## Annual Review of Salary and Benefits for International Staff, National Staff, and Administrative Staff

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| ABBREVIATIONS |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ADB | - | Asian Development Bank |
| CPI | - | consumer price index |
| FY | - | fiscal year |
| IAE | - | internal administrative expenses |
| MRP | - | market reference point |
| NSAS | - | national staff and administrative staff |
| SMI | - | supplemental merit increase |
| SPA | - | salary progression adjustment |
| US | - | United States |
|  |  | GLOSSARY |
| comparatio | - | The ratio of a salary to the midpoint. This is an indicator of the extent to which salaries are aligned with the midpoint. |
| market positioning | - | The competitive positioning of the organization within the market. For example, a market positioning at the 75th percentile indicates that the organization's objective is to set its pay at a level above $75 \%$ of organizations in the defined market for similar jobs. |
| market reference point | - | The point near the middle of a salary range, around which the salary range is constructed. Its value is set close to the market value of the grade level and serves as the reference point with which average salaries are aligned. |
| midpoint | - | The market reference point in a symmetrical salary range. The market reference point is midway between the minimum and maximum of the grade level range. |
| payline | - | The midpoints for consecutive grades often plotted as a line to show pay progression by grade level. |
| salary budget increase | - | The projected growth in the amount of salaries and other salary-related personnel actions such as promotions and confirmation increases to be paid in a year over the corresponding amount in the previous year. |
| salary increase | - | The percentage increase to be applied to actual salary or to the midpoints of the new salary structure. |
| salary range | - | The range within which the salaries of a group of staff are administered. Each grade level has its own salary range, which is defined in terms of a minimum, a midpoint, and a maximum. |
| salary structure | - | The set of salary ranges that are established for various grade levels. |

salary structure - The average percentage increase in the midpoints of the increase salary structure from 1 year to the next.

## NOTE

In this report, "\$" refers to US dollars, unless otherwise stated.

## CONTENTS

Page
I. INTRODUCTION ..... 1
II. ADB'S COMPENSATION SYSTEM ..... 2
A. International Staff ..... 2
B. National Staff and Administrative Staff ..... 3
III. SALARY STRUCTURE AND AVERAGE SALARY INCREASE FOR 2015 ..... 3
A. Compensation Results for International Staff ..... 4
B. Compensation Results for National Staff and Administrative Staff ..... 6
C. Performance-Based Salary Increase Distribution ..... 10
IV. SUMMARY OF 2015 PROPOSALS ..... 11
A. International Staff ..... 11
B. National Staff and Administrative Staff ..... 11
V. BUDGET EFFECT ..... 11
VI. BENEFITS ..... 12
VII. RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION ..... 12
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS ..... 13
APPENDIXES

1. Primary Findings of the Compensation Review for International Staff in 2010 and ..... 14
National Staff and Administrative Staff in 2011
2. Overview of the World Bank Compensation Methodology ..... 17
3. ADB and World Bank International Staff Salary Structure and Salary Increase ..... 19(2006-2015) and Effect of Exchange Rate and Philippines Consumer Price Indexon Staff Expenses as a Percentage of Salary
4. List of Comparator Companies and Organizations for Salary Review of ..... 21
Headquarters National Staff and Administrative Staff
5. Proposed Field Office Salary Structures Effective 1 January 2015 ..... 22
6. Proposed Field Office Structure Adjustment, Salary Increase, and Comparatio for ..... 37 2015, and Summary of Field Office Average Annual Salary Increase and Consumer Price Index (2011-2015)
7. Ratio of Staff Salaries and Benefits to Internal Administrative Expenses ..... 39
8. Recruitment and Retention Experience ..... 40

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. This paper presents to the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Board of Directors the results of the annual review of salary and benefits for international staff, and national staff and administrative staff (NSAS) at headquarters and in field offices. It seeks Board approval of the 2015 salary structures and corresponding salary increase proposals for all staff. This review has been completed in accordance with the compensation system approved by the Board for international staff in November 2010 and NSAS in November 2011. The annual review is conducted to assess the competitiveness of ADB's compensation practices with the overall strategic objective to remain an employer of choice that is able to attract and retain a very diverse workforce of the highest caliber while being fiscally prudent. ${ }^{1}$ Similar to the review papers in 2012 and 2013, this document consolidates recommendations for staff salaries for international staff and NSAS at headquarters and in 30 field offices.
2. Given the midterm review of Strategy 2020 and the total compensation review scheduled for 2015, a broader discussion will be needed about strategic staffing, workforce planning, talent management, and the right compensation system to support ADB's business needs. ${ }^{2}$ In the meantime, the salary increase proposals contained in this paper continue to balance the results of the rules-based compensation methodology that will ensure market competitiveness and financial sustainability within ADB's constricted overall budget resources in light of lower projected lending levels and net income, given current global market conditions. The salary increase proposed for staff has been determined by targeting a higher comparatio for international staff of $93.9 \%$ than last year's $93.3 \%$, and a lower combined comparatio for NSAS of $97.9 \%$ ( $97.0 \%$ for NSAS in headquarters and $99.7 \%$ for NSAS in field offices) than last year's $99.0 \%$. Management requests that the Board of Directors approve its proposal, which reflects (i) an overall modest budget impact of $\$ 5.1$ million ( $2.2 \%$ of total payroll or $0.8 \%$ of the 2015 internal administrative expense [IAE] budget) for salary increases and (ii) \$1.1 million for salaryrelated benefits, which in aggregate amounts to $\$ 6.2$ million ( $2.7 \%$ of total payroll or $1.0 \%$ of the 2015 IAE).
3. An organization's compensation system is critical to achieving its operational goals especially in an increasingly competitive recruitment environment. For the organization, the compensation system must be appropriately competitive to allow for recruitment and retention of the talent needed. For staff, compensation is the most tangible reward for performance, productivity, and proficiency. One of the principles of ADB's Our People Strategy is to "offer competitive remuneration, benefits, and rewards aligned with the nature and objectives of the organization and with the marketplace, to complement the attractiveness of ADB's mission and rewarding work environment. ${ }^{3}$ ADB's compensation system is merit-based with pay increases based on individual performance. Automatic increases and cost-of-living adjustment are not provided.
4. ADB conducted remuneration studies for international staff in 2010, for NSAS at headquarters in 2011, and for specific field offices from 2011 to 2014. The primary objective of these comprehensive reviews is to assess the overall competitiveness of ADB's compensation package in the various markets ADB recruits from and loses talent to. These reviews included a comparison of total remuneration (salaries, allowances, and employer-provided benefits) for

[^0]international staff with six other international organizations. For NSAS, the review was based on a compensation survey of local comparators in each of their respective duty stations. Appendix 1 summarizes the primary findings of these reviews.

## II. ADB'S COMPENSATION SYSTEM

5. ADB follows the same market-based compensation system for all staff. Salaries are positioned at the 75th percentile of the defined relevant market for each category of staff. The difference for international staff and NSAS lies in the market reference used for salary comparisons. The World Bank ${ }^{4}$ serves as the proxy for the global market for international staff and for local markets for field office NSAS; for headquarters NSAS, salaries are compared with those offered by 15 companies and international organizations in Manila. ${ }^{5}$ Appendix 2 provides an overview of the World Bank's market-based compensation methodology; similar steps are taken in conducting ADB's market-based salary survey for NSAS at headquarters. Under the market-based compensation system, salary adjustments from 1 year to the next are not directly linked to the cost-of-living or consumer price index (CPI) movements. These indexes are reflected implicitly in the market movement of salaries in the global or local market settings, which are also influenced by labor market conditions (e.g., supply versus demand for specific skills, global economic fluctuations, and domestic fiscal conditions).
6. The recommendations in the 2010 and 2011 salary and benefits review reflect the following key principles of ADB's compensation system:
(i) remain market competitive by reflecting labor market changes to attract and retain top talent,
(ii) maintain a rules-based compensation system whereby salary increases are determined through a transparent formula-driven methodology,
(iii) remain fiscally prudent in recognition of budgetary requirements and in response to external market economic conditions, and
(iv) award differentiated salary increases according to performance.
7. The two significant changes introduced as a result of the 2011 review for NSAS were (i) Board approval of the annual compensation review of field offices; and (ii) a new formula to determine salary increases, which results in a more modest overall growth of staff salaries by setting a target comparatio at or below the payline (i.e., $100 \%$ comparatio), reflecting factors such as average time in grade, salary dilution, recruitment and retention experience, and budget impact. ${ }^{6}$

## A. International Staff

8. Based on the results of the 2010 international staff comprehensive review, the Board approved a revised compensation system to guide the formulation of the salary structure increase and salary increase proposals until the next comprehensive review in 2015.
9. The main features of the new compensation system are as follows:

[^1](ii)
(iii) Based on job equivalency (Table 1), midpoints of ADB international staff levels IS1, IS3, IS5, IS7, and IS9 are anchored to the MRPs of World Bank levels E, F, G, H, and I, respectively. Midpoints for the intervening ADB levels IS2, IS4, IS6, and IS8 are interpolated to establish the new payline. The midpoint for ADB international staff level IS10 is positioned about midway between levels I and J of the World Bank.
(iv) Full parity with the market (i.e., a $100 \%$ comparatio) is targeted for international staff levels IS1-IS6 by 2015.
(v) The average salary increase rate will be set at a level higher than the average structure increase to enable salaries of staff to progress within the range.
(vi) Salary increases will be applied to the range midpoint, as they have been since 2009.

## B. National Staff and Administrative Staff

10. Based on the results of the 2011 comprehensive review, the Board approved the following main features of the NSAS compensation system until the next major review in 2015:
(i) The market-based approach will be retained.
(ii) At headquarters, ADB will develop its salary structure based on a customized salary survey of comparators in Manila; for field offices, ADB will continue to base its salary structure on the salary structure of the World Bank, which conducts custom surveys periodically in all of ADB field office locations.
(iii) The market positioning for NSAS in headquarters and in field offices will be anchored at the 75th percentile of total cash (including base pay, incentive pay, and allowances plus the value of in-kind benefits not provided by ADB) in each of its duty station locations. ${ }^{8}$
(iv) Where applicable, ADB will separate the salary increase pool for NSAS to better align to their respective salary midpoints and to remain competitive in the market.
(v) The average salary increase proposal will continue to be determined based on generally achieving a desired level of parity with the market payline (the target comparatio assigned depending on circumstances that may be peculiar to headquarters or a particular field office, such as time in grade, high turnover, or new office).
(vi) Salary increases will be applied to the range midpoint, as they have been since 2009.

## III. SALARY STRUCTURE AND AVERAGE SALARY INCREASE FOR 2015

11. Based on ADB's compensation principle of ensuring competitiveness with the relevant market reference, the salary structure is adjusted based on the movement of the comparator market. The structure adjustment, average salary of staff, and a desired level of parity with the payline (i.e., the target comparatio) are inputs in determining the overall salary increase. The overall salary increase and assumed distribution of performance ratings determine the salary

[^2]increase matrix for each staff category or location. ${ }^{9}$ The salary increase given to staff members is based only on their individual performance ratings as a percentage of the midpoint of their respective grade level. Staff do not receive an automatic increase equal to the average structure increase or a minimum cost-of-living adjustment. Staff rated unsatisfactory receive no salary increase, and their salary can be lower than the minimum salary for their grade level.

## A. Compensation Results for International Staff

## 1. Structure Increase for 2015

12. The salary structure increase represents the adjustment or movement of the market payline from year to year. Since the World Bank's MRPs are being used as the market proxy for this purpose, the structure increase is effectively the movement of the World Bank's MRPs for the grades that are equivalent to ADB job levels, resulting in a $2.3 \%$ average salary structure increase for 2015 (Table 1). ${ }^{10}$

Table 1: International Staff Structure Increase for 2015

| World Bank |  |  |  | ADB |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Grade | MRP as of 1 July 2013 $(\$)$ | MRP as of 1 July 2014 (\$) | MRP Movement (\%) | ADB Level | Confirmed Staff (No.) | $\begin{gathered} 2014 \\ \text { Midpoint }^{\text {a }} \end{gathered}$ <br> (\$) | ${ }_{\text {Midpoint }}{ }^{\text {a }}$ <br> (\$) | Midpoint Movement (\%) |
| E | 82,300 | 84,200 | 2.3 | IS1 | 7 | 81,500 | 83,400 | 2.3 |
|  |  |  |  | IS2 | 17 | 94,900 | 97,100 | 2.3 |
| F | 109,400 | 111,900 | 2.3 | IS3 | 71 | 108,300 | 110,800 | 2.3 |
|  |  |  |  | IS4 | 220 | 128,000 | 130,900 | 2.3 |
| G | 147,600 | 151,000 | 2.3 | IS5 | 252 | 147,600 | 151,000 | 2.3 |
|  |  |  |  | IS6 | 218 | 174,400 | 178,400 | 2.3 |
| H | 201,100 | 205,700 | 2.3 | IS7 | 88 | 201,100 | 205,700 | 2.3 |
|  |  |  |  | IS8 | 62 | 235,500 | 240,900 | 2.3 |
| 1 | 269,800 | 276,000 | 2.3 | IS9 | 27 | 269,800 | 276,000 | 2.3 |
|  |  |  |  | IS10 | 17 | 290,000 | 296,700 | 2.3 |
|  |  |  |  | IS1-IS6 | 785 | 144,264 | 147,570 | 2.3 |
|  |  |  |  | IS7-IS10 | 194 | 229,445 | 234,708 | 2.3 |
|  |  |  |  | All IS Levels | 979 | 161,144 | 164,837 | 2.3 |


a Under the new ADB compensation system, international staff at levels IS1 and IS3 are anchored at 99\% of the World Bank grade levels E and F, respectively, to reflect more accurately global market positioning. ADB international staff levels IS5, IS7, and IS9 are anchored at 100\% of the World Bank grade levels G, H, and I, respectively. The midpoint for ADB international staff level IS10 is positioned at the MRP of World Bank level I plus $7.5 \%$.
Source: ADB.

## 2. Proposed Salary Structure

13. Table 2 shows the proposed salary structure for 2015 based on a weighted structure increase of $2.3 \%$ and the same salary range spread that has been used since 2013.
[^3]Table 2: International Staff Salary Structure Effective 1 January 2015

| ADB <br> Level | 2015 <br> Minimum <br> $(\$)$ | 2015 <br> Midpoint <br> $(\$)$ | 2015 <br> Maximum <br> $(\$)$ | Range <br> Spread <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| IS1 | 75,800 | 83,400 | 91,000 | 20 |
| IS2 | 84,400 | 97,100 | 109,700 | 30 |
| IS3 | 94,300 | 110,800 | 127,300 | 35 |
| IS4 | 111,400 | 130,900 | 150,400 | 35 |
| IS5 | 125,800 | 151,000 | 176,100 | 40 |
| IS6 | 148,700 | 178,400 | 208,200 | 40 |
| IS7 | 171,400 | 205,700 | 240,000 | 40 |
| IS8 | 200,800 | 240,900 | 281,100 | 40 |
| IS9 | 234,900 | 276,000 | 317,100 | 35 |
| IS10 | 263,700 | 296,700 | 329,600 | 25 |

ADB = Asian Development Bank, IS = international staff.
Source: ADB.

