



# Validation Report

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Reference Number: PVR-364  
Project Number: 39304-012  
Grant Number: 0020  
December 2014\*

## Kyrgyz Republic: Second Education Project

Independent Evaluation Department  
**Asian Development Bank**

\* Revised May 2015.

## ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	–	Asian Development Bank
CPIU	–	central project implementation unit
DMF	–	design and monitoring framework
ESDP	–	Education Sector Development Program
KAE	–	Kyrgyz Academy of Education
LTM	–	learning and teaching materials
MOES	–	Ministry of Education and Science
PCR	–	project completion report
RRP	–	report and recommendation of the President
REP	–	Rural Education Project (of the World Bank)
RPIU	–	regional project implementation unit
RTIS	–	rural teacher incentive scheme

## NOTE

In this report, “\$” refers to US dollars.

### Key Words

access and participation, adb, asian development bank, classroom rehabilitation, curriculum reform, education, kyrgyz republic, learning assessment, strengthening teacher training

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## PROJECT BASIC DATA

<b>Project Number:</b>	39304-012	<b>PCR Circulation Date:</b>	Jun 2013	
<b>Grant Number:</b>	0020	<b>PCR Validation Date:</b>	Dec 2014	
<b>Project Name:</b>	<b>Second Education Project</b>			
<b>Country:</b>	Kyrgyz Republic		<b>Approved</b> (\$ million)	<b>Actual</b> (\$ million)
<b>Sector:</b>	Education	<b>Total Project Costs:</b>	21.85	17.66
<b>ADB Financing:</b> (\$ million)	<b>ADF:</b> 15.50	<b>Grant:</b>	15.50	14.13
		<b>Borrower:</b>	6.35	3.53
	<b>OCR:</b> 0.00	<b>Beneficiaries:</b>	0.00	0.00
		<b>Others:</b>	0.00	0.00
<b>Cofinancier:</b>		<b>Total Cofinancing:</b>	0.00	0.00
<b>Approval Date:</b>	27 Oct 2005	<b>Effectiveness Date:</b>	3 Feb 2006	6 Apr 2006
<b>Signing Date:</b>	5 Nov 2005	<b>Closing Date:</b>	30 Jun 2011	30 Jun 2012
<b>Project Officers:</b>	A. Chyngysheva G. J. Tentieva M. Razaev	<b>Location:</b> Kyrgyz Resident Mission Kyrgyz Resident Mission Kyrgyz Resident Mission	<b>From:</b> Nov 2006 Aug 2010 Jan 2012	<b>To:</b> Jul 2010 Dec 2011 Jun 2012
<b>Validator:</b>	M. J. Walsh, Consultant	<b>Peer Reviewer:</b>	M. Vijayaraghavan, Senior Evaluation Specialist, IED2 B. Prakash, Consultant	
<b>Quality Reviewer:</b>	E. Gozali, Principal Evaluation Specialist. IED1	<b>Director:</b>	W. Kolkma, IED1	

ADB = Asian Development Bank; ADF = Asian Development Fund; IED1 = Independent Evaluation Department, Division 1; IED2 = Independent Evaluation Department, Division 2; OCR = ordinary capital resources; PCR = project completion report.

## I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

### A. Rationale

1. The Second Education Project<sup>1</sup> was designed specifically to further build on the achievements of the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP)<sup>2</sup> and to help the Kyrgyz Republic sustain its education-related Millennium Development Goals. The ESDP was the first education project provided by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. It was introduced to arrest the deterioration of basic education services since independence. The ESDP helped the government start the restoration of quality education services and to focus on (i) implementing policy reforms in education finance, (ii) rationalizing the Ministry of Education and Science (MOES) staffing, (iii) enhancing private sector participation in the production of textbooks, and (iv) providing assistance to poor families to enable them to enroll their children in basic and early childhood education. Despite the achievements of the ESDP, textbooks and learning materials were still outdated, the supply of new teachers was inadequate, in-service training for existing teachers was insufficient, and the dilapidated state of rural schools still persisted. For ESDP, the government borrowed from ADB to initiate the rehabilitation of the education sector and clear the backlog while this Second Education project was financed by ADB on a grant basis.

<sup>1</sup> ADB. 2005. *Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Asian Development Fund Grant to the Kyrgyz Republic for the Second Education Project*. Manila.

