



Technical Assistance

TAR: PAK 38576

**Technical Assistance to the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
for Implementing Public Safety
Reforms in Four Districts of the
Province of Punjab
(Financed by the Poverty
Reduction Cooperation Fund)**

December 2004

Asian Development Bank

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(as of 3 December 2004)

Currency Unit	–	Pakistan rupee/s (PRe/PRs)
PRe1.00	=	\$0.0168
\$1.00	=	PRs59.58

ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	–	Asian Development Bank
AJP	–	Access to Justice Program
CPLC	–	citizen police liaison committee
DCJCC	–	district criminal justice coordination committee
DFID	–	Department for International Development
DPO	–	district police officer
DPSC	–	district public safety commission
GRAP	–	gender reform action plan
LGO	–	Local Government Ordinance
MOU	–	memoranda of understanding
P&DD	–	Planning and Development Department
PPG	–	Punjab provincial government
PMU	–	program management unit
PO 2002	–	Police Order 2002
PRSP	–	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC	–	public safety commission
SHO	–	station house officer
TA	–	technical assistance

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CLASSIFICATION

Targeting Classification	–	General intervention
Sector	–	Law, economic management, and public policy
Thematic	–	Governance, inclusive social development, and gender and development

NOTE

In this report, "\$" refers to US dollars.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved the Access to Justice Program (AJP) loans, and advisory technical assistance (TA) in December 2001.¹ The AJP is supporting five interrelated governance objectives: (i) providing a legal basis for judicial, policy, and administrative reforms; (ii) improving the efficiency, timeliness, and effectiveness of judicial and police services; (iii) supporting greater equity and accessibility in justice services for the vulnerable poor; (iv) improving predictability and consistency between fiscal and human resource allocation and the mandates of reformed judicial and police institutions at the federal, provincial, and local government levels; and (v) ensuring greater transparency and accountability in the performance of the judiciary, police, and administrative justice institutions.

2. This TA² was prepared by a team drawn from the Government, the AJP Program Management Unit (PMU), ADB, and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID). They supported a 2-week mission in May 2004 by a police reform expert to facilitate a final round of technical consultations with a range of district institutions and individuals including district mayors, district coordination officers, district public safety commission (PSC) members, citizen police liaison committee (CPLC) members, senior provincial police officers, National Police Academy, and National Police Bureau officers and representatives of the United States Department of Justice and DFID.³ The mission also received Government's concurrence with the goals, purpose, scope and implementation arrangements, cost, financing arrangements and the terms of reference. The TA framework is in Appendix 1, and a risk analysis and mitigation strategy in Appendix 2.

II. ISSUES

3. Vulnerability, justice, and entitlements are closely linked. Vulnerability is a function of insecurity of access to key sets of material, social, political, and environmental assets. Justice is a function of the relationship between institutions responsible for delivering entitlements (public goods, rights, and services) predictably, affordably, and accountably; and the ability of citizens to secure and sustain their access to key sets of assets. In this context, the efforts to limit the vulnerability of the poor to the vagaries of systems of administrative, political, civil, and criminal justice are at least as important as macroeconomic performance in poverty reduction.

4. The majority of poor people recognize that the state has responsibilities to provide effective and equitable public goods and services. In particular, the poor often perceive their interactions with public safety agencies as increasing their vulnerability to erosion of household, political, civil, natural resource, and social assets. Globally, the impact of a brutal police force and a corrupt judiciary is identified by the poor far more often than is attended to in official accounts of indicators and causes of poverty focusing, for instance, on access to health or education.⁴ These intermediating public safety and security institutions, particularly at the local

¹ ADB. 2001. *Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on Proposed Loans to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the Access to Justice Program*. Manila (Loans 1897/98/99-PAK, for \$350 million, approved on 20 December 2001); and ADB. 2001. *Technical Assistance to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for Supporting and Monitoring Progress under the Access to Justice Program*. Manila (TA 3823-PAK, approved in December 2001 for \$0.9 million with additional financing of \$0.44 million from the Government of Netherlands in August 2003).

² The TA is in the 2004 Country Program and first appeared in *ADB Business Opportunities* (internet edition) on 21 October 2004

³ DFID. 2004. *Technical Review Report*. Islamabad (available on request).

⁴ This refers to global experience, as comparative research is only beginning in Pakistan. For instance, under a National Reconstruction Bureau district survey of service providers, respondents consistently rate police lowest.

level, are demoralizing for the poor, who already feel defenseless and unable to exert pressure for improved performance.