## 3. Proposed Average Salary Increase

14. The compensation system allows ADB the flexibility to set the salary increase. At a minimum, it should be set higher than the structure increase to allow salaries to progress along the salary range to reward staff for proficiency and performance. This would also improve the comparatio, which projected at $92.3 \%$ for 31 December 2014 remains far below $100.0 \%$ of the market payline (represented by the salary midpoints). In setting the proposed salary increase, other factors are taken into account, such as salary budget costs for resource allocation priorities, the relativity of salary increases of comparator organizations, and budgetary considerations.
15. For international staff, the overall proposed salary increase is $4.0 \%$. This includes (i) a structure adjustment component of $2.3 \%$, which is the budgeted salary increase; and (ii) a budget-neutral salary increase component of $1.7 \%$, which will be absorbed within the existing real budget envelope for 2015. The budget-neutral salary adjustment is provided to allow for salary progression along the salary range (i.e., comparatio improvement) and inclusion of an additional merit increase for high performers rated exceptional and satisfactory with special recommendation. The proposed total salary increase of $4.0 \%$ is considered reasonable for the following reasons:
(i) The World Bank staff's comparatio is at $97.1 \%$, whereas ADB staff's comparatio after the salary increase would only be at $93.9 \%$. Even for international staff at levels IS1-IS6, for which the compensation methodology approved by the Board in 2010 called for full parity (i.e., $100 \%$ comparatio) with the market payline by 2015, the comparatio after the proposed salary increase would only be at $95.2 \%$. Appendix 3 (Table A3.1) shows the 10-year historical comparison of the structure adjustment and salary increase for the World Bank and ADB.
(ii) The price impact of the salary increase on the overall budget is only $2.3 \%$ of payroll or $0.6 \%$ of IAE. As a component of IAE, although there may have been slight increases during the intervening years, staff salaries have declined since 2005. Appendix 7 shows the 10 -year historical ratio of staff salaries and benefits to the IAE.
(iii) The basket of goods consumed by expatriate staff as a proportion of pay has increased more quickly than salary increases because of higher inflation in Manila and the appreciation of the Philippine peso against the United States (US) dollar over the 10-year period 2005 to 2014. As illustrated in Appendix 3 (Table A3.2), the estimated local expenditure of $58 \%$ of pay in 2005 for a married staff member with two children would amount to $62 \%$ of pay in 2014 (based on the
salary increases awarded over this period, including promotions; the corresponding inflation rates in Manila; and the currency exchange rates).
(iv) In addition to the World Bank's salary increase of $4.0 \%$, their Board approved about $1.3 \%$ of the World Bank's total wage bill for performance awards (including rewards and recognition). ADB's allocation for its rewards and recognition program is $0.1 \%$ of IAE, or $\$ 453,100$.
16. For 2015, ADB is prioritizing bringing the salaries of international staff at levels IS1-IS6 closer to the market payline. Therefore, a split approach is being proposed whereby the average salary increase of $4.0 \%$ results in a differentiated increase of $4.2 \%$ for international staff levels IS1-IS6 and $3.6 \%$ for levels IS7-IS10. Table 3 shows the structure adjustment for each group, the proposed average salary increase, and the comparatio before and after the salary increase.

Table 3: International Staff Average Salary Increase and Estimated Comparatio

| ADB Levels | Confirmed Staff <br> (No.) | Structure Adjustment (\%) | Budget <br> Neutral Salary Increase Component (\%) | Proposed Average Salary Increase (\%) | Estimated Comparatio before Salary Increase (\%) | Estimated Comparatio after Salary Increase (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| IS1-IS6 | 785 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 4.2 | 91.3 | 95.2 |
| IS7-IS10 | 194 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 3.6 | 87.4 | 90.6 |
| All IS Levels | 979 | 2.3 | 1.7 | 4.0 | 90.2 | 93.9 |

ADB = Asian Development Bank, IS = international staff.
Source: ADB.

## B. Compensation Results for National Staff and Administrative Staff

## 1. Salary Structure for 2015

17. In accordance with the NSAS compensation system that follows a market-based approach, the salary structure for NSAS at headquarters and in each field office is adjusted annually based on movements in the local comparator labor market.
18. The current structure increase for headquarters NSAS is based on an annual survey of local comparators in Manila. Towers Watson conducted a quick salary survey of ADB's comparators in Manila in the third quarter of 2014 (Appendix 4). ${ }^{11}$ Based on the results of the survey, a weighted average salary structure increase of $4.5 \%$ when compared with the 2014 midpoints is being proposed for headquarters NSAS for 2015.
19. The salary structure for field offices is linked to the World Bank resident mission in each of the duty station locations except for Japan, which is based on an independent survey conducted by Towers Watson. The World Bank salary structures are effective on 1 July, whereas ADB's salary structures are effective the following 1 January. To recognize the 6month lag between the effective dates, an aging factor is applied to the World Bank MRPs to determine the salary midpoints for ADB's salary structure. ${ }^{12}$ The proposed structure adjustments

[^4]for each of the field offices are shown in Appendix 6, which results in an overall structure adjustment of all field offices of $4.4 \%$ for 2015 . It should be noted that the salary structures for NSAS in all locations are based on net salaries (net of income tax) whereas in Japan, Philippines, and the US continue to reflect gross salaries.
20. Following the comprehensive review of the salary methodology for all NSAS conducted in 2011 and the reviews of a select number of locations in 2012 and 2013, a review of the remaining field offices for which Birches Group data is available-Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan, and Viet Nam—was conducted in 2014. ${ }^{13}$ The result of the review affirmed that ADB's weighted midpoints based on the World Bank salary structure were reasonably close to the weighted MRPs of the employers that participated in Birches Group's independent survey. This confirms that the comparator organizations used by the World Bank in these locations are appropriate and are likely to be the same companies that ADB would select for salary comparisons. Thus, the structure movement will continue to be linked to the movement of the MRPs for the corresponding World Bank resident mission in the respective duty station location.
21. In 2014, the Kyrgyz Republic Resident Mission requested for an interim review of its salary structure given the devaluation of the Kyrgyz Republic Som to the US dollar and its effect on the prices of commodities in the Kyrgyz Republic. While devaluation of currency does not automatically cause an increase in compensation, it may be a factor in the change in the country's CPI, which may be reflected in the local compensation data for which ADB uses the World Bank salary structure as a proxy. Following the World Bank's change in the denomination and disbursement of salaries of staff in its country office in the Kyrgyz Republic from Kyrgyz Republic Som to US dollars, the same is being proposed for salaries of staff in the Kyrgyz Republic Resident Mission effective 1 January 2015.

## 2. Proposed Salary Structure

22. For headquarters NSAS, the salary midpoints from 2013 reflect base pay, the two bonus payments, and the dependency allowance component with the introduction of the new salary payment mode effective 1 July 2012. ${ }^{14}$ Table 4 shows the salary structure increase for NSAS at headquarters for 2015, which results in a weighted structure increase of $4.5 \%$.
[^5]Table 4: Salary Structure Increase for National Staff and Administrative Staff at Headquarters, 2015
(Philippine pesos per year)

| ADB Level | Staff <br> (No.) | 2014 <br> Midpoint | 2015 <br> Midpoint | Midpoint <br> Movement <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 |  | 512,000 | 512,000 | 0.0 |
| AS2 | 4 | 575,000 | 575,000 | 0.0 |
| AS3 | 696,400 | 696,400 | 0.0 |  |
| AS4 | 191 | 809,500 | 825,700 | 2.0 |
| AS5 | 266 | 977,400 | $1,016,500$ | 4.0 |
| AS6 | 203 | $1,197,900$ | $1,257,800$ | 5.0 |
| AS7 | 169 | $1,43,600$ | $1,504,200$ | 5.0 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 112 | $1,592,000$ | $1,681,500$ | 5.6 |
| NS2 | 153 | $1,753,600$ | $1,858,800$ | 6.0 |
| NS3 | 117 | $2,163,100$ | $2,249,600$ | 4.0 |
| NS4 | 42 | $2,783,700$ | $2,867,200$ | 3.0 |
| NS5 | 10 | $3,446,800$ | $3,550,200$ | 3.0 |
| NS6 | 2 | $4,270,000$ | $4,398,100$ | 3.0 |
| All AS | 833 | $1,083,639$ | $1,128,963$ | 4.2 |
| All NS | 436 | $1,971,585$ | $2,065,707$ | 4.8 |
| All | 1,269 | $1,388,717$ | $1,450,807$ | 4.5 |
| ADB $=$ Asian Development Bank, AS $=$ administrative staff, NS $=$ national staff. |  |  |  |  |
| Source: ADB. |  |  |  |  |

23. Table 5 shows the proposed salary structure for NSAS at headquarters for 2015 using the same salary ranges used since 2013.

Table 5: Salary Structure ${ }^{\text {a }}$ for National Staff and Administrative Staff at Headquarters Effective 1 January 2015
(Philippine pesos per year)

| ADB <br> Level | 2015 <br> Minimum | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ <br> Midpoint | $\mathbf{2 0 1 5}$ <br> Maximum | Range <br> Spread <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 393,800 | 512,000 | 630,100 | 60 |
| AS2 | 442,300 | 575,000 | 707,700 | 60 |
| AS3 | 525,600 | 696,400 | 867,200 | 65 |
| AS4 | 623,200 | 825,700 | $1,028,300$ | 65 |
| AS5 | 753,000 | $1,016,500$ | $1,280,100$ | 70 |
| AS6 | 931,700 | $1,257,800$ | $1,583,900$ | 70 |
| AS5 | $1,094,000$ | $1,504,200$ | $1,914,500$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $1,222,900$ | $1,681,500$ | $2,140,100$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $1,351,900$ | $1,858,800$ | $2,365,800$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $1,606,900$ | $2,249,600$ | $2,892,400$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $2,048,000$ | $2,867,200$ | $3,686,400$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $2,535,900$ | $3,550,200$ | $4,564,600$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $3,141,500$ | $4,398,100$ | $5,654,700$ | 80 |

ADB = Asian Development Bank, AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Gross salary structure.
Source: ADB.
24. The proposed salary structure, effective 1 January 2015 for each ADB field office, is shown in Appendix 5; the weighted structure increase for each field office is shown in Appendix 6 (Table A6.1).

## 3. Average Salary Increase

25. Similar to the proposed salary increase for international staff, the average salary increase for NSAS is set higher than the structure increase to allow salaries to progress along the salary range to reward staff for proficiency and performance. For headquarters NSAS, the overall proposed salary increase is $7.6 \%$, which includes a structure adjustment component of $4.5 \%$, which is the budgeted salary increase and a budget-neutral salary increase component of $3.1 \%$ that will be absorbed within the existing real budget envelope for 2015. The budget-neutral salary increase component is provided to allow for salary progression along the salary range (i.e., comparatio improvement) and the inclusion of an additional merit increase for high performers rated exceptional and satisfactory with special recommendation. Table 6 shows the structure adjustment, the proposed average salary increase, and the resulting comparatio before and after the salary increase.

Table 6: Average Salary Increase and Estimated Comparatio for National Staff and Administrative Staff at Headquarters

| ADB Levels | Confirmed Staff <br> (No.) | Structure Adjustment <br> (\%) | Budget <br> Neutral Salary Increase Component (\%) | Proposed Average Salary Increase (\%) | Estimated Comparatio before Salary Increase (\%) | Estimated Comparatio after Salary Increase (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All Levels | 1,269 | 4.5 | 3.1 | 7.6 | 91.1 | 97.0 |

ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Source: ADB.
26. Table 7 shows the average annual structure adjustment, nominal average annual salary increase, annual average CPI, and real annual salary increase for headquarters NSAS from 1 January 2011 to 1 January 2015.

Table 7: Summary of Average Annual Salary Increase and Consumer Price Index
(2011-2015)

|  | Average Annual <br> Structure <br> Increase <br> $(\%)$ | Average Annual <br> Salary Increase <br> (nominal) <br> $(\%)$ | Average <br> Annual CPI <br> $(\%)$ | Average Annual <br> Salary Increase <br> (real) <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | 3.9 | 7.6 | 3.6 | 4.0 |
| 2011 | 2.3 | 6.0 | 4.2 | 1.8 |
| 2012 | 2.9 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 2.0 |
| 2013 | 4.0 | 7.6 | 4.1 | 3.5 |
| 2014 | 4.5 | 7.6 | $4.9^{\text {b }}$ | 2.7 |
| 2015 | 3.4 | 6.7 | 3.9 | 2.8 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |

$\overline{\mathrm{CPI}}=$ consumer price index.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Point-to-point inflation data from Republic of the Philippines National Statistics Office.
${ }^{\text {b }}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
27. For all of the field offices combined, the proposed overall salary increase is $7.0 \%$, which includes (i) a structure adjustment component of $4.4 \%$ which is the budgeted salary increase and (ii) a budget-neutral salary increase component of $2.6 \%$, which will be absorbed within the existing real budget envelope for 2015. The budget-neutral salary adjustment is provided to allow for salary progression along the salary range (i.e., comparatio improvement) and inclusion of an additional merit increase for high performers rated exceptional and satisfactory with special recommendation. The various currencies are converted to US dollars, based on the 31 August 2014 exchange rates. Appendix 6 (Table A6.1) shows the proposed overall average salary increase, the structure adjustment component (the budgeted salary increase), and the budget neutral-salary increase component for each field office.
28. Appendix 6 (Table A6.2) shows the average annual structure adjustment, nominal average annual salary increase, annual average CPI, and real annual salary increase for each field office from 1 January 2011 to 1 January 2015.
29. Table 8 shows the average annual structure adjustment, nominal average annual salary increase, annual average CPI, and real annual salary increase for field office NSAS from 1 January 2011 to 1 January 2015.

Table 8: Summary of Field Office Average Annual Salary Increase
in Salary Currency (2011-2015)

|  | Average <br> Annual <br> Structure <br> Increase <br> $(\%)$ | Average Annual <br> Salary Increase <br> (nominal) <br> $(\%)$ | Average <br> Annual CPI <br> $(\%)$ | Average Annual <br> Salary Increase <br> (real) <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | 7.1 | 11.1 | 7.8 | 3.3 |
| 2011 | 8.5 | 12.8 | 6.9 | 5.9 |
| 2012 | 4.0 | 6.5 | 5.7 | 0.8 |
| 2013 | 7.0 | 8.3 | 6.1 | 2.2 |
| 2014 | 4.4 | 7.0 | 4.8 | 2.2 |
| 2015 | 6.0 | 8.9 | 6.2 | 2.7 |
| Average |  |  |  |  |

$\overline{\mathrm{CPI}}=$ consumer price index.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Data from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, the Asian Development Bank Economics and Research Department (for Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and the Reserve Bank of Australia (for Australia).
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## C. Performance-Based Salary Increase Distribution

30. Salary increases awarded in 2015 to individual staff will continue to be based on their performance and applied as a percentage of the midpoint salary of the staff member's grade level. Individual pay increases are based entirely on individual performances. Staff do not receive an automatic increase or an automatic cost-of-living adjustment.
31. The salary increase matrixes will be linked to overall performance ratings (i.e., exceptional, satisfactory with special recommendation, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory) and will have ranges that allow flexibility for supervisors to award for relative performance. Staff rated exceptional or satisfactory with special recommendation will receive increases above the average salary increase. Staff members who are rated unsatisfactory will receive no salary increase. The allocation of the salary increase budget using the salary increase matrix will ensure that adequate funding is available to maintain a performance rating distribution of up to $10 \%$ of staff rated exceptional and up to $25 \%$ of staff rated satisfactory with special recommendation, with the remaining $65 \%$ for staff rated satisfactory.
32. International staff at all levels rated satisfactory will be subject to the same salary increase matrix; a higher salary increase matrix will be used for levels IS1-IS6 than for levels IS7-IS10 for staff rated satisfactory with special recommendation or exceptional. For NSAS at headquarters, the same salary increase matrix will be employed since there is no significant difference in their respective average comparatios. For NSAS in each field office, a split salary increase matrix may be warranted, depending on the difference in comparatios of national staff versus administrative staff relative to their midpoints.

