



# Technical Assistance Report

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Project Number: 42089  
June 2008

## Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Security Plan for Project Implementation

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(as of 30 April 2008)

Currency Unit	–	afghani/s (AF)
AF1.00	=	\$0.0203915200
\$1.00	=	AF49.039993

## ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	–	Asian Development Bank
AFRM	–	Afghanistan Resident Mission
CMP	–	crisis management plan
FSO	–	field security officer
MOSS	–	Minimum Operating Security Standards
NSO	–	national security officer
TA	–	technical assistance
UN	–	United Nations

## TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CLASSIFICATION

<b>Targeting Classification</b>	–	General intervention
<b>Sector</b>	–	Law, economic management, and public policy
<b>Subsector</b>	–	National government administration
<b>Theme</b>	–	Governance
<b>Subtheme</b>	–	Public governance

## NOTES

- (i) The fiscal year of the Government ends on 20 March. FY before a calendar year denotes the year in which the fiscal year ends, e.g., FY2008 ends on 20 March 2008.
- (ii) In this report, "\$" refers to US dollars.

<b>Vice Presidents</b>	L. Jin, Operations 1 B. Lohani, Finance and Administration
<b>Director General</b>	J. Miranda, Central and West Asia Department (CWRD)
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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. The security situation in Afghanistan remains dangerous. Recent publications from a number of international think tanks (including the Afghanistan Study Group and International Crisis Group) suggest the security situation will deteriorate without major increases in military and economic assistance to counter the challenges of reconstituted Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, a runaway opium economy, and poverty faced by most Afghans.<sup>1</sup> Support for the Taliban by local populations, whether voluntary or coerced, and recruitment into terrorist and suicide bomber training camps have increased. Weapons employed by antigovernment elements are more sophisticated and deadly, and arms and ammunition smuggled into the country are providing the Taliban with a greater capability to launch more frequent and deadly attacks against coalition and Afghan forces. The Government of Afghanistan is unable to provide effective security outside the immediate environs of Kabul. Even with the presence of the large international and national military and police forces, Kabul itself comes under routine attack in the form of improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks.<sup>2</sup> Radical political and religious factions have stepped up their attacks on international representatives and nongovernment organizations in recent months. Clearly, donor nations, development organizations, and humanitarian nongovernment organizations are not immune to the vagaries of this environment, or the frustrations generated by public expectations from the international community. Reconstruction projects of the international community have been declared acceptable targets and Asian Development Bank (ADB)-funded road projects have incurred a number of attacks.

2. The increased threat poses distinct challenges for the implementation of humanitarian and development programs. As a result, stringent United Nations (UN) mandated safety and security regimens have been developed to enable program activity of international organizations with a presence in Afghanistan. Multilateral institutions, including ADB, and many of the international organizations are members of the UN Security Management System. Compliance with UN security guidelines is also each such organization's responsibility to its staff. This technical assistance (TA)<sup>3</sup> is to address these issues by assisting the Government of Afghanistan to plan and implement appropriate mitigation measures to protect staff and assets involved in reconstruction and development projects in Afghanistan.

## II. ISSUES

### A. Asian Development Bank Operations in Afghanistan

3. The objective of ADB's strategy and operations in Afghanistan since 2002 is to help the Government reconstruct and rehabilitate infrastructure and services. ADB resumed operations in Afghanistan on 28 May 2002 with the approval of the Initial Country Strategy and Program 2002–2004,<sup>4</sup> which included \$500 million in loans and grants. This amount was consistent with ADB's pledges at the Tokyo Conference in January 2002. On 2 May 2003, ADB's Board of Directors endorsed a country strategy and program update for Afghanistan for 2003–2005,

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<sup>1</sup> Afghanistan Study Group. 2008. *Revitalizing Our Efforts, Rethinking Our Strategies*. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of the Presidency, 30 January; International Crisis Group. 2008. *Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve*. Asia Report N°145. Brussels: International Crisis Group, 6 February.

<sup>2</sup> The attack on the Kabul Serena Hotel on 14 January 2008, which claimed six lives, was the most recent such attack for which the Taliban claimed responsibility. The hotel has been used by the development community, international media, senior politicians, and military personnel. The hotel houses the Australian embassy in Afghanistan. A Norwegian delegation under Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre resided at the hotel at the time of the attack.