5. **Rule of Law and Poverty.** A large body of research suggests that weak property rights amplify poverty. But the rule of law underpins more than property and contractual rights. In a society with up to 35% of the population assumed to be living in poverty and in effect unable to access their entitlements through the administrative, judicial, or political systems, this inability to secure property and contract manifests in and exacerbates lawlessness. Ironically, while the just and effective application of laws governing people's access to basic entitlements is highlighted in poor people's accounts of poverty, analysis of and support to institutions responsible for delivery of this primary public good has been greatly underplayed in externally supported government poverty reduction efforts.⁵ It is now acknowledged that unaccountable police forces weaken social cohesion, and greatly increase poor people's vulnerability in terms of access to public services, economic livelihoods, and security. The disintegration of institutional checks and balances on police action can lead to human rights abuse and exploitation. For instance, the cost of informal charges made by the police on the public is on average PRs30,000–35,000 per episode.⁶ The extreme form of injustice affecting the poor is police harassment and extortion. Patronage can be solicited, but this often forces the poor to sell their assets, thus pushing them further into poverty. Since its creation under the Police Act of 1861, the predominant function of the police has been simply to control.

6. **Declining Professionalism and Lack of Public Oversight.** Weak incentive and sanction systems and political interference have over time eroded the capacity of public safety agencies. Politicization has undermined police professionalism and weakened their capacity to serve the rule of law. An alliance between the local political elite, district administration, and former magistracy (under the control of the executive) has eroded protection under constitutional and other legal rights. Recruitment based on political patronage or corruption has led to a grave loss of public confidence in the police; and made people, especially the poor, vulnerable to threats, intimidation, and abuse by those in power. Weak social cohesion, declining confidence in police, and inadequate police accountability severely undermine social regulation and public safety in Pakistan.

7. **Slow Implementation of Reforms.** Supported by the AJP, Police Order 2002 (PO 2002) is the most thorough reform achieved since the 1861 Police Act. The PO provides for setting up (i) federal, provincial, and district PSCs to increase public oversight and police accountability; (ii) district criminal justice coordination committees (DCJCCs); and (iii) separation of watch and ward from investigation, and creation of an independent prosecution service. The responsibilities of the district PSCs, with mandatory 33% representation of women, include approving the police plan, setting performance standards, and holding the district police chief accountable for performance against the plan. The pace of reforms since 2002 has been slow, largely due to inadequate capacity and uncertainty surrounding the durability of the police reforms. Further, implementation of new institutions created under the PO 2002 and the local government ordinances (LGOs) 2001 concerned with access to justice has also been slow due to strong resistance from the police and provincial elites. Nevertheless, substantial progress has been achieved in establishing the district PSCs, which now are functioning in 90% of districts of the country. At this critical stage, the Government has expressed the need to learn lessons from intensive work in selected districts to assist in scaling up, with AJP support, across the country.

⁵ The initiatives and recommendations under the AJP are incorporated in the current Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which is perhaps the first official recognition of the links between policing and poverty.

⁶ National Reconstruction Bureau. 2001. Community Monitoring of Public Services and Human Rights. Islamabad. Survey of over 10,000 respondents.

Technical support to police departments and provincial governments constitutionally mandated to provide public safety and security is required to deepen the ongoing reform process.

8. The federal and provincial cabinets have approved gender reform action plans (GRAPs)⁷ to implement the Government's commitments on gender equality. GRAPs include a package of legislative, political, administrative, and fiscal reforms. Reforms approved under the Punjab GRAP will be strengthened by creating linkages with ongoing police reforms. Special areas of focus will be developing capacity of the female members of district PSCs, incorporating gender concerns in policing plans, and advancing gender responsiveness in the police stations.

III. THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

A. Purpose and Output

9. The TA goal is to improve access to justice and public safety through better policing for poor and vulnerable people, especially women, children, and minorities in Punjab. The purpose is to support PO 2002 implementation in four pilot districts of Punjab province, and develop a safer and more secure environment based on respect for human rights and equitable access to justice through policing that is more responsive to the needs of the poor and vulnerable.

B. Methodology and Key Activities

10. The TA has five outputs across three components.

1. Effective Community-Based Policing (Component 1)

11. **Output 1.** Quality investigations are undertaken in a timely and professional manner to facilitate effective prosecution and adjudication of cases. This output involves the following activities in four districts in Punjab province: (i) formulating and implementing pilot district strategies (3 years), and annual work plan and budget for the effective separation of watch and ward⁸ and investigation; (ii) formulating and implementing pilot district human resource development plans and budget ensuring sufficient personnel trained in PO 2002, investigation training, training needs analysis, curriculum design and development, senior investigating officer training (including the management of investigations), watch and ward, community policing, human rights, gender, and local and special laws; (iii) strengthening district police inspectorate systems, including formulation and implementation of performance management measures; (iv) establishing a performance-based system of rewards and promotions, including amendment of the annual confidential report/performance evaluation report system;⁹ (v) implementing a public awareness campaign about PO 2002, including revised police systems and procedures, and public grievance redress procedures, and activities on prevention of crimes affecting women and vulnerable groups; (vi) developing basic forensic awareness training, including crime scene preservation, using modular competency-based packages that can be delivered to police in model stations; and (vii) establishing, resourcing, and supporting police forensic offices in pilot districts to provide basic forensic services.

