Water

Comparative Analysis of Water Sector Reforms
Tracking Progress in Asia and the Pacific
Phase 1 - References

Summary Notes:
Dialogue on Water Sector Reform

• Introduction
• Summary Discussion
• Overall Summary

The Dialogue was organized to take advantage of the gathering of experts for the 2004 ADB Water Week. About 20 individuals were invited to participate, selected on the basis of their in-depth knowledge of the water sector in particular countries represented at the Water Week.

The Dialogue was an informal affair, held over a buffet dinner, with participants asked to discuss, round-table style, one or more of a set of questions on water sector reform:

1. How is reform and change in the water sector linked to changes in government and the economy as a whole?
2. What are the key factors that seem to enable or promote change? …and prevent or limit change?
3. Can champions bring change that otherwise would not happen? Can gatekeepers prevent change that would have happened?
4. How much does reform and change depend on guidance from outside the country?
5. Are there areas of reform and institutional change that must happen first, or that produce the greatest or most rapid benefits?
6. Are the same policy reforms and institutional changes needed in water services and water resources management, as in other types of services and natural resources?

In the event, groups discussed the first four questions, and none reached the last two.

Top

The following points were reported by a representative of each table:

• Key factors differ widely from country to country. In China, economic development leading to environmental degradation brought change. In Cambodia, it was driven primarily by public awareness of water-related issues, which then became a government priority. In Vietnam, economic development and the need for environmental protection also was a key driver. In Pacific Islands, there is little awareness, little reform, and little change. A suggestion was made that changes in political/economic systems (in Vietnam, China, CARs) also triggered change, although this was disputed. The role of external agencies in promoting changes - e.g. river basin organizations in Vietnam - also was acknowledged (although, again, it was pointed out that some changes could be introduced in other countries with no external pressure, eg river basin organizations in Indonesia).

• Another representative listed the key factors promoting change as:

1. A crisis automatically leads to change
2. Political change such as appointment of a new Prime Minister
3. Top administrators
4. Rising public awareness, possibly as a result of a campaign (by whom?)
5. Globalization and world-wide trends/experience

Some countries are more subject to external pressures than others. Key factors preventing change include:

1. political leaders
2. top administrators
3. the bureaucracy (acting as a gatekeeper)
4. ignorance

Hence, many of the same factors can either promote or prevent change, depending on the people involved. An Indian representative considered that political parties have had little effect on trends or changes - "it's the same whichever party is in power". (Perhaps that indicates the power of top administrators, and the priority placed by politicians on other matters??) Thai representatives strongly affirmed that political figures have had a major influence in that country, while an Indonesian representative considered that the key factors are crisis, political change, and global influences.

• Other tables agreed with the importance of some form of crisis, or major event that triggers change (threshold for change), although it was also pointed out that repeated crises or events (e.g. recurrent storms, floods or droughts in the Pacific) could be so debilitating that change became impossible.

• The Malaysian representative emphasized the importance of IT and as facilitators and promoters of change. Others agreed that the HR (knowledge, skills) base is important in enabling reform, at all levels. In Bangladesh, water sector reform was an internal initiative, but there was heavy use of the many studies that already had been carried out by/for external support agencies (ESAs).

• In most countries, reform seems to have started in one area or another, and then moved - often starting in irrigation and then moving to water supply, in response to changing importance of issues such as food security, public health, and rural-urban balance of power. It was noted that aggregating water-related matters into a single Ministry has often been a strategy for disseminating reforms more widely.

• The point was made that if reform is imposed, that does not reflect real needs, it is rarely true reform. Implementation of effective reform requires a line-up of politicians, administrators, and technical people, and if any of those oppose change it will be difficult to implement. Civil society and NGOs can make a big difference in the nature and progress of change, but their role is less essential to the process. NGOs find it very difficult to exercise sustained influence (reversals are too easy, e.g at present, NGO influence seems to be waning in India). Nevertheless, they have had a large influence in many countries and areas, particularly in implementation rather than policy.

• Governments are not (in most cases?) monolithic, and there are differences of opinion within them. Reformers can use donors to promote reform that they would not be able to bring themselves. Technical people often agree with ESAs, and need external assistance to overcome political resistance (and reformed policies may be very helpful to administrators, by enabling them to resist political pressure because "the policy doesn't permit it). An Indian representative advised that reform is always led from inside in India, and that consultants are used to do what the governments want.