## IV. SUMMARY OF 2015 PROPOSALS

## A. International Staff

33. The salary proposal for international staff effective 1 January 2015 is an overall salary increase of $4.0 \%$, which includes (i) a structure adjustment component of $2.3 \%$ (equal to the budgeted salary increase that results in the salary structure shown in Table 2); and (ii) a budgetneutral salary increase component of $1.7 \%$, which is recommended to allow salary progression and merit increases for high performers.

## B. National Staff and Administrative Staff

34. The salary proposals for NSAS effective 1 January 2015 are as follows:
(i) for headquarters NSAS, an overall salary increase of $7.6 \%$, which includes (i) a structure adjustment component of $4.5 \%$ (equal to the budgeted salary increase that results in the salary structure shown in Table 5); and (ii) a budget-neutral salary increase component of $3.1 \%$, which is recommended to allow salary progression and merit increases for high performers; and
(ii) for NSAS in field offices, an overall salary increase of $7.0 \%$, which includes (i) an average structure adjustment component of $4.4 \%$ (equal to the budgeted salary increase that results in the salary structure shown in Appendix 5); and (ii) an average budget-neutral salary increase component of $2.6 \%$, which is recommended to allow salary progression and merit increases for high performers (Appendix 6).

## V. BUDGET EFFECT

35. The increase in the salary budget is the projected growth in the amount of salaries and other salary-related personnel actions to be paid in 2015 over the corresponding figures in 2014. The overall increase in the salary budget will be used to fund increases in salaries and other salary-related personnel actions, such as confirmations, promotions, grade level alignment, and salary adjustments driven by operational requirements. The amount being requested to fund salary increases is limited to the salary structure adjustment component, which reflects market price movement. Since the proposed salary increase component in excess of the structure adjustment and other salary-related personnel actions (e.g., confirmation increase, promotion increase) will be absorbed within the existing real budget envelope for 2015, it will be budget neutral. These increases are expected to be funded through the projected salary dilution that is anticipated in 2015 (i.e., staff leaving on average have higher salaries than newly appointed staff) and prudent management of promotions. Table 9 shows the total estimated budget effect of the 2014 and 2015 salary increase proposals by staff category.
36. The proposals result in a request for new funds of $\$ 5.1$ million for salary increases $(0.8 \%$ of the estimated proposed 2015 budget) and $\$ 1.1$ million for salary-related benefit costs ( $0.2 \%$ of the proposed 2015 budget). Appendix 7 shows the 10-year history (2005-2014) of the ratio of staff salaries and benefits to IAE. Based on the 2014 midyear estimate, staff salaries and
benefits are expected to represent about 61.1\% of IAE (45.8\% for international staff and 15.3\% for NSAS), which is lower than the figure of $63.9 \%$ in 2013 ( $48.9 \%$ for international staff and $15.0 \%$ for NSAS).

Table 9: Budget Effect of Salary Increase Proposals

|  | 2015 |  |  |  | 2014 |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Increase (\$ million) | IS | $\begin{gathered} \text { HQ } \\ \text { NSAS } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { FO } \\ \text { NSAS } \end{gathered}$ | Total | IS | $\begin{gathered} \text { HQ } \\ \text { NSAS } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { FO } \\ \text { NSAS } \end{gathered}$ | Total |
| Salary Increase ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 3.7 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 5.1 | 3.1 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 6.4 |
| Salary Increase (as \% of salary) | 2.3 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 7.0 | 2.9 |
| Salary-Related Benefits ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | 0.8 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 1.4 |

$\mathrm{FO}=$ field office, $\mathrm{HQ}=$ headquarters, $\mathrm{IS}=$ international staff, NSAS = national staff and administrative staff.
a Including promotion increase, confirmation increase, and other salary-related personnel actions.
${ }^{b}$ Primarily staff retirement plan contributions (i.e., $21 \%$ for the Staff Retirement Plan and the balance of $0.43 \%$ for insurance benefits)
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## VI. BENEFITS

37. No change in benefits is proposed at this time. The next total remuneration study for all ADB staff has commenced and will be completed in 2015. The technical review of the Staff Retirement Plan has been completed and will be reviewed with the other benefit plans in the context of overall potential changes to align the compensation and incentive system to support ADB's business needs and workforce requirements.

## VII. RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION

38. ADB recruits from its member countries highly qualified and experienced professionals with international exposure to join as international staff. ADB recruits highly qualified and talented NSAS for each of its field offices from nationals of the duty station country. ADB seeks to attract staff from multinational companies, the finance sector, international financial institutions, international organizations, the public sector, and the academe.
39. ADB's recruitment and retention experience for international staff and NSAS is presented in Appendix 8. A review of the 3-year transformation period (2010-2012) showed that ADB was able to recruit and retain the required talent and skills. In line with the midterm review of Strategy 2020, the skills audit and HR audit may identify potential skills required to deliver project outputs and outcomes and make the necessary staffing adjustments. To build up the future pipeline of qualified candidates, ADB must continue to explore avenues and means for talent acquisition, including the use of social media. Candidates for some specific job families or positions (e.g., technology, risk management, treasury, finance, and private sector operations) continue to be difficult to attract or retain as demand and supply for these jobs in the global market remain very competitive.
40. For headquarters NSAS, ADB continues to be an attractive employer in Manila. However, recruitment and retention of suitably qualified and experienced NSAS continues to present a challenge in some field office locations. In some countries with well-developed employment markets, ADB tends to employ overqualified and highly experienced candidates, which can lead to job dissatisfaction later.
41. ADB expects to be able to recruit the staff needed for 2015 based on the proposed 2015 salary structures. The salary range widths at all levels provide sufficient flexibility to offer appointment salaries that take into account an individual's qualifications and experience.

## VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

42. The President recommends that the Board approve for international staff the 2015 salary structure in Table 2 and an overall average salary increase of $4.0 \%$, effective 1 January 2015, which reflects a structure adjustment component of $2.3 \%$ (equal to the budgeted salary increase) and a budget-neutral salary increase component of $1.7 \%$ to allow salary progression and merit increases for high performers.
43. The President recommends that the Board approve the following for NSAS, effective 1 January 2015:
(i) for headquarters NSAS, the 2015 salary structure as shown in Table 5 and an overall average salary increase of $7.6 \%$, which reflects a structure adjustment component of $4.5 \%$ (equal to the budgeted salary increase) and a budget-neutral salary increase component of $3.1 \%$ to allow salary progression and merit increases for high performers; and
(ii) for field office NSAS, the 2015 salary structures as shown in Appendix 5 and an overall average salary increase of $7.0 \%$, which reflects an average structure adjustment component of $4.4 \%$ (equal to the budgeted salary increase) and a budget-neutral average salary increase component of $2.6 \%$. The corresponding figures for each field office are shown in Appendix 6 (Table A6.1).
44. Upon approval of the recommendations in paras. 42 and 43, the costs will be reflected in the 2015 budget proposal to be discussed and considered by the Board in December 2014.

## PRIMARY FINDINGS OF THE COMPENSATION REVIEW FOR INTERNATIONAL STAFF IN 2010 AND NATIONAL STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF IN 2011

## A. International Staff

1. The 2010 international staff compensation review's primary objective was to assess the overall competitiveness of the compensation package of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) relative to various markets, both private sector and public sector salaries in Australia; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; Japan; Singapore; and the United States. The review also included comparisons of total remuneration (salaries, allowances, and employer-funded benefit values) with six international financial institutions and other international organizations: the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations, and the World Bank.
2. The review noted that in accordance with the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the Charter), ${ }^{1}$ ADB needs an overall compensation program and, in particular, a salary system that is
(i) set at internationally competitive levels in order to recruit and retain staff of the highest caliber from as wide a geographical basis as possible, and
(ii) structured to recognize and provide strong incentives for high levels of performance throughout staff members' careers.
3. The review's primary findings and conclusions were as follows:
(i) Total remuneration. Total remuneration is generally competitive if the measure is the midpoint of salaries. When the comparison used actual average salaries as the basis, the competitiveness of ADB's total remuneration dropped below the average and median values since average salaries of ADB staff are about $8 \%$ below the average midpoint salaries. This also affects salary-related benefit values. If the housing benefit is set aside, which as the consultants point out is a benefit that is a requirement unique to ADB to attract and retain staff because of location considerations, ADB's total remuneration package falls below the average and median values, even on the basis of midpoint salaries.
(ii) Compensation. ADB's salary midpoints are generally competitive against global markets (Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and the United States). The study has shown that for the international staff positions that ADB recruits from the market, their pay levels converge in the global and regional markets. Performance bonuses are common only in the private sector, where the amounts are a significant component of total cash compensation. Among the six comparators, only the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Finance Corporation (part of the World Bank) pay performance bonuses.
(iii) Benefits. Overall, ADB's benefits are competitive with those offered by the six comparators, but there are variations over the four broad benefit categories:
(a) security benefits (pension, insurance, sickness and disability benefits, and separation grants);

[^6](b) other professional staff benefits (dependency allowance, annual leave, and statutory holidays);
(c) expatriate allowances (home country travel, education assistance, and mobility premium); and
(d) housing allowances and rental subsidies.
4. Based on the aggregate value of all four categories of benefits, ADB ranks first and is above both the median and average values. However, this is primarily because of the rental subsidy, which is provided by only one other comparator. Without the rental subsidy, ADB's benefits package ranks fifth and falls below both the median and average. The consultants found that special factors make the provision of the rental subsidy a necessary allowance that allows ADB to address location-specific challenges.
5. The consultants also noted that ADB offers a comprehensive benefits package that is generally competitive with those of the comparators. However, many of the benefit programs operate under complex rule-based systems and are administratively burdensome to ADB. Staff members have also expressed a desire for simplification, more options, and flexibility to match their diverse personal circumstances. The review identified opportunities for making changes to individual benefits and allowances by reallocating resources within the total remuneration envelope. The recommended changes address the need to offer staff more options and some flexibility, balanced with ADB's need to make more effective use of its budgetary resources. The proposed changes will also help streamline processes and lower administration costs.

## B. National Staff and Administrative Staff

6. Similar to the 2010 comprehensive review for international staff, the 2011 review's primary objective was to assess the appropriateness of the current compensation methodology and determine the overall competitiveness of ADB's compensation package at headquarters and in field offices for national staff and administrative staff (NSAS). The total remuneration comparison was limited to headquarters and three field offices-the People's Republic of China, India, and Indonesia-because reliable salary data was not readily available in many duty station locations and the timeline for the completion of the review restricted the scope.
7. The review included comparisons of total remuneration (salaries and employer-provided benefit values) with the local comparator companies and the World Bank in the duty station location. The primary findings and conclusions are as follows:
(i) Total remuneration. Total remuneration, as measured by the sum of cash compensation plus the monetary value assigned to the employer-provided portion of benefits, is at par for NSAS in headquarters and in the three field offices when compared with the World Bank. This is because both organizations provide many of the same benefits to locally recruited staff as are provided to international staff, notably pension, medical insurance, and leave. However, when compared with local comparator companies, total remuneration at ADB headquarters and the three field offices is significantly higher.
(ii) Compensation. ADB's cash compensation at headquarters is lower than the World Bank and is at par with local comparator companies. For the three field offices, it is essentially the same, as expected, since the World Bank salary structure serves as the basis for the ADB salary structure in all of its field offices with the exception of Japan.
(iii) Benefits. ADB's benefits are competitive with those offered by the World Bank, but are particularly higher when compared to the benefits provided by local comparator companies. Compared with the World Bank, most of the benefits are
at par; benefit values are higher for loans because of the interest subsidy and lower for life insurance.
8. The review noted that ADB offers a comprehensive benefits package that is generally above those of market comparators and at par with the World Bank. This is a result of ADB following the practice of most international financial institutions to maintain the same benefit programs and practices across locations to ensure parity among staff. The review endorsed the current practice of generally applying the same set of benefits across locations, especially since some field offices have few staff. The consultants also recommended that ADB consider "tradeoffs" or reallocation of existing budgetary resources when considering changes to existing benefits or introducing new ones.
9. The review also identified opportunities to change certain benefits to unify the policy and practice for all NSAS. The recommended changes will also help streamline processes and simplify administration. ADB will continue to review benefits and allowances regularly, and will introduce cost-effective changes-primarily by reallocating existing budgetary resources-with the goal of providing staff with more options and flexibility, and simplifying administration.

## OVERVIEW OF THE WORLD BANK COMPENSATION METHODOLOGY

1. The revised compensation methodology for international staff approved by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) Board of Directors in 2010 reaffirmed the appropriateness of ADB continuing to reference the World Bank as its principal comparator. Therefore, ADB adjusts its salary structure by the same salary structure movement as the World Bank. This appendix provides an overview of the policies and procedures used under the World Bank rules-based compensation system to measure the United States (US) comparator market. ${ }^{1}$
2. Step 1: Surveying the market and selecting comparator organizations. The World Bank's salary structure for Washington-appointed staff is referenced to the US market. The compensation system utilizes salary data from three labor market sectors in setting the salary structure: the public sector, the private general industrial sector, and the private financial sector. For the public sector, market data is gathered from the US civil service, federal agencies, and the Federal Reserve System. Multiple high-quality data sources are used to ensure adequate coverage for World Bank jobs. Data from the Hay Group are used for the industrial sector, and data from McLagan Partners and Towers Watson are used for the financial sector. ${ }^{2}$
3. Step 2: Job matching and collecting total cash compensation data. Job matching reviews are conducted to reflect changes in the World Bank jobs relative to jobs in comparator organizations. This process contributes to a better understanding of the counterpart jobs in the market. Total cash compensation, which includes base salary and annual variable pay, is used to build the salary structures. Long-term incentives that are based on multiyear results, such as stock options or performance-based incentives, are excluded.

## Aggregating the Data

| World Bank <br> grade levels E <br> to H | ADB grade levels <br> IS1 to IS8 | The data source weighting is 33\% for the US <br> public sector (US civil service 60\%, Federal <br> Reserve 40\%) and 67\% for the private sector <br> (50\% industrial sector, 50\% financial sector). |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| World Bank <br> grade level I | ADB grade levels <br> IS9 and IS10 | The data source weighting is half public sector <br> and half private sector. |

ADB = Asian Development Bank, IS = international staff, US = United States.
Source: ADB.
4. Step 3: Market positioning-setting the payline and designing the structure. Once the market salary levels have been weighted and aggregated for each World Bank grade, the existing salary structure is adjusted effective July 1 to align the market reference points (MRPs) with the market grade levels based on a smoothing technique. This ensures that new MRPs are close to their respective market values, and the weighted average of the market values of the various grades and the weighted average of the MRPs are approximately equal. The competitive positioning of the World Bank is set at the 75th percentile of the market data. The MRPs determine the salary payline. To complete the structure, minimum and maximum salaries are developed from the MRPs using range spreads, which vary by grade level.
5. Step 4: Calculating the structure adjustment and overall salary increase. The structure adjustment is the increase in the weighted average of the new MRPs when compared with the previous year's MRPs (weighted by the number of staff). For its 2015 fiscal year (FY), 1

[^7]July 2014-30 June 2015, the structure adjustment for the World Bank is $2.3 \%$. The overall salary increase consists of the budgeted structure adjustment plus a non-budgeted salary increase component. The non-budgeted salary increase component has two elements: (i) the supplemental merit increase (SMI), which is provided to differentiate rewards for high performers and/or to address competitiveness issues for grades with average salaries significantly below the MRP; and (ii) the salary progression adjustment (SPA), which provides for progression within salary ranges, similar to the step increases in the public sector-except at the World Bank, where these are not automatic and are totally performance-based. The calculations of the SMI and the SPA are as follows:
(i) The SMI is determined as the salary gap of staff with performance ratings of 4 or 5 relative to their MRP in the previous year (the World Bank ratings of 4 or 5 are similar to the ADB performance ratings of satisfactory with special recommendation and exceptional). The SMI is distributed to high-performing staff across all grades. For FY2015, the SMI for the World Bank is $0.3 \%$.
(ii) The SPA is determined as the 5-year average of the salary gap of confirmed staff (staff with more than 1 year in the same grade) relative to the MRPs over the same period. For FY2015, the SPA for the World Bank is $1.4 \%$.
6. Step 5: Converting gross market values to net values. While labor market compensation data are collected and provided in gross terms, the resulting gross market values per grade are then netted down based on current tax tables provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers to restate them in terms comparable to the net-of-tax salaries of World Bank staff.
7. Step 6: Developing a salary increase matrix. Based on the overall salary increase and the distribution of performance ratings, the salary increase matrix is developed. The weighted average of the midpoint of the salary increase ranges for each performance rating weighted by the expected percentage of staff assigned for each rating is matched closely with the overall salary increase percentage.

