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Asian Development Outlook 2006 : II. Economic trends and prospects in developing Asia : South Asia
IndiaThe Indian economy grew by 8.1% in FY2005, according to official estimates. Price pressure has been building as the authorities are unlikely to have the resources to cushion domestic fuel prices from the full extent of fuel import price increases for much longer. On the supply side, growth will continue to be fueled by the opening up of space for private investment. India faces two key policy challenges as the economy undergoes a structural transformation. First, it must continue consolidating its fiscal position. It will have to do so while ensuring both adequate hard infrastructure improvements to support industrial and high-skill services development, and public investment to advance rural productivity and human development. Second, it needs to improve the investment environment by lowering the cost of doing business. Growth rates of 7.6% in FY2006 and 7.8% in FY2007 are forecast. The annual average growth rate over 2006-2010 is unlikely to exceed 8-8.5%. ![]() Economic performanceThe Indian economy achieved a gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 8.1% in FY2005 (1 April 2005–31 March 2006). On the expenditure side, the economy was lifted by broad-based domestic demand growth. While aggregate expenditure data have not yet been released, consumption growth is estimated at 8.0%, driven by a good monsoon, which supported rural incomes. Gross fixed capital formation grew at an estimated rate of 8.5%, reflecting rising investor confidence (Figure 2.16.1) in the face of strongly entrenched demand growth and as a consequence of the expansion in credit and companies’ initial public offerings. The rate of gross fixed capital formation in GDP has increased to 25.9% and that of gross domestic capital formation to 30.1%. Meanwhile, public consumption grew less rapidly than GDP as the central Government set the target to reduce its overall deficit to 4.3% of GDP for FY2005. The Government has announced that it expects to have surpassed this target, reducing the deficit to 4.1% of GDP. The boom in domestic private demand, combined with rising oil import costs, widened the trade deficit and pushed the current account further into a deficit equivalent to 2.5% of GDP. Figure 2.16.2 shows the decomposition of growth by sector.
The importance of the services sector was reaffirmed in FY2005.
This sector accounts for 54% of economic output and grew by an unprecedented
9.8%. This was mainly the result of significant increases in the
demand for domestic services. The industry sector, which accounts for approximately 26% of GDP, grew by 9.0%. This strong performance was driven by manufacturing, which accounts for about four fifths of industrial output. Textiles, basic metals and alloys, and transport equipment were the fastest-growing product categories. As discussed in Part 1 of this Asian Development Outlook, India has benefited from the ending of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, with exports of clothing and textile intermediates to the United States rising by 34% and 22%, respectively, in value terms in calendar 2005. India’s exports of clothing and textiles to the European Union increased by 16% in value terms in this period, but by under 5% in volume terms, reflecting a significant improvement in unit values. These increases, however, partly reflect the shift in trading patterns from formally nonquota to quota countries. Growth in the transport equipment sector reflects, in part, the rapid emergence of Tamil Nadu state as an international destination for automobile component manufacturing. The agriculture sector, with a share of about 20% of GDP, registered
only a 2.3% growth rate, despite a favorable monsoon, reflecting
continuing difficulties in raising productivity. These difficulties
have been linked to increasing problems with irrigation and surface
water management, as well as with persistent structural weakness
in the markets for rural credit and for crop insurance. Investor concern over India’s infrastructure deficit continued to mount in 2005, especially with regard to a shortage of power generation capacity, stemming in part from continued financial problems at many state electricity boards. Urban planning, too, remains worrisome with constraints tightening in transport, sanitation, hotel accommodation, and other facilities usually required by investors. High global oil prices might have been expected to damp growth in FY2005. The reasons why they have not are structurally revealing. First, as shown in Table 2.16.1, the economy, when measured in purchasing power parity terms, is not especially intensive in its consumption of energy. Moreover, much of this energy—the electrical component—is derived from domestically mined coal and hydropower (Figure 2.16.3). Second, as depicted in Figure 2.16.2 above, India’s growth over the past few years has been driven primarily by the services sector and, with the exception of transport, this sector (particularly its high-growth components such as IT, retailing, and BPO) is relatively oil un-intensive. Third, since 2003, the central Government has shielded the domestic economy from international oil price increases by controlling retail fuel prices, especially those for cooking fuel (liquefied petroleum gas [LPG]) and kerosene. The burden of this implicit subsidy, which could approach 1% of GDP in FY2005, falls predominantly on state-owned oil production and marketing companies. It is likely that the cost of these subsidies will eventually be reduced, or shifted back to the fiscal budget, to ensure the financial health of these companies. Fourth, manufacturing goods inflation has been falling (Figure 2.16.4), perhaps indicating productivity increases and competitive pressures, thus counteracting inflationary pressure from higher fuel prices. According to the preliminary estimates presented by the finance minister in
the February 2006 budget speech, the overall federal fiscal deficit
(including adjustments to capital funds) fell to 4.1% of GDP in
