Evaluation

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Special Evaluation Study of the Policy Impact of Involuntary Resettlement
Completed 2000

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) adopted an involuntary resettlement policy (IRP) in February 1994 and formally endorsed it in November 1995. The IRP requires that people who lose assets or livelihood because of a project, irrespective of tenure status, receive assistance from the project for relocation and resettlement and be paid market or replacement value for assets acquired by the project.

A major IRP objective is to ensure that those affected receive rehabilitation assistance to achieve at least the same level of well-being with the project as without it. The IRP requires that all projects, including cofinanced and private sector projects, with identified resettlement effects have a satisfactory resettlement plan, with time-bound actions and appropriate budget.

Eight sample projects in four countries (Bangladesh, People's Republic of China [PRC], Indonesia, and Philippines) were selected for field investigation based on sector and regional criteria. The sample includes projects approved before and after implementation of the IRP. In addition, eight projects, approved between 1997 and 1999, were randomly selected for a desk study to assess the current pattern and practices in managing ADB's resettlement portfolio.

   Summary of Findings

• Since the adoption of the IRP in 1994, by 1999, ADB had financed 80 projects involving resettlement in 12 developing member countries (DMCs). On average, close to 120,000 people were affected annually by ADB-funded projects, of these about 40,000 required relocation and resettlement.



• In terms of number of people relocated, the PRC had the highest portion (60%) of the total number affected, followed by Viet Nam (14%), Bangladesh (12%), Indonesia (7%), and Cambodia (2%). Sectorwise, transport projects recorded the highest number of people relocated (78% of the total number of affected people). The energy and water supply and irrigation projects together recorded 18% (9% each) of the people relocated.



• Resettlement plans were relatively more detailed in projects approved between 1997 and 1999 in terms of entitlements of displaced persons, specific time-bound resettlement actions, mitigating measures, and provisions for monitoring the status of resettled people.



• The IRP had made progress in achieving its development objectives, contributing in many instances to enhanced payments of compensation for lost assets, providing improved housing and infrastructure, and restoring livelihoods for many resettled families.



• The practical aspects of implementing the IRP framework is an area of concern, as well as the capacity of executing agencies to implement and adhere to the IRP guidelines.



• The IRP demands fundamental structural changes in national land acquisition laws and payments of compensation for development-induced displacement. Experience from sample project analysis indicated that the IRP is mostly project-driven and DMCs' compliance is largely to gain loan approval. Improvements in compensation and other benefits are ad hoc and project-specific.



• Ineffective implementation and limited impact of the IRP in terms of the overall resettlement process of the DMCs was seen as a major concern. Major problems were
• lack of appropriate and compatible national resettlement policy in most DMCs,



• inadequate social investigations at the project preparatory level,



• improperly identified impoverishment risks resulting in inadequate restoration of income and livelihood and serious implications for the sustainability of resettlement programs,



• weak institutional capabilities of executing agencies and lack of or inadequate funding for resettlement activities,



• weak supervision and monitoring of resettlement implementation,



• lack of consistency in capacity-building and in the role of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in project implementation and sustainability, and



• inadequate aid coordination among donor agencies.


• The IRP was adequate and relevant but refinements are needed to clarify specific policy elements, such as compensations, people directly affected by projects, and those of the vulnerable groups. Implementation practices should be improved with a focus on income restoration in the postresettlement period.

   Recommendations

Six factors were viewed as crucial for an integrated approach to resettlement planning and implementation:

• Appropriate Policy Framework. An appropriate country policy and legal framework to provide clear guidelines, specify inclusive definitions of affected people, assure market or replacement value for all kinds of assets acquired, and establish mechanisms for grievance resolution.



• Comprehensive Planning. Early attention is needed to resolve land acquisition and resettlement issues; establish a database for comprehensive development planning and a resettlement site with civic amenities, including options for resettlement; develop a gender-based income restoration plan, training for alternative income programs, and other programs as appropriate (e.g., vulnerable groups); and provide for mitigating unanticipated project consequences.



• Disclosure and Consultation with Stakeholders. This includes disclosing information and consulting with stakeholders, and forming task-oriented special committees (consisting of project staff, local government officials, experts, affected people, etc.) to collect specialized information, consult with local communities to assess the extent of impact, and determine compensation rates.



• Strong Implementing Agency. The agency should be strong; be present in the field; involve local government officials, displaced people, the host community, NGOs, and community-based organizations (CBOs) in resettlement policy implementation; and be willing to learn from experience, adapt, and improve implementation strategies.



• Resettlement Costs and Funding. Costs must be properly budgeted and based on market or replacement value; funding should be available on schedule and paid to displaced people prior to relocation.



• Supervision and Monitoring. A system of supervision and internal monitoring must be established, and monitoring data then be used as feedback to improve performance. NGOs, CBOs, and affected people should be involved in the monitoring process.