12. **Output 2.** Community policing programs are implemented in selected stations in pilot districts, and include (i) formulating and implementing strategies for increased citizen

⁷ GRAPs are action plans approved by the governments to implement Pakistan's national and international commitments to gender equity. At present GRAPs do not focus on judicial and police reforms but provide for provincial strategies to address issues of gender justice to ensure flexibility.

⁸ Watch and ward refers to the preventive and law enforcement functions of the police.

⁹ During the Inception Mission, ADB and the Government will specify the precise nature of direct incentives for well-performing police officers.

participation in the delivery of police services to ensure vulnerable sections enjoy equality of access to quality police services and protection; (ii) formulating and implementing community policing plans and consolidation in district policing plans; (iii) establishing mechanisms to ensure regular consultation with civil society organizations concerned with the rights of the poor, women, and vulnerable groups; (iv) developing the awareness of members of institutions created under the PO 2002 and LGOs 2001 of community policing principles; (v) building the capacity of female police in at least one model station in each pilot district; and (vi) developing standard operating procedures for the model police station.

2. Effective Public Oversight Bodies (Component 2)

13. **Output 3.** Public oversight bodies are functioning effectively in pilot districts. This output focuses on two key bodies, the district PSC and the DCJCC, and includes (i) establishing an adequately resourced and trained district PSC in each pilot district with agreed rules of business and operating procedures, including performance monitoring and information systems; (ii) building the capacity of the pilot district PSCs to facilitate a participatory process including civil society for the preparation of strategic (3-year) and annual policing plans, (iii) building the capacity of the DCJCCs to facilitate a participatory process including civil society for the preparation of strategic (3-year) and annual local justice policy, (iv) formulating operating procedures among the DCJCC member institutions, and (v) training DCJCC members on PO 2002.

14. **Output 4.** PO 2002 (district PSCs, DCJCCs) and LGO 2001 institutions (Insaaf committees, Musalihat Anjuman, union council safety committees, citizen community boards) are functionally integrated in pilot districts. This includes (i) formulating and implementing strategies, procedures, and rules to enable effective and efficient engagement between the district police officer and the district nazim on law and order issues; (ii) reviewing and recommending measures to strengthen the regulation of police services through PO 2002 and LGOs 2001, including procedures for common reporting standards; (iii) formulating and implementing strategies, procedures, and rules for the efficient and effective enforcement of municipal and administrative laws; (iv) formulating and implementing an integrated district information system on crime and police services; and (v) strengthening the capacity of members of the PO and LGO citizen oversight institutions to effectively engage with the police in pilot districts.

3. Effective Policy Dialogue (Component 3)

15. **Output 5.** Lessons from the pilot project contribute to policy dialogue on national and provincial police reforms. This includes (i) formulating and implementing a project performance monitoring and evaluation system; (ii) commissioning baseline and ongoing research in pilot districts and police stations; (iii) formulating and implementing national public access to information policy and public awareness campaign on the PO and reformed police systems and procedures; (iv) analyzing and documenting police engagement with the PO and LGO institutions and the criminal justice system; (v) holding workshops to review pilot lessons with policymakers in the justice sector; (vi) devising a roll-out program for the remainder of the Punjab; (vii) developing a manual of guidance for implementing police reform in other provinces; (viii) commissioning research, analyzing, and proposing revisions to Police Rules 1934; (ix) establishing a mechanism for sharing lessons learned to all districts in Punjab; and (x) establishing mechanisms to depoliticize the police to bring about a professional and non-partisan police force in the province.

C. Cost and Financing

16. The TA is estimated to cost \$1,190,000 million equivalent, comprising foreign exchange cost of \$68,000 and local currency cost of \$1,122,000 equivalent. The TA will be financed on a grant basis by the Poverty Reduction Cooperation Fund, endorsed at a peer review meeting held in Manila in June 2004. ADB will administer the \$950,000 of TA funds, while the Government of Pakistan will contribute \$240,000 equivalent for office accommodation and counterpart staff support. Appendix 3 summarizes the cost estimates.