ADB AND WORLD BANK INTERNATIONAL STAFF SALARY STRUCTURE AND SALARY INCREASE (2006-2015) AND EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE AND PHILIPPINES CONSUMER PRICE INDEX ON STAFF EXPENSES AS A PERCENTAGE OF SALARY

Table A3.1: ADB and World Bank International Staff Salary Structure and Salary Increase (2006-2015) (\%)

| $\begin{gathered} \begin{array}{c} \text { Calendar } \\ \text { Year } \end{array} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Structure Adjustment |  | Salary Increase |  | Comparatio |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | ADB | World Bank | ADB | World Bank | ADB | World Bank |
| 2006 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 5.4 | 92.4 | 100.0 |
| 2007 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 91.7 | 100.0 |
| 2008 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 90.9 | 100.0 |
| 2009 | 4.3 | 3.3 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 91.8 | 100.0 |
| 2010 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 91.6 | 100.0 |
| 2011 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 91.5 | 100.0 |
| 2012 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 3.9 | 2.8 | 93.3 | 98.9 |
| 2013 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 93.3 | 98.1 |
| 2014 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 93.3 | 97.5 |
| 2015 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 93.9 | 97.1 |
| Compounded Growth Rate | 30.7 | 29.5 | 49.3 | 49.4 |  |  |
| Compounded Annual Growth Rate | 2.7 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 4.1 |  |  |

ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Source: ADB.

Table A3.2: Effect of Exchange Rate and Philippines Consumer Price Index on Staff Expenses as a Percentage of Salary ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Year | Average Salary (Including Promotion Increases) (\$) | Amount Spent in Manila Starting at 40\% of Pay in 2004 <br> (\$) | Annual Staff Share of Rent $\qquad$ (\$) | Staff Share of Primary/ Secondary Education (\$) | Total (\$) | Amount Spent in Manila as \% of Pay (\%) | $\qquad$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { CPI } \\ \begin{array}{c} \text { Philippines } \\ (\%) \\ \hline \end{array}{ }^{\text {b }} \end{gathered}$ | Salary Increase $\qquad$ <br> (\%) | Amount Spent in Manila Starting at $40 \%$ of Pay in 2005 <br> (P) | Staff Share of Rent (P) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2005 | 88,506 | 35,402 | 9,894 | 5,634 | 50,930 | 58 | 53.68 | 7.6 | 6.1 | 1,900,314 | 531,059 |
| 2006 | 93,861 | 41,721 | 11,361 | 5,974 | 59,055 | 63 | 49.01 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 2,044,738 | 556,794 |
| 2007 | 99,633 | 52,675 | 14,109 | 6,334 | 73,117 | 73 | 41.23 | 2.9 | 6.2 | 2,171,512 | 581,632 |
| 2008 | 105,462 | 47,027 | 12,704 | 6,716 | 66,446 | 63 | 47.52 | 8.3 | 5.9 | 2,234,486 | 603,614 |
| 2009 | 113,529 | 52,388 | 13,378 | 7,121 | 72,887 | 64 | 46.18 | 4.2 | 7.7 | 2,419,064 | 617,752 |
| 2010 | 119,717 | 57,582 | 14,450 | 7,550 | 79,583 | 66 | 43.78 | 3.8 | 5.5 | 2,520,665 | 632,562 |
| 2011 | 126,960 | 59,675 | 14,491 | 8,005 | 82,171 | 65 | 43.85 | 4.6 | 6.1 | 2,616,450 | 635,337 |
| 2012 | 134,133 | 66,735 | 14,677 | 8,488 | 89,900 | 67 | 41.01 | 3.2 | 5.7 | 2,736,807 | 601,890 |
| 2013 | 140,773 | 63,641 | 13,025 | 9,000 | 85,666 | 61 | 44.38 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 2,824,385 | 578,064 |
| 2014 | 147,600 | 67,654 | 13,873 | 9,543 | 91,070 | 62 | 43.00 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 2,909,116 | 596,544 |
| Annual Increase (\%) | 5.8 | 7.5 | 3.8 | 6.0 | 6.7 | 0.8 | (2.4) | 4.5 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 1.3 |

( ) = negative, $\mathrm{CPI}=$ consumer price index, $\mathrm{P}=$ Philippine peso.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ This illustrative example is based on the following assumptions:
(i) The salary increase is the approved annual average salary increase plus a component to reflect an average promotion increase during $2005-2014$.
(ii) Staff with two dependent children in duty station schooling in Manila.
(iii) Staff's total local expenditure (excluding rent and education) is at $40 \%$ of salary; this includes food, clothing, transportation costs, and utilities.
(iv) Staff share is $25 \%$ of education cost; education cost is assumed to be an average of primary and secondary tuition fees at international schools in Manila.
(v) Staff share is $35 \%$ of actual rent; rent is assumed to be at the average median gross rent in each calendar year.
${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Annual inflation data from the Republic of the Philippines National Statistics Office.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

LIST OF COMPARATOR COMPANIES AND ORGANIZATIONS FOR SALARY REVIEW OF HEADQUARTERS NATIONAL STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

| No. | Company Name | Line of <br> Business | Headquarters | Total <br> No. of <br> Staff |
| :---: | :--- | :--- | :--- | ---: |
| 1 | Accenture, Inc. | Services | United States | $>1,000$ |
| 2 | Citibank, N.A. | Finance | United States | $>1,000$ |
| 3 | HSBC Group | Finance | United Kingdom | $>500$ |
| 4 | International Rice Research Institute | Supranational | Philippines | $>1,000$ |
| 5 | National Power Corporation | Service/Utilities | Philippines | $>1,000$ |
| 6 | Nestle Philippines, Inc. | Consumer | Switzerland | $>1,000$ |
| 7 | Petron Corporation | Oil | Philippines | $>1,000$ |
| 8 | Procter \& Gamble, Philippines | Consumer | United States | $>1,000$ |
| 9 | San Miguel Corporation | Consumer | Philippines | $>1,000$ |
| 10 | Smart Communications, Inc. | Service/Utilities | Philippines/Japan | $>1,000$ |
| 11 | Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada | Finance | Canada | $>500$ |
| 12 | United Laboratories, Inc. | Pharmaceutical | Philippines | $>1,000$ |
| 13 | United States Embassy | Embassy | United States | $>1,000$ |
| 14 | World Bank, Manila Office | Supranational | International | $<500$ |
| 15 | World Health Organization | Supranational | International | $<500$ |

> = greater than, < = less than.
Source: Towers Watson's Salary Survey Report.

PROPOSED FIELD OFFICE SALARY STRUCTURES EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 2015
CENTRAL WEST ASIA
Table A5.1: Afghanistan Resident Mission
(\$ per year)

| (\$ per year) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 10,500 | 13,700 | 16,800 | 60 |
| AS2 | 12,100 | 15,700 | 19,400 | 60 |
| AS3 | 13,900 | 18,400 | 22,900 | 65 |
| AS4 | 15,500 | 20,600 | 25,600 | 65 |
| AS5 | 18,100 | 24,400 | 30,800 | 70 |
| AS6 | 20,000 | 27,000 | 34,000 | 70 |
| AS7 | 25,200 | 34,600 | 44,100 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 29,200 | 40,100 | 51,100 | 75 |
| NS2 | 33,100 | 45,500 | 57,900 | 75 |
| NS3 | 38,800 | 54,300 | 69,800 | 80 |
| NS4 | 45,800 | 64,100 | 82,400 | 80 |
| NS5 | 52,800 | 73,900 | 95,000 | 80 |
| NS6 | 58,200 | 81,500 | 104,800 | 80 |
| NS7 | 64,000 | 89,600 | 115,200 | 80 |
| AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff. |  |  |  |  |
| Source: Asian Development Bank. |  |  |  |  |

Table A5.2: Armenia Resident Mission
(AMD per year)

| Level | (AMD per year) |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Minimum |  | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | $4,365,000$ | $5,675,000$ | $6,984,000$ | 60 |
| AS2 | $4,947,000$ | $6,431,000$ | $7,915,000$ | 60 |
| AS3 | $5,294,000$ | $7,014,000$ | $8,735,000$ | 65 |
| AS4 | $5,834,000$ | $7,730,000$ | $9,626,000$ | 65 |
| AS5 | $6,455,000$ | $8,714,000$ | $10,974,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | $7,149,000$ | $9,651,000$ | $12,153,000$ | 70 |
| AS7 | $8,894,000$ | $12,229,000$ | $15,565,000$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $10,337,000$ | $14,213,000$ | $18,090,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $11,779,000$ | $16,196,000$ | $20,613,000$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $14,211,000$ | $19,895,000$ | $25,580,000$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $16,567,000$ | $23,194,000$ | $29,821,000$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $2,07,000$ | $28,108,000$ | $36,139,000$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $22,474,000$ | $31,463,000$ | $40,453,000$ | 80 |
| NS7 | $24,721,000$ | $34,610,000$ | $44,498,000$ | 80 |

$\overline{\text { AS }}=$ administrative staff, $\mathrm{NS}=$ national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.3: Azerbaijan Resident Mission

| (AZN per year) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 13,300 | 17,300 | 21,300 | 60 |
| AS2 | 14,200 | 18,500 | 22,700 | 60 |
| AS3 | 15,900 | 21,100 | 26,200 | 65 |
| AS4 | 17,600 | 23,300 | 29,000 | 65 |
| AS5 | 19,600 | 26,400 | 33,300 | 70 |
| AS6 | 21,600 | 29,200 | 36,700 | 70 |
| AS7 | 25,200 | 34,700 | 44,100 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 29,200 | 40,100 | 51,100 | 75 |
| NS2 | 33,100 | 45,500 | 57,900 | 75 |
| NS3 | 39,900 | 55,800 | 71,800 | 80 |
| NS4 | 46,600 | 65,200 | 83,900 | 80 |
| NS5 | 55,100 | 77,200 | 99,200 | 80 |
| NS6 | 61,400 | 85,900 | 110,500 | 80 |
| NS7 | 67,400 | 94,400 | 121,300 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.4: Georgia Resident Mission
(GEL per year)

|  | (GEL per year) |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 23,300 | 30,300 | 37,300 | 60 |
| AS2 | 27,500 | 35,700 | 44,000 | 60 |
| AS3 | 29,500 | 39,100 | 48,700 | 65 |
| AS4 | 31,700 | 42,000 | 52,300 | 65 |
| AS5 | 35,000 | 47,200 | 59,500 | 70 |
| AS6 | 40,200 | 54,300 | 68,300 | 70 |
| AS7 | 44,800 | 61,600 | 78,400 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 50,700 | 69,700 | 88,700 | 75 |
| NS2 | 56,500 | 77,700 | 98,900 | 75 |
| NS3 | 70,400 | 98,500 | 126,700 | 80 |
| NS4 | 81,400 | 113,900 | 146,500 | 80 |
| NS5 | 102,000 | 142,800 | 183,600 | 80 |
| NS6 | 108,600 | 152,100 | 195,500 | 80 |
| NS7 | 119,600 | 167,400 | 215,300 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.5: Kazakhstan Resident Mission

|  |  | (T per year) |  | Range <br> Level |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | (\%) |  |
| Administrative Staff |  |  | 60 |  |
| AS1 | $2,288,000$ | $2,974,000$ | $3,661,000$ | 60 |
| AS2 | $2,568,000$ | $3,338,000$ | $4,109,000$ | 65 |
| AS3 | $2,829,000$ | $3,748,000$ | $4,668,000$ | 65 |
| AS4 | $3,106,000$ | $4,116,000$ | $5,125,000$ | 70 |
| AS5 | $3,323,000$ | $4,486,000$ | $5,649,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | $3,929,000$ | $5,304,000$ | $6,679,000$ | 75 |
| AS7 | $4,591,000$ | $6,312,000$ | $8,034,000$ |  |
| National Staff |  |  |  | 75 |
| NS1 | $5,484,000$ | $7,541,000$ | $9,597,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $6,378,000$ | $8,770,000$ | $11,162,000$ | 80 |
| NS3 | $8,575,000$ | $12,005,000$ | $15,435,000$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $10,391,000$ | $14,547,000$ | $18,704,000$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $12,948,000$ | $18,127,000$ | $23,306,000$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $15,462,000$ | $21,647,000$ | $27,832,000$ | 80 |
| NS7 | $17,008,000$ | $23,811,000$ | $30,614,000$ | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.6: Kyrgyz Republic Resident Mission