FY2005. This reflects stronger current revenues, which—according
to estimates from the Reserve Bank of India—rose by roughly
0.4% of GDP, from 9.7% in FY2004. Meanwhile, interest payments on
central government debt fell to 3.9% of GDP, continuing a downward
trend begun in FY2002. Aware of the need to reduce the debt burden
and create fiscal space for much-needed infrastructure investments,
the Government has announced a deficit target of 3.8% of GDP for
FY2006. Other potential areas for fiscal tightening include further privatization of inefficient public companies and reductions in government payrolls. Both areas are politically difficult, yet improvements can be discerned. First, a standoff over the privatization of the management of Mumbai and Delhi airports was resolved in February 2006, in favor of privatization. This outcome appears to have renewed the drive of reformers, and was followed by an announcement of plans to merge India’s two national airlines and sell up to 20% of their shares via an initial public offering. Second, as shown in Figure 2.16.5, the number of public employees has stopped increasing, with obvious fiscal benefits. When the accounts of the state governments are combined with the
federal account, the consolidated overall fiscal deficit approaches
7.6% of GDP. Many states have substantial accrued levels of debt
(the International Monetary Fund estimates that the combined value
of states’ debt is equal to 33% of national GDP), the interest
burden of which is substantial. Many states have also initiated
serious fiscal consolidation measures, and enacted fiscal responsibility
acts. All of these measures have helped in achieving a lower consolidated
fiscal deficit of 7.6% of GDP in FY2005. In the interim, however,
state deficits will continue to have implications for the sharing
of resources between federal and state governments. The introduction
of a value-added tax (VAT) in April 2005 (the proceeds of which
accrue to state governments) has already increased revenue collections
in some states—a result that was only expected one or two
years from now. As depicted in Figure 2.16.4, the pace of wholesale price inflation has actually dropped off a little in FY2005, with prices rising by 4.2% year on year to February 2006. While the wholesale fuel price index, which has a 14.2% weight in the overall wholesale price index, registered growth of 7.6% year on year to February 2006, the rate of inflation in manufactures (with a 63.8% weight in the overall wholesale price index) fell to 2.3%, perhaps reflecting productivity growth and competitive pressure. Meanwhile, primary product prices edged up in the second half of FY2005, driven essentially by food prices. Monetary policy remained relatively accommodative in early FY2005 (Figure 2.16.6), even as international interest rates began to rise. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) left its reverse repo interest rate at 5.00%, after raising it in April 2005 from 4.75%, its lowest level for many years. However, accommodative monetary policy and the deteriorating trade balance put slight downward pressure on the rupee, which slid slowly between July and December 2005 (Figure 2.16.7). The RBI raised the reverse repo to 5.25 % in October 2005 and again to 5.50% in January 2006, after which the rupee regained its value and stabilized at just above 44 rupees (Rs) to the dollar. This tightening of rates was presented by the RBI as a necessary response to growing expectations of inflation. Despite these concerns, capital inflows in 2005, particularly in the area of portfolio investment (Figure 2.16.8), were adequate to offset the growing current account deficit, and foreign reserves grew in CY2005, albeit much more slowly than they have subsequently. Portfolio investment has not just grown in absolute terms, but also in relation to India’s total foreign exchange reserves. Given the potential volatility of these flows, this is causing some concern, and points to the need to improve the environment for foreign direct investment (FDI).
The equity markets rallied strongly in FY2005. The Bombay Stock
Exchange’s Sensitivity Index (SENSEX) crossed the 10,000 mark
in February 2006 and the 11,000 mark in March. The rally was broad
based across sectors and is often attributed to strong fundamentals
of the economy and large purchases by mutual funds and international
investors. Notwithstanding the support from the real economy, some
observers are worried about the relatively high growth of potentially
speculative portfolio investment, and the RBI has urged investors
to exercise caution. Demand for bank credit by the commercial sector has grown strongly in FY2005. However, deposits have not kept pace with credit growth. Banks have now started raising their deposit rates in response to this and perhaps, also, to firming RBI policy rates. Average lending rates have also risen, though prime lending rates remain unchanged. The growth in bank credit has been accompanied by changes in the composition of loan portfolios to include higher-yield, though riskier, loans. For example, consumer and mortgage lending is on the rise. Industrial corporations, historically large and relatively secure customers for bank credit, are now raising more finance directly in capital markets. The higher spread between prime and average lending rates also implies that at least some of this risk is being priced in. Although India lacks good current labor market indicators, the informal signs are of a clear tightening in urban markets, which is consistent with the recent strong growth performance. Similarly, indirect evidence suggests that wages are rising as well. A recent Asian Development Bank study has shown average urban real wages in India rising over the past two decades, using data from successive National Sample Surveys. This trend is driven almost exclusively by growth in the highest quintile of wage distribution, while wages in the bottom quintile have moved up only slightly. Informal indications are that this trend toward growing inequality may have strengthened in recent years.