D. Implementation Arrangements

17. The Planning and Development Department (P&DD), Government of the Punjab will be the Executing Agency for the TA under the existing AJP implementation arrangements. The Punjab Police Department, Home Department, and National Police Bureau will be the implementing agencies. The AJP PMU will support the TA activities ensuring coordination with ongoing AJP program activities. P&DD will liaise closely with the director general, National Police Bureau. The TA coordinator engaged under this TA will be responsible for overall day-to-day supervision in consultation with the AJP TA team leader. Quarterly TA review meetings, chaired by the chair P&DD/chair AJP provincial steering committee, will include consultants engaged under the TA and ADB, to review TA implementation progress, address issues that may arise, and guide the consultants. The performance of consultants will be subject to evaluation through the AJP annual performance review processes.

18. TA implementation is designed on the following principles: (i) appointment of four superintendents of police as focal persons in each TA district and agreement with the Punjab Police Department to ensure that the focal persons will not be transferred from the district for at least 12 months; (ii) provision of necessary office, logistics, and personnel support in the AJP PMU and the TA district offices; and (iii) assurance that the required information and data is available to support TA implementation and promote public access to information about all relevant aspects of TA implementation.

19. The TA is scheduled to be implemented in 36 months, from December 2004 to December 2007. A team of 8 domestic consultants will provide 270 person-months of domestic consulting services to P&DD and the implementing agencies. An international consultant (3 person-months) will provide periodic peer reviews and guidance to the domestic consultants. ADB will engage the consultants on an individual basis in accordance with its *Guidelines on the Use of Consultants* and other arrangements satisfactory to ADB for engaging domestic consultants. Outline terms of reference are in Appendix 4. The consultants recruited under the TA will report to the TA coordinator who will be responsible for their performance. Modifications to the scope, terms, and activities of consultants will be agreed jointly by the TA coordinator, AJP PMU, and ADB.

IV. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

20. The President, acting under the authority delegated by the Board, has approved ADB administering technical assistance not exceeding the equivalent of \$950,000 to the Government of Pakistan to be financed on a grant basis by the Poverty Reduction Cooperation Fund for Implementing Public Safety Reforms in Four Districts of the Province of Punjab, and hereby reports this action to the Board.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK

Design Summary	Performance Indicators/Targets	Monitoring Mechanisms	Assumptions & Risks
<p>Goal: Improve access to justice and personal safety through replication of successful aspects of the pilot ensuring better policing for poor and vulnerable people, especially women, children, and minorities in Punjab</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • By fiscal year 2007/08, government expenditure on governance (law and order) is 0.92% of total gross domestic product • Increased conviction rates, including for those crimes that impact on the poor, women, and excluded groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper budgetary expenditure on governance (law and order) 2002–2008 • Subordinate and high court records 	
<p>Purpose: Support implementation of Police Order 2002 (PO) in selected pilot districts of Punjab, and develop a safer and more secure environment based on respect for human rights and equitable access to justice through police reform that is more responsive to the needs of poor and vulnerable people.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Police-citizen ratio reduced • Number of complaints recorded with district public safety commission (PSC) from women and vulnerable groups and record of action taken 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitor baseline and ongoing research in pilot districts and model police stations • District PSC records 	<p>Risks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Punjab government budget resources are not provided in a sufficient, timely, or predictable fashion • Low pay and poor conditions of service for the lower ranks not addressed by government
<p>Output 1. High quality investigations are undertaken in a timely and professional manner to facilitate effective prosecution and adjudication of cases.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investigations are methodical, rule-based, and have integrity • Investigation section staffed in accordance with agreed staffing formula • Increased detection rates in investigations • Number/type of questions raised by prosecution of evidence presented by police • Number/type of cases where interim challan not put to court concerned within 17 days • % forensics evidence not accepted in court • Police Rules 1934 revised in light of PO 2002 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Court records • Crime recording statistics • District criminal justice coordination committee (DCJCC) and citizen police liaison committee (CPLC) records • Comparative analysis of investigation, and prosecution files • Human rights and other civil society monitoring reports 	<p>Risk</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in reported crime creates political tension
<p>Activities 1.1 Formulate and implement pilot districts strategy (3 years) and annual work plan and budget for the effective separation of watch and ward and investigation.</p>			

