Politically Motivated Trade Protection

Publication | June 2024
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This paper shows that the Electoral College system used to elect presidents of the United States (US) distorts US federal policies in favor of key industries in swing states.

Using detailed data on US trade policies, the paper finds that the level of trade protection granted to an industry during a presidential term depends on its importance in expected swing states in elections at the end of that term. Swing-state politics only matters during first terms, when the incumbent president can be reelected. As a result, swing-state politics generates winners and losers: it fosters growth in protected industries, but hampers growth in downstream industries.

Contents

  • Introduction
  • Related Literature
  • Antidumping Protection in the United States
  • Data and Variables
  • Swing-State Politics and US Trade Protection
  • Effects of Politically Motivated Trade Protection
  • Conclusion

Additional Details

Authors
Type
Series
Subjects
  • Economics
  • Industry and trade
Pages
  • 50
Dimensions
  • 8.5 x 11
SKU
  • WPS240322-2
ISSN
  • 2313-6537 (print)
  • 2313-6545 (electronic)

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