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2.16.2 From the Hindu rate of growth to 10%: What will it take?
Box figure 1 shows the actual GDP growth rate for 1960–2005 and the trend growth rate. A number of features are worth mentioning. First, India achieved high growth rates, of 7% and higher, on several occasions in past decades. Second, it seems that what characterized growth rates for decades until the early 1980s was a large degree of volatility, including contractions in 1965, 1972, and 1979. The first two of these coincided with wars with Pakistan, while the 1979 contraction coincided with an international oil shock. Agricultural output also contracted in all of these years. Since 1979 India has not had a single year of economic contraction. Thus, India’s infamous “Hindu rate of growth” of the 1960s and 1970s reflects high volatility, not just consistently low GDP growth rates. Third, the trend growth rate has increased steadily from about 4% between the 1960s and early 1980s up to about 6.5% today. The reduction in the volatility of the GDP growth rate does
not simply reflect a decrease in incidents that negatively
affected the economy. It also reflects the structural shift
of economic activity from agriculture into services. Between
1960 and 2005, the services sector grew at an average annual
rate of 6.1%, compared with 5.6% in industry and 2.6% in agriculture.
Accordingly, the share of services in GDP grew from around
34% to 54%, and the share of agriculture in output declined
from 47% to 20%. As the agricultural growth rate is more volatile
than that of either industry or services, it is not surprising
that the overall growth rate has become more stable. Economic growth has also benefited from three additional, related factors. First, the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP, shown in Box figure 2, has increased steadily from about 10% in the 1950s to 20% in the 1970s and 1980s, and to around 25% in recent years. Second, capital productivity (the ratio of GDP to the capital stock—also shown in Box figure 2) has also increased significantly from about 0.3 (30%) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to about 0.4 (40%) in 2002. This is indeed a salient characteristic of the Indian economy.1 The increase in the share of capital formation, together with the increase in capital productivity, explains the increase in India’s rate of capital accumulation.2 Third, the composition of investment has changed, as Box
figure 3 shows. Between 1975 and the mid-1980s, public and
private investment (as a percentage of GDP) were increasing
and were not significantly different; however, after 1987
the share of public investment started declining, while that
of private investment continued increasing. Today, the share
of private investment in GDP is about three times that of
public investment. The private investment pickup over the
past 15 years reflects accelerating reform efforts, including
privatizations, less onerous licensing and zoning requirements,
lowering of trade barriers, simplification of international
investment rules, and the shortening of lists of industries
reserved for small enterprises. Efforts to improve fiscal
performance, which have moved to the forefront of the Government’s
economic agenda, have also played a key role in slowing the
rate of public investment. These trends, taken together, are
consistent with the view that increasing space for the private
sector increases the efficiency of investment, which is vital
for sustaining growth. Moreover, the public sector has narrowed
its investment focus toward public and quasi-public goods,
and appears to have improved the quality of its investments.
Time and cost overruns of central sector projects seem to
have declined substantially. Finally, can India keep the growth momentum and even increase the growth rate of GDP to about 9–10% during 2006–2010? Certainly, achieving this over a single year is possible (e.g., due to an excellent monsoon). The question is whether this rate can be achieved and maintained for successive years. Assuming, optimistically, that India could raise its share of gross fixed capital formation from the current 26% of GDP to about 30%, and that capital productivity remains at about 0.4, the growth rate of the capital stock would rise by about 2.5 percentage points, to 7% a year. This would consequently raise the contribution of capital accumulation to GDP growth by about 1.10%, to 3.15 percentage points, given a capital share of 0.45. Assuming, also optimistically, that employment grows by about 2.5% a year, faster than in previous decades, the overall contribution of employment growth to GDP growth would be about 1.37%. Using these figures in a simple growth-accounting exercise leads to the conclusion that the average GDP growth rate in 2006–2010 is unlikely to exceed 8–8.5%.3 Achieving an average growth rate of 9–10% would require a significantly higher share of capital formation in GDP, of about 40%. Moreover, absorbing this extra investment would itself require substantial structural changes in the economy that are difficult to envisage in the next 5 years. The difficulty of raising and maintaining growth rates above the already remarkable 8% should thus not be underestimated. 1 See
Emma X. Fan and Jesus Felipe. 2005. “The Diverging Patterns
of Profitability, Investment, and Growth in China and India,
1980-2003.” Available: http://cama.anu.edu.au/Working%20Papers/Papers/Fan_Felipe_222005.pdf. |
FDI can also be a means of bridging the gap between the huge investment requirements and domestic savings. An official estimate suggests that the economy can absorb an average of $30 billion of infrastructure FDI alone in each of the next 5 years—in contrast to the current less than $5 billion a year in total FDI, which implies that potential foreign direct investors still face significant hurdles. In addition to having to work without a well-developed market for long-term debt, foreign investors also face difficulties in hedging long-term currency risk.