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Design Summary	Performance Indicators/Targets	Monitoring Mechanisms	Assumptions and Risks
<p>Activities 1.2 Formulate and implement pilot district human resource development plans and budget ensuring sufficient personnel trained in (a) PO 2002; (b) investigation training: training needs analysis; curriculum design and development; senior investigating officer training—including the management of investigations; (c) watch and ward; (d) community policing; (e) human rights; (f) gender; (g) local and special laws. 1.3 Strengthen district police inspectorate system, including formulate and implement performance management indicators and measures. 1.4 Establish a performance-based system of rewards and promotions. 1.5 Amend the performance evaluation systems system.</p>			
<p>Output 2. Community policing program implemented in selected stations in pilot districts.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of police assigned to specific community policing role increased • Number of police—community consultations • Number of policewomen in senior posts in pilot police stations • Community perceptions of security improves in pilot districts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baseline and ongoing surveys, including police perceptions • DPSC annual report • District Police Officer (DPO) annual report 	<p>Risk</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local groups may be co-opted by local elites in areas of model stations
<p>Activities 2.1 Formulate and implement strategies for increased citizen participation in the delivery of police services to ensure vulnerable sections enjoy equality of access to quality police services and protection. 2.2 Formulate and implement community policing plans in consultation with local stakeholders and consolidate in policing plans. 2.3 Establish mechanisms to ensure regular consultation with civil society organizations concerned with the rights of the poor, women, and vulnerable groups—including children and excluded minorities.</p>			

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Design Summary	Performance Indicators/Targets	Monitoring Mechanisms	Assumptions and Risks
<p>Activities 2.4 Develop the awareness of members of public oversight institutions covered by the PO and Local Governance Ordinance (LGO) of community policing principles. 2.5 Build the capacity of women police in at least one model police station in each pilot district.</p>			
<p>Output 3. Public oversight bodies are functioning effectively in pilot districts.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • District PSC and CPLC providing accurately and timely information to the community • Annual provincial and district police plans are approved, including performance and financial indicators • DCJCC justice policy and plans approved and implemented • Number/type of decisions by public safety commission relating to incidents of external interference in policing and policing malpractice • Code of ethics published and posted in police stations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public and police perception/satisfaction surveys • District PSC, DCJCC, and CPLC annual reports 	<p>Risk</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public oversight bodies undermined by local elites
<p>Activities 3.1 Establish an adequately resourced and trained district PSC in each pilot district with agreed rules of business and standard operating procedures, including performance monitoring and information systems. 3.2 Build the capacity of the pilot district PSCs to facilitate a participatory process including civil society for the preparation of strategic (3 year) and annual policing plans. 3.3 Build the capacity of the DCJCC to facilitate a participatory process including civil society for the preparation of strategic (3 year) and annual local justice policy. 3.4 Formulate standard operating procedures between the DCJCC member institutions 3.5 Train DCJCC members on PO 2002.</p>			

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Design Summary	Performance Indicators/Targets	Monitoring Mechanisms	Assumptions and Risks
<p>Output 4. PO (district PSC, DCJCC) and LGO institutions (Insaaf committee, Musalihat Anjuman, union council safety committee, citizen community boards) functionally integrated in pilot districts</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Standard operating procedures clarifying relationship between district nazim and DPO in pilot areas approved • Common reporting standards devised and implemented • Information on crimes and police services disseminated in all pilot districts • Number of PO and LGO institution members trained in PO 2002 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey nazims, district coordination officers, DPOs, and civil society in pilot areas • Access to Justice Program Provincial Program Review and Coordination Committee records • Monitoring local media 	<p>Risk</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Union level committees not adequately resourced and empowered
<p>Activities</p> <p>4.1 Formulate and implement strategies, procedures, and rules to enable effective and efficient engagement between the DPO with the district nazim on law and order issues.</p> <p>4.2 Review and recommend measures to strengthen the regulation of police services through the PO (district PSC, DCJCC) and LGO institutions (Insaaf committee, Musalihat Anjuman, union council safety committee, citizen community boards) including standard operating procedures for common reporting standards.</p> <p>4.3 Formulate and implement strategies, procedures, and rules for the efficient and effective enforcement of municipal and administrative laws.</p> <p>4.4 Formulate and implement an integrated district information system on crime and police services</p> <p>4.5 Strengthen the capacity of members of the PO (district PSC, DCJCC) and LGO institutions (Insaaf committee, Musalihat Anjuman, union council safety committee, citizen community boards) to effectively engage with the police in pilot districts</p>			

