Validation Report

Reference Number: PVR-392
Project Number: 36105
Loan Number: 2147
February 2015

Bangladesh: Chittagong Port Trade Facilitation Project

Independent Evaluation Department
Asian Development Bank
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I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

A. Rationale

1. During project preparation, the economy of Bangladesh had expanded at an average annual rate of more than 5% over a 5-year period. International trade also grew at 10% per annum. By 2003, about 45% of total exports were destined to the European Union and more than 25% to the United States (US), while about 30% of total imports were from the People’s Republic of China and India. About 85% of exports and 25% of imports were textiles or textile materials.¹

¹ ADB. 2004. Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loan and Technical Assistance Grant to Bangladesh for the Chittagong Port Trade Facilitation Project. Manila.
2. More than a third of the country’s economic activity was located within the Dhaka–Chittagong corridor, where the bulk of international trade is generated. Three modes of transport serve the corridor—road, rail, and inland waterways, which together account for 20 million tons of freight annually. There are three main ports in Bangladesh: Chittagong, Mongla, and Dhaka–Narayanganj, with 80% of the trade flowing through the port of Chittagong. Chittagong Port is an integral part of the subregional transport and logistics chain connecting northeastern India, Bhutan, and Nepal to Europe, North America, and Southeast Asia. The efficiency of the transportation system in the Dhaka–Chittagong corridor and the port of Chittagong in particular, was considered vital for sustained economic growth.

3. Chittagong Port is owned and operated by the Chittagong Port Authority (CPA). The government, through provisions in the CPA Ordinance, oversees planning, expenditure, and human resource management. In the last 10 years, container throughput at the port increased, on average, approximately 5% annually. In 2003, it handled over 600,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) and about 21 million tons of bulk cargo. Freight traffic was expected to reach 43 million tons with container throughput of about 1.78 million TEUs by 2016. Direct employment by the CPA was approximately 8,500 with additional employment for 6,200 dockworkers, 5,300 merchant laborers, and 3,000 stevedores. The total annual wages and salaries of these groups amounted to about 27% of the CPA’s total revenue in fiscal year 2002–2003. The government planned to reduce the labor force through an early retirement program beginning in May 2004, and outsource more activities to privately owned off-dock facilities. These were to allow the introduction of more mechanized cargo handling.

4. During the same period, container dwell times at Chittagong Port remained high, and were rising sharply due to manual operations management and document processing methods. Under the manual methods, documents passed through various stages, requiring 48 endorsements, which increased dwell times and created opportunities for corruption. The manual container tracking system delayed container movements in the yard. Without information technology, berth productivity was expected to further decline and add to shipping costs. Even with a computerized port management system, a few customs processing rules in force could limit port capacity. Delays on taking delivery of import cargoes and the inefficient auctioning rules of the Customs House of Chittagong (CHC) for unclaimed consignments added to container dwell times.

5. The government’s ratification of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (Marine Pollution and Prevention Convention [MARPOL] 73/78) in September 2003 was expected to limit port capacity unless oil-waste reception and treatment facilities, and other basic infrastructure and equipment necessary for managing maritime waste were provided. No routine monitoring of the concentration of pollutants, including oil and grease, was being conducted in the port area.

B. Expected Impact

6. The project’s envisaged impact was the facilitation of trade. The impact indicators were annual percentage increases in both national gross domestic product (GDP) and trade, after project completion. The baseline and target years, GDP and trade data, and expected percentage changes were not indicated.
C. Objectives or Expected Outcome

7. The project’s expected outcome was increase in container terminal capacity. The outcome performance indicators were (i) sustained annual growth in container throughput at above 6% in the first 6 years after project completion; (ii) reduced port charges by 20% within 2 years of project completion; and (iii) reduced vessel turnaround time and berth occupancy rate by 20% within 2 years of project completion.

D. Outputs

8. The project had three intended groups of outputs with interrelated sub-outputs. The outputs of the CPA comprised five sub-outputs. The first pertained to the installation of a computerized container terminal management system (CTMS) and upgrading of the existing management information system (MIS), including provision of training for CPA staff in the use and upkeep of the CTMS and MIS. The CTMS was to interface with the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA)++ system of the CHC. The second was improvement of the port environment and the environmental management capacity of the CPA by (i) installing facilities for receiving and separating oil waste from ships; (ii) providing equipment to handle oil spills; and (iii) constructing a building to store spill-management equipment and material, and house a laboratory and the port’s environment monitoring office.