<sup>3</sup> The TA first appeared in the business opportunities section of ADB's website on 13 June 2008.

<sup>4</sup> ADB. 2002. *Afghanistan: Initial Country Strategy and Program (2002–2004)*, Manila.

providing \$610 million in assistance over 3 years (\$580 million from the Asian Development Fund and \$30 million in TA grants).<sup>5</sup> At the Berlin Conference in 2004, ADB pledged \$800 million of assistance during 2005–2008. ADB had also identified loan and equity investments of up to \$100 million in partnership with local and foreign investors, and guarantees of about \$100 million to catalyze private sector investments into Afghanistan. With these initiatives, total ADB assistance to Afghanistan is likely to exceed \$1.5 billion during 2002–2008.

4. Projects of multilateral and other relevant organizations in Afghanistan are exposed to security risks. This has a direct impact on the Government of Afghanistan (the Government), staff, consultants, and contractors. Some projects take place in high risk areas of the country. In the southeast, construction crews and base camps associated with the Kandahar–Spin Boldak road improvement project<sup>6</sup> have experienced repeated attacks, resulting in multiple casualties. In the north, implementation of projects has placed project consultants and contractors in direct contact with Taliban-controlled areas. The Doabi road construction camp has been attacked several times and one project engineer murdered.

## **B. United Nations Cooperation**

5. A key aspect of the UN Security Management System is the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) program. Under this program, the UN has established minimum standards of security equipment and protocols for each of its duty stations deemed necessary to enable the safe implementation of programs and projects. As members of the UN Security Management System, relevant organizations are obliged to comply with the MOSS program.

6. The UN views Afghanistan as second only to Iraq as its most high-risk duty station and, understandably, has a very robust MOSS program in place to mitigate the threats. The Government wishes to assist the relevant organizations in addressing the long list of MOSS requirements for its personnel, facilities, and operations in Afghanistan so that they can achieve and maintain the required compliance.

7. As in most duty stations, the UN strongly recommends a number of additional security measures that are not mandatory. Uniquely in Afghanistan, this includes a recommendation that each international organization within the UN Security Management System should have a resident security specialist or full-time contract security director in the country. Most international agencies operating in Afghanistan recognize the value of this recommendation and now have full-time international security advisers.

8. In this context, ADB has been implementing its security plan through a technical assistance (TA) project.<sup>7</sup> Under this TA and a staff consultancy, ADB has contracted a resident security coordinator and two regional security officers, referred to as the field security officer (FSO) and national security officers (NSOs). The FSO manages and coordinates the overall security and risk management plan, and is responsible for implementing a set of specific measures dealing with staff, assets, and projects.

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<sup>5</sup> ADB. 2003. *Afghanistan Country Strategy and Program Update (2003–2005)*, Manila.

<sup>6</sup> ADB. 2007. *Afghanistan: Road Employment Project for Settlement and Integration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons*. Manila (Grant-9024).

<sup>7</sup> ADB. 2004. *Technical Assistance to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for the Security of ADB-Financed Projects in Afghanistan*. Manila (TA 4345-AFG)

### **III. THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE**

#### **A. Impact and Outcome**

9. The primary impact of the TA is to establish a framework for security that (i) addresses the challenges of working in the difficult environment of Afghanistan and (ii) enables projects of the relevant organizations to be implemented in as safe a manner as possible. The main outcome of the TA is to provide security-related advice and assistance to the Government of Afghanistan, and donors, financiers and contractors of its ongoing projects. The TA will also provide guidance and oversight related to security standards and measures for government employees, contractors, consulting firms, and nongovernment organizations working on such projects, including those of ADB.

10. To accomplish this goal, the nature of projects being implemented and the security environment in the areas where the work is taking place must be understood. Security must be included at the earliest stage of the project proposal. This issue will, in future, become an integral part of the concept paper clearance process, including the due diligence and investment plans. This action will help ensure that all necessary steps are taken to safeguard staff, assets, and projects. Including security from the beginning will be more cost-effective than adding it at a later stage.

11. In the field, detailed accurate information needs to be collected and analyzed to identify threats, then exposure to those threats must be determined and weighed against expected results, and appropriate mitigation measures put in place. To function effectively, the security officers employed under the TA will be given authority to implement and enforce security guidelines and regulations. These officers will have clear terms of reference, reporting lines, and access to decision makers. The security office will have dedicated administrative support to manage the TA budget in an effective and transparent manner.