<sup>2</sup> ADB. 1997. *Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors: Proposed Loans and a Technical Assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic for the Education Sector Development Program*. Manila.

2. The project was planned and designed to focus on (i) modernizing the curriculum, developing learning materials for it, and revising learning assessments to promote a student-centered teaching-learning process; (ii) comprehensively supporting teachers and school principals by strengthening in-service teacher training; and (iii) upgrading schools in rural and poor areas by rehabilitating facilities and providing new equipment and learning materials.

## **B. Expected Impact**

3. The expected impact of the project was an enhanced general education system that is responsive to the needs of a modern, market-oriented economy and focused on poorer areas of the country. Impact indicators in the design and monitoring framework (DMF) were reduced youth unemployment rates, more secondary school graduates accepted into universities, and an improvement in the quality of learning of rural students.

## **C. Objectives or Expected Outcome**

4. The expected outcomes of the project were increased enrollment in primary and general secondary education in poorer areas of the country, and improved student performance as measured by learning outcomes. The project outcomes would be measured by (i) increased enrollment rates across basic education and upper secondary education, (ii) increased number of students advancing from lower to upper secondary education, (iii) increased average daily attendance at project-supported schools, (iv) improved performance in national examinations, and (v) reduced student–teacher ratio in project-supported rural schools.

## **D. Outputs**

5. The project has three types of outputs under different components. Output 1 involved modernizing the curriculum and learning assessment, Output 2 required strengthening the teaching profession, and Output 3 entailed improving participation and quality in rural schools.

6. **Output 1. Modernizing the curriculum and learning assessment.** This has three sets of outputs. The first set—modernizing the curriculum and developing new learning materials—was designed to develop a national curriculum framework with a new curriculum and a student-centered learning process for all subject areas and for all grades. It aimed to support the phased development of new textbooks and learning materials for grades 1–5, 6–9, and 10–11 or 12. Prior to the development of the new curriculum, a series of policy studies were to be conducted to help MOES implement its overall education strategy.

7. The second set—modernizing learning assessment—aimed to develop and implement for each grade a clear assessment policy, assessment standards, and regulations on formative and summative classroom assessment systems.

8. The third set—raising public awareness on the new curriculum and learning assessment—intended to conduct participatory forums and use multimedia programs and materials to provide information and advocacy on the reforms.

9. **Output 2. Strengthening the teaching profession.** This comprised two sets of outputs that included (i) strengthening in-service teacher training, and (ii) providing incentives for rural teachers to work in isolated posts. The first subcomponent was to strengthen the in-service training of teachers and principals to deal with the full range of curriculum reforms, and to upgrade teachers' professional skills. The project aimed to strengthen the capacity of the

National Teacher Training Institute at Kyrgyz Academy of Education (KAE), along with seven teacher training institutes (TTIs), to deliver professional in-service training for teachers and school principals in all other *oblasts* (provinces). The second set was to support a pilot rural teacher incentive scheme (RTIS) to attract and retain teachers in rural schools.

10. **Output 3. Improving participation and quality in rural schools.** This aimed to help MOES rehabilitate and upgrade school facilities and infrastructure by repairing dilapidated structures, improving sanitation, and providing access for handicapped students in selected rural schools.

## **E. Provision of Inputs**

11. The total cost of the project at appraisal was \$21.85 million equivalent, including physical and price contingencies, taxes, and duties. ADB was to provide a grant of \$15.50 million equivalent to finance 71% of the total project cost. The remaining \$6.35 million equivalent, or 29%, was to be provided by the government.

## **F. Implementation Arrangements**

12. The executing agency was to be MOES. A national project steering council was to provide overall strategic policy guidance, monitor implementation, and coordinate with the World Bank's Rural Education Project (REP).<sup>3</sup> A central project implementation unit (CPIU) headed by a project manager was to be established to coordinate day-to-day project activities and be staffed by domestic consultants. Two regional project implementation units (RPIUs) headed by regional project coordinators were to be located in two *oblast* departments of education and were to be responsible for project activities in their respective areas. The project was to contract both international and domestic (local) consulting services with around 70% to be allocated for the CPIU and the 2 RPIUs. These were to include experts in the fields of policy research and evaluation, curriculum and learning materials design, learning assessment, teacher training, procurement, finance, civil engineering, project management, accounting, monitoring and evaluation, and translation.