9. The third sub-output was the reconstruction and upgrading of internal roads and the bridge between the Chittagong Container Terminal (CCT) and the general cargo berths, and the improvement of two access or egress points (gates). The fourth pertained to the construction of a 900-meter port service road and bridge for direct access from the yard to the port park. The last sub-output was provision for consulting services for the design of the CTMS and the MIS and civil works, oil-waste receptor, and separation plant; and supervision of the supply of goods and services; and contract administration.

10. The CHC’s output consisted of the activation of the manifest module of the ASYCUDA++ system and provision of workstations with connection to the CTMS; installation of a system of container scanners; and (iii) consulting services for supervision of the supply of goods and services, contract administration, and on-the-job training on the use and maintenance of the ASYCUDA++ and the scanner system. The construction of a 1.7-kilometer access-controlled road (Chittagong Port access road) to the yards of the Chittagong Container Terminal and the New Mooring Container Terminal and related consulting services for the design of civil works, construction supervision, and contract administration comprised the output of the Roads and Highways Department (RHD).

E. Provision of Inputs

11. The total cost of the project at the time of approval was $41.3 million, but the actual costs were reduced to $27.8 million because of the CHC’s decision during implementation to refurbish the automation system and procure four container scanners using government funds. The exchange rate fluctuations between the taka and the dollar also contributed to lowering project cost at completion. These led to the cancellation of $12.5 million or 30% of loan funds—$7.0 million during implementation and $5.5 million undisbursed loan balance at loan closing.²

12. The project was classified category B under the Asian Development Bank (ADB) environmental category requirements. The initial environmental examination showed no major adverse environmental impacts associated with the project, which is located within the existing port jurisdiction and does not encroach upon the coastal areas. A mitigation and monitoring plan was designed, which required measures to be put in place, to address minor, localized, and temporary impacts such as soil erosion and vegetation damage, and the possible spread of potentially hazardous materials and waste in the project area.

13. At appraisal, land acquisition and other resettlement impacts were considered not significant, although about 112 individuals in 19 households, 6 businesses, and 3 community buildings were to be affected. The affected persons were mainly informal dwellers, and their removal triggered resettlement safeguards with appropriate compensation packages provided under the resettlement plan. At completion, 177 individuals were affected by the project. The project completion report (PCR) indicated that the resettlement plan was implemented successfully (footnote 2).

14. At appraisal, the project required an estimated input of 141 person-months of international and 180 person-months of national consulting services. The actual consulting services input at completion were 333 person-months of international and 538 person-months of national consulting services. The increase was attributed to the extended supervision time for the CTMS and port connector roads. Five teams of consultants were engaged. The recruitment and fielding of the consultants was delayed by about 33 months because of the lack of advance actions by the executing agencies and the government’s protracted recruitment procedures.

15. An advisory technical assistance (TA) with two components attached to the loan was financed by ADB in the amount of $700,000 equivalent on a grant basis from the Japan Special Fund (footnote 1). The first component under the Ministry of Communications (MOC) was to address hinterland transportation and logistics issues at the macro level, while the second component under the CPA targeted specifically the port of Chittagong to ensure sustainability of project benefits. The MOC consultants submitted a final report, which recommended improvements in logistical systems; multimodal transport; and institutional, legal, and policy changes.

16. The CPA consultants recommended major improvements in the CPA and the CHC operations. These included more efficient container berth management, labor management and payments, CHC procedures, port/berth security; removal of containers from the port area; and elimination of the Dock Workers Management Board. A plan for the strategic reform of the CPA and the CHC was proposed, which was to cover the reorganization of the CPA into a port regulator so that all operations would be contracted to the private sector; preparation of a master plan; improvement of the tariff system; and reform of customs procedures. The TA completion report observed that the outputs of the two consultants had overlapped because some parts of the terms of reference were redundant. It rated the TA partly successful because of the start-up delay of 21 months and the revision of the terms of reference for the CPA components. 