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Design Summary	Performance Indicators/Targets	Monitoring Mechanisms	Assumptions and Risks
<p>Output 5. Lessons from pilot project contribute to national and provincial police reforms policy dialogue.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performance monitoring and evaluation system producing timely reports and analysis • Information freely available to public on police activities in pilot districts • Number of workshops for policymakers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Province Program Review Coordination Committee records • Monitoring of national and local media • Surveys with national and local policymakers and civil society 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Model stations too costly and/or sophisticated to be replicable
<p>Activities 5.1 Formulate and implement technical assistance performance monitoring and evaluation system. 5.2 Commission baseline and ongoing research in pilot districts. 5.3 Formulate and implement a national public access to information policy and public awareness campaign on the PO. 5.4 Analyse and document police engagement with the PO and LGO institutions and the criminal justice system. 5.5 Workshops on pilot lessons with policymakers in the justice sector. 5.6 Devise a roll-out program for the remainder of the Punjab. 5.7 Develop a manual of guidance for implementing police reform. 5.8 Commission research, analyze, and propose revisions to Police Rules 1934. 5.9 Establish a mechanism for feeding lessons learned to all districts in Punjab. 5.10 Establish mechanisms to depoliticize the police to bring about a professional and non-partisan police force. Inputs: 8 Personnel (project coordinator; police reform specialists; policy research and evaluation specialist; justice system automation specialist; and monitoring and evaluation specialist) Equipment and operational budget for consultants Training program costs Research and survey costs Contingencies Government counterpart costs— office accommodation, staff salary/per diem; other</p>			

RISK ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION STRATEGY

No.	Risk	Probability	Impact	Mitigation of Risk
1	Government will not meet its commitment under the poverty reduction strategy to increase % expenditure of gross domestic product on law and order	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level diplomatic engagement throughout lifetime of the technical assistance (TA) • Strong aid coordination and agreement on approach • Community
2	The Punjab provincial government (PPG) will not meet its budgetary commitment on police reform	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Memoranda of understanding (MOU) with Government and PPG • Strong partnership between Asian Development Bank (ADB)/Department for International Development (DFID) and PPG Home Department
3	Lack of Government/PPG commitment to genuine reform of police and criminal justice institutions	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Well-designed indicators with clearly stated milestones to demonstrate to Government/PPG the benefits of the partnership
4	Corruption so embedded that TA activities will have no sustainable effect in areas of model police station	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Break the cycle of corruption and improve police morale through better conditions of service, working relationships that make them feel valued by their superiors and the community. • TA model police station seen in a positive light as the testing ground for police reform
5	Resources are not provided in a sufficient, timely or predictable fashion	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective and workable MOUs in place
6	TA components not institutionalized	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appropriate counterparts in place by end of month 6 of TA, together with an undertaking from PPG to retain them in post for as long as possible. • Identify and develop champions for change in the home department and Punjab Police • By end of year 1, PPG police budget plans begin to reflect recurrent costs of the TA in pilot districts and model police station • Establish linkages with other aid interventions e.g., United States Department of Justice programs
7	PPG selectively implements components of the TA	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifying champions for change in PPG and police • Key change management policies in place • Effective TA management and monitoring mechanisms • Effective communication strategy within the police office and externally to the whole community
8	PPG counterparts and recipients of inputs constantly being removed from their roles	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agreement with PPG that appropriate counterparts in place by end of month 6 of TA, and remain in post for life of TA • Human resource development strategy implemented in pilot districts

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No.	Risk	Probability	Impact	Mitigation of Risk
9	Police reform is personality driven and not sustainable at institutional level	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build strong partnerships between district nazims, councils, district PSCs, district criminal justice coordination committees (DCJCCs), citizen police liaison committees (CPLCs) and police district senior officers Build strong partnerships between model police station, station house officers (SHOs) and union council nazims and peace committees, etc
10	Police reform will falter if issues such as low pay and working conditions not addressed by Government/PPG on grounds of financial constraints	High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of police budget completed by end of Year 1 Implement reforms to conditions of service in model police station
11	Personnel, finance, and resources not available to effectively separate watch and ward from investigations	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MOUs agreed with PPG
12	Increase in reported crimes and registering of First Information Report (FIR) creates political tension	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effective communication strategy within the police and externally to the whole community
13	Prosecution capacity not supported	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen relationships between police and DCJCCs with training
14	Model police station not seen as opportunities to pilot genuine reforms, but rather as punishment postings, e.g., isolated geographic locations	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At operational level, close attention at model police station to police disciplinary process and building in police accountability Better conditions of service for model police station staff, including accommodation Selection criteria for model police station includes a representative set of police station from which to choose Selection of model police station completed by end of month 6 in compliance with criteria
15	Model police station too costly and/or sophisticated to be replicable	Low	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appropriately qualified TA team with support from experienced development persons appointed Effective monitoring to measure the design process against the reality of financial constraints of the PPG development budget
16	The TA fails to shift the balance from law enforcement policing to crime prevention in the model police station, including active community involvement	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appropriately qualified TA team with support from experienced development persons appointed TA develops strong partnerships with the community in the model police stations
17	Local community groups may be co-opted by local elites in areas of model police station	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TA develops strong partnerships with the community in the model police station Effective communication strategy within the police and externally to the whole community Participatory research process will identify areas of concern, and actions to lessen impact adopted Establish partnerships between local police station and civil society at union council level