13. The National Project Steering Council did not meet on a quarterly basis as originally planned; it only met once in October 2008. Intended coordination between the project and the World Bank's REP did not proceed as originally envisaged, and the only overlap occurred through the MOES deputy minister, who was the national director for both projects.

# **II. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE AND RATINGS**

## **A. Relevance of Design and Formulation**

14. The project completion report (PCR) rated the project design *relevant*.<sup>4</sup> It was designed to continue the achievements of ESDP and is consistent with the ADB country partnership strategy (2004–2006),<sup>5</sup> and with the ADB Education by 2020 sector operations plan, which focused on the improvement of teacher training, revising the curriculum, and improving the efficiency of education service delivery.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> World Bank. 2004. *Kyrgyz Republic Rural Education Project*. Washington, D.C.

<sup>4</sup> ADB. 2013. *Completion Report: Second Education Project in the Kyrgyz Republic*. Manila.

<sup>5</sup> ADB. 2004. *Country Partnership Strategy: Kyrgyz Republic, 2004–2006*. Manila.

<sup>6</sup> ADB. 2010. *Education by 2020: A Sector Operations Plan*. Manila.

15. This validation, however, notes four issues relating to the project design. First, the project scope was deemed to be overly ambitious. The project proposed the development and implementation of a new curriculum framework, a new 11- or 12-year curricula, accompanied by the development of a new generation of textbooks and teaching guides in all subjects and in all four languages. New learning assessment methods (formative and summative) were also to be introduced for all grades as well as to promote public acceptance of the new education approach. Experience in implementing the project (PCR, paras. 14–25) showed that the aforementioned scope—which was akin to overhauling the country’s primary and secondary education methods—was too ambitious for the time frame and grant funding available under the project. One issue with the plan to change curricula and textbooks was the lack of cooperation from the Kyrgyz education experts, which took time to overcome. The time needed was not adequately accounted for in the project design, which led to deferring needed activities (revision and dissemination of the teaching guides, teachers training, printing and dissemination of textbooks). The second issue was the lack of buy-in from the KAE to implement the project’s reform initiative (RRP, para. 11). This was to unbundle KAE’s mandate to regulate (i.e., review and approve curriculum, learning and teaching materials (LTMs) from its other mandates to produce and distribute LTMs and textbooks. This lack of buy-in by KAE—an agency critical in facilitating many project activities—was not adequately recognized as a risk and addressed at design stage and contributed to slow project progress. Third, there was a lack of linkage between the main project outputs 1 and 2 (change in curricula and teaching methods) with envisaged project outcome to improve enrollment/advancement rates (education access) and examination score.<sup>7</sup> Fourth, the PCR noted that the budget allocated for some key activities such as in-service teachers training was inadequate (PCR, paras. 20–21). As a result, the scope and the quality of teachers’ training under the project were substantially reduced.

16. The aforementioned design limitations contributed to substantial shortfalls in output accomplishments (paras. 17–26), even though this validation recognizes that other exogenous factors (political turmoil) did impede project progress. The validation, nonetheless, notes that the abovementioned issues should have been better anticipated considering that this was a follow on project to the ESDP. In view of these, this validation assesses the project *less than relevant*.

## **B. Effectiveness in Achieving Project Outcomes and Outputs**

17. The PCR rated the project *less than effective* in achieving its envisaged outcomes and outputs. Of the six outcome indicators in the DMF, only two were achieved, two were partially achieved, and two were not achieved at all. Those that were partially achieved had overoptimistic and unrealistic targets. For example, when considering the increased enrollment outcome, the target was set at 100% for basic education (grades 1–9). No revision of any of the targets took place during the various implementation reviews including at the midterm review.

18. For the outcome reflecting improved student performance on national examinations at the end of grades 9 and 11, only the grade 1 curriculum rollout was achieved under the project. Any effect of the project activity on student performance in these national examinations at grades 9 and 11 will not be felt until SY2019/20 when the full project-sponsored curriculum has been rolled out. The target to decrease the student–teacher ratio also had no directly supporting project activity and was not achieved.