The country’s overall investment environment has to be strengthened. India scores very low in many regards on the World Bank’s Doing Business survey. For example, entrepreneurs could recently expect to go through 11 steps to launch a business, taking over 71 days. The number of steps was 7.9 for South Asia (already much higher than the OECD average), and 35.3 days for South Asia. Securing operating permits, the costs and procedures of importing or exporting a standardized shipment of goods, bankruptcy-resolution costs and time frames, as well as enforcing commercial contracts are all rated slightly worse for India than the South Asian average.
Turning next to the uses of such investment, the dual imperatives for the economy are to improve conditions in agriculture and, simultaneously, expand industry fast. Nearly two thirds of the labor force are employed in agriculture, a sector that produces less than one fifth of GDP, and has seen yields slip in recent years. India needs to boost agricultural growth, through diversification and development of agroprocessing, and critically, through improvements in productivity. Low productivity growth depresses employment generation and wages in agriculture; low wages and abundant labor limit incentives for mechanization, which in turn restrains productivity growth. Agricultural development will not only benefit farmers and a large section of the rural poor, but will also boost overall economic growth through backward and forward linkages.
Availability and management of water are among the most important
constraints on agricultural productivity and this area has been
neglected for lack of resources, especially among state governments,
and because of the diffusion of responsibilities over several different
departments in the federal Government. Agricultural diversification
needs to be supported by the evolution of suitable market institutions.
It requires much stronger linkages between farmers (and therefore
their production decisions) and buyers, who reflect the specific
needs of the market.
Strengthening research and development (R&D)
and improving post-harvest management technologies—particularly
storage—will give a further boost to productivity. Rapid growth
of agroprocessing industries close to agricultural production centers
will be necessary to absorb surplus labor without moving people
from rural to urban areas.
India also needs to devise feasible strategies for sustained industrial growth (manufacturing, also in need of further investment, represents just over 20% of GDP). The secondary sector needs to grow rapidly to boost the overall growth rate, and to generate much-needed employment for the existing labor force and new entrants—predominantly teenagers and women. In several industrial activities, firms have integrated into global supply chains and have achieved rapid export growth. Pharmaceutical companies—a sunrise sector—have, during the last decade, adopted a strategy of R&D-based innovative growth, which could allow the industry to move beyond its current mainstay of generic drug manufacture. In addition to manufacturing drugs, the pharmaceutical industry offers significant potential for handling outsourced clinical research, particularly in the area of biotechnology, and especially since India signed up to the international system of intellectual property rights on 1 January 2005.
Likewise, BPO will continue to grow rapidly. The large number of
English-speaking skilled people has made India a major exporter
of software services. The good prospects for this sector will depend
on companies’ capacity to upgrade their services and on whether
protectionist tendencies in some industrial countries can be eased.
Likewise, prospects since the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
for the domestic textile industry appear healthy, provided that
it continues to modernize. This suggests that, with appropriate
scale, investment, and technology, it can achieve rapid industrial
growth. 
While calls for labor market reform in India are common, it is not clear that across-the-board reforms will induce significant employment creation. A few Indian labor laws, most notably the Industrial Relations Act (which requires the Government to authorize closure of any facility employing over 100 people), are responsible for the strongest disincentives to investment in the formal sector. However, as a recent Asian Development Bank study shows, labor laws in practice apply to only the 7% of the labor force working in the formal sector (Figure 2.16.5 above). It would seem that while rationalizing a few of the most damaging laws would indeed be helpful, there are other more significant barriers to investment.
As always, the tenuous consolidated fiscal position is a major risk to the medium-term outlook. Public outlays on critical infrastructure and rural development, or private investment, will be crowded out if the governments are not able to sustain spending discipline in other areas or if tax revenues fall short. A key potential risk is that the recommendations of the federal Pay Commission, which is to review the salaries of public servants, may be more generous than the fiscal target allows (as has happened before).
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