12. The TA will be implemented over 2 years. The mandate will be adaptable to meet any changes in the security environment in Afghanistan (Appendix 1).

#### **B. Methodology and Key Activities**

13. The TA will provide the support and expertise required to plan and improve security measures in Afghanistan. The FSO will be responsible for the development and preparation of guidelines, security plans, and crisis management plans (CMP) for selected projects and resident offices of relevant organizations. As required, the FSO will provide guidance on the development of specific security plans to certain organizations or contractors implementing high-risk projects in the country. The TA will facilitate security-related coordination work between the Government, UN, and other agencies. The objective of the guidelines, CMPs and project-specific security plans is to address identified threats. The guidelines, CMPs and security plans will provide prevention, mitigation, and reaction measures to cope with theft, terrorism, demonstrations, natural disasters, and other related problems (Appendix 2). The training and seminars component will be utilized to supplement the security training of staff directly supporting the implementation and administration of the TA. Courses such as the UN Security Awareness Induction Training program will be considered, as well as other UN training offered locally in Afghanistan.

### C. Cost and Financing

14. The TA is estimated to cost \$995,000 equivalent. The TA will be financed on a grant basis by ADB's TA funding program. Cost and financing details are given in Appendix 3. The Government of Afghanistan will have no cost-sharing requirement.<sup>8</sup>

### D. Implementation Arrangements

15. The Government's Ministry of Finance (MoF) will act as the Executing Agency for the TA and CWRD the TA supervising unit. AFRM will assist the MoF and be responsible for day-to-day administration, including the request and liquidation of advances with proper supporting documentation. CTL is responsible for TA disbursement. The Office of Administrative Services will be responsible for technical support and oversight.

16. An estimated 96 person-months of consulting and contractual services will be engaged under the TA. One individual international consultant (FSO) and two individual national consultants (NSOs) will be engaged for 24 person-months each, along with one administration and accounting assistant. The cost of satellite armed security guards will be handled as a UN cost-sharing operation as it is currently within the UN-mandated regulations set down by the UN special representative to the UN secretary general. The FSO will manage the national consultants and support staff. The FSO and NSOs will prepare guidelines, CMPs and security plans for selected projects, including the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities ADB is involved in. They will also coordinate with security personnel from other agencies present in Afghanistan, such as the UN, World Bank, United States Agency for International Development, International Security Assistance Force, coalition forces, and others. The security team will participate in security management committee meetings and make presentations on findings and recommendations. The two NSOs will be located at AFRM in Kabul, jointly covering Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar, and other regions, as may be required by the projects. Terms of reference for the FSO and NSOs are in Appendix 4. ADB will carry out the selection and engagement of consulting services and procurement under the TA in accordance with ADB's *Guidelines on the Use of Consultants* (2007, as amended from time to time) and ADB's *Procurement Guidelines* (2007, as amended from time to time). The FSO and NSOs will be recruited through single-source selection on the basis of their previous experience and unique qualifications in security issues in Afghanistan under TA-4345. The equipment to be purchased includes one armored vehicle for usage by TA FSO and NSOs for daily requirements and project missions. After completion of the TA, this vehicle will be turned-over to the Executing Agency of the Government

17. The TA will be implemented over 24 months; it is expected to start in June 2008 and be completed by June 2010.

## IV. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION

18. The President, acting under the authority delegated by the Board, has approved the provision of technical assistance not exceeding the equivalent of \$995,000 on a grant basis to the Government of Afghanistan for the Security Plan for Project Implementation, and hereby reports this action to the Board.

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<sup>8</sup> ADB. 2007. *Proposed Extension of the Waiver of the Cost-Sharing Limits for Asian Development Bank Operations in Afghanistan*. Manila (R4-07).

