Procurement*: (1) contract registration and price verification after contract awards; and (2) postcontract price negotiations with suppliers. In January 2006, ADB declared misprocurement for two contracts after the EA's failure to honor the lowest evaluated substantially responsive bid in accordance with the ADB guidelines. The EA canceled three signed contracts (one international competitive bidding and two international shopping).

The Evaluator appreciates the PCR's frank and fair assessment on the above, particularly with respect to the Government's misprocurement.

- (v) **Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency.** The PCR indicated that inefficient borrower's approval procedures and inadequate interagency coordination resulted in substantial delays in preparing bidding documents, evaluating bids, and awarding and signing contracts. The Project was the EA's first investment project and is considered complex because of its structure and implementation procedures. The EA need extensive training on ADB procedures, particularly procurement, financial management, and contract law. However, with the problems of extensive delays, misprocurement, and inability to fulfill some important loan covenants and commitments as assessed in earlier sections, the Borrower's and EA's performance was rated as *partly satisfactory*.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's *partly satisfactory* rating of the Borrower's and EA's performance.

- (vi) **Performance of the Asian Development Bank.** The PCR rated ADB's performance *satisfactory*. During project implementation, ADB fielded 12 review missions, including inception, midterm review, special loan administration, and special project administration missions. The focus of ADB supervision was on implementation progress, identification and resolution of problems, and general project management issues. Toward the Project's end, field supervision encountered a 12-month gap due to completion of project activities. During this period, more intensive support was provided by telephone and e-mail. The assistance provided by ADB missions and the Uzbekistan Resident Mission, especially in resolving the procurement issues, preparation for the project completion review mission, and resolution of implementation issues, contributed significantly to project implementation. ADB maintained a cordial working relationship with the EA.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's *satisfactory* rating of ADB's performance.

D. Evaluation of Performance (PCR assessment and Validation)

- (i) **Relevance.** The PCR rated the Project *highly relevant* because its objectives were consistent with the education sector's most urgent priorities to implement the NPPT and with ADB's assistance strategy for Uzbekistan. The PCR Mission's independent survey revealed that the Project positively impacted the effective management of model secondary schools and development of a flexible curriculum to reflect local conditions. It also improved the quality of teacher training, which positively affected the quality of learning in classrooms via interactive teaching methods. Model secondary schools noted the significance of receiving adequate equipment and learning materials under the Project. They was also a moderate impact on trustee boards' activities and improvement of employment rates through labor market research and marketing.

The Evaluator rates the Project *relevant*, because while the Project was consistent with national and ADB goals and priorities, it did not have any special elements that made it stand out. It was not well conceived since it assumed that the Government would have sufficient capacity to expand the 45 model secondary schools throughout the whole secondary school education system.

- (ii) **Effectiveness in achieving outcomes.** The purpose of the Project was to implement and refine the new senior secondary school education curriculum to maintain relevance in Uzbekistan's new economic and social context. However, the Project's outcomes were only partially achieved (e.g., teacher development, students' retention rates and completion rates, and employability of graduates) and limited to the 45 model secondary schools only. The EMIS and M&E components were not completed and were vital in addressing policy decisions based on reliable data. CSSE made its decisions based on unreliable data. Thus, the PCR rated the Project *less effective*.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's *less effective* rating.

- (iii) **Efficiency in achieving outcomes and outputs.** The PCR rated the Project *less efficient* in attaining its intended outputs and outcomes in a cost-effective manner. The PCR Mission's survey revealed that only 70% of teachers used modern teaching techniques. Modern equipment provided under the Project was not used fully, and training was not applied to the entire secondary school system.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's *less efficient* rating. While no internal rate of return was calculated, the Evaluator notes that for nearly the same cost as was planned for a revamp of the whole sector, only 45 model secondary schools benefited from the Project. Moreover, in day-to-day project management, several deficiencies were seen, including two cases of misprocurement and significant delays in consultant recruitment.