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Footnote 2: The PCR indicated that the US Trade and Development Agency provided grant funds for the detailed assessment of needs, including preparation of technical specifications, and training on law enforcement and procurement of container scanners. The grant was designed to enable technology-based security management measures of the CPA and the CHC to be integrated with the scanner system to maximize the utility of the CHC component financed under the project.
F. Implementation Arrangements

17. As envisaged at appraisal, the CPA, the CHC, and the RHD were the executing agencies for their respective outputs (paras. 8–10). A project implementation unit (PIU) was established to administer each output. The PCR indicated that a coordination committee, headed by the chair of the CPA—and with the CHC commissioner and the additional chief engineer of the RHD as members—was established and served as a channel of communication and coordination of activities among the three executing agencies. At the plenary level, an interministerial steering committee chaired by the secretary of the MOS with representatives of the MOC, the National Board of Revenue, the Economic Relations Division of the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission, and representatives of the three executing agencies as members, was formed. It periodically reviewed implementation progress and provided guidance, as required. This validation notes that the Chittagong City Corporation (CCC) was not represented in the project coordination committee, when some project subcomponents were to be implemented within the city limits. This could have avoided the delay in the construction of pier 19 of the flyover, for example, since the CCC did not give clearance to the location for some time (para. 26).

18. The PCR noted that the compliance of the government and executing agencies with the major loan covenants was satisfactory, except for compliance delays in a few cases. The delayed compliance related to the publication of a schedule of port tariffs and charges by the port service improvement committee and the construction of a new customs warehouse along the Bangladesh Railway corridor adjacent to the port access road. Construction work commenced only in January 2014 with government financing and was scheduled for completion in January 2015. Other covenants that were delayed pertained to the baseline data that were not prepared for the project performance management system (PPMS) and the final draft of the Anticorruption Strategy, which was submitted to ADB only in April 2008. The borrower and executing agencies substantially met the reporting requirements stipulated by the loan covenants. This validation notes that the baseline data, as required under the loan covenant, were not submitted, and the new tariff schedule was not published—which should have been considered as noncompliance.

II. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE AND RATINGS

A. Relevance of Design and Formulation

19. The PCR rated the project relevant. It indicated that the project’s design and formulation were consistent with the government’s development objectives in both the Fifth Five-Year Plan4 and the Sixth Five-Year Plan.5 The PCR also noted that the project was in line with ADB’s strategy in the transport sector in general and the port and roads subsector in particular. This validation assesses that the project was consistent with the development priorities of Bangladesh and the country and sector strategies of ADB.

20. This validation also rates the formulation of project design appropriate. However, it notes the cancellation of the financing allocation for the container scanners (para. 11). The government decided to pursue the acquisition of the scanners using its own funds, when ADB funding was already made available as agreed. The PCR and the loan review mission reports did not explain the reason for this sudden decision. The PCR noted that this could have been

avoided had there been greater consultations between ADB and the CHC during project preparation. This validation notes that the cancellation did not affect the subsequent implementation of the project. On the whole, this validation rates the project relevant.

B. Effectiveness in Achieving Project Outcome and Outputs

21. The PCR rated the project highly effective in achieving its outcome. It indicated that the project attained most of the targeted outputs, including the procurement, installation, and operation of the container scanners. The completion of these outputs enabled the port, as noted by the PCR, to show a 10% annual growth in container throughputs from 2005 to 2012 as against the target of above 6%, although container traffic declined slightly in 2013 because of the adverse political situation in the country. However, both the PCR and this validation noted that port charges had not been reduced by 20% within 2 years of project completion as stipulated in the project framework. The PCR indicated that the port service improvement committee commenced a survey in February 2014 for publishing a schedule of reduced port tariff and charges by 2014. It also indicated the reduction in vessel turnaround time by 42% as against the target of 20% and berth occupancy rate was reduced by 42% as against the target of 20%.

22. This validation notes that the output performance indicators were actually outcome indicators. The following targeted and actual values of indicators were achieved: (i) reduction in average customs clearance time for import containers by 35% (target: 30%); (ii) increase in the annual number of customs declarations by 27% (target: 20%); (iii) reduction in average container dwell time at the port by 50% (target: at least 20%); (iv) reduction in customs inspection time by 32% (target: 30%); (v) use of the connector road by 80% of all traffic to and from container terminals (target: 50%); (vi) reduction in the number of vehicles inside the port at any given time by 60% (target: 50%); (vii) reduction in vehicle waiting time to enter and exit the port by 32% (target: 30%); and (viii) reduction in oil content in water at sample stations in Karnaphuli River within 2 years of project completion. The PCR noted that the CPA fully met the requirements specified under the International Shipping and Port Security Code, including those specified under the container security initiatives launched by the US Customs in 2002.