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 8,800 | 11,400 | 14,100 | 60 |
| AS2 | 9,200 | 11,900 | 14,700 | 60 |
| AS3 | 9,900 | 13,100 | 16,300 | 65 |
| AS4 | 10,800 | 14,300 | 17,800 | 65 |
| AS5 | 11,000 | 14,800 | 18,700 | 70 |
| AS6 | 12,400 | 16,700 | 21,100 | 70 |
| AS7 | 14,200 | 19,500 | 24,900 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 16,300 | 22,400 | 28,500 | 75 |
| NS2 | 18,300 | 25,200 | 32,000 | 75 |
| NS3 | 20,800 | 29,100 | 37,400 | 80 |
| NS4 | 24,200 | 33,900 | 43,600 | 80 |
| NS5 | 28,800 | 40,300 | 51,800 | 80 |
| NS6 | 31,900 | 44,700 | 57,400 | 80 |
| NS7 | 35,100 | 49,200 | 63,200 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.7: Pakistan Resident Mission
(PRs per year)

| (PRs per year) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 581,000 | 755,000 | 930,000 | 60 |
| AS2 | 732,000 | 952,000 | 1,171,000 | 60 |
| AS3 | 725,000 | 960,000 | 1,196,000 | 65 |
| AS4 | 915,000 | 1,213,000 | 1,510,000 | 65 |
| AS5 | 1,274,000 | 1,720,000 | 2,166,000 | 70 |
| AS6 | 1,503,000 | 2,029,000 | 2,555,000 | 70 |
| AS7 | 1,892,000 | 2,601,000 | 3,311,000 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 2,526,000 | 3,473,000 | 4,421,000 | 75 |
| NS2 | 3,159,000 | 4,344,000 | 5,528,000 | 75 |
| NS3 | 3,813,000 | 5,338,000 | 6,863,000 | 80 |
| NS4 | 5,092,000 | 7,129,000 | 9,166,000 | 80 |
| NS5 | 5,992,000 | 8,389,000 | 10,786,000 | 80 |
| NS6 | 7,564,000 | 10,589,000 | 13,615,000 | 80 |
| NS7 | 8,320,000 | 11,648,000 | 14,976,000 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.8: Tajikistan Resident Mission
(\$ per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 8,300 | 10,800 | 13,300 | 60 |
| AS2 | 9,300 | 12,100 | 14,900 | 60 |
| AS3 | 10,200 | 13,500 | 16,800 | 65 |
| AS4 | 11,600 | 15,400 | 19,100 | 65 |
| AS5 | 12,800 | 17,300 | 21,800 | 70 |
| AS6 | 14,100 | 19,000 | 24,000 | 70 |
| AS7 | 16,900 | 23,200 | 29,600 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 19,000 | 26,100 | 33,300 | 75 |
| NS2 | 21,100 | 29,000 | 36,900 | 75 |
| NS3 | 24,300 | 34,000 | 43,700 | 80 |
| NS4 | 27,600 | 38,600 | 49,700 | 80 |
| NS5 | 30,400 | 42,600 | 54,700 | 80 |
| NS6 | 33,300 | 46,600 | 59,900 | 80 |
| NS7 | 36,600 | 51,300 | 65,900 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.9: Turkmenistan Resident Mission
(\$ per year)

|  |  | (\$ per year) |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 8,300 | 10,800 | 13,300 | 60 |
| AS2 | 10,500 | 13,700 | 16,800 | 60 |
| AS3 | 12,200 | 16,100 | 20,100 | 65 |
| AS4 | 13,400 | 17,700 | 22,100 | 65 |
| AS5 | 14,500 | 19,600 | 24,700 | 70 |
| AS6 | 15,600 | 21,100 | 26,500 | 70 |
| AS7 | 17,600 | 24,200 | 30,800 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 20,500 | 28,200 | 35,900 | 75 |
| NS2 | 23,400 | 32,200 | 41,000 | 75 |
| NS3 | 29,100 | 40,800 | 52,400 | 80 |
| NS4 | 34,100 | 47,700 | 61,400 | 80 |
| NS5 | 40,700 | 57,000 | 73,300 | 80 |
| NS6 | 44,100 | 61,800 | 79,400 | 80 |
| NS7 | 48,600 | 68,000 | 87,500 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.10: Uzbekistan Resident Mission (\$ per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 7,600 | 9,900 | 12,200 | 60 |
| AS2 | 8,300 | 10,800 | 13,300 | 60 |
| AS3 | 9,400 | 12,500 | 15,500 | 65 |
| AS4 | 10,300 | 13,700 | 17,000 | 65 |
| AS5 | 11,300 | 15,300 | 19,200 | 70 |
| AS6 | 13,200 | 17,800 | 22,400 | 70 |
| AS7 | 15,200 | 20,900 | 26,600 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 17,900 | 24,600 | 31,300 | 75 |
| NS2 | 20,600 | 28,300 | 36,100 | 75 |
| NS3 | 25,700 | 36,000 | 46,300 | 80 |
| NS4 | 29,900 | 41,900 | 53,800 | 80 |
| NS5 | 35,500 | 49,700 | 63,900 | 80 |
| NS6 | 40,400 | 56,500 | 72,700 | 80 |
| NS7 | 44,400 | 62,200 | 79,900 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## EAST ASIA

Table A5.11: People's Republic of China Resident Mission (CNY per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 97,200 | 126,300 | 155,500 | 60 |
| AS2 | 108,800 | 141,500 | 174,100 | 60 |
| AS3 | 119,600 | 158,500 | 197,300 | 65 |
| AS4 | 136,800 | 181,200 | 225,700 | 65 |
| AS5 | 154,000 | 207,900 | 261,800 | 70 |
| AS6 | 175,300 | 236,600 | 298,000 | 70 |
| AS7 | 223,500 | 307,300 | 391,100 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 258,000 | 354,700 | 451,500 | 75 |
| NS2 | 292,400 | 402,000 | 511,700 | 75 |
| NS3 | 389,400 | 545,200 | 700,900 | 80 |
| NS4 | 481,200 | 673,700 | 866,200 | 80 |
| NS5 | 608,100 | 851,400 | $1,094,600$ | 80 |
| NS6 | 681,800 | 954,500 | $1,27,200$ | 80 |
| NS7 | 750,000 | $1,050,000$ | $1,350,000$ | 80 |
| AS =administrative staff, NS = national staff. |  |  |  |  |
| Source: Asian Development Bank. |  |  |  |  |

Table A5.12: Mongolia Resident Mission
(\$ per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 8,300 | 10,800 | 13,300 | 60 |
| AS2 | 9,300 | 12,100 | 14,900 | 60 |
| AS3 | 10,200 | 13,500 | 16,800 | 65 |
| AS4 | 11,200 | 14,900 | 18,500 | 65 |
| AS5 | 13,300 | 17,900 | 22,600 | 70 |
| AS6 | 14,200 | 19,200 | 24,100 | 70 |
| AS7 | 16,800 | 23,100 | 29,400 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 19,600 | 26,900 | 34,300 | 75 |
| NS2 | 22,300 | 30,600 | 39,000 | 75 |
| NS3 | 27,400 | 38,400 | 49,300 | 80 |
| NS4 | 30,900 | 43,300 | 5,600 | 80 |
| NS5 | 42,100 | 58,900 | 75,800 | 80 |
| NS6 | 46,500 | 65,100 | 83,700 | 80 |
| NS7 | 51,100 | 71,600 | 92,000 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## PACIFIC

Table A5.13: Pacific Liaison and Coordination Office
(A\$ per year)

| (A\$ per year) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 33,000 | 42,900 | 52,800 | 60 |
| AS2 | 36,000 | 46,800 | 57,600 | 60 |
| AS3 | 38,000 | 50,300 | 62,700 | 65 |
| AS4 | 41,900 | 55,500 | 69,100 | 65 |
| AS5 | 44,600 | 60,200 | 75,800 | 70 |
| AS6 | 48,200 | 65,100 | 81,900 | 70 |
| AS7 | 55,100 | 75,700 | 96,400 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 62,400 | 85,800 | 109,200 | 75 |
| NS2 | 69,700 | 95,900 | 122,000 | 75 |
| NS3 | 78,600 | 110,000 | 141,500 | 80 |
| NS4 | 88,300 | 123,600 | 158,900 | 80 |
| NS5 | 101,400 | 142,000 | 182,500 | 80 |
| NS6 | 113,100 | 158,400 | 203,600 | 80 |
| NS7 | 124,500 | 174,300 | 224,100 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.14: Pacific Subregional Office in Suva, Fiji
(F\$ per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 16,800 | 21,800 | 26,900 | 60 |
| AS2 | 18,800 | 24,400 | 30,100 | 60 |
| AS3 | 20,200 | 26,700 | 33,300 | 65 |
| AS4 | 22,500 | 29,800 | 37,100 | 65 |
| AS5 | 24,400 | 33,000 | 41,500 | 70 |
| AS6 | 27,000 | 36,500 | 45,900 | 70 |
| AS7 | 31,600 | 43,500 | 55,300 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 38,100 | 52,400 | 66,700 | 75 |
| NS2 | 44,600 | 61,300 | 78,100 | 75 |
| NS3 | 59,600 | 83,500 | 107,300 | 80 |
| NS4 | 71,400 | 100,000 | 128,500 | 80 |
| NS5 | 81,400 | 114,000 | 146,500 | 80 |
| NS6 | 95,200 | 133,300 | 171,400 | 80 |
| NS7 | 104,700 | 146,600 | 188,500 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.15: Papua New Guinea Resident Mission

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 22,400 | 29,100 | 35,800 | 60 |
| AS2 | 25,900 | 33,700 | 41,400 | 60 |
| AS3 | 28,000 | 37,100 | 46,200 | 65 |
| AS4 | 31,200 | 41,400 | 51,500 | 65 |
| AS5 | 35,300 | 47,700 | 60,000 | 70 |
| AS6 | 41,300 | 55,700 | 70,200 | 70 |
| AS7 | 49,500 | 68,100 | 86,600 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 57,700 | 79,400 | 101,000 | 75 |
| NS2 | 66,000 | 90,700 | 115,500 | 75 |
| NS3 | 78,800 | 110,300 | 141,800 | 80 |
| NS4 | 97,900 | 137,100 | 176,200 | 80 |
| NS5 | 125,400 | 175,600 | 225,700 | 80 |
| NS6 | 131,900 | 184,600 | 237,400 | 80 |
| NS7 | 145,000 | 203,000 | 261,000 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.16: Timor-Leste Resident Mission
(\$ per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 5,200 | 6,700 | 8,300 | 60 |
| AS2 | 6,300 | 8,200 | 10,100 | 60 |
| AS3 | 6,700 | 8,900 | 11,100 | 65 |
| AS4 | 7,800 | 10,300 | 12,900 | 65 |
| AS5 | 8,400 | 11,300 | 14,300 | 70 |
| AS6 | 9,600 | 12,900 | 16,300 | 70 |
| AS7 | 12,800 | 17,600 | 22,400 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 14,900 | 20,500 | 26,100 | 75 |
| NS2 | 17,100 | 23,500 | 29,900 | 75 |
| NS3 | 21,000 | 29,400 | 37,800 | 80 |
| NS4 | 26,100 | 36,500 | 47,000 | 80 |
| NS5 | 35,100 | 49,200 | 63,200 | 80 |
| NS6 | 39,400 | 55,100 | 70,900 | 80 |
| NS7 | 43,300 | 60,600 | 77,900 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## SOUTH ASIA

Table A5.17: Bangladesh Resident Mission
(Tk per year)

| Level | (Tk per year) |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| AS1 | 486,000 | 632,000 | 778,000 | 60 |
| AS2 | 568,000 | 739,000 | 909,000 | 60 |
| AS3 | 706,000 | 935,000 | $1,165,000$ | 65 |
| AS4 | 812,000 | $1,076,000$ | $1,340,000$ | 65 |
| AS5 | 959,000 | $1,295,000$ | $1,630,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | $1,047,000$ | $1,413,000$ | $1,780,000$ | 70 |
| AS7 | $1,323,000$ | $1,819,000$ | $2,315,000$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $1,615,000$ | $2,221,000$ | $2,826,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $1,908,000$ | $2,623,000$ | $3,339,000$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $2,304,000$ | $3,226,000$ | $4,147,000$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $3,486,000$ | $4,880,000$ | $6,275,000$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $4,031,000$ | $5,644,000$ | $7,256,000$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $5,074,000$ | $7,103,000$ | $9,133,000$ | 80 |
| NS7 | $5,581,000$ | $7,814,000$ | $10,046,000$ | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.18: Bhutan Resident Mission

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 208,000 | 270,000 | 333,000 | $60 \%$ |
| AS2 | 238,000 | 309,000 | 381,000 | $60 \%$ |
| AS3 | 266,000 | 353,000 | 439,000 | $65 \%$ |
| AS4 | 297,000 | 394,000 | 490,000 | $65 \%$ |
| AS5 | 327,000 | 442,000 | 556,000 | $70 \%$ |
| AS6 | 356,000 | 480,000 | 605,000 | $70 \%$ |
| AS7 | 394,000 | 542,000 | 690,000 | $75 \%$ |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 425,000 | 585,000 | 744,000 | $75 \%$ |
| NS2 | 457,000 | 628,000 | 800,000 | $75 \%$ |
| NS3 | 491,000 | 688,000 | 884,000 | $80 \%$ |
| NS4 | 524,000 | 733,000 | 943,000 | $80 \%$ |
| NS5 | 556,000 | 779,000 | $1,001,000$ | $80 \%$ |
| NS6 | 594,000 | 831,000 | $1,069,000$ | $80 \%$ |
| NS7 | 653,000 | 914,000 | $1,175,000$ | $80 \%$ |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.19: India Resident Mission

| (Rs per year) |  |  |  | Level |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
|  | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 366,000 | 476,000 | 586,000 | 60 |
| AS2 | 429,000 | 558,000 | 686,000 | 60 |
| AS3 | 495,000 | 656,000 | 817,000 | 65 |
| AS4 | 589,000 | 780,000 | 972,000 | 65 |
| AS5 | 669,000 | 903,000 | $1,137,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | 814,000 | $1,099,000$ | $1,384,000$ | 70 |
| AS7 | $1,028,000$ | $1,413,000$ | $1,799,000$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $1,234,000$ | $1,697,000$ | $2,160,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $1,441,000$ | $1,981,000$ | $2,522,000$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $1,778,000$ | $2,489,000$ | $3,200,000$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $2,719,000$ | $3,807,000$ | $4,894,000$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $3,733,000$ | $5,226,000$ | $6,719,000$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $4,611,000$ | $6,455,000$ | $8,300,000$ | 80 |
| NS7 | $5,071,000$ | $7,100,000$ | $9,128,000$ | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.20: Nepal Resident Mission
(NRs per year)

| Level | (NRs per year) |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |  |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 534,000 | 694,000 | 854,000 | 60 |
| AS2 | 636,000 | 827,000 | $1,018,000$ | 60 |
| AS3 | 675,000 | 894,000 | $1,114,000$ | 65 |
| AS4 | 807,000 | $1,069,000$ | $1,332,000$ | 65 |
| AS5 | 905,000 | $1,222,000$ | $1,539,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | $1,004,000$ | $1,355,000$ | $1,707,000$ | 70 |
| AS7 | $1,220,000$ | $1,678,000$ | $2,135,000$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $1,424,000$ | $1,958,000$ | $2,492,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $1,628,000$ | $2,239,000$ | $2,849,000$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $2,089,000$ | $2,924,000$ | $3,760,000$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $2,509,000$ | $3,512,000$ | $4,516,000$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $3,044,000$ | $4,261,000$ | $5,479,000$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $3,547,000$ | $4,966,000$ | $6,385,000$ | 80 |
| NS7 | $3,901,000$ | $5,462,000$ | $7,022,000$ | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.21: Sri Lanka Resident Mission
(SLRs per year)

| (SLRs per year) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 939,000 | $1,221,000$ | $1,502,000$ | 60 |
| AS2 | $1,020,000$ | $1,326,000$ | $1,632,000$ | 60 |
| AS3 | $1,229,000$ | $1,629,000$ | $2,028,000$ | 65 |
| AS4 | $1,377,000$ | $1,824,000$ | $2,272,000$ | 65 |
| AS5 | $1,525,000$ | $2,059,000$ | $2,593,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | $1,924,000$ | $2,597,000$ | $3,271,000$ | 70 |
| AS7 | $2,275,000$ | $3,128,000$ | $3,981,000$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $2,712,000$ | $3,729,000$ | $4,746,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $3,148,000$ | $4,329,000$ | $5,509,000$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $3,754,000$ | $5,256,000$ | $6,757,000$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $4,805,000$ | $6,727,000$ | $8,649,000$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $6,456,000$ | $9,039,000$ | $11,621,000$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $8,280,000$ | $11,592,000$ | $14,904,000$ | 80 |
| NS7 | $9,108,000$ | $12,751,000$ | $16,394,000$ | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## SOUTHEAST ASIA