- (iv) **Preliminary assessment of sustainability.** The PCR rated the Project *to be less likely sustainable* for the following reasons: (a) no provision was made for recovering costs to maintain and repair equipment provided by the Project, and it is unlikely that an increased budget will be available from the Ministry of Finance; (b) achievements and lessons to strengthen teaching methods were limited to the model secondary schools and have not yet been incorporated into the entire secondary school system;

(c) although demand for project services and available products is adequate and effective, the current education financing system cannot provide adequate long-term support; and (d) the Government's commitment focuses on capital investments (e.g., civil works and procurement of equipment) to sustain passage of the 12-year education system by 2009, while less attention is given to the adequate training of teachers, education financing reforms, improvement of secondary school education efficiency, and other factors that could substantially improve the quality of senior special and vocational education.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's *less likely* sustainable rating.

- (v) **Impacts.** The PCR noted that the Project supported implementation of compulsory secondary school education and promoted equitable provision of secondary school education for males and from low-income families, remote rural areas, and various language groups. All 45 model secondary schools had a fair balance of students in terms of gender, language of origin, and some mechanisms to support students from low-income families. However, the PCR also noted that the Project has not had a significant impact on the secondary school education system in Uzbekistan. It failed to develop strategies to make a substantial reform of the sector—including efficiency, quality standards, education financing, aid coordination, and partnership with the private sector. The Project had limited impacts on higher education acceptance rates and on overall graduates' employment rates, including that of females graduating from the model secondary schools. Therefore, the overall impacts of the Project were rated *modest*.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's *modest* rating of the impacts.

E. Overall Assessment, Lessons, and Recommendations (Validation of PCR assessment)

- (i) **Overall assessment.** The PCR's overall project rating was *partly successful* (highly relevant, less effective, less efficient, and less likely sustainable). The PCR considered that the Project was well conceived and comprehensive in its approach but was not implemented in a completely successful manner. The outcomes were limited to the model secondary schools, with substantial delays and unpromising financial prospects.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's overall project rating as *partly successful* but did not think that the Project was highly relevant. The Project was designed for the Government to expand the secondary school model to the entire secondary school education system. But since the Government failed to do so, it demonstrated the Government's lack of ownership and commitment and that the Project was not so well conceived to take into account constraints facing the Government.

- (ii) **Lessons.** The PCR identified the following lessons from the Project:
- (a) Project monitoring efforts should include means to ensure that new equipment is fully integrated in lessons, qualified teachers are available to conduct lessons as planned, and sufficient consumables and supporting tools are in place.
 - (b) ADB should have been more proactive in working with the Government to fully comply with the loan agreement. In particular, while ADB took corrective actions in several cases, its actions should have been more immediate to ensure adherence to ADB procedures over local laws and regulations relating to procurement of goods and consulting services.
 - (c) ADB should have been more effective in enforcing the loan covenants on M&E, teacher education certification system, and the project steering committee. Those covenants were crucial for successful project implementation from the broader development perspective and better management of project implementation.
 - (d) An M&E system to collect and maintain data and to monitor and analyze quantitative and qualitative indicators should be built into project design.

The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's lessons.

(iii) **Recommendations.** The PCR provided the following recommendations:

- (a) Future projects should build on the Project's lessons and provide a more focused M&E framework to guide project implementation and evaluation of activities. Specifically, they should include actions to ensure proper utilization of equipment and integration of equipment use in the curriculum. Future projects should strengthen the relationship with the private sector, ensure relevant actions to increase links to the labor market, and provide demand-driven skills training.
- (b) Although the Project helped revise the secondary school education curriculum, more work is needed to integrate curriculum development and teacher training. The Project was only partially successful in doing so and did not develop proper indicators to evaluate the impact of in-country and international training.
- (c) CSSE should restore M&E of the secondary school education system, prepare indicators for monitoring the qualitative impact on learning and teaching effectiveness, and update them regularly with agreed intermediate and process benchmarks. These indicators should be used for evaluating effectiveness of the current and new secondary school education reforms.
- (d) CSSE should review the experience of the textbook revolving fund system established for the basic education subsector and introduce such a system for secondary schools. ADB may provide additional TA to design and implement such a system.
- (e) To support the Government's institutionalization of competitive bidding for education materials, ADB should provide periodic training to members of various procurement committees.