23. This validation notes that the project’s PPMS was not fully operational and no baseline data collection surveys were conducted as required under the loan covenant (para. 18). This brings into question the data used in measuring the achievement of outcome and impact performance targets. There were also issues pertaining to both impact and outcome attributions. The growth in container traffic and the improvement in vessel turnaround time and berth occupancy could not all be credited to the project; these could be because of the improved port operation by the CPA with its acquisition of four new gantry cranes and the operation of the new 1,000-meter container quay with a capacity of 500,000 TEUs (New Mooring Container Terminal) and management by a private entity under a concession agreement. This was equipped with additional gantry cranes, and has a 220,000-square meter back-up area to help speed up container handling and lower ship turnaround times leading to lower freight rates. In view of the lack of evidence that port charges were reduced by 20% within 2 years of project completion, as indicated in the project framework (report and recommendation of the President [RRP], Appendix 1), the lack of baseline data to validate the achievement of performance targets, and the problem with attributing improvements in port operations solely to the project, this validation rates the project effective.

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6 The Chittagong Port Authority continues to implement the Schedule of Charges on Goods and Vessels, etc. of 25 April 2007: portal.cpa.gov.bd/home.php?option=rules_regulations
C. Efficiency of Resource Use in Achieving Outcome and Outputs

24. The PCR rated the project efficient. Its reevaluation of the project showed higher incremental economic benefits at project completion compared with appraisal, particularly for the CPA and the RHD outputs. The project resulted in two types of economic benefits: (i) reduction in vessel turnaround time, which benefit vessel owners through savings in vessel waiting times and operating costs; and (ii) reduction in the capital cost of cargo owners, shippers, and consignees as the need to maintain inventory is less because of the quicker disposal of containers to shipping agencies. Benefits to vessel owners accrued in two categories: 100% benefits from savings of waiting time for normal traffic and 50% benefits from savings of waiting time for incremental traffic. The benefits accruing from reduced container dwell time were computed for ready-made garments (textile items) and other general cargo (non-textile items). All financial benefits were converted into economic benefits by applying a standard conversion factor. The overall recalculated economic internal rate of return (EIRR) was 24.98%, which was higher than the 21.6% computed at appraisal.

25. However, attributing improvements in port and vessel operations to the project alone could be difficult. When the project was being implemented, other port improvements were either being implemented or completed. The increase in berthing and container storage space, acquisition and operation of additional and new container handling equipment such as gantry cranes, straddle carriers, reach stackers, tractor-trailers, other minor container-handling equipment, and private sector management of port operations could be responsible for most of the benefits that were attributed to the project. The PCR could have exerted more effort in allocating benefits to various project and non-project-related improvements to come up with a more realistic estimate of benefits attributable to the project. The absence of baseline information had also made reevaluation of project benefits unreliable.

26. In process efficiency, the project experienced 42 months of implementation delays. These were attributed to initial start-up delays because of the protracted process of making the loan effective (5 months after approval of loan) and initial delays in recruiting loan consultants for design and in procuring equipment for waste reception and oil spill protection. There was also a 6-month delay in implementing the CTMS and the MIS because of the expanded scope of the CTMS coverage and facilities, and the time required to educate the thousands of port users on the new system. Likewise, the implementation of the port connector road was behind schedule by about 18 months. This was attributed to delays in moving and removing utility lines. There was also a delay in the construction of pier 19 of the flyover by about 9 months since clearance from the CCC was not obtained on time. The construction of the connector road fell behind schedule by 5 months because of poor stabilization of the subsurface foundation soil. In spite of the delays, however, the project still registered a high EIRR, indicating robust economic viability. Based on these, this validation rates the project efficient.