Table A5.22: Cambodia Resident Mission

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 7,000 | 9,100 | 11,200 | 60 |
| AS2 | 8,200 | 10,600 | 13,100 | 60 |
| AS3 | 8,800 | 11,600 | 14,500 | 65 |
| AS4 | 10,200 | 13,500 | 16,800 | 65 |
| AS5 | 10,600 | 14,300 | 18,000 | 70 |
| AS6 | 12,400 | 16,800 | 21,100 | 70 |
| AS7 | 16,100 | 22,200 | 28,200 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 18,800 | 25,800 | 32,900 | 75 |
| NS2 | 21,300 | 29,300 | 37,300 | 75 |
| NS3 | 27,400 | 38,400 | 49,300 | 80 |
| NS4 | 32,300 | 45,200 | 58,100 | 80 |
| NS5 | 41,200 | 57,700 | 74,200 | 80 |
| NS6 | 47,100 | 66,000 | 84,800 | 80 |
| NS7 | 51,900 | 7,600 | 93,400 | 80 |
| AS |  |  |  |  |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.23: Indonesia Resident Mission

| (Rp per year) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | $93,113,000$ | $121,047,000$ | $148,981,000$ | 60 |
| AS2 | $113,608,000$ | $147,691,000$ | $181,773,000$ | 60 |
| AS3 | $120,844,000$ | $160,118,000$ | $199,393,000$ | 65 |
| AS4 | $147,136,000$ | $194,955,000$ | $242,774,000$ | 65 |
| AS5 | $167,504,000$ | $226,131,000$ | $284,757,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | $208,541,000$ | $281,531,000$ | $354,520,000$ | 70 |
| AS7 | $254,019,000$ | $349,276,000$ | $444,533,000$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $307,436,000$ | $422,724,000$ | $538,013,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $360,852,000$ | $496,171,000$ | $631,491,000$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $518,379,000$ | $725,730,000$ | $933,082,000$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $645,482,000$ | $903,675,000$ | $1,161,868,000$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $901,895,000$ | $1,262,653,000$ | $1,623,411,000$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $1,027,866,000$ | $1,439,012,000$ | $1,850,159,000$ | 80 |
| NS7 | $1,130,652,000$ | $1,582,913,000$ | $2,035,174,000$ | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.24: Lao People's Democratic Republic Resident Mission (\$ per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 5,800 | 7,500 | 9,300 | 60 |
| AS2 | 6,400 | 8,300 | 10,200 | 60 |
| AS3 | 6,900 | 9,100 | 11,400 | 65 |
| AS4 | 7,500 | 10,000 | 12,400 | 65 |
| AS5 | 8,200 | 11,100 | 13,900 | 70 |
| AS6 | 9,000 | 12,100 | 15,300 | 70 |
| AS7 | 10,500 | 14,500 | 18,400 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 12,600 | 17,300 | 22,100 | 75 |
| NS2 | 14,600 | 20,100 | 25,600 | 75 |
| NS3 | 20,400 | 28,500 | 36,700 | 80 |
| NS4 | 26,000 | 36,400 | 46,800 | 80 |
| NS5 | 36,600 | 51,200 | 65,900 | 80 |
| NS6 | 44,500 | 62,300 | 80,100 | 80 |
| NS7 | 48,900 | 68,500 | 88,000 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.25: Myanmar Resident Mission

|  | (\$ per year) |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 7,000 | 9,100 | 11,200 | 60 |
| AS2 | 8,000 | 10,400 | 12,800 | 60 |
| AS3 | 8,800 | 11,700 | 14,500 | 65 |
| AS4 | 9,800 | 13,000 | 16,200 | 65 |
| AS5 | 10,900 | 14,700 | 18,500 | 70 |
| AS6 | 12,000 | 16,200 | 20,400 | 70 |
| AS7 | 13,500 | 18,500 | 23,600 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 14,800 | 20,400 | 25,900 | 75 |
| NS2 | 16,200 | 22,300 | 28,400 | 75 |
| NS3 | 18,300 | 25,600 | 32,900 | 80 |
| NS4 | 20,100 | 28,100 | 36,200 | 80 |
| NS5 | 21,900 | 30,600 | 39,400 | 80 |
| NS6 | 24,000 | 33,600 | 43,200 | 80 |
| NS7 | 26,400 | 37,000 | 47,500 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.26: Thailand Resident Mission
( B per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 279,000 | 363,000 | 446,000 | 60 |
| AS2 | 348,000 | 453,000 | 557,000 | 60 |
| AS3 | 406,000 | 538,000 | 670,000 | 65 |
| AS4 | 509,000 | 674,000 | 840,000 | 65 |
| AS5 | 607,000 | 820,000 | $1,032,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | 762,000 | $1,029,000$ | $1,295,000$ | 70 |
| AS7 | 911,000 | $1,252,000$ | $1,594,000$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $1,092,000$ | $1,501,000$ | $1,911,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $1,273,000$ | $1,750,000$ | $2,228,000$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $1,879,000$ | $2,630,000$ | $3,382,000$ | 80 |
| NS4 | $2,812,000$ | $3,937,000$ | $5,062,000$ | 80 |
| NS5 | $3,329,000$ | $4,660,000$ | $5,992,000$ | 80 |
| NS6 | $3,872,000$ | $5,421,000$ | $6,970,000$ | 80 |
| NS7 | $4,259,000$ | $5,963,000$ | $7,666,000$ | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.27: Viet Nam Resident Mission
(\$ per year)

| (\$ per year) |  |  |  | Level |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
|  | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS1 | 8,700 | 11,300 | 13,900 | 60 |
| AS2 | 9,300 | 12,100 | 14,900 | 60 |
| AS3 | 10,700 | 14,200 | 17,700 | 65 |
| AS4 | 12,300 | 16,300 | 20,300 | 65 |
| AS5 | 14,200 | 19,200 | 24,100 | 70 |
| AS6 | 16,400 | 22,200 | 27,900 | 70 |
| AS7 | 20,800 | 28,600 | 36,400 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 26,100 | 35,900 | 45,700 | 75 |
| NS2 | 31,300 | 43,100 | 54,800 | 75 |
| NS3 | 44,100 | 61,700 | 79,400 | 80 |
| NS4 | 51,200 | 71,700 | 92,200 | 80 |
| NS5 | 65,800 | 92,100 | 118,400 | 80 |
| NS6 | 84,100 | 117,700 | 151,400 | 80 |
| NS7 | 92,500 | 129,500 | 166,500 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## REPRESENTATIVE OFFICES

Table A5.28: European Representative Office
( $€$ per year)

| ( $€$ per year) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS4 | 30,600 | 40,600 | 50,500 | 65 |
| AS5 | 32,300 | 43,600 | 54,900 | 70 |
| AS6 | 37,300 | 50,400 | 63,400 | 70 |
| AS7 | 40,900 | 56,200 | 71,600 | 75 |
| National Staff | 46,400 | 63,800 | 81,200 | 75 |
| NS1 | 51,900 | 71,400 | 90,800 | 75 |
| NS2 | 66,400 | 92,900 | 119,500 | 80 |
| NS3 | 6 |  |  |  |

[^8]Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A5.29: Japan Representative Office ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | $(¥$ per year) |  |  |  |
| :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS4 | $4,165,000$ | $5,519,000$ | $6,872,000$ | 65 |
| AS5 | $4,223,000$ | $5,701,000$ | $7,179,000$ | 70 |
| AS6 | $4,472,000$ | $6,037,000$ | $7,602,000$ | 70 |
| AS7 | $5,661,000$ | $7,784,000$ | $9,907,000$ | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | $6,139,000$ | $8,441,000$ | $10,743,000$ | 75 |
| NS2 | $6,617,000$ | $9,098,000$ | $11,580,000$ | 75 |
| NS3 | $8,736,000$ | $12,230,000$ | $15,725,000$ | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Gross salary structure.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## Table A5.30: North American Representative Office ${ }^{\text {a }}$

(\$ per year)

| Level | Minimum | Midpoint | Maximum | Range <br> Spread (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Administrative Staff |  |  |  |  |
| AS4 | 38,600 | 51,100 | 63,700 | 65 |
| AS5 | 44,400 | 59,900 | 75,500 | 70 |
| AS6 | 49,700 | 67,100 | 84,500 | 70 |
| AS7 | 54,700 | 75,200 | 95,700 | 75 |
| National Staff |  |  |  |  |
| NS1 | 64,500 | 88,700 | 112,900 | 75 |
| NS2 | 74,300 | 102,200 | 130,000 | 75 |
| NS3 | 98,200 | 137,500 | 176,800 | 80 |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Gross salary structure.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## PROPOSED FIELD OFFICE STRUCTURE ADJUSTMENT, SALARY INCREASE, AND COMPARATIO FOR 2015 AND SUMMARY OF FIELD OFFICE AVERAGE ANNUAL SALARY INCREASE AND CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (2011-2015)

Table A6.1: Proposed Field Office Structure Adjustment, Salary Increase, and Comparatio

| Regional Department/ Field Office Location | Confirmed Staff (No.) | Structure Adjustment Component $\qquad$ (\%) | Budget Neutral Salary Increase Component $(\%)$ | Proposed Average Salary Increase (\%) | Estimated Comparatio before Salary Increase $\qquad$ (\%) | Estimated <br> Comparatio <br> after <br> Salary <br> Increase <br> $(\%)$ | Salary Currency | $\begin{gathered} \begin{array}{c} \text { Exchange } \\ \text { Rate }^{\mathrm{a}} \end{array} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Central West Asia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Afghanistan | 15 | 10.7 | 0.1 | 10.8 | 90.7 | 100.6 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Armenia | 6 | 7.2 | 1.0 | 8.2 | 90.6 | 98.3 | AMD | 410.93 |
| Azerbaijan | 5 | 6.4 | 0.1 | 6.5 | 93.3 | 99.4 | AZN | 0.78 |
| Georgia | 6 | 0.1 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 96.6 | 100.0 | GEL | 1.73 |
| Kazakhstan | 11 | 12.1 | 1.6 | 13.7 | 87.5 | 99.5 | T | 182.08 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | - 9 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 5.2 | 95.5 | 100.5 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Pakistan | 35 | 16.8 | 0.1 | 16.9 | 86.3 | 101.3 | PRs | 101.85 |
| Tajikistan | 14 | 19.5 | 2.4 | 21.9 | 79.4 | 98.0 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Turkmenistan | 4 | 1.3 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 97.9 | 103.2 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Uzbekistan | 14 | 0.0 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 98.2 | 101.1 | \$ | 1.00 |
| East Asia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PRC | 49 | 6.3 | 1.5 | 7.8 | 90.6 | 97.6 | CNY | 6.14 |
| Mongolia | 15 | 0.0 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 99.9 | 103.1 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Pacific |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Australia | 10 | 0.3 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 102.3 | 104.6 | A\$ | 1.07 |
| Fiji | 13 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 2.5 | 100.3 | 102.9 | F\$ | 1.85 |
| PNG | 9 | 0.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 98.0 | 100.2 | K | 2.46 |
| Timor-Leste | 5 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 2.8 | 98.9 | 101.7 | \$ | 1.00 |
| South Asia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bangladesh | 45 | 0.9 | 8.5 | 9.4 | 88.6 | 97.0 | Tk | 77.60 |
| Bhutan ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | 1 | 0.4 | 1.6 | 2.0 |  |  | Nu | 60.60 |
| India | 61 | 2.8 | 4.8 | 7.6 | 91.0 | 97.9 | Rs | 60.60 |
| Nepal | 36 | 12.0 | 1.8 | 13.8 | 84.2 | 96.0 | NRs | 96.84 |
| Sri Lanka | 31 | 7.9 | 2.5 | 10.4 | 86.4 | 96.0 | SLRs | 130.23 |
| Southeast Asia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cambodia | 26 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 98.1 | 101.1 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Indonesia | 37 | 0.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 99.4 | 101.4 | Rp 1 | 11,705.00 |
| Lao PDR | 17 | 0.0 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 97.7 | 100.0 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Myanmar ${ }^{\text {c }}$ |  | 0.3 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 104.1 | 106.2 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Thailand | 11 | 0.0 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 98.5 | 101.0 | B | 31.95 |
| Viet Nam | 37 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 5.8 | 94.5 | 100.0 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Representative Offices |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Germany | 3 | 2.2 | 0.1 | 2.3 | 111.1 | 113.6 | $€$ | 0.76 |
| Japan | 3 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 121.7 | 124.1 | ¥ | 104.09 |
| United States | 3 | 2.3 | 3.7 | 6.0 | 86.8 | 92.0 | \$ | 1.00 |
| Total/Average | 531 | 4.4 | 2.6 | 7.0 | 93.1 | 99.7 |  |  |

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PNG = Papua New Guinea, PRC = People's Republic of China.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
${ }^{\text {b }}$ Comparatio values for staff in the Bhutan Resident Mission are not shown for purposes of confidentiality.
${ }^{\text {c }}$ Current national and administrative staff in the Myanmar Resident Mission were appointed in 2014 and will not be entitled to the 2015 salary increase. Figures shown only reflect indicative values for the confirmation increase.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A6.2: Summary of Field Office Average Annual Salary Increase and Consumer Price Index ${ }^{\text {a }}$ (2011-2015)

| $\qquad$ | Average Annual Structure Increase (\%) | Average Annual Salary Increase (nominal) (\%) | Average Annual $C_{1}{ }^{\text {a }}$ <br> (\%) | Average Annual Salary Increase (real) (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Uzbekistan | 5.8 | 8.6 | 11.5 | (2.9) |
| Timor-Leste | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.9 | (0.3) |
| Australia | 2.2 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 0.1 |
| India | 3.8 | 8.6 | 8.5 | 0.1 |
| Mongolia | 11.5 | 13.3 | 13.0 | 0.3 |
| Germany | 0.6 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 0.5 |
| Afghanistan | 7.4 | 8.4 | 7.6 | 0.8 |
| PNG | 6.2 | 8.3 | 7.5 | 0.8 |
| Nepal | 7.7 | 10.7 | 9.5 | 1.2 |
| Indonesia | 4.6 | 6.9 | 5.5 | 1.4 |
| Cambodia | 4.3 | 5.6 | 4.0 | 1.6 |
| Fiji | 2.3 | 5.2 | 3.6 | 1.6 |
| Azerbaijan | 5.4 | 8.1 | 6.0 | 2.1 |
| United States | 4.0 | 5.0 | 1.9 | 3.1 |
| Japan | (3.2) | 4.1 | 0.9 | 3.2 |
| Pakistan | 10.5 | 13.4 | 10.0 | 3.4 |
| Viet Nam | 9.9 | 12.9 | 9.4 | 3.5 |
| Lao PDR | 7.0 | 9.5 | 5.9 | 3.6 |
| Thailand | 1.3 | 6.4 | 2.8 | 3.6 |
| Bangladesh | 7.4 | 11.6 | 7.9 | 3.7 |
| Kazakhstan | 7.2 | 9.9 | 6.2 | 3.7 |
| Armenia | 7.3 | 9.9 | 4.6 | 5.3 |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 6.8 | 9.2 | 3.8 | 5.4 |
| Sri Lanka | 7.9 | 11.7 | 5.8 | 5.9 |
| Georgia | 6.0 | 9.3 | 3.3 | 6.0 |
| PRC | 7.5 | 9.5 | 3.2 | 6.3 |
| Tajikistan | 11.2 | 13.0 | 5.4 | 7.6 |
| Turkmenistan | 6.8 | 14.5 | 5.5 | 9.0 |
| Average | 6.0 | 8.9 | 6.2 | 2.7 |

() = negative; CPI = consumer price index, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PNG = Papua New Guinea, PRC =
People's Republic of China.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Data from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, the Asian Development Bank Economics and Research Department (for PNG, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and the Reserve Bank of Australia (for Australia).
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## RATIO OF STAFF SALARIES AND BENEFITS TO INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

(\%)


IAE = Internal Administrative Expenses, IS = international staff, NSAS = national staff and administrative staff. Notes:

1. 2005-2013: actual data; 2014: midyear estimates
2. Major events in the rationalization of salaries and benefits:

