Traditional Procurement versus Public–Private Partnership: A Comparison of Procurement Modalities Focusing on Bundling Contract Effects

Publication | September 2018

This study explores an optimal structure of procurement contracts between public and private partners by comparing traditional procurement and public–private partnerships.

The study sets up a principal–agent model, focusing on bundling effects of procurement, and shows that this effect is one of the main sources of efficiency gains for PPPs. An examination of the PPP project data reveals that the efficiency gain has not been fully realized in the Republic of Korea due to the imbalanced contract participation of different types of investors.

Contents 

  • Introduction
  • Theoretical Models of Procurement Contracts
  • Empirical Analysis of Public–Private Partnership Projects in the Republic of Korea
  • Conclusion

Additional Details

Authors
Type
Series
Subjects
  • Governance and public sector management
  • Public procurement systems
  • Private sector development
  • Public-Private Partnerships
Countries
  • Korea, Republic of
Pages
  • 20
Dimensions
  • 8.5 x 11
SKU
  • WPS189560-2
ISSN
  • 2313-6537 (print)
  • 2313-6545 (electronic)

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