## DESIGN AND MONITORING FRAMEWORK

<b>Design Summary</b>	<b>Performance Targets and/or Indicators</b>	<b>Data Sources and/or Reporting Mechanisms</b>	<b>Assumptions and Risks</b>
<p><b>Impact</b> Improved portfolio management and better protection of human lives</p>	<p>By 2010, noticeable improvement in the following indicators (baseline data to be gathered during the TA) should be evident in projects at relevant organizations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reduction of project and technical assistance (TA) preparation time, project and TA execution disruptions, and lost project-related work days</li> <li>• Faster project preparation and increased contract award and disbursements</li> <li>• Shortened time to contract awards due to clarity of bidding and security implications</li> </ul>	<p>Reports of consultants</p> <p>Reports of Security Management Team and Security Working Group meetings (i.e., summary of proceedings) prepared by the United Nations (UN)</p> <p>Back-to-office reports of ADB consultation missions</p> <p>Security plan documents for selected projects</p>	<p><b>Assumptions</b> Commitment of TA and project staff and consultants, and staff of resident offices to strictly adhere to security measures and regulations</p> <p>Country security risks are reasonably manageable</p>
<p><b>Outcome</b> Assisting relevant organizations with implementing projects in a relatively safe environment</p>	<p>Less disruption to TA and projects due to improved security measures at time of implementation</p> <p>Positive trends should be seen within 1–2 years with outcomes achieved by May 2010</p>	<p>Crisis management plan (CMP) and individual project security plan documents</p> <p>Reports of Security Management Team and Security Working Group meetings (i.e., summary of proceedings) prepared by UN</p> <p>TAs and project documents</p> <p>Reports of consultants</p>	<p><b>Assumptions</b> Project staff, consultants, contractors, and Government accept and strictly follow security recommendations</p> <p>Willingness of the UN, international military forces, and other organizations to share information</p> <p><b>Risks</b> Political and security situation becomes completely unpredictable and unmanageable</p>
<p><b>Outputs</b> 1. Security risk assessment and</p>	<p>Security risk assessment and needs identification</p>	<p>Reports of consultants</p>	<p><b>Assumptions</b> Member country and involved project contractors and</p>

<b>Design Summary</b>	<b>Performance Targets and/or Indicators</b>	<b>Data Sources and/or Reporting Mechanisms</b>	<b>Assumptions and Risks</b>
needs identification analysis	report prepared by consultants by August 2008 with ongoing updates as necessary	Reports of Security Management Team and Security Working Group meetings (i.e., summary of proceedings) prepared by UN	consulting firms implement the TA components in a timely manner  Willingness of the UN, international military forces, and other organizations to share information
2. Guidelines and Crisis Management Plans	Guidelines and CMPs submitted to and approved by EA by October 2008 with ongoing updates as necessary		<b>Risks</b>  Constraints caused by the political and security situation may alter the assessed needs
3. Guidelines and Security Plans for selected projects	Guidelines and security plans submitted to and approved by EA by October 2008, with ongoing updates as necessary		Delay in implementing the suggested measures may incur serious threats to the normal pace of project implementation
4. Needs assessment and professional advice to relevant organizations on implementing security plans	Needs assessment and security measures implementation guidelines report submitted to and approved by EA by 2008, with annual updates		Lack of cooperation of the UN, international military forces, and other organizations may hinder understanding and assessment of the security situation
5. Permanent participation at security-related coordination bodies	Establishment of a regular information-sharing scheme between relevant agencies by November 2008 with regular updates as necessary		
6. Procurement of equipment required by the consultants, such as trauma kits; and general office equipment such as computers, software, and furniture	Procurement of equipment in year 1 of the TA		

<b>Activities with Milestones</b>	<b>Inputs</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Prepare background papers by mid-August 2008.</li> <li>2. Review current security arrangements and carry out security risk analysis in selected projects and resident offices, and identification of security needs by August 2008. Update periodically as required.</li> <li>3. Prepare guidelines and CMPs by end of September 2008. Review periodically as required.</li> <li>4. By early September 2008, assess needs of security plans for selected projects including human resources, equipment, and infrastructure needed to implement the recommended security measures. Review periodically as required.</li> <li>5. Prepare guidelines and project-specific security plans by end of December 2008. Review periodically as required.</li> <li>6. Assist with implementation of guidelines, CMPs and security plans for selected projects by March 2009.</li> <li>7. Actively participate in Security Management Team and Security Working Group meetings.</li> <li>8. Prepare and implement security training for Government and project-related staff of relevant organizations. Conduct training on a regular basis.</li> <li>9. Report on security conditions and provide analysis of potential threats to resident offices of selected relevant organizations. Conduct on a regular basis.</li> <li>10. The TA consultants will prepare and submit a draft final report by the end of May 2010.</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International consultant: 24 person-months</li> <li>• National consultants: 48 person-months.</li> <li>• Contractual services: 24 person-months</li> </ul> <p>ADB: \$995,000.</p> <p>Government: Contribution to be waived</p>

## CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN

1. The following are some of the security measures to be included in the crisis management plans (CMPs):

- (i) protection of project offices and work camps;
- (ii) medical evacuation plans;
- (iii) protection of work sites;
- (iv) protection of critical infrastructure;
- (v) patrols;
- (vi) protection of equipment and nighttime parking areas;
- (vii) protection of guesthouses;
- (viii) escorts as required;
- (ix) security screening of employees for contractors, subcontractors, and consulting firms;
- (x) assistance to develop and implement security contingency plans; and
- (xi) coordination with the United Nations (UN) Security Management Team on large-scale emergencies such as natural disasters and mass casualty incidents.

2. The field security officer (FSO) and national security officers (NSOs) will provide guidance and oversight to the contractors and consulting firms for implementing measures described in the security plans.

3. Under the technical assistance (TA), the FSO will be primarily responsible for all security assessments from forward-looking strategic assessments to day-to-day tactical working assessments. The FSO will be supported in these activities by the NSOs who are expected to undertake more of the short- to midterm assessments, leaving the long-term strategic assessments and coordination with the Government, the UN, and other stakeholders to the FSO. All members of the security team will work with the Government, its contractors, staff of selected relevant organizations, and consultants to enable their activities in a safe and secure manner. To accomplish this, the FSO will deploy security officers as appropriate.

4. The key to ensuring all necessary safety and security measures are in place will be the preparation of a thorough threat and risk analysis for a project during the project processing phase. A security needs assessment should be incorporated into the earliest stages of project planning and continuous review will ensure that security needs will continue to be met. At the country level, effective communication between various levels of project management and the security office must be ensured. Security must be part of the project processing phase to provide relevant and timely inputs.

5. Involvement beginning in the project processing phase will afford the security team the opportunity to establish sources and agencies for reliable information, which can be acted upon to ensure the safety of the project from the start. Early familiarization with the area of proposed operations, people in power, civic leaders, local politics and rivalries, and other issues will illuminate threats to the project and allow for adequate mitigation strategies to be incorporated into the planning process, which can reduce costly mistakes at a later date. Establishing rapport with the various civil, military, and law enforcement agencies in the area well in advance of a project's start helps ensure the support of the community and enhances the security and safety of the project overall. Valuable insights into potential problems or issues that could cause security challenges to the project are a result of these early contacts and relationships. Security

advice provided to the project teams before decisions are formulated and taken can mitigate problems that may surface later causing delay or cancellation of a part, or all, of the planned program.

6. During project implementation, the FSO and NSOs will provide oversight and compliance auditing of security requirements for contractors. These requirements will be based on the requirements of the UN Minimum Operating Security Standards. Contractors will be provided with any relevant information available to the FSO and NSOs that may impact on their safety and security. This information will include situation analysis of the areas where the projects will be implemented, advice on appropriate safety and security measures, and estimates of the cost of meeting the minimum requirements. These requirements are implemented to meet “duty of care” of relevant organizations to all people working on their projects. Penalties and/or sanctions should be established to ensure that staff, consultants, and contractors have sufficient incentives to adhere to established security rules and regulations.

7. The FSO and NSOs will develop and deliver relevant training activities. These trainings will include topics such as: (i) mine awareness; (ii) surviving as a hostage; (iii) basic communications—VHF, HF, satellite; (iv) cultural awareness; (v) basic vehicle maintenance and emergency driving; and (vi) basic first aid.

8. To improve and maintain critical skills, the FSO and NSOs must undertake training when available and applicable. Training should include: (i) emergency trauma bag training, (ii) hostage incident management, (iii) surveillance and reconnaissance detection, and (iv) stress recognition and debriefing.

9. In addition, the FSO and NSOs will provide security-related information and advisories to project personnel; liaise with UN agencies, International Security Assistance Force, coalition forces, provincial reconstruction teams, and nongovernment organizations on security matters; and provide security briefings/training for contractors, subcontractors, and consulting firm personnel as required. This coordination includes planning and preparations related to natural disasters, mass evacuation, and other large-scale incidents, under which a relevant organization follows UN security policies and guidelines..