For international staff:
(i) Education grant: rationalization of tuition and flat rate allowance (1999-2003)
(ii) Home country travel and education travel: $80 \%$ airfare (2006)
(iii) Rental subsidy: fixed cost sharing at 60\% Asian Development Bank and 40\% staff (2006)
(iv) Post-retirement group medical insurance plan: decrease in reimbursement rate and elimination of subsidy for stop loss benefits (2006)
(v) Staff Retirement Plan: new plan provisions (2006 and 2009)
(vi) Rental subsidy: fixed cost sharing at 65\% Asian Development Bank and 35\% staff (2008)
(vii) Rental subsidy: implementation of rental allowance scheme (2012)

For national staff and administrative staff:
(i) Dependency allowance for headquarters NSAS: 3-year buyout for parents and parents-in-law (2011)
(ii) Dependency allowance for headquarters NSAS: eliminated for staff hired from 1 January 2012 (2012)
(iii) Salary payment mode for headquarters NSAS: annualized salary paid over 12 months (2012)
(iv) Overtime: uniform overtime rate for all administrative staff to 1.5 for weekdays and 1.7 for weekends and holidays (2012)
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION EXPERIENCE

## A. International Staff

1. Tables A8.1-A8.6 present the recruitment and retention experience of the Asian Development Bank for international staff. The main points are as follows:
(i) Recruitment rate. The highest recruitment rate during 2005-2014 was $16.0 \%$ (in 2010). The highest recruitment percentage (20.5\%) of women was also recorded in 2010 (Table A8.1). The annualized recruitment rate of $6.8 \%$ for 2014 is the lowest for the 10-year period. ADB's newly recruited staff in 2014 have primarily come from government agencies (43.3\%) and the private sector (33.3\%) with the rest coming from other international organizations, from within ADB (promotions from national staff positions), and the academe (Table A8.2).
(ii) Rejection rate. The annualized rejection rate for 2014 of $16.1 \%$ is higher than the average rejection rate from 2005 to 2013 of $15.3 \%$ (Table A8.3). The average rejection rate for women was greater than that for men from January 2005 to August 2014. The main reasons for rejection of job offers were related to family or spouse employment (45.1\%) and salary-related (42.8\%) concerns (Table A8.4). During the first 8 months of 2014, six candidates rejected the offer primarily due to job-related concerns.
(iii) Termination rate. The staff termination annualized rate of $9.2 \%$ for 2014 is higher than the average termination rate of 8.7\% during 2005-2013 (Table A8.5).
(iv) Voluntary resignation rate. The staff voluntary resignation annualized rate of $3.6 \%$ for 2014 is higher than the average termination rate of $3.2 \%$ for 2005-2013 (Table A8.5). Table A8.6 shows that in the first 8 months of 2014, 26 staff resigned voluntarily, 11 of whom for personal or family-related reasons, and 13 for other reasons (e.g., return to parent organization, department and/or division management, and job content). During the first 8 months of 2014, four of the six women international staff voluntarily resigned for family or other personal issues. Renewed efforts are being made to ensure that women are provided opportunities to gain experience to increase their competitiveness for progression and that the promotion process ensures that women are fully considered.

Table A8.1: Recruitment of International Staff

|  | Staff as of $\mathbf{1}$ January |  | No. of Staff Hired |  | Recruitment Rates (\%) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | All Staff | Women | All Staff | Women | All Staff | Women |
| 2005 | 855 | 255 | 94 | 21 | 11.0 | 8.2 |
| 2006 | 883 | 259 | 70 | 19 | 7.9 | 7.3 |
| 2007 | 856 | 249 | 99 | 25 | 11.6 | 10.0 |
| 2008 | 847 | 248 | 115 | 22 | 13.6 | 8.9 |
| 2009 | 874 | 248 | 119 | 29 | 13.6 | 11.7 |
| 2010 | 927 | 258 | 148 | 53 | 16.0 | 20.5 |
| 2011 | 1,024 | 298 | 118 | 54 | 11.5 | 18.1 |
| 2012 | 1,055 | 332 | 103 | 54 | 9.8 | 16.3 |
| 2013 | 1,076 | 368 | 91 | 37 | 8.5 | 10.1 |
| $2014^{\text {a }}$ | 1,083 | 375 | 49 | 13 | 4.5 | 3.5 |

${ }^{2}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
Table A8.2: Recruitment Source

| Recruitment Source | 2008 |  | 2009 |  | 2010 |  | 2011 |  | 2012 |  | 2013 |  | $2014{ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All | Regional | All | Regional | All | Regional | All | Regional | All | Regional | All | Regional |  | Regional |
| International Organization | 11 | 6 | 19 | 6 | 15 | 6 | 19 | 12 | 18 | 9 | 18 | 10 | 7 | 3 |
| Private Sector | 62 | 34 | 53 | 28 | 94 | 54 | 52 | 21 | 50 | 27 | 43 | 24 | 17 | 10 |
| Academe | 4 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| Government Agency | 35 | 24 | 35 | 27 | 24 | 16 | 37 | 27 | 24 | 18 | 20 | 10 | 19 | 13 |
| From ADB's National Staff | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 115 | 71 | 119 | 70 | 148 | 88 | 118 | 68 | 103 | 64 | 91 | 53 | 49 | 30 |

ADB = Asian Development Bank.
${ }^{a}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
Table A8.3: Rejection of Job Offers

|  | Total Offers |  | No. of Rejections |  | Rejection Rates (\%) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | All Staff | Women | All Staff | Women | All Staff | Women |
| 2005 | 104 | 23 | $11^{\text {a }}$ | 1 | 10.6 | 4.3 |
| 2006 | 86 | 25 | 12 | 5 | 14.0 | 20.0 |
| 2007 | 122 | 29 | 20 | 3 | 16.4 | 10.3 |
| 2008 | 131 | 29 | 20 | 5 | 15.3 | 17.2 |
| 2009 | 146 | 39 | 19 | 5 | 13.0 | 12.8 |
| 2010 | 156 | 54 | 10 | 3 | 6.4 | 5.6 |
| 2011 | 126 | 72 | 13 | 7 | 10.3 | 9.7 |
| 2012 | 119 | 59 | 11 | 6 | 9.2 | 10.2 |
| 2013 | 91 | 33 | 11 | 7 | 12.1 | 21.2 |
| $2014^{\text {b }}$ | 56 | 17 | 6 | 2 | 10.7 | 11.8 |

[^9]Table A8.4: Reasons for Rejections of Job Offers

| Reason |  | 2005 | $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}^{\text {a }}$ Total |  |
| :--- | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Salary-related $^{\text {b }}$ | All Staff | 4 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 10 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | $\mathbf{5 2}$ |
|  | Women | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | $\mathbf{1 6}$ |
| and spouse | All Staff | 4 | 4 | 10 | 10 | 9 | 3 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 1 | $\mathbf{6 1}$ |
| employment | Women | 0 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 0 | $\mathbf{2 0}$ |
| Security and living | All Staff | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\mathbf{0}$ |
| conditions in Manila $^{*}$ Job-related $^{\text {c }}$ | Women | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $\mathbf{0}$ |
|  | All Staff | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | $\mathbf{2 0}$ |
|  | Women | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | $\mathbf{8}$ |
| Total | All Staff | $\mathbf{1 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 9}$ | $\mathbf{1 0}$ | $\mathbf{1 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 1}$ | $\mathbf{1 1}$ | $\mathbf{6}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 3}$ |
|  | Women | $\mathbf{1}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{7}$ | $\mathbf{6}$ | $\mathbf{7}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{4 4}$ |

a Data as of 31 August 2014.
${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Includes low salary, receipt of better offer, and non-transferability of pension.
${ }^{\text {c }}$ Includes broader job requirement, job assignment preference, and higher entry-level position.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
Table A8.5: Termination Rates

| Year | Voluntary Resignations ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |  |  |  | Other Terminations |  |  |  | Total Terminations |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Staff as of 1 January All |  | All |  | Termination Rates (\%) All |  | All |  | Termination Rates (\%) All |  | All |  | Termination Rates (\%) All |  |
|  | Staft | Women | Staff | Women | Staff | Women |  | omen | Staff | Women | Staff | Women | Staff | Nomen |
| 2005 | 855 | 255 | 19 | 8 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 47 | 9 | 5.5 | 3.5 | 66 | 17 | 7.7 | 6.7 |
| 2006 | 883 | 259 | 34 | 14 | 3.9 | 5.4 | 63 | 16 | 7.1 | 6.2 | 97 | 30 | 11.0 | 11.6 |
| 2007 | 856 | 249 | 60 | 20 | 7.0 | 8.0 | 48 | 6 | 5.6 | 2.4 | 108 | 26 | 12.6 | 10.4 |
| 2008 | 847 | 248 | 38 | 14 | 4.5 | 5.6 | 50 | 8 | 5.9 | 3.2 | 88 | 22 | 10.4 | 8.9 |
| 2009 | 874 | 248 | 18 | 8 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 48 | 11 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 66 | 19 | 7.6 | 7.7 |
| 2010 | 927 | 258 | 22 | 3 | 2.4 | 1.2 | 29 | 10 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 51 | 13 | 5.5 | 5.0 |
| 2011 | 1,024 | 298 | 26 | 8 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 61 | 12 | 6.0 | 4.0 | 87 | 20 | 8.5 | 6.7 |
| 2012 | 1,055 | 332 | 28 | 7 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 54 | 11 | 5.1 | 3.3 | 82 | 18 | 7.8 | 5.4 |
| 2013 | 1,076 | 368 | 23 | 12 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 61 | 18 | 5.7 | 4.9 | 84 | 30 | 7.8 | 8.2 |
| $2014{ }^{\text {b }}$ | 1,083 | 375 | 26 | 6 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 40 | 13 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 66 | 19 | 6.1 | 5.1 |

[^10]Table A8.6: Reasons for Voluntary Resignations ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Personal or <br> Family $^{\text {b }}$ | Salary- or <br> Career- <br> Related |

${ }^{a}$ The number of voluntary resignations from 2005 have been restated to exclude staff who are eligible for early retirement benefits.
${ }^{\text {b }}$ Includes the situation in the Philippines, spouse employment, and/or children's education.
${ }^{\text {c }}$ Includes better career prospects elsewhere and lack of professional opportunities.
${ }^{\text {d }}$ Includes return to parent organization, department, and/or division management and job content.
e Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

## B. Headquarters National Staff and Administrative Staff

2. Tables A8.7-A8.13 present the recruitment and retention experience for national staff and administrative staff (NSAS) at headquarters. The main points are as follows:
(i) Recruitment rate. Table A8.7 provides a summary of the offers made and accepted from January 2005 to August 2014. Of the 51 offers made in the first 8 months of 2014, 44 ( 36 administrative staff and 8 national staff) were accepted (Table A8.8). However, the acceptance rate of $86.3 \%$ is lower than the average acceptance rate of $96.3 \%$ during 2005-2013. Moreover, the recruitment rates of $3.7 \%$ and $3.3 \%$ in 2013 and 2014, respectively, are the lowest per year since 2005. From January 2005 to August 2014, the majority of recruited NSAS came from the private sector (74.8\%) and government agencies (19.7\%) and the rest from international organizations and the academe, although no headquarters NSAS have been recruited from the academe since 2013 (Table A8.9).
(ii) Rejection rate. Table A8.10 shows the rejection rates from January 2005 to August 2014. The rejection rate of $13.7 \%$ during January-August 2014, which is the highest since 2006, is also considerably higher than the average rejection rate of 5.6\% during 2005-2013.
(iii) Termination rate. Table A8.11 shows the termination rates from January 2005 to August 2014. The annualized termination rate of $6.5 \%$ is almost the same as the average termination rate of $6.4 \%$ during 2005-2013. However, the highest number of terminations (143) for the period was recorded in 2013, majority of which is due to early retirement (59.4\%), voluntary resignation (17.5\%), and normal retirement (11.9\%). Terminations from January 2005 to August 2014 were mainly because of retirement, voluntary resignations, and ADB-initiated separations (Table A8.12).
(iv) Voluntary resignation rate. The annualized voluntary resignation rate of $2.4 \%$ for 2014 is higher than the average voluntary resignation rate of $1.7 \%$ during 2005-2013. Table A8.13 shows that in the first 8 months of 2014, 21 staff
resigned voluntarily-more than half of them (52.4\%) for salary or career-related reasons.

Table A8.7: Recruitment Experience

| Year | No. of Staff as of 1 <br> January | Number of $^{\text {Offers }}{ }^{\text {a }}$ | No. of Staff <br> Hired $^{\text {b }}$ | Acceptance <br> Rate (\%) | Recruitment <br> Rate (\%) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2005 | 1,222 | 73 | 70 | 95.9 | 5.7 |
| 2006 | 1,227 | 81 | 68 | 84.0 | 5.5 |
| 2007 | 1,170 | 107 | 101 | 94.4 | 8.6 |
| 2008 | 1,200 | 92 | 84 | 91.3 | 7.0 |
| 2009 | 1,220 | 102 | 97 | 95.1 | 8.0 |
| 2010 | 1,235 | 140 | 136 | 97.1 | 11.0 |
| 2011 | 1,325 | 108 | 102 | 94.4 | 7.7 |
| 2012 | 1,384 | 114 | 105 | 92.1 | 7.6 |
| 2013 | 1,424 | 54 | 52 | 96.3 | 3.7 |
| $2014^{\text {c }}$ | 1,336 | 51 | 44 | 86.3 | 3.3 |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ Includes formal offers and informal offers (only where the candidates declined).
${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Includes all candidates who accepted offers made during the year.
${ }^{c}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
Table A8.8: Recruitment by Staff Category

|  |  | Number of Staff $^{\mathrm{a}}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Category | Level | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | $2014^{\mathrm{b}}$ |
| Administrative Staff | AS3 | 6 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 14 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 2 |
|  | AS4 | 33 | 56 | 44 | 47 | 57 | 51 | 56 | 30 | 26 |
|  | AS5 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 3 |
|  | AS6 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 4 |
|  | AS7 | 8 | 7 | 12 | 14 | 19 | 9 | 8 | 1 | 1 |
| National Staff | NS1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 12 | 8 | 6 |
|  | NS2 | 14 | 15 | 8 | 16 | 26 | 17 | 9 | 4 | 1 |
|  | NS3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 1 |
|  | NS4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | NS5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total |  | $\mathbf{6 8}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 1}$ | $\mathbf{8 4}$ | $\mathbf{9 7}$ | $\mathbf{1 3 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 2}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 5}$ | $\mathbf{5 2}$ | $\mathbf{4 4}$ |

AS = administrative staff, NS = national staff.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Includes all candidates who accepted offers made during the year.
${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A8.9: Recruitment by Source ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | Private <br> Sector <br> $(\%)$ | International <br> Organization <br> $(\%)$ | Government <br> Agencies <br> $(\%)$ | Academe <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | 68.5 | 1.4 | 24.7 | 5.5 |
| 2005 | 70.8 | 1.5 | 23.1 | 4.6 |
| 2007 | 74.8 | 2.9 | 18.5 | 3.9 |
| 2008 | 71.3 | 3.5 | 24.1 | 1.2 |
| 2009 | 69.8 | 6.3 | 20.8 | 3.1 |
| 2010 | 72.9 | 2.9 | 22.1 | 2.1 |
| 2011 | 78.3 | 5.0 | 15.8 | 0.8 |
| 2012 | 71.4 | 2.9 | 23.8 | 1.9 |
| 2013 | 92.3 | 1.9 | 5.8 | 0.0 |
| $2014^{\text {b }}$ | 75.0 | 4.5 | 20.5 | 0.0 |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ Includes all candidates who accepted offers made during the year.
${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
Table A8.10: Rejection of Job Offers

| Year | No. of <br> Offers | No. of <br> Rejections | Rejection <br> Rates <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2005 | 73 | 3 | 4.1 |
| 2006 | 81 | 13 | 16.0 |
| 2007 | 107 | 6 | 5.6 |
| 2008 | 92 | 8 | 8.7 |
| 2009 | 102 | 5 | 4.9 |
| 2010 | 140 | 4 | 2.9 |
| 2011 | 108 | 4 | 3.7 |
| 2012 | 114 | 5 | 4.4 |
| 2013 | 54 | 2 | 3.7 |
| $2014^{\text {a }}$ | 51 | 7 | 13.7 |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.