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No.	Risk	Probability	Impact	Mitigation of Risk
18	Conflict may arise between police and community in areas of model police station	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong representative community partnerships in place Conflict prevention and resolution strategies in place
19	Public oversight bodies not resourced adequately	Med	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effective monitoring to measure the design process against the reality of financial constraints of the PPG development budget MOUs agreed with PPG
20	Public oversight bodies undermined by local elites	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong representative community partnerships in place Conflict prevention and resolution strategies in place
21	Public oversight bodies not seen as effective or representative by citizenry, especially the poor and women	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong representative community partnerships in place Conflict prevention and resolution strategies in place TA develops strong partnerships with the community in the model police station Effective communication strategy within the police and externally to the whole community Participatory research process will identify areas of concern, and actions to lessen impact adopted
22	District institutions are remote from village life	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effective communication strategy within the police and externally to the whole community Engage actively with civil society to bridge this gap Strengthen the role of union council public safety committee, especially women members
23	Union-level committees not adequately resourced and empowered	Med	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MOUs with PPG Engage actively with civil society at union level
24	Relationship between union level and district is not strong enough to enable the union level to influence district institutions	Low	Med	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use project milestones to measure institutionalization of reforms at both levels Engage actively with civil society at union level

Source: DfID 2004. Technical Appraisal for DFID – Pakistan of ADB Project “Implementing the Police Order District Public Safety in Faisalabad, Multan, Gujranwala and Gujrat – Punjab Province.”

COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING PLAN
(\$'000)

Item	Foreign Exchange	Local Currency	Total Cost
A. Poverty Reduction Cooperation Fund Financing^a			
1. Consultants			
a. Remuneration and Per Diem			
i. Domestic Consultants	0.0	382.0	382.0
ii. International Consultants	50.0	0.0	50.0
b. International and Local Travel	18.0	40.0	58.0
c. Reports and Communications	0.0	54.0	54.0
2. Equipment	0.0	45.0	45.0
3. Training Programs	0.0	216.0	216.0
4. Surveys	0.0	30.0	30.0
5. Miscellaneous Administration and Support Costs	0.0	30.0	30.0
6. Contingencies	0.0	85.0	85.0
Subtotal (A)	68.0	882.0	950.0
B. Government of Pakistan Financing			
1. Office Accommodation and Transport	0.0	100.0	100.0
2. Remuneration and Per Diem of Counterpart Staff	0.0	95.0	95.0
3. Others	0.0	45.0	45.0
Subtotal (B)	0.0	240.0	240.0
Total	68.0	1,122.0	1,190.0

^a Administered by the Asian Development Bank.
Source: Asian Development Bank estimates.

OUTLINE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CONSULTANTS

1. The technical assistance (TA) will augment existing professional resources available to the provincial agencies and, in particular, support the program management units at the provincial and district levels. The tasks supported under this TA will be performed by a team of domestic consultants (person-months in parenthesis) comprising (i) a TA coordinator (36), (ii) one police reform specialist (36), (iii) four district police reforms specialists (144), (iv) policy research and evaluation specialist (36), and (v) justice system automation specialist (18).
2. International expertise to provide guidance and peer support to the domestic team and counterparts will be engaged: (i) police reforms adviser (3). A substantial pool of resources has been allocated and will be deployed to support training programs and special campaigns on community policing and gender sensitization.
3. Consultants recruited under the TA will report first to the TA coordinator who will be responsible for the quality of their performance. Modifications to the scope, terms, and activities of consultants recruited under the TA will be decided jointly by the TA coordinator and the provincial steering committee under the Access to Justice Program (AJP) and communicated to the consultants via the TA coordinator.
4. The inputs of each consultant will be directed by the TA coordinator around the three components of the TA: (i) high quality investigations, (ii) community policing programs, (iii) effective public oversight, (iv) support to local justice institutions, and (iv) advancing national policy dialogue on police reforms.

A. Domestic Consulting Services

5. **Project Coordinator** (36 person-months). The project coordinator will be a senior police sector expert; and will provide technical guidance and coordinated vision, identify needs, and ensure policy implementation. The consultant will
 - (i) review documentation arising from Government and aid agency initiatives in support of gender reform action plans (GRAPs); liaise with the implementing agencies, including the Ministry of Women Development Program Support Office (PSO), assisting them to ensure that TA-financed activities are designed to exploit every opportunity to research, document, and disseminate policy and operational lessons from implementation experience;
 - (ii) support the Government in designing, planning, and implementing policy dialogue and communications strategy;
 - (iii) design, plan, and conduct public conferences, workshops, and media campaigns to promote gender equality and gender reform agenda;
 - (iv) coordinate training activities and provide TA to human resource development activities in pilot districts;
 - (v) provide TA in training of police and management of training activities;
 - (vi) support policy research and evaluation specialist in preparing papers, reports, and case studies;
 - (vii) facilitate effective communication of TA monitoring and evaluation results to all stakeholders;
 - (viii) assist in designing and implementing annual performance review processes, evaluating the quality of that process, preparing reports for the National Steering Committee, and disseminating the results; and

- (ix) perform any other duties that may be assigned by the AJP program director or AJP TA program coordinator.