10. The FSO and NSOs will assist in the security arrangements for relevant organizations. This will include: (i) security assessments of all facilities; (ii) access control; (iii) oversight of all guard forces; (iv) physical security of all facilities; (v) establishment and operation of radio room and emergency communications systems; (vi) operations, monitoring, and maintenance of closed circuit television and other security systems; (vii) key control; and (viii) all safety issues, i.e., fire safety, hazmat.

**COST ESTIMATES AND FINANCING PLAN**  
(\$'000)

<b>Item</b>	<b>Total Cost</b>
<b>Asian Development Bank (ADB) Financing<sup>a</sup></b>	
1. Consultants	
a. Remuneration and per diem	
i. International consultants	452.0
ii. National consultants	120.0
b. International and local travel	117.0
c. Reports and communications	7.0
2. Equipment	
a. Trauma kits	2.0
b. Helmets and vests	5.0
c. Computers, software, furniture	7.0
d. Armored vehicle <sup>b</sup>	150.0
3. Training and Seminars	25.0
4. Miscellaneous Administration and Support Costs	
a. Supplemental security for VIPs and missions	15.0
b. Communications and TA administrative expenses	42.0
5. Contingencies	
a. Technical assistance contingency	53.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>995.0</b>

AFRM = Afghanistan Resident Mission, VIP = very important people.

<sup>a</sup> Financed by ADB's technical assistance funding program.

<sup>b</sup> Purchase of one armored vehicle for usage by technical assistant officer and national security officers for daily requirements and project missions.

Source: ADB estimates.

## OUTLINE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CONSULTANTS

### A. Field Security Officer

1. The field security officer (FSO), on a full-time basis, will coordinate security-related requirements for reconstruction and development activities of relevant agencies in Afghanistan, including those financed by ADB. The FSO's specific objectives are to

- (i) advise and assist with project security requirements, including participating in planning operations and providing security inputs;
- (ii) coordinate security-related issues with appropriate agencies and organizations in Afghanistan;
- (iii) undertake threat and risk analysis for selected projects and resident offices in Afghanistan and develop appropriate mitigation strategies and security plans;
- (iv) ensure appropriate measures are undertaken for the protection of project personnel, facilities, offices, and assets;
- (v) monitor project activities for compliance with established United Nations (UN) standards, and report noncompliance to the concerned authorities; and
- (vi) disseminate pertinent security information and advice to the concerned authorities in a timely manner.

2. The FSO will have an extensive background and experience in the security field, with (i) at least 15 years in government, military, and/or police service or equivalent private sector security-related experience; (ii) area knowledge and experience in Afghanistan; (iii) demonstrated experience in crisis management and operating in difficult circumstances and conditions; (iv) strong written and verbal briefing skills; and (v) demonstrated experience in operating in a multicultural environment. The FSO will work closely with the UN, International Security Assistance Force, coalition forces, Afghan national security forces, and other security stakeholders as deemed necessary or beneficial. The FSO will also participate in UN Security Management Team meetings established under the UN chief security adviser.

3. The detailed responsibilities of the FSO include the following:

#### 1. General Security Arrangements and Operations

4. The FSO will advise on the security arrangements for selected project offices including

- (i) security assessments of facilities;
- (ii) access control;
- (iii) oversight of guard forces;
- (iv) physical security of facilities;
- (v) establishment and operations of radio room and emergency communication systems;
- (vi) operations, monitoring and maintenance of closed circuit television and other security systems;
- (vii) key control; and
- (viii) other safety issues, i.e., fire safety, hazmat.

## **2. Security Risk Information Gathering and Assessment**

### 5. The FSO will

- (i) oversee and manage the collection, analysis, and dissemination of security-related information;
- (ii) supervise and coordinate the activities and work of full-time national security officers;
- (iii) liaise closely with the UN and other security entities;
- (iv) provide detailed security briefings to the concerned authorities on a regular basis and to project staff and consultants as required; and
- (v) monitor and make recommendations on communications systems required for project implementation.