Table A8.11: Termination Rates

| Year | No. of Staff as of 1 January | Voluntary Resignations ${ }^{\text {a }}$ |  | Other Terminations |  | Total Terminations |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | No. of Staff | Rate (\%) | No. of Staff | Rate (\%) | No. of Staff | Rate (\%) |
| 2005 | 1,222 | 20 | 1.6 | 48 | 3.9 | 68 | 5.6 |
| 2006 | 1,227 | 19 | 1.5 | 103 | 8.4 | 122 | 9.9 |
| 2007 | 1,170 | 37 | 3.2 | 35 | 3.0 | 72 | 6.2 |
| 2008 | 1,200 | 25 | 2.1 | 42 | 3.5 | 67 | 5.6 |
| 2009 | 1,220 | 21 | 1.7 | 60 | 4.9 | 81 | 6.6 |
| 2010 | 1,235 | 18 | 1.5 | 32 | 2.6 | 50 | 4.0 |
| 2011 | 1,325 | 15 | 1.1 | 46 | 3.5 | 61 | 4.6 |
| 2012 | 1,384 | 17 | 1.2 | 42 | 3.0 | 59 | 4.3 |
| 2013 | 1,424 | 25 | 1.8 | 118 | 8.3 | 143 | 10.0 |
| $2014{ }^{\text {b }}$ | 1,336 | 21 | 1.6 | 36 | 2.7 | 57 | 4.3 |
| The number of voluntary resignations from 2005 have been restated to exclude staff who are eligible to early retirement benefits. <br> Data as of 31 August 2014. <br> ource: Asian Development Bank. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Table A8.12: Reasons for Terminations

| Termination Reasons | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | $2014{ }^{\text {a }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Voluntary resignation ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | 20 | 19 | 37 | 25 | 21 | 18 | 15 | 17 | 25 | 21 |
| Retirement | 7 | 18 | 16 | 25 | 23 | 21 | 27 | 25 | 105 | 33 |
| Normal | 4 | 14 | 8 | 13 | 9 | 9 | 19 | 17 | 19 | 2 |
| Early | 3 | 4 | 7 | 12 | 14 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 85 | 31 |
| Incapacity | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
| Fixed-term expiration | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| ADB-initiated separation | 32 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 12 | 11 | 8 | 0 |
| Misconduct | 3 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Non-confirmation | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Death | 1 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| III health | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Special separation package | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Enhanced separation program | 0 | 73 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Change to international staff category | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Total | 68 | 122 | 72 | 67 | 81 | 50 | 61 | 59 | 143 | 57 |
| ADB = Asian Development <br> ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Data as of 31 August 20 <br> ${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ The number of voluntary retirement benefits. | Bank. <br> 4. <br> resigna <br> nt Bank | ions fro | $\text { n } 2005$ | ave bee | restat | d to excl | de sta | who are | eligible | rearly |

Table A8.13: Reasons for Voluntary Resignations ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Reason | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | $2014{ }^{\text {b }}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary- or careerrelated | 7 | 6 | 13 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 11 |
| Migration | 8 | 4 | 13 | 4 | 10 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Personal or family | 5 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 6 | 8 | 6 | 10 | 13 | 9 |
| Not provided by staff | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Total voluntary resignations | 20 | 19 | 37 | 25 | 21 | 18 | 15 | 17 | 25 | 21 |
| Total terminations | 68 | 122 | 72 | 67 | 81 | 50 | 61 | 59 | 143 | 57 |
| Ratio of voluntary resignations to total terminations | 29.4 | 15.6 | 51.4 | 37.3 | 25.9 | 36.0 | 24.6 | 28.8 | 17.5 | 36.8 |
| Total number of staff | 1,222 | 1,227 | 1,170 | 1,200 | 1,220 | 1,235 | 1,325 | 1,384 | 1,424 | 1,336 |
| Ratio of voluntary resignations to number of staff | 1.6 | 1.5 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 1.6 |
| ${ }^{\text {a }}$ The number of voluntary resignations from 2005 have been restated to exclude staff who are eligible for early retirement benefits. <br> ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Data as of 31 August 2014. <br> Source: Asian Development Bank. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

## C. Field Office National Staff and Administrative Staff

3. Tables A8.14 to A8.20 present the recruitment and retention experience for field office NSAS. The main points are as follows:
(i) Recruitment rate. Table A8.14 provides a summary of the offers made and accepted from January 2007 to August 2014. All 32 offers made in the first 8 months of 2014 were accepted-16 for administrative staff positions and 16 for national staff positions (Table A8.15). Most of the staff recruited came from the private sector (Table A8.16).
(ii) Rejection rate. The average rejection rate from January 2007 to August 2014 is 7.7\%. (Table A8.17).
(iii) Termination rate. Table A8.18 shows the termination rate of local staff in field offices from January 2007 to August 2014, while Table A8.19 shows the reasons for the termination. The annualized termination rate of $5.3 \%$ in 2014 is lower than the average termination rate of $7.5 \%$ during 2007-2013. The terminations were mainly due to voluntary resignations.
(iv) Voluntary resignation rate. Table A8.20 shows that the main reasons for voluntary resignations were personal or family concerns and salary- or careerrelated issues.

Table A8.14: Recruitment Experience

| Year | No. of Staff as of <br> 1 January | No. of <br> Offers $^{\mathbf{a}}$ | No. of Staff <br> Appointments $^{\text {a }}$ | Acceptance <br> Rate $(\%)$ | Appointment <br> Rate $(\%)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2007 | 374 | 62 | 55 | 88.7 | 14.7 |
| 2008 | 391 | 69 | 57 | 82.6 | 14.6 |
| 2009 | 406 | 64 | 58 | 90.6 | 14.3 |
| 2010 | 435 | 78 | 70 | 89.7 | 16.1 |
| 2011 | 477 | 86 | 71 | 82.6 | 14.9 |
| 2012 | 512 | 72 | 63 | 87.5 | 12.3 |
| 2013 | 545 | 41 | 37 | 90.2 | 6.8 |
| $2014^{\text {b }}$ | 550 | 32 | 32 | 100.0 | 5.8 |
| Includes local staff in the representative offices and all candidates who accepted offers made during the year. |  |  |  |  |  |
| bata as of 31 August 2014. |  |  |  |  |  |
| Source: Asian Development Bank. |  |  |  |  |  |

Table A8.15: Recruitment by Staff Category

|  | No. of Staff $^{\text {a }}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Item | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | $2014^{\text {b }}$ |
| Administrative Staff | 29 | 28 | 36 | 36 | 46 | 36 | 18 | 16 |
| National Staff | 26 | 29 | 22 | 34 | 25 | 27 | 19 | 16 |
| Total | 55 | $\mathbf{5 7}$ | $\mathbf{5 8}$ | $\mathbf{7 0}$ | $\mathbf{7 1}$ | $\mathbf{6 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 7}$ | $\mathbf{3 2}$ |
| a |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ Includes all candidates who accepted offers made during the year.
${ }^{\text {b }}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
Table A8.16: Recruitment by Source ${ }^{\text {a }}$

|  | Private <br> Sector <br> $(\%)$ | International <br> Organization <br> $(\%)$ | Government <br> Agencies <br> $(\%)$ | Academe <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | 69.1 | 16.4 | 14.6 | 0.0 |
| 2007 | 61.4 | 19.3 | 15.8 | 3.5 |
| 2008 | 62.1 | 10.3 | 27.6 | 0.0 |
| 2010 | 57.1 | 21.4 | 18.6 | 2.9 |
| 2011 | 67.6 | 19.7 | 11.3 | 1.4 |
| 2012 | 61.9 | 17.5 | 15.9 | 4.8 |
| 2013 | 64.9 | 18.9 | 16.2 | 0.0 |
| $2014^{\text {b }}$ | 84.4 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 3.1 |

[^11]Table A8.17: Rejection of Job Offers

| Year | No. of <br> Offers | No. of <br> Rejections | Rejection <br> Rates <br> $(\%)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2007 | 62 | 7 | 11.3 |
| 2008 | 69 | 12 | 17.4 |
| 2009 | 64 | 6 | 9.4 |
| 2010 | 78 | 7 | 9.0 |
| 2011 | 86 | 10 | 11.6 |
| 2012 | 72 | 9 | 12.5 |
| 2013 | 41 | 4 | 9.8 |
| $2014{ }^{\text {a }}$ | 32 | 0 | 0.0 |
| Data as of 31 August 2014. |  |  |  |
| Source: Asian Development Bank. |  |  |  |

Table A8.18: Termination Rates

|  | No. of <br> Staff as of | Voluntary <br> Resignations <br> a <br> No. of <br> Staff |  | Other <br> Terminations <br> No. of <br> Sate (\%) |  | Total <br> Terminations |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | Rate (\%) | No. of <br> Staff | Rate (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| 2007 | 374 | 31 | 8.3 | 8 | 2.1 | 39 | 10.4 |
| 2008 | 391 | 37 | 9.5 | 5 | 1.3 | 42 | 10.7 |
| 2009 | 406 | 21 | 5.2 | 8 | 2.0 | 29 | 7.1 |
| 2010 | 435 | 14 | 3.2 | 14 | 3.2 | 28 | 6.4 |
| 2011 | 477 | 24 | 5.0 | 12 | 2.5 | 36 | 7.5 |
| 2012 | 512 | 13 | 2.5 | 17 | 3.3 | 30 | 5.9 |
| 2013 | 545 | 19 | 3.5 | 14 | 2.6 | 33 | 6.1 |
| $2014^{\text {b }}$ | 550 | 14 | 2.5 | 5 | 0.9 | 19 | 3.5 |

${ }^{a}$ The number of voluntary resignations from 2005 have been restated to exclude staff who are eligible for early retirement benefits.
b Data as of 31 August 2014.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
Table A8.19: Reasons for Terminations

| Reason | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4}^{\text {a }}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Voluntary resignation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| b | 31 | 37 | 21 | 14 | 24 | 13 | 19 | 14 |
| Retirement | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 4 |
| Fixed-term expiration | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| ADB-initiated separation | 3 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Change to international staff <br> category | 3 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 1 |
| Total | $\mathbf{3 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 8}$ | $\mathbf{3 6}$ | $\mathbf{3 0}$ | $\mathbf{3 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 9}$ |

[^12]Table A8.20: Reasons for Voluntary Resignations ${ }^{\text {a }}$

| Reason | 2007 | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 4} \mathbf{b}^{b}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Salary- or career-related | 16 | 13 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 8 | 4 |
| Migration | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 |
| Personal or family | 12 | 21 | 12 | 6 | 11 | 8 | 9 | 8 |
| Not provided by staff | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Total voluntary resignations | 31 | 37 | 21 | 14 | 24 | 13 | 19 | 14 |
| Total terminations | 39 | 42 | 29 | 28 | 36 | 30 | 33 | 19 |
| Ratio of voluntary resignations to <br> total terminations | 79.5 | 88.1 | 72.4 | 50.0 | 66.7 | 43.3 | 57.6 | 73.7 |
| Total number of staff | 374 | 391 | 406 | 435 | 477 | 512 | 545 | 550 |
| Ratio of voluntary resignations to <br> number of Staff | 8.3 | 9.5 | 5.2 | 3.2 | 5.0 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 2.5 |

[^13]
[^0]:    1 Competitive compensation and benefits are the core of a strong employment value proposition, which includes
    ADB's compelling mission and standing in the international development community; challenging and rewarding work; a diverse workforce; an intellectually dynamic environment; and a range of experiences provided by the depth and breadth of its client base, products, and services.
    2 ADB. 2008. Strategy 2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank, 2008-2020. Manila.
    3 ADB. 2010. Our People Strategy. Manila.

[^1]:    4 Any reference to the World Bank refers to the World Bank Group, which includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, and many other organizations.
    5 Except for the Japan Representative Office. Market data for this office is based on the Towers Watson market compensation data for Tokyo, which is designed to be locally competitive in accordance with ADB's compensation policy. The World Bank's salary structure for Japan is intended to be globally competitive since the World Bank considers its Tokyo office as a satellite office of its headquarters.
    6 This feature of not using $100 \%$ comparatio as an annual target to determine the salary increase recommendation has been in place for international staff since 2006, as a result of the 2005 comprehensive review.

[^2]:    7 Broad-based market studies will be conducted every 4-5 years; the next one will be in 2015.
    8 Some examples of in-kind benefits are uniforms, memberships in fitness centers, transportation allowance, mobile allowance, subsidized company products, rice, meals, beverages, and a car program.

[^3]:    9 The four performance ratings are exceptional, satisfactory with special recommendation, satisfactory, and unsatisfactory.
    ${ }^{10}$ As in 2013 (FY2014, which ends on 30 June at the World Bank), the World Bank headquarters salary structure for 2014 (FY2015) was adjusted using published projected market pay increases resulting from the application of the indexation methodology in accordance with its multi-year review process.

[^4]:    ${ }^{11}$ Customized salary surveys are conducted biennially under the compensation system for headquarters NSAS. In the intervening year, a quick salary survey of the estimated salary increase that will be provided by comparators is used to adjust the salary structure.
    12 The aging factors used are based on compensation data gathered by the Birches Group on local compensation packages. Future trends in pay growth serve as a proxy for anticipated local labor market movement. Birches Group is an international compensation consulting firm that tracks salary developments in various locations. Where data for certain locations are not available, aging factors from reputable sources-such as the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, the Asian Development Bank Economics and Research Department and the Reserve Bank of Australia-are used.

[^5]:    ${ }^{13}$ ADB subscribes to the Birches Group's Indigo ${ }^{\text {TM }}$ for access to its survey data, which includes information about salaries, fixed allowances, variable pay, and in-kind benefits for most ADB field office locations.
    ${ }^{14}$ This reflects the 2012 NSAS recommendation of discontinuing the 2-month bonus payment, which is now included in base pay. In addition, the base pay includes an amount equal to the median dependency allowance, which was lowered following the dependency allowance buyout for parents and parents-in-law in 2011.

[^6]:    ${ }^{1}$ ADB.1966. Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank. Manila.

[^7]:    1 Historical analyses have shown that the US market has been consistently competitive internationally. Every 3 years, the Washington salary scale is compared against the composite French and German market paylines to assess its international competitiveness.
    2 The Hay Group, McLagan Partners, and Towers Watson are compensation survey consulting firms.

[^8]:    AS = administrative staff, $\mathrm{NS}=$ national staff.

[^9]:    ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Excludes one candidate whose offer was withdrawn as the offer lapsed.
    ${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
    Source: Asian Development Bank.

[^10]:    ${ }^{\text {a }}$ The number of voluntary resignations from 2005 have been restated to exclude staff who are eligible for early retirement benefits.
    ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
    Source: Asian Development Bank.

[^11]:    ${ }^{2}$ Includes all candidates who accepted offers made during the year.
    ${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
    Source: Asian Development Bank.

[^12]:    ${ }^{\text {a }}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
    b The number of voluntary resignations from 2005 have been restated to exclude staff who are eligible for early retirement benefits.
    Source: Asian Development Bank.

[^13]:    ${ }^{a}$ The number of voluntary resignations from 2005 have been restated to exclude staff who are eligible for early retirement benefits.
    ${ }^{\text {b }}$ Data as of 31 August 2014.
    Source: Asian Development Bank.