D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability

27. The PCR rated the project likely sustainable. It indicated that the CPA operates as an independent legal entity, allows autonomous management of the port and is fully regimented with the operations, based on a sound commercial footing. Port operations involving cargo and container handling and management of the container yard have been outsourced to the private sector. The PCR noted that these have improved the speed and reduced the cost of container handling at the port. It also noted that the addition of gantry cranes, and other container-handling equipment, improvement of the port’s internal roads and bridge, construction of the
port connector road, and operationalization of the CTMS and the MIS have enhanced the port’s operational efficiency and commercial profitability.

28. Likewise, the PCR indicated that with port throughput growing at about 10% per annum and doubling during 2005–2013, port revenue earnings increased by more than 100% during the same period. Operating revenue increased by more than 12% annually during 2006–2013, indicating increased imports and exports through Chittagong Port. The growth in operating expenses was estimated at 6%–7% a year during 2006–2013, resulting in the decrease in operating ratios to 32% in 2012 from 47% in 2007. Returns on total assets remained in the 16%–19% range. The high profitability of the CPA was attributed also to high interest income from bank deposit, with more than 40% of the operating income in 2012 coming from interest on fixed deposits. Because of the large surplus and low level of external debt, the debt service ratio is very high.

29. The financial reevaluation of the project resulted in a financial internal rate of return of 16.4%, less than the appraisal estimate of 18.0% and was attributed to project implementation delays. The PCR indicated that the project demonstrated financial viability and generated sufficient cash flow to support incremental operating costs.

30. The funding for the repair and maintenance of the project roads is dependent on government allocating the required financing for these activities. While not assured, funding may be sourced from the government’s Road Maintenance Fund Board that was set up on 22 July 2013. This included a mechanism to mobilize the resources needed for road maintenance from user charges and it was expected to contribute to sustainability by mitigating the RHD’s maintenance funding constraints. On the whole, this validation rates the project likely sustainable.

E. Impact

31. The PCR indicated that the preliminary assessment of the project’s impact was substantial. It indicated that for 2012–2013 after project completion, the country’s GDP grew by about 6% on average per year. Trade via Chittagong Port increased to 41.9 million tons in 2012 from 25.9 million tons in 2005, but decreased to 37.9 million tons in 2013 because of political turmoil. However, GDP and trade growth could not be wholly attributed to the project; some effort is required to measure the project’s contribution to the improvement in these impact performance indicators.

32. The PCR noted that the improved port facilities, connector roads, environmental improvement measures, automation, and use of scanners by the CHC, and introduction of the CTMS and the MIS by the CPA generated economic, commercial, environmental, and social benefits to the target port users in particular, and to the country’s population in general. These benefits helped achieve the project goals of trade facilitation through the improvement of port facilities and provision of speedier and economical transport links between Chittagong Port and the capital city and hinterland through the Dhaka–Chittagong corridor. On the environment, the installation of facilities for receiving and separating oil waste from ships and the provision of equipment to handle oil spills helped improve water quality in the port and its vicinity. On the whole, this validation rates the project’s impact highly significant.
III. OTHER PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS

A. Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency

33. The PCR rated the performance of the borrower and executing agencies *satisfactory*. It noted that the steering committee fulfilled most of its tasks in monitoring project implementation and providing strategic guidance on interagency and inter-ministry issues. The CPA assisted the PIU and project consultants on procurement, infrastructure development, installation and operationalization of the equipment for the CTMS, waste collection and reception, and environmental management. The RHD managed the construction of the port connector road, including the flyover through the city center. However, significant delays were encountered by the road subcomponents due to various reasons (para. 26). Nonetheless, the interfacing of works for the CPA and the RHD outputs was managed well, thus minimizing further implementation delays. The government provided counterpart funds regularly, and no shortage was reported during project implementation. On the whole, this validation rates borrower and executing agency performance *satisfactory*.

B. Performance of the Asian Development Bank

34. The PCR rated ADB’s performance *satisfactory* based on its timely response to the government’s request for support and the reasonably short time taken to process the loan. The project design incorporated lessons learned from previous ADB-assisted transport sector and port development projects in Bangladesh. The PCR indicated that ADB responded quickly to issues during project implementation, with the Bangladesh Resident Mission carrying out close and effective coordination through regular meetings with the executing agencies and with project review missions. ADB fielded one inception mission, eight project review missions, three special project review missions, and a midterm review mission. The missions were effective in identifying and resolving implementation issues in a timely manner.