While the Evaluator agrees with the PCR's recommendations mentioned above, the PCR should be more specific on how to transfer these recommendations into follow-up actions, particularly recommendations (b)–(d).

F. M&E Design, Implementation, and Utilization (PCR assessment and Validation)

- (i) **M&E design.** The project design included a project framework with performance indicators and a monitoring mechanism; the monitoring activities were supposed to be undertaken by the CSSE's M&E Department.
- (ii) **Implementation.** An M&E system was established, but the CSSE's Department of M&E, which carried out all related activities under this component, was formally abolished by a Government decree in July 2004.
- (iii) **Utilization.** Since the Department of M&E was abolished, it was not possible to use data it had gathered as a basis for assessment. The PCR Mission thus undertook its own sample study as the basis for making its evaluation.

As per the PCR, the Evaluator notes that the Project's M&E design, implementation, and utilization were weak due mainly to lack of government ownership and commitment. According to the PCR, CSSE staff members realized the value of a functioning M&E system only after the Project was completed, during the PCR preparation phase.

G. Others (e.g., safeguards, including governance and anticorruption; fiduciary aspects; government assessment of the Project, as applicable) (PCR assessment and Validation)

The PCR noted that the Project had no adverse impacts on the environment and no resettlement issues since no land acquisition took place. However, there was a governance problem related to misprocurement in two cases as mentioned in Sections C (iii) and (iv). Due to this misprocurement, \$3.9 million of available funds under the equipment component were canceled.

The Evaluator posits that the problem of misprocurement was not fully detailed by the PCR in terms of what happened and why, as well as implications for future projects.

H. Ratings	PCR	OED Review	Reasons for Disagreements/Comments
Relevance:	Highly Relevant	Relevant	The Project did not contain any special elements to warrant a <i>highly relevant</i> rating. In addition, the Project was designed for the Government to expand the secondary school model throughout the entire secondary school education system. But since the Government failed to do so, it demonstrated the Government's lack of ownership and commitment and that the Project was not so well conceived to take into account constraints facing the Government.
Effectiveness in Achieving Outcomes:	Less Effective	Less Effective	Agreed.
Efficiency in Achieving Outcomes and Outputs:	Less Efficient	Less Efficient	Agreed.
Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability:	Less Likely	Less Likely	Agreed.
Borrower and EA:	Partly Satisfactory	Partly Satisfactory	Agreed.
Performance of ADB:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Agreed.
Impacts:	Modest	Modest	Agreed.
Overall Assessment:	Partly Successful	Partly Successful	Agreed.
Quality of PCR:		Satisfactory	See below.

I. Comments on PCR Quality

The PCR is *satisfactory*. It clearly and frankly describes the history of the Project and salient events and issues that occurred in line with guideline requirements. Although discussions in some sections were repetitive, the eventual ratings were generally well-founded. The PCR should address the problem of misprocurement more fully in terms of what happened and why, as well as implications for future projects.

J. Recommendation for OED Follow Up

The Central and West Asia Regional Department should make the PCR's recommendations (b)–(d) as follow-up actions with CSSE. It should also take into account the lessons identified if further activities are being considered in the secondary school education system.

K. Data Sources for Validation

The data sources for this validation exercise include the Project's Report and Recommendation from the President, PCR, back-to-office reports from loan review missions, aide-mémoire from the Midterm Review Mission, and the associated TA report and completion report.

REGIONAL DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT VALIDATION REPORT

On 10 October 2008, the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) circulated the draft Project Completion Validation Report for interdepartmental comments. OED received comments from the Uzbekistan Resident Mission on 10 October 2008. The Resident Mission, also speaking on behalf of the Central and West Asia Department, supports the assessment that was provided in the report.