19. Of the three output areas, outputs under components 1 and 2 were mostly not achieved but outputs under component 3 were fully achieved. The first output—modernizing the

<sup>7</sup> The validation recognizes that component 3 (i.e., rehabilitation of 91 schools) contributed to the stated outcomes. However, these outputs were still not sizable enough to influence the envisaged project outcomes which was to improve access to and the quality of 11 or 12 grades of formal education nationwide.

curriculum, developing and producing new learning materials, and raising public awareness on the new curriculum and learning assessment—was the most difficult to accomplish because it was a fundamental reform to the existing system and a new curriculum took time to prepare considering, among others, the history and diversity of the Kyrgyz society. There was a 2-year delay in conducting the five policy studies required during early implementation under this output. The first two studies were to guide the work on (i) curriculum and learning materials development and (ii) the transition to a 12-year curriculum. They were scheduled to be completed by 2006 but were completed in 2008. The second policy study recommended the new curriculum not to be extended to year 12, and this was accepted by the government. The new draft of subject curricula for grades 5–9 were expected to be completed by December 2009 and for grades 10–11 by July 2010, but they were only drafted in May 2012 and used on a pilot basis because of another 2-year delay in approving the National Curriculum Framework. In June 2013 (a year after project closing), the PCR reported that the KAE had not finalized its review of the grade 5-9 curricula. This extended delay was partly due to a political turmoil in 2010 and also because KAE was resisting its role in the project by not assuming many of its assigned roles in curriculum development. As a result of these slippages, the implementation teams postponed other works, such as the phased public awareness raising of the new curricula for the higher grades and developing learning assessment methods. They concentrated, instead, on curriculum development to make up for lost time. The new curricula for grades 5–11 have been included for full approval under the 2012–2014 plan.

20. New textbooks and LTMs were to be developed for grades 1–11 while textbooks for grade 1 were to be disseminated. Due to the delay in curriculum approval, only LTMs for grade 1 were developed under the project, while textbooks for grades 2–4 were developed under the World Bank’s REP. The grade 1 textbooks were delivered to schools as planned.

21. The in-country and overseas training of a core group of 24 national specialists—on curriculum development, learning assessment, and learning materials development—was successfully completed. Upon their return, these specialists led the curriculum review process. The PCR noted that the project designed, printed, and disseminated 573,650 copies of the new grade 1 textbooks in the four official languages of instructions, along with 54,160 teacher guides, 805,550 workbooks, and 7,500 music discs containing LTMs to all public schools in a timely manner (PCR, para. 11). However, the target to develop assessment tools for all curricula for grades 1–11 was only partially achieved. A certificate program in learning assessment with standards for formative and summative assessment was not established as planned.

22. Despite an intensive program to raise public awareness on the new curriculum and the changed learning assessment standards and processes, there was serious resistance against curriculum change from within the education establishment and a mixed understanding by the general public and parents. This output was less than successful.

23. The second component/output—strengthened teaching profession—was only partially delivered. The funding level required to effectively train sufficient teachers, school principals, and directors on the new curriculum was too low. The plans for face-to-face in-service training for 16,000 teachers could not be realized because there was a shortfall in funds. The face-to-face teacher training was shortened from 3 days to 1 day and supplemented by self-learning, computer-based modules, which were rated by teachers as insufficient to deal with the complexities of curriculum reform, learning assessment, and teaching reforms. It is clear from the PCR that this training was inadequate in terms of length and content (PCR, paras. 16, 21, and 22).

24. The RTIS was designed to give 300 selected teachers sufficient incentives to teach in rural schools and remain there for a minimum of 3 years in return for a monthly salary supplement that was to be paid at the end of the assignment. Originally, 307 teachers had signed up for the program (PCR, Appendix 7) but it seemed that 30 teachers dropped out, leaving only 277 teachers completing the trial program. The RTIS was discontinued after its initial trial because national salary increases for teachers were more of an incentive than the stipend paid under the scheme. Thus, the incentive scheme was dwarfed and overtaken by the salary increase.

25. The third component/output—improved participation and quality of rural schools—targeted 90 selected rural schools for building rehabilitation, and provision of computer and language laboratory equipment. A total of 91 schools were rehabilitated successfully, but classroom and library furniture were not provided due to government budget cutbacks. Despite the provision of modern language laboratories, almost no impact on the quality of foreign language learning occurred because appropriate learning course materials were not provided and the locally available teachers lacked the capacity to maintain and use the laboratories.