35. This validation notes that the project review mission report of 5–24 November 2008 recommended that the CPA or the RHD plan a truck-parking terminal to avoid congestion in the Chittagong Port access road. However, still no action was made on this matter. On the PPMS, the review missions failed to ensure full compliance to the loan covenant and, based on the various review mission reports, had assumed that the government was in full compliance although the baseline surveys or data were not fully submitted up to the project’s completion. On the whole, this validation rates ADB’s performance *satisfactory*.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT, LESSONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Overall Assessment and Ratings

36. The PCR rated the project *successful*. This validation rates the project *successful* but gives a lower rating on effectiveness (see table). This validation notes that the required port tariff adjustment was not attained. While increases in port throughput and improvement in vessel turnaround time and berth occupancy rates surpassed the targets set at appraisal, these improvements could not be entirely attributed to the project. Other port improvements had also taken place and could have been responsible for the major improvements observed.
### Overall Ratings

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<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>PCR</th>
<th>IED Review</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreement and/or Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Lack of evidence that port charges were reduced by 20% within 2 years of project completion. The improvements in port operations, vessel operations, and cargo throughput could not be solely attributed to the project (paras. 22–23).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effectiveness in achieving project outcome and outputs</td>
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<td>Effective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preliminary assessment of sustainability</td>
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<td>Likely sustainable</td>
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<td>Overall Assessment</td>
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<td>Borrower and executing agency</td>
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<td>Quality of PCR</td>
<td>Refer to para. 41.</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
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ADB = Asian Development Bank, GDP = gross domestic product, IED = Independent Evaluation Department, PCR = project completion report.

### B. Lessons

37. The PCR identified a few important lessons from the project. A more effective, high-level coordinating body needs to be established for a complex project of this nature, which comprised various groups of outputs. This could help regularly monitor a project’s implementation progress. Planning and coordinating preliminary activities must be done well to minimize delays, including the use of advance actions. Sufficient consultation during project preparation should be undertaken in light of the CHC’s decision during implementation not to use ADB funds for their automation program.

38. This validation offers a few lessons. During project implementation, constant follow-up is needed on the operationalization of the PPMS and the conduct of baseline and other survey/data collection requirements that could be used in the PCR’s preparation. Likewise, the membership in the project coordination committee could have included a representative of the CCC. While not directly implementing any component, the CCC could have expedited the implementation of activities within the Chittagong city proper and helped avoid delays.

### C. Recommendations for Follow-Up

39. The Bangladesh Resident Mission could follow up on implementing the PPMS and the regular collection of data to comply with the relevant loan covenant. In particular, the issue on attribution of project benefits and the formulation of an acceptable method in assessing such benefits needs to be resolved. This could allow for a more realistic measurement of project benefits.
V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP

A. Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation, and Utilization

40. The project’s PPMS was not fully implemented. The PCR acknowledged that the baseline data were not prepared, and data from ADB’s project preparatory TA was used to monitor and evaluate project impacts as set forth in the PPMS. This was inadequate as non-project activities were being undertaken and completed before the start of project implementation. These could already affect performance indicators prior to project implementation. These non-project activities generated the same type of benefits, from which the attribution issue occurred.

B. Comments on Project Completion Report Quality

41. This validation rates the PCR quality satisfactory, given the information and analysis provided. The PCR ratings for effectiveness and efficiency attributed improvements in port operations, container throughput, vessel turnaround time, and container dwell time to the project, when a major share of these could be due to other port improvement factors implemented before or during project implementation. The PCR estimate of the EIRR seemed overstated given the benefit attribution issue. It also noted full compliance with loan covenants, when, in fact, the executing agencies did not completely implement the PPMS as no baseline data collection/surveys were used in the PCR. However, these deficiencies could have been avoided had a proper PPMS been implemented. Also, such analysis require more sophisticated research, possibly using computer modeling, as most of the cause and effect are intertwined. However, these were outside the capacity of the PCR to correct at project completion.

C. Data Sources for Validation


D. Recommendation for Independent Evaluation Department Follow-Up

43. The preparation of a project performance evaluation report (PPER) may be prepared in or after 2017 to allow project benefits to be measured more carefully. The PPER could provide a benefit attribution method to measure project outcomes and impact performance indicators more accurately.