## **3. Preemptive Security Risk Management Services**

### 6. Responsibilities include

- (i) maintain up-to-date, detailed instructions on precautions and emergency procedures that should be taken;
- (ii) develop emergency response, crisis management, and business continuity plans;
- (iii) develop detailed security and evacuation plans;
- (iv) maintain updated threat and risk analyses;
- (v) develop and oversee implementation of security systems and physical protection guidelines as well as fire and safety guidelines;
- (vi) ensure the maintenance and accuracy of staff lists;
- (vii) develop and deliver appropriate security-related trainings;
- (viii) monitor and ensure compliance of project activities with requirements of the UN Security Management System;
- (ix) cooperate on security matters with the UN and other security stakeholders;
- (x) provide guidelines and advise on residential accommodations
- (xi) conduct periodic security awareness meetings; and
- (xii) schedule appropriate drills to test and strengthen incident response procedures.

## **4. Security Incident Management**

### 7. The FSO will

- (i) ensure coordination and implementation all incident response procedures and guidelines;
- (ii) ensure accurate reporting of incidents and follow up; and
- (iii) undertake identification of lessons after all incidents.

### 8. The FSO will provide any other assistance related to the above as may be requested by ADB.

## **B. National Security Officers**

### 9. Two national security officers (NSOs), on a full-time basis, to assist the FSO by enabling project implementation activity through the implementation of security guidelines and

procedures in Afghanistan in close consultation and cooperation with the Government, contractors, staff of selected relevant organizations and consultants. Under the supervision of the FSO, the security officers specific objectives are to

- (i) assist in developing and implementing the necessary security plans for project site and implementation activities,
- (ii) assist contractors and engaged consulting firms with developing and implementing their security plans,
- (iii) support selected projects in coordinating with key agencies and organizations present in Afghanistan concerning security issues,
- (iv) assist in developing and implementing security-related contingency and crisis management plans, and
- (v) monitor contractors and engaged consulting firms to ensure compliance with relevant security and safety regulations and guidelines.

10. The NSOs will have extensive backgrounds and experience in the security field, including (i) at least 5 years in government, military, and/ or police service or equivalent private sector security-related experience; (ii) excellent local knowledge of their working areas in Afghanistan; (iii) experience in preparing and implementing security plans in conflict, postconflict, and high-risk environments; and proven information gathering and sound analytical skills; (iv) language skills appropriate to the area as well as fluency in spoken and written English; and (v) demonstrated experience in operating in a multicultural environment. The NSOs will work under the direct supervision of the FSO, reporting to the FSO on all matters.

11. Under the supervision of the FSO, the NSOs will work closely with project staff, staff of resident offices, consultants and contractors, as well as officials of other related agencies or international agencies. They will participate in UN security team activities as necessary. They will liaise, as required, with local government officials, national and international security forces, local leaders, and any other individuals or groups necessary for the fulfillment of their tasks. The NSOs will be deployed as appropriate by the FSO. The FSO may appoint a senior NSO to serve as the FSO deputy and fill in when the FSO is away from the duty station

12. The outline terms of reference for the NSOs include the following:

**1. Security Risk Information Gathering and Assessment**

13. The NSOs will

- (i) collect, analyze, and disseminate security-related information that pertains to project implementation activities in Afghanistan;
- (ii) liaise with the UN and other security entities, as required;
- (iii) conduct security assessments of the field locations of selected projects;
- (iv) provide detailed security briefings to concerned authorities, consultants, and contractors as required; and
- (v) provide regular reports to the FSO and spot reports on specific incidents; and
- (vi) monitor communications systems.

## **2. Preemptive Security Risk Management Services**

### 14. Responsibilities include

- (i) maintain up-to-date, detailed instructions on precautions and emergency procedures that should be taken in their areas of operations;
- (ii) adapt emergency response, crisis management, and business continuity plans;
- (iii) develop detailed security and evacuation plans for selected projects;
- (iv) maintain updated threat and risk analyses;
- (v) develop and deliver appropriate security-related trainings;
- (vi) monitor and ensure compliance project activities with requirements of the UN Security Management System;
- (vii) cooperate on security matters with the UN and other security stakeholders;
- (viii) conduct periodic security awareness meetings;
- (ix) contribute to the local security situation; and
- (x) manage, maintain, and ensure operability of security-related equipment and other assets.

## **3. Security Incident Management**

### 15. The NSOs will

- (i) report all security-related incidents to the FSO in a timely manner,
- (ii) implement incident management procedures, and
- (iii) identify lessons after all incidents.

16. The NSOs will provide any other assistance related to the above as may be requested by ADB.