26. Delays throughout the project resulted in extending the implementation by 18 months. Only year 1 LTMs were completed and distributed as planned. The preparation of LTMs for years 2–11 was not completed. Given the number of outputs that were only partially achieved and some that were not achieved at all, this validation concurs with the PCR that the project was *less than effective* in achieving outcomes and outputs.

### **C. Efficiency of Resource Use in Achieving Outcome and Outputs**

27. The PCR rated the project *efficient* in the use of resources in achieving its outcomes and outputs despite extending the project completion twice—first for 12 months, then for another 6 months beyond the proposed end date of 31 December 2010.

28. The PCR reported that the project delivered the completed outputs in a cost-effective manner. The project provided all grade 1 students with high-quality, new LTMs in four languages (Russian, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik) by 2011; and teacher's guides for each textbook were provided for the first time. However, many other outputs were not fully completed or undertaken with the requisite quality. The project rehabilitated 91 dilapidated schools into attractive, functional learning units that were supplied with computer and language laboratories, and trained more teachers (27,480 against 22,000) than originally planned, as reported in the PCR. However, rehabilitated schools were not provided classroom and library furniture. There were also some questions about the quality and benefits of the teacher training provided (para. 23).

29. Project costs at appraisal were estimated at \$21.9 million equivalent to be financed by an ADB grant of \$15.5 million and \$6.4 million from the government. The project was implemented within the estimated budget, and ADB actual expenditure was \$14.13 million or 91% of the appraised amount. The government's actual expenditure was \$3.53 million or 56% of the expected commitment. Throughout the project, the government made a genuine effort to achieve project outputs within the given project budget and time frame. This validation assesses the project as *efficient*.

### **D. Preliminary Assessment of Sustainability**

30. The PCR rated the project *likely sustainable*. The government almost tripled its spending on education during project implementation between 2006 and 2012 and raised



teacher salaries during that time. The government is committed to fully implement the partially completed outputs (PCR, paras. 52–53). For example, the grades 5–11 curriculum development was approved by June 2012, which implies serious commitment and ownership of the process.

31. Further budget allocation was made by the government for textbooks in 2013, one year after project completion, and received \$16.5 million of assistance from the World Bank for new curriculum textbook development and printing, additional teacher training, and learning assessment improvement for 2014–2018. This will ensure that the new curriculum reforms established under the project will be implemented. The quality of rehabilitation works in the 91 targeted schools was deemed satisfactory, with computer and language laboratories provided and operating with the required equipment. However, the government could not provide new furniture to the rehabilitated schools because of a budget crisis at the time of political conflict in the country. This validation agrees with the rating of *likely sustainable* because there is a definite commitment by the government to develop the education sector, institutionalize the project gains, and support its full implementation.

## **E. Impact**

32. Many of the outputs of the project have only recently been completed and so the impact indicators proposed at appraisal cannot be measured. The DMF proposed three targets to be achieved by 2015.<sup>8</sup> These were clearly outside the project's influence given that the new curriculum for grades 10–11 would not be phased in until 2018, 2019, and 2020. By the end of the project, only the grade 1 curriculum had been fully implemented, and the attitudes of grade 1 parents and teachers toward the new curriculum were positive, hence, the impact on the teachers and students (grade 1) is significant. The renovated 91 schools are now much more attractive learning environments for students and teachers and the improved student attendance can only be properly assessed during a targeted impact assessment in the future. It is expected that, in time and with a sustained pursuit of the project activities, the revised curriculum will cascade to higher grades and will give rise to an enhanced general education system responsive to the needs of a modern, market-oriented economy, which will give greater access to education in poorer areas of the country. The project reforms in the teaching–learning process are likely to produce graduates with more relevant skills and knowledge to better meet contemporary economic and social demands. The government continues to be committed and is investing more resources in education during the recent years as seen from the salary increase of teachers. Building on the ESDP, this project has continued the restoration of quality education in the country. This validation considers the preliminary assessment of impact *significant*.

