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Comparative Analysis of Water Sector Reforms
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To provide real insight into the policy process, empirical observations on the status of national water sectors and sector reform need to be structured. A model of process of reform is needed to guide data collection and analysis, ensure systematic and consistent treatment of information, and provide the ability to explain, predict and manage the process. After an extensive literature review, the study adopted nine parameters as the key factors that influence reform. |
CONTENTS
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Elements of the political environment that provide incentives or impediments to change include policy and institutional reforms that
Examples include devolution of responsibility to sub-national levels of government, or the corporatization or privatization of formerly public services. They are usually driven by government-wide change.
The political environment has a significant impact in terms of enabling and, often, hindering change. Examples can be provided for virtually every country. Overall, a centralized government with a strong leadership tends to facilitate change, as in PRC, if the central leadership is persuaded that change is needed. On the other hand, where the balance of political power is divided among several parties, water sector reform sometimes become a "political football" (e.g. delayed passage of a draft Water Act), or is so peripheral to dominant political concerns that it is neglected.
A strong trend towards devolution in several countries is having an impact on the water sector, as in Pakistan, Thailand, and Indonesia. The impact is not always in the same direction, however. Devolution may facilitate change and adoption of some of the elements of ADB's water policy as greater responsibility is given to local levels of government and administration. On the other hand, in some circumstances, it has hindered change, as ill-equipped and ill-resourced local administrations are unable to cope with their new responsibilities, and local politicians bring their own influence to bear.
Political change in some countries has opened the way for reform. An example is when a newly elected government has a particular interest in water. On the other hand, there are instances where a new or uncertain political environment or an uninterested government virtually suspended change.
There seems to be general agreement with the view that events and changes in the water sector are conditioned largely by what is happening in the wider political and economic environment. Where there is a general "climate of reform", then reform will be easy (if not demanded) in the water sector; where there is not, then changes in the water sector outside the envelop of general practice are unlikely.
Generally, it appears that the water sector has not often been an innovative area of the public sector. Major reform and institutional change (e.g. engagement of the private sector' new regulatory arrangements) has been more likely to begin in areas such as energy, telecommunications and transport, and then to be picked up in water-related areas.
These are activities of external support agencies (ESAs), such as the World Bank's assistance to prepare Poverty Reduction Strategies and Programs (PRSPs), or the ADB's assistance to carry out water sector reviews. They serve to disseminate to many countries a substantially common approach to analysis of issues, although it may be too early to determine if they have contributed to their resolution.
There is abundant evidence that the activities of ESAs, particularly the World Bank and ADB, have had a substantial influence on the water sector in many DMCs. Key concerns of the international community, such as achievement of the Millennium Development Goals or conservation of wetlands, are on many national agendas, in countries that otherwise may not have placed a high priority thereon. The preparation of National Poverty Reduction Strategies and Programs provided opportunity to ensure that water-related investments are on the national agenda in several DMCs. Notably in Cambodia, several aspects of managing water resources, water-related hazards and water services are included in the PRSP, although in other countries only water supply is mentioned.
Similarly, principles of IWRM, arrangements for public service provision, and the use of various economic/financial/regulatory instruments that have wide currency internationally are being applied rather generally. Thailand, for example, is making notable progress in introducing principles of IWRM and river basin management to its water management practice, perhaps in part because of the significant role that it has played in the Global Water Partnership's Southeast Asia Technical Advisory Committee (SEATAC).
However, it is clear that individual DMCs implement and internalize international "imports" only to the extent that they are seen to be beneficial (to the nation or to the particular decision-makers). In several countries receiving ADB Technical Assistance (TA) in the water sector, reform has been slow and uncertain. Innovations such as river basin organizations or beneficiary participation in O&M are formally included in reform and assistance packages, but frequently implemented to only a limited extent.
One interviewee commented that "reform that is imposed is not true reform". "If it does not address a need felt by the country itself, it is unlikely to be owned, sustained, or beneficial" . The most successful and sustained reforms appear to be in countries such as PRC, which actively sought external advice on how to deal with internally-perceived challenges, and have the national capacity to tailor that advice to their own needs.
"Elite" refers to the ministers and senior civil servants who provide political and administrative leadership. They determine, through their support or opposition, whether or not a particular reform initiative will proceed.
The role of the lower echelons of the public service cannot be overlooked since they actually implement (or obstruct) change. Their degree of exposure to change, and the availability of adequate numbers of capable staff, certainly is. The influence of public/voter opinion on the elite and public servants should also be considered.
The progress of water sector reform depends first of all on the extent to which the political and administrative leadership sees the need for and desires reform, and is in accord over its goals. Progress in the water sector in Cambodia benefited considerably from the personal interest of Prime Minister Hun Sen in water-related issues. On the other hand, conflict among government ministers or senior civil servants in some countries effectively prevented reform. Moreover, there are several countries where lack of conviction or outright opposition on the part of mid-level civil service officials served to delay or dilute reform and institutional change.
Of course, reform and institutional change are intended to address precisely those issues that hinder reform - turf wars among a multiplicity of water sector agencies, political interference in service delivery organizations, community stakeholder resistance to improved management of water resources, etc. Therefore, many countries show cases where specific types of reform have been delayed or neutralized by one interest group or another. It appears that resistance to reform is, in general, more pervasive than its promotion. The promoters of reform (almost certainly the "elite") usually have many matters to deal with, and therefore are unable to give sustained attention to following through on reform.
Elements of the socio-economic environment that provide either incentive or impediments to change may include
This group is a very broad one, and evidence for its influence is difficult to analyze. Small population size and cohesive social structure could facilitate consensus and decision making in some cases such as Kiribati and Samoa. However, the same result could be achieved via hierarchical, party-based structure like PRC even though it is so much larger.
Several interviewees for this study drew attention to the influence of the general level of education on a country's ability to implement reforms, particularly those that involve beneficiaries and the community at large. This factor seems to be relevant to the progress being made in Malaysia in extending good water management practices to the community level, often working through schools.
Reforms in rural areas (e.g. with regard to irrigation management or rural water supply) are commonly very difficult to introduce, partly because of the low levels of education and skill of rural populations.
This pertains to particular crisis events that prompt change, such as massive flood, or activity by another riparian state in a shared river basin that is perceived to pose a threat.
None of the interviewees pointed to specific cases in which a crisis precipitated major policy reform or institutional change. There are examples, nevertheless, such as Cambodia's strengthening of disaster management arrangements in response to the catastrophic Mekong flooding of 2001/2, and the sophisticated flood warning systems being implemented in Bangladesh. The cases suggested are better described as increasing stress or impending crisis - the severe geographical imbalance in water resources within the PRC, growing recognition of dry season water shortage in Cambodia, or competition for water in Sri Lanka.
In crisis situations, decision makers may recognize the need to act, but have difficulty in sustaining action - memories rarely seem to be longer that 2-3 years - so change must be accomplished quickly, or the need is overtaken by more pressing concerns.
This refers to the nature of the performance/output gaps, if any, that prompted reform and institutional change in the water sector. This item is akin to impact of "crisis events", but of a more sustained nature.
Few interviewees mentioned this factor, even using different terminology, but perhaps it is such an obvious motivation for change that they did not think to point it out.
Sri Lanka is a good example of a country whose water management arrangements, while very effective for one set of circumstances, have become increasingly unable to deliver the water management services required under changing circumstances. This brings in pressure to reform.
Several interviewees pointed out that The point was made by several interviewees that a standard approach to policy reform and institutional change cannot always be used, because particular circumstances and needs require different types of intervention. Therefore, careful definition of the performance/output gaps is required, to ensure that appropriate interventions are prescribed.
The nature of the approach used to policy reform and organizational change: the level of intervention (the more senior, the better, according to Hage and Finsterbusch, 1987), use of information to measure performance and monitor progress, means of engaging all stakeholders (from villagers to the decision-making "elite", changes in organizational structure and type, use of phased change and experimentation, etc.
Many of the elements of the ADB Water Policy are, in fact, components of an approach to reform and change, e.g. enabling the participation of service beneficiaries, or enhancing inter-agency coordination. There are many others, such as tactics for engaging senior decision makers in sustained change, means of defining the performance/output gaps in a way that is constructive and encourages change, or building effective teams of people from different (sometimes competing) agencies.
This refers to the stage that reform and change has reached: the position along the particular trajectory of change that the country if following. Few countries are at the same stage and to that extent are not comparable; furthermore, Savioe (1998) shows that planned reforms rarely are brought to a conclusion before modifications are introduced, or reform even is reversed, so the trajectory itself may not be constant.
This item is important because it influences the apparent or cumulative success of reform in a particular country. On the other hand, there is no direct relationship between the elapsed time since reforms supposedly commenced, and the degree of achievement. There are several examples of countries in which reform commenced years ago, but none has progressed very far, commonly due to resistance from particular interest groups.
There are others where rapid reform suddenly commenced, as in the case of the recent development of water policy and strategy in Bangladesh, when "the time was right" (i.e. a general climate of reform prevailed or external assistance became available), or key decision-makers came to accept the need for reform and became active promoters.
The results that flow from the reform and change - operational, process, system/institutional capacity, realization of vision (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000) and, perhaps most importantly, outcomes/impacts desired by the community.
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