6. **Police Reform Specialist** (1 position, 36 person-months). The police specialist will be a multidisciplinary person with a law degree and experience with police administration, familiar with public sector budgetary procedures and issues of restructuring, and capable of legislative drafting. The consultant will

- (i) review documentation of government and aid initiatives in support of devolution and access to justice reforms, and liaise with the implementing agencies to ensure TA financed activities are effectively monitored and evaluated;
- (ii) help the implementing agencies and other stakeholders design and review investment proposals, under the TA funds and AJP resources;
- (iii) maintain regular liaison with all stakeholders (government, civil society/nongovernment organizations and funding agencies) associated with implementing GRAPs, and provide appropriate technical and other support as directed by the TA coordinator;
- (iv) maintain regular dialogue with representatives of executing and implementing agencies associated with ADB's programs supporting AJP, Decentralization Support Program, and GRAPs;
- (v) assist in designing and implementing annual performance review processes, evaluating the quality of that process, preparing reports for the steering committee, and disseminating the results; and
- (vi) provide regular reports and perform any other duties that may be assigned by the AJP program director or TA program coordinator.

7. **District Police Reform Specialists** (4 positions, 144 person-months). The consultant will

- (i) assist the district police officer in charge of police stations and district PSCs in preparing annual policing plans;
- (ii) design and launch community-policing campaigns, and prepare monitoring reports for the Government to review and if necessary modify the activities and approaches to community policing;
- (iii) assist the district PSCs and district criminal justice coordination committees in undertaking the monitoring functions, and help prepare documentation for effective functioning of local oversight institutions;
- (iv) maintain and develop active coordination with local civil society groups, in particular advocacy nongovernment organizations and community-based organizations, to facilitate informed police-citizenry relationships; and
- (v) provide regular reports and perform any other duties that may be assigned by the AJP program director or TA program coordinator

8. **Policy Research and Evaluation Specialist** (36 person-months). The consultant will

- (i) review all relevant documentation on police reforms in Pakistan and associated aid-financed support programs, and identify key areas for policy research in the context of the pilot project;
- (ii) review AJP program monitoring and evaluation system, and make recommendations to ensure that appropriate indicators and means of verification for this pilot TA are incorporated;
- (iii) assist the gender specialist to conduct a quarterly gender audit of the pilot TA as part of the AJP;

- (iv) help conduct policy dialogues through various forums enabling police reform stakeholders to analyze policy implications of implementation experience;
- (v) produce occasional policy papers and cases studies for dissemination through publications, workshops, and seminars;
- (vi) help conduct of annual performance review processes, evaluate the quality of the process, prepare reports for the national program steering committee, and disseminate the results; and
- (vii) provide regular reports and perform any other duties that may be assigned by the AJP program director or TA program coordinator.

9. **Justice System Automation Specialist** (18 person months). The consultant will

- (i) assimilate and review the automation plans prepared under ADB TA 3433 “Strengthening of institutional capacity for judicial and legal reform” and any follow-up work carried out;
- (ii) prepare networking environment between the provincial police, district police, oversight bodies, and local government for increased access to information and simplifying complaint procedures;
- (iii) prior to their submission, vet and approve all TA proposals prepared by the stakeholders to (a) ensure standardization of technology platform (hardware and software) at the national level as well as compatibility with the automation plan, (b) check wasteful expenditure on equipment;
- (iv) assess capacity of the existing management information departments and concerned staff of the stakeholders and make appropriate recommendations for their strengthening in terms of provision of additional resources and training; and
- (v) help the Government develop, introduce, pilot, and upscale electronic-governance systems and techniques, by engaging public institutions and private sector agencies (consultants, tertiary institutions, nongovernment organizations).

B. International Consulting Services

10. **Police Reforms Adviser** (3 person-months). The consultant will

- (i) provide design, operational, and technical support to implement activities under the TA;
- (ii) undertake periodic peer review of the TA implementation strategy, and advise the team of domestic consultants of international lessons and experience in police and justice reforms; and
- (iii) provide technical guidance and mentoring to the Government and Pakistan Resident Mission to enhance TA effectiveness