## **III. OTHER PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENTS**

### **A. Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency**

33. The PCR rated the performance of the borrower *less than satisfactory*. MOES and its CPIU operated efficiently and satisfactorily throughout project implementation with most project outputs being of good quality and within the project's budget. There were warnings at appraisal that outputs 1 and 2 in the project design were overly optimistic and their implementation turned out to be beyond the capacity of the executing agency. Problems emerged with the level of control of KAE over the processes of curriculum development and

<sup>8</sup> The DMF impact indicators were: (i) reduced youth unemployment rates (by 3%); (ii) more secondary school graduates accepted into universities (an increase of 10%); and (iii) an improvement in the number of rural students in the top 5,000 scorers in science and languages, with all targets to be achieved by 2015.

teacher training. This delayed the approval of the National Curriculum Framework, which meant that the introduction of the new curriculum was also delayed. MOES devised alternative strategies for curriculum development and teacher in-service training. This move somewhat mitigated the delays once the differences between MOES and KAE were resolved. MOES demonstrated strong capacity and ownership over the project in the latter stages of implementation.

34. The government was not able to provide counterpart financing at the expected level during project implementation, and its actual expenditures were 56% of what was planned. Education sector funding was reported as having improved in 2013, one year after project closing. This was helped by the support from the World Bank (PCR, para. 53). This validation assesses the executing agency's performance *less than satisfactory*, as the KAE-related problem was serious and the executing agency should have made stronger efforts to resolve it earlier.

## **B. Performance of the Asian Development Bank**

35. The PCR rated ADB performance *satisfactory*. There were 11 review missions conducted by ADB, including a supplementary mission due to a further extension of the project beyond the PCR review. There were no reported instances of any substantial disagreements between ADB and MOES, the executing agency. The validation notes the efforts made by ADB in policy dialogue, in resolving administrative issues, and in project monitoring. The project implementation coincided with two periods of political turmoil and frequent staff changes in MOES which were exogenous to the project undertaking. However, both ADB and the borrower share the responsibility for not responding in a timely manner to the main constraints encountered during project implementation. Additional actions could have been taken in a timely manner during project implementation to address project design issues. Envisaged project outputs needed to be revised to levels that were achievable and commensurate with the available project resources, time frame, and institutional capacities. Further, a solution could have been found with respect to the lack of funds allocated to teacher training, which was an important activity under the project, as well as for furniture acquisition for the rehabilitated schools. This validation assesses the performance of ADB *less than satisfactory*.

# **IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT, LESSONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

## **A. Overall Assessment and Ratings**

36. The PCR rated the project *relevant, less than effective, efficient, likely sustainable*, and rated the overall project *successful*. The design of the project was aligned with both the government and ADB strategies of improving the general education system. However, the validation notes that the design was overly ambitious, did not adequately take into account the likely institutional resistance to fundamental reforms, and some key activities were under resourced. Therefore, the project is rated *less than relevant*. The project was *less than effective* in attaining intended project outcomes and outputs. The accomplished project outputs/activities, together with necessary follow-on investments in formal education, were believed to have generated benefits that outweigh the costs. As such, this validation assesses the project as *efficient* with respect to the use of economic resources. Further, the gains and reforms made during the project are *likely sustainable* with ongoing follow-on works and/or project to modernize the education sector. Overall, this validation rates the project *less than successful*. Nonetheless, this validation recognizes that the project had laid the necessary groundwork for the sector to progress toward the right direction. Given the importance of the education sector, this validation supports a continuing ADB engagement in the sector.