• Importance of champions/gatekeepers varies widely in different countries. In small countries, eg. Pacific SIDSs, everyone knows everyone, so that change can be promoted through personal contact (but also prevented through the resistance of the elders). In larger countries (China, Vietnam) it was indicated that individuals do not and cannot have personal impacts, but that decisions are more collective.

• A Thai representative agreed that countries often use donors/consultants as a tool to bring change that they could not implement themselves, but the relationship varies between countries; some countries are more susceptible to external pressure because they are poor. International organizations should be aware that they have an impact - good or bad - whatever they do. Appropriate changes can be hugely beneficial, but by promoting inappropriate change, they can create more problems than they solve.

• Another table commented that outside influences can be catalytic and are usually beneficial, but that many reforms in many countries have been "home-grown" - eg decentralization in Sri Lanka, or water policy and sector institutions in Bangladesh. (In the latter case, very rapid progress was possible, because the exercise was very much a national endeavor). Attempts to impose change from outside are rarely successful; they can be pushed through but will not be internalized or sustained. There is a danger that reform will be seen by some (for political motives?) as imposed from outside, even though it is really a home-grown initiative. If an ESA wishes to promote particular reform, it must do so in a completely transparent way, to avoid the risk of subsequent rejection. However, in many cases ESA assistance is essential for major reforms and changes, to bring in outside knowledge and experience - i.e. for implementation.



• The question was raised whether international treaties and agreements (e.g. outputs of WSSD) have any significance. Several participants affirmed that they do; wide adoption of the MDGs and the current emphasis on poverty reduction undoubtedly have been influenced by international debate. However, they do not always have an influence, or at least a sustained influence. If international agreements lead to changes in conditionalities and other practices of ESAs, then they can have major and long-lasting impacts, however.

• Concern was expressed at the tendency for policy fashions, introduced and replaced on a time scale too short to be fully assimilated. Vocabulary may change, but actions do not. It was pointed out that some countries will go along with international trends and agreements because they know that resources will be available to them. Because some of these trends are relatively long-term (e.g. MDGs), present-day politicians may accept them without conviction, because they do not have immediate impact on budgets or require commitment beyond the electoral cycle.

• The Malaysian representative affirmed that, if new ideas will do good for Malaysia, then they will be adopted, and international events/agreements have benefit in disseminating new ideas and technology. It is up to the individual country to choose what is suitable for itself. Thai representatives noted that new ideas from outside, e.g. with regard to RBOs, could be adopted and then be "internalized" by reviving and aligning their own traditional and national knowledge and practice.

• One table discussed decentralization, as an example of a particular reform. Points made included:


1. Devolution without money/resources isn't real devolution, and Ministries of Finance often attempt to retain central control by controlling the money
2. Local shares are often required as a demonstration of commitment/ownership. These can be subverted eg. in Bangladesh local contractors will pay the 10% required local share to get the work in a particular village. Ways must be found to avoid this, so that all villages have equal opportunity to benefit. It is important that commitment be long-term, in implementation and O&M, and not just at project initiation.
3. A critical need is good monitoring.
4. It was suggested that desalinization has been a major cause of reform, to decentralize the formerly centralized colonial administration.
5. Decentralization often results from central government's lack of funds and the need to devolve costs
6. Planning and implementation of decentralization must be comprehensive - including staffing etc (not just government; also NGOs, community based organizations, etc)
7. Politicians often are happier with decentralization than the administrators (except that local governments often are a different political party)
8. Noted that in Vietnam resources came from different sources in different parts of the country: central government, UNICEF, local share … Beneficiaries have to pay 100% of O&M everywhere, but start-up local contribution varies regionally - only 10% in mountains. Water supply and sanitation in Vietnam is by state or private companies, with privatization progressively extending. Originally there was resistance to paying for water; this was dealt with by progressive increase in tariffs commensurate with increasing service standards, and educational programs through the Mothers Union etc.

Top

There seemed to be strong agreement among participants that reform and change in the national water sector can be seen in the context of nation-wide trends in politics/governance/economy, and - despite widely agreed and accepted international trends - is very much country-specific in terms of the factors that initiate and guide change. ESAs certainly can support and promote change, not least by channeling knowledge and experience, but they must be aware of and work within the national context and constraints.