### Overall Ratings

Criteria	PCR	IED Review	Reason for Disagreement and/or Comments
Relevance	Relevant	Less than relevant	Design did not adequately take into account known institutional resistance to fundamental reforms (curriculum changes and unbundling of the KAE mandates) and some key activities (teacher training and furniture acquisition) were under resourced leading to implementation delays and substantial underachievement in outputs (paras. 14–16).
Effectiveness in achieving project outcome and outputs	Less than effective	Less than effective	
Efficiency in achieving outcome and outputs	Efficient	Efficient	
Preliminary assessment of sustainability	Likely sustainable	Likely sustainable	
<b>Overall assessment</b>	<b>Successful</b>	<b>Less than successful</b>	
Impact	Not rated	Significant	It is expected that given the sustained pursuit of the project activities, including with additional external support, the enhanced curriculum and LTM will cascade to higher grades. The rehabilitated schools continue to be used and are having impacts on parents, teachers, and students (para. 32).
Borrower and executing agency	Less than satisfactory	Less than satisfactory	
Performance of ADB	Satisfactory	Less than satisfactory	The validation notes the efforts made by ADB in improving policy dialogue, in resolving administrative issues, and in project monitoring. The project was implemented under a difficult period of political turmoil. Despite these considerations, however, insufficient progress was made during project implementation to address the initial design issues, i.e., revise the project activity goals to levels that were achievable and commensurate with the available project resources, time horizon, and institutional capacity, as well as find a solution to the lack of funds allocated for teacher training—a key activity of the project (para. 35).
Quality of PCR		Satisfactory	Refer to para. 42.

ADB = Asian Development Bank, IED = Independent Evaluation Department, KAE = Kyrgyz Academy of Education, LTM = learning and teaching materials, PCR = project completion report.

Source: ADB Independent Evaluation Department.

## **B. Lessons**

37. Each of the substantial points made in the PCR (PCR, paras. 57–60) is strongly supported by this validation. Curriculum reform requires strong political commitment in terms of counterpart financing and clear policy changes are required to support the reform. Teacher competencies enhanced to deal with the changes and LTMs must run in close tandem with the curriculum reform. Teachers need at least 3–5 days of face-to-face training on the new curriculum, assessment requirements, and classroom teaching; and their learning gains must be assessed at the training's conclusion instead of simply measuring inputs. The 1-day orientation and self-learning modules provided to most teachers under this project as in-service training was inadequate to expect full-scale implementation of the reforms.

38. Provision of LTMs, particularly textbooks, requires continuity of content and approach. Hence, textbooks for a series of grades—such as mathematics for grades 1–4—should be developed by the same team of authors. The rehabilitation of 91 previously dysfunctional schools and the provision of new equipment was a very positive outcome of the project. Further attention to this infrastructure issue may well be an effective means of increasing attendance rates, particularly for rural communities.

## **C. Recommendations for Follow-Up**

39. Since the project helped the Kyrgyz education sector progress in the right direction, this validation supports further engagements in the sector. There should be a dedicated unit established within MOES that is responsible for maintaining a dynamic and flexible curriculum review process to make modifications and adjustments at regular intervals, and to provide support to teachers when using new and inclusive LTMs. The government should separate the conflicting duties and responsibilities of KAE, so that KAE and MOES can work in a complementary manner without overlapping responsibilities to enhance system efficiency.

# **V. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND FOLLOW-UP**

## **A. Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation, and Utilization**

40. There was virtually no direct reference to any monitoring and evaluation function throughout the PCR, and this is a serious deficiency. The RRP made specific reference to the project monitoring and evaluation activities, along with reference to the frequency with which they would be conducted (RRP, paras. 43 and 69). However, there was no reference made in the PCR as to how this was achieved. There was also no reference in the PCR with respect to the activities of the two RPIUs. Gender was not specifically discussed and data reported in the appendices were not gender-disaggregated as was expected in the RRP.

41. As suggested earlier (para. 39), the government should establish a specific unit within MOES to monitor and constantly improve subject curricula and LTMs by regularly and systematically collecting feedback after rolling out the new curricula and LTMs for each grade. This unit should also be responsible for monitoring the trial of draft LTMs and for modifying them in terms of content and gender before large-scale production, printing, and dissemination take place.

**B. Comments on Project Completion Report Quality**

42. The PCR quality is *satisfactory* as it followed the PCR guidelines and clearly showed the achievements of the project in the DMF. It highlighted areas, such as the lack of due diligence during design and at appraisal, and the overoptimistic output targets that resulted in the partial achievement of several outputs. It appeared that the inadequate in-service teacher training arrangements were reported as being more successful than they actually were, with emphasis on the input data rather than a more frank assessment of the outputs of the training. The PCR should have also rated the impact of the project.

**C. Data Sources for Validation**

43. This validation made use of the RRP, PCR, two loan review mission reports dated 20 January 2009 and 23 March 2012, and some previous PCR validation reports.

**D. Recommendation for Independent Evaluation Department Follow-Up**

44. No follow